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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the political activism of Croatians in Australia between 1947
and 1989. It is clear that the history of opprobrium that this political activism has
attracted – sometimes seen as extremist and violent – is unfounded. To
understand this activism, this thesis argues that there are three aspects which
mediate the relationship between Australia and its migrant ‘Other’ and thus
determine Australian responses to Croatian political activism.
First, push and pull factors act as catalysts for migration, and determine the
composition and characteristics of the community that develops in Australia.
Without understanding these push and pull factors, the migrant ‘Other’ in
Australia cannot be contextualised, explained, nor understood.
Second, the concept of the Good Australian Migrant - a highly constructed
identity, imbued with a set of expectations and provisions, determine how the
migrant ‘Other’ is perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. It embodies
what I call the ‘expectations of oughts’ – of what Australia ought to be, of how
Australians ought to behave, and of who migrants ought to be and how they
ought to behave.
Third, domestic, transnational, and international contexts arbitrate the first two
aspects, establishing the paradigms within which they are created and
understood. These paradigms shape the responses of legal, political, and media
authorities to particular migrant groups, who occupy varying spaces and levels of
the ‘Other’.
In the case of Australian responses to Croatian activism in the post-war period,
there are three distinct paradigm shifts around which responses can be grouped,
1949-1971, 1972-1979, and 1980-1989. Despite the differences across periods,
Australian responses can be distilled to a single but flawed belief – that Croatians
were a problematic community. This ‘problem’ was attributable to their radical,
and in the eyes of some Australians, irrational political agenda.

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
With so many to thank it is difficult to know where to start - so we start at the
beginning.
I would like to thank my indefatigable rock-star of a supervisor, Dr Glenn
Mitchell, for the many hours, emails, and coffees that have gone into getting me
here, particularly in the final months before submission. Your advice has been
invaluable, and your feedback delivered with a panache I have yet to find
elsewhere. I would also like to thank you for the support and confidence you have
had in my abilities as both a fledgling historian and as an educator - I treasure it
beyond measure.
I would like to acknowledge the many individuals and organisations that have
guided me through my research – to what was then known as the Faculty of Arts
Research & Postgraduate Committee for granting me the HDR Research Support
Funding that allowed me to go on a research trip overseas, to the wonderful staff
down at the National Archives in Canberra who provided moral support during
my marathon sessions, and to everyone who in any way provided their
professional knowledge or expertise – I thank you.
To the fellow postgraduate students I have shared office spaces, lunchtimes, and
coffees with – I thank you all for looking out for me, checking in on me, and
being understanding and supportive of me whenever I needed it. I only hope that
I have been able to repay the favour in any small way.
To all of my lovely friends who have been so generously supportive of me through
this process – thank you for your patience, and for believing in me when I did not
believe in myself. I will be repaying your gifts of friendship and kindness for a
long time to come.
And finally, my nearest and dearest. To my brothers, Stjepan and Anto, thank you
for your unconditional support and the sacrifices you have made in order for me
to do this. To Mariela and Marko, thank you for putting up with me (and us
altogether). To Baka, hvala za sve tvoje molitve. Last, but not least, to my Mama –
without you, your love and support, and everything you have done for me, none
of this would have been possible. I do not know how to begin to thank you.

vii

INTRODUCTION

Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 234

The sign on the building Hrvatsko Poslanstvo - Croatian Embassy,
together with the [Croat] emblem and the tricolour [the flag],
better than any radio or television advertisement, or volumes of
thick books, makes the point to everyone that that which
Croatians want is nothing more and nothing less than their own
state.1
Mario Dešpoja

1

On 29 November 1977 the first Croatian embassy in Australia opened in
Canberra. Ceremony proceedings were as expected for such an occasion. The
Charge d’Affaires, Mario Dešpoja, welcomed the 200-strong crowd, community
leaders from across Australia spoke about the significance of the occasion, a flag
was raised, and an anthem played. At the end of the formalities, the doors of the
embassy were symbolically thrown open to the Croatian people.2 This seemingly
unremarkable ceremony in the nation’s capital, however, was both the catalyst
for an almost two-year diplomatic nightmare for the Australian Government and
the subject of national and international attention. For this was an embassy
without a state - the territory of Croatia then one of the six republics of
Yugoslavia, and the people of Croatia Yugoslav citizens.
The ‘Embassy’ proclaimed itself a ‘trumpet of Croatian independence in these
regions distant from Croatia,’3 and its strength lay in its symbolism. The
organisers of the ‘Embassy’ deliberately exploited the political language of
diplomacy in order to challenge the sovereignty of the Yugoslav state, rejecting
the claim that the Yugoslav Government represented Croatia, Croatians, or their
interests, whether in Australia, Yugoslavia, or elsewhere. The Yugoslav
Government, through its Ambassador Aleksandar Šokorac, was quick to
condemn the ‘Embassy’ as ‘a very grave political provocation against the integrity
and sovereignty of Yugoslavia.’4 The Australian Government was equally
concerned with it, but lacked legal recourse; this was, after all, the first embassy
of its kind to be seen in Australia, and perhaps the world.
On 24 August 1978 the Diplomatic and Consular Missions Act 1978 received
Royal Assent, and after another year of legal vacillation, the ‘Embassy’ was forced

Speech delivered at Mother’s Day Luncheon in Wollongong, as found in:
‘News from the Croatian Embassy’, Spremnost, 23 May 1978, 6.
2
‘First ‘embassy’ for Croats’, Canberra Times, 30 November 1977, 11.
National Archives of Australia, Canberra (hereafter NAA): A1838, 1490/5/51/1, PART 1, ‘Official
opening of Croatian Embassy’.
3
I. Čizmić, ‘Hrvatska Ambasada U Canberri 1977,-1979’, in V. Kukavica (ed.), Hrvatski Iseljenićki Zbornik
(Zagreb, Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika, 2006), 189.
Original quote: ‘Glavni smisao otvaranja Hrvatske ambasade, prema zamisli osnivača, bio je da 'bude
trubač hrvatske državotvorne misli u ovim dalekim krajevima od Hrvatske.'
4
B. Juddery, ‘Removal of Croatian ‘Embassy’ demanded’, Canberra Times, 10 December 1977, 3.
1

2

to close its doors on 25 October 1979. Though the ‘Embassy’ became the central
point from where Croatian political activism in Australia unfolded during its
operation, it was neither the first to gain national exposure, nor did its closure
signify the end of the community’s activism. Rather, the ‘Embassy’ was simply
one episode (albeit a significant and colourful one) in the political activism that
defined the Croatian community. That there was no independent Croatian state
between 1945-1991 gave a distinct flavour to its Australian community and
impetus to their actions. Croatians were most present in the Australian public
sphere when advocating for an independent Croatian state, or for a Croatian
identity distinct from a Yugoslav one, either through protest and demonstration,
in the petitioning of the Australian Government, or in its staunch dedication to
preserving Croatian culture and language. During the 1960s and 1970s, allegations
of political violence and terrorism pushed the community into the national
spotlight, and marked Croatians with a reputation for extremism that still haunts
many.
This activism became the defining characteristic of Australia’s post-war
Croatian community. However, perceptions of this activism - and of the Croatian
community in general - have not evolved too far from the ‘folksy’ image of
migrants in Australia. Croatians are often reduced to the familiar migrant
markers of speaking a harsh language, eating strange foods, working the blue
collar jobs of the construction and manufacturing industries, and most
importantly, playing the football that has contributed so much to Australia’s
sporting life. The stereotype of the ‘Balkan Brute’ still taints perceptions of the
community, particularly in its association with football violence, the supposed
ethnic hatred of Serbs, or the hushed accusations of being ‘too political’, even if
very little is known about the activism itself. In casting a light on this unfamiliar
history, there is more to gain than just a better understanding of the history of
Croatians in Australia. To the trained eye, the legal, political, and cultural
legacies that shaped the history of Croatian political activism in Australia are
palpable in the present. The imperative to understand the relationship of
Australia with its migrant ‘Other’, whether past, present, or future, will only
3

increase

as

unprecedented

levels

of

global

migration,

technological

interconnectedness, and the looming spectre of global terrorism exert their
influence on our present.

THESIS OVERVIEW
This thesis is concerned with the various ways Australian political, legal and
media authorities have responded to Croatian political activism from 1947-1989.
It argues that there are three aspects which mediate the relationship between
Australia and its migrant ‘Other’. The first are the push and pull factors which act
as catalysts for migration. These factors determine the composition and
characteristics of the community which develops in Australia, and in turn the
activities and causes around which they organise. The second aspect is the
concept of the Good Australian Migrant - a highly constructed identity, imbued
with a set of expectations and provisions upon which migrants are perceived,
understood, and ultimately judged. Finally, domestic and international contexts
arbitrate the first two aspects, establishing the paradigms within which they are
created and understood.
In the case of Australian responses to Croatian political activism in the postwar period, there are three distinct paradigm shifts around which these responses
can be grouped – 1947-1971, 1972-1979, and 1980-1989. Within each period, both
the actions of Croatians and their Australian responses were tempered by a
complex interaction of contexts from Australia, Croatia, and the wider
international political environment. Despite the differences across periods,
Australian responses can be distilled to a single but flawed belief – that Croatians
were a problematic community. This ‘problem’ was attributable to their radical,
and in the eyes of some Australians, irrational political agenda. The origin of this
belief is found in the expectation that migrants would become apolitical upon
their settlement in Australia. Ironically, Croatians are perceived as problematic
precisely because they take their citizenship as ‘Good Australians’ seriously – they
4

do not just buy the rhetoric, but enact it through their political activism. Thus,
this history can be read as the tension between the objectives of authorities to
create the Good Australian Migrant, and those who, in the eyes of these
authorities, do not, cannot, or will not conform.
This thesis addresses these issues with the following structure. Chapter One
takes a longitudinal approach to the history of Croatian migration to Australia,
both chronologically from the first arrivals in the 1800s to the present, and
geographically from the reasons for leaving Croatia to the choice of Australia as
the destination, in order to map the contexts which work to define Croatian
political activism in the post-war period.

These push and pull factors of

migration act as catalysts to migration and determine the composition and
characteristics of the Croatian community which develops in Australia. These
factors motivate certain individuals to leave their country of origin in the first
instance, and to choose to settle in Australia in the second. This in turn
influences how these migrants organise upon settlement, and the activities and
causes around which they organise. Changes in the push and pull factors of
migration will influence different individuals to emigrate as motivations change,
and in turn change the composition and characteristics of the community and
their political activism.
Chapter Two introduces the concept of the Good Australian Migrant. This
figure is a post-war construction, introduced by the Australian Government after
1945 to make mass immigration acceptable to an insular and unreceptive society.
The three broad functions of the Immigration Department – selection and entry,
settlement, and citizenship – ascribed certain characteristics and expectations to
migrants which demarcated the social space migrants were to occupy. Though
some of these have evolved as historical, political, social, and cultural changes
have exerted their influence, these expectations still form the foundations upon
which migrants are perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. The Good
Australian Migrant is therefore a highly constructed identity, imbued with a set
of expectations and provisions which mediate the relationship between Australia
and the migrant Other. As such, it embodies what I call the ‘expectations of
5

oughts’ – of what Australia ought to be, of how Australians ought to behave, and
of who migrants ought to be and how they ought to behave.
Chapter Three centres on the first post-war period of Croatian political
activism, 1947-1971. Like other post-war migrants, the first wave of Croatian
migrants established welfare and social organisations in order to respond to the
issues raised by migration and settlement in a new country operating under an
assimilation policy. However, these organisations also embodied political
undertones which sought to establish a Croatian identity as separate from a
Yugoslav one and advocated for an independent Croatian state.

This was

problematic in the eyes of Australian authorities for two reasons - first it
contravened the assimilationist expectations of the Good Australian Migrant, and
second, replaced it with a political agenda that was problematic. Despite these
contraventions, Australian responses were tempered by Cold War politics, and
thus afforded the community latitude in its activism. The 1960s brought with it
wider social, political and cultural changes, as well as a second wave of Croatian
migrants, which disrupted these paradigms.
Chapter Four explores the period of 1972-1979, during which Croatian
political activism was conflated with allegations of Croatian/Ustasha terrorism.
The election of Gough Whitlam and his government ushered in a new political
paradigm, a large feature of which was the disavowal of the Cold War myopia
that had defined the preceding 23 years of conservative government rule. It was
no longer leftist activism and communism which threatened Australia’s national
security, but right-wing extremists who had been able to operate under the cover
of their anti-communism. Croatians were the foremost example of such a group,
attested by the unprecedented raid on the headquarters of the Australian
Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) by the Federal Attorney-General
Lionel Murphy on 16 March 1973 and its aftermath. At the same time, the
introduction of multiculturalism by the Whitlam Government, and later
supported by Malcom Fraser’s Government, opened up a legitimate space for
Croatian activism. This led to the establishment of the Croatian ‘Embassy’ in 1977,
6

which sought to redress the terrorist conflation with which the Whitlam
Government had branded the community and its activism.
Chapter Five covers the final period of 1980-1990, during which Croatian
political activism finds legitimacy. This is due to three main developments that
shift the paradigms once more and cause Croatian independence to become
politically acceptable, and in some corners, even desirable. First, the
reconfiguration of Croatian activism within the paradigms of multiculturalism
allowed it to sit better within the Good Australian Migrant framework, while the
rise of second-generation Croatians and the arrival of a third wave of Croatian
migrants reinforced these changes. Second, Asian immigration caused a
disruption in immigration paradigms, challenging the general consensus on
multiculturalism as a successful or desired policy. Third, the death of the
President of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and the general demise of communism
worldwide, meant that Yugoslavia was no longer of strategic importance in the
international political environment. This not only legitimised Croatian
nationalism and activism, but led to its encouragement by the very same
governments that had been ambivalent (and sometimes vehemently opposed) to
Croatian activism in the previous three decades.
This thesis is concerned with establishing a new paradigm through which
this history can be approached. It is less concerned with filling the gaps in the
literature as it is in expanding the boundaries of it. It seeks to build a foundation
from which further research can be extended that moves understandings away
from descriptive and confrontational histories to one of critical interrogation that
integrate the contexts that define it. It avoids focus on the minutiae of Croatian
political activism in Australia itself, but rather focuses on Australian responses to
them in order to lay the contextual groundwork for such a project. This history is
far more complicated than the varying narratives of good prevailing over evil, or
of the successes and failures of integration, found in both Australian and Croatian
accounts of the post-war community.

7

In doing so this thesis will present Croatian political activism not as an
anomaly or peculiar trait inherent or exclusive to Croatians, but as the actions of
a group of Australian citizens engaging with the body politic about an issue of
perceived importance, but whose status as an ‘Other’ guides the reception of
their contributions. Neither the activism of Croatians nor Australian responses to
them occurred in a vacuum; both Croatians and Australians were situated in
domestic, transnational, and international contexts which informed their
understandings and shaped their actions and reactions. Moreover, Croatians were
not only the subjects of policy and public debate, but sought to shape them as
citizens contributing to a national conversation, articulating explanations and
justifications of their actions and of the world around them.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on Croatian political activism in Australia is a paradox – while
it is tempting to simply ask ‘what literature?’, the bibliography for this thesis
attests to the disparate avenues of research this activism has been, and can be,
associated with. Though the most significant characteristic of the Croatian
community has been its political activism, there has been little critical or
academic research that explicitly addresses it. Where accounts do exist, they are
largely without continuity, lacking comparative study of the activism over time,
across geography, against the activism of other migrant communities, or in
regards to Australian responses to it. Thus, Croatian political activism is often
reduced to isolated case studies, usually as bit-parts to a wider story, and
presented descriptively, with little attention to context. This approach shapes the
activism as homogenous and stagnant, changing little over time and rarely
presented as a contested activism.
That which has been written has largely been in isolation of the other; works
by non-Croatians have focused on English-language sources and perceptions,
while those by Croatians have focused on Croatian-language sources and
8

perceptions. These competing histories talk at each other, rather than with each
other. Thus, what is presented is often without nuance, where sources are
selective and taken at face value, complex issues glossed over in a paragraph or
two, and the ‘other side’ dismissed without any real dialogue or analysis. An
example of this can be found in Fabijan Lovoković’s Hrvatske Zajednice u
Australiji: Nastojanja i Postignuća, a substantial work presented as a 'true
representation'5 of the history of the post-war Croatian community. Lovoković
attempts to integrate English-language sources, such as newspaper articles and
quotations from Federal Hansard, to create a compendium of dates, facts and
figures that trace the development of the post-war community. Though
expansive, it is not an academic work, and as Budak outlines, has many implicit
and explicit shortcomings including its lack of structure, narrative, and cohesion,
and the misrepresentation, and in some cases omission, of information.6
From an Australian perspective, Croatian political activism is almost entirely
defined by the allegations of Croatian/Ustasha terrorism and right-wing
extremism of the 1960-70s. This means that all Croatian political activism is often
dismissed as extremist and right-wing in nature, coded as irrational and morally
reprehensible. This is facilitated by an explicit ‘top-down’ approach to the role of
Croatian organisations and their leaders within the community, with a focus on
alleged links to Ustashism, rather than a ‘bottom-up’ approach which considers
the different reasons why individuals grouped within and around these
organisations, and their varied interpretations of Croatian identity, nationhood,
and rhetoric.
Croatian political activism in Australia is therefore framed within a narrative
of the adjustment of the Croatian community to Australian society, that is, its
‘Australianisation’, with Australian authorities the driving force of this narrative.
The Australian Government is positioned as the subjugator of Croatian
F. Lovoković, Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji (Kingsgrove: Središnji Odbor Hrvatskih Društava Australije,
2010), xviii.
6
L. Budak, ‘Review of F. Lovoković, Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji, Nastojanja I Postignuća [Croatian
Communities in Australia, Endeavour(ing)s and Achievements]’, Croatian Studies Review, 8(1), 2012,
161–67.
5
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extremism and terrorism, its legal, judicial, and law-enforcement agencies
stamping out the ideological legacies from ‘over there’, in favour of the civilised
values of Australian society. This narrative rests heavily on the well-worn
Western discourse that Todorova has termed ‘Balkanism’ – the geographical,
historical, political, and sociological construction of the Balkans as a pejorative
symbol, imbued with negative connotations against which a positive image of
Europeanness has been built.7 Balkanist discourse creates a dichotomy between
the civilized, wealthy, organised, and sophisticated world of the European, with
the uncivilised, primitive, crude, and cruel world of the ‘Balkan Brute’. Therefore
at the heart of these narratives lies the transformation of Croatian ‘Balkan Brutes’
into Good Australian Migrants.
This Balkanist narrative is explicitly linked with the history of Left and Right
politics in Australia, and often arises in literature dealing with Murphy’s ‘raid’ on
ASIO. Allegations of Croatian terrorism are treated as just another example of the
difference between the conservatism of Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies and
consecutive Coalition governments and the progressive, post-Cold War era
Whitlam and the Labor (Australian Labor Party –ALP) Government represented:
where the Liberals persecuted innocent Australians because of their ideologies,
Labor persecuted those who posed a real threat to the security of Australia –

M. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Although all owe an intellectual debt to Edward Said’s Orientalism, scholars of Balkanism vary in their
interpretation of the relationship between Balkanism and Orientalism. Some, like Todorova, argue that
while Orientalism relates to the differences between ‘imputed types’ (i.e. the ‘Occident’ and the
‘Orient’), Balkanism relates to the differences within one type (i.e. Europe). Others, however, argue that
Balkanism is one of the variations of Orientalism, which Bakić-Hayden terms ‘nesting Orientalisms’.
See: D. Bjelić and O. Savić (eds.), Balkan as Metaphor: Between globalization and fragmentation
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).
K. Fleming, ‘Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography’, American Historical Review, 105(4),
2000, 1218-1233.
M. Bakić-Hayden and R. Hayden, ‘Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans’: Symbolic Geography in
Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics’, Slavic Review, 51(1), 1992, 1-15.
M. Bakić-Hayden, ‘Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia’, Slavic Review, 54(4), 1995,
917-31.
P. Patterson, ‘On the Edge of Reason: The Boundaries of Balkanism in Slovenian, Austrian, and Italian
Discourse’, Slavic Review, 62(1), 110-141.
V. Drapac, Constructing Yugoslavia: A Transnational History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010),
25–27.
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right-wing Croatian terrorists.8 This narrative is yet to be challenged, and is best
exemplified by the fact that to this day, the evidence for this view is often taken
almost verbatim from Murphy’s Ministerial Statement on Croatian terrorism.9
The most recent contribution to the field - Blaxland’s volumes of ASIO’s official
history, The Protest Years and the Secret Cold War - does little to challenge the
implicit assumptions of the literature, even with unprecedented access to ASIO
files documenting the most problematic years of Croatian political activism.
Instead, Blaxland repeats many of the tropes already identified as shaping the
well-worn narrative of Croatian political activism in Australia. It is defined as
extremist, irrational, and morally bereft, borne of the ethnic hatred idiosyncratic
of the 'Balkan Brutes' that comprised Yugoslavia, and the result of a 'deep-seated
resentment felt by Croat migrants towards the Serb-dominated state of
Yugoslavia.'10 Croatian political activism is reduced to nothing more than the
Croatian pursuit of 'righting the perceived wrongs done to them.'11 Again, there is
an explicit top-down approach, concentrating on alleged links to Ustashism,
where the actions of the few are coded as representative of the many, with almost
no contextual engagement, particularly with Croatian history or sources. As
might be expected of an official history, the greatest attention is given to the
internal machinations of ASIO in dealing with the ‘Croat problem’. Like his
predecessors, Blaxland frames the perceived successes and failures of managing
Croatian extremism within the Left-Right political paradigm of the 1960s and
1970s, rather than questioning the implicit assumptions on which this paradigm
is based. Thus it seems that the discourse of the ‘Australianisation’ of Balkan
For a detailed investigation into the history of the raid on ASIO and its implications for the Croatian
community, see: K. Kalfic, ‘Knock Knock. Who’s there? Lionel. Lionel Who?: The Attorney-General’s Raid
on ASIO, 1973’ (BA Honours Dissertation, University of Wollongong, 2011).
9
Australia, Senate, Parliamentary Debates, No. S.13, 1973, 528-547 (See: Appendix 1B).
The most striking example can be found in David McKnight’s 1994 Australian Spies and their Secrets, in
which his chapter on Croatian terrorism is openly declared to be almost entirely based on the Ministerial
Statement and its tabled documents.
See: D. McKnight, ‘Reaping the Whirlwind’ in Australian Spies and their Secrets, 171-181
This is despite the many challenges raised both then and now questioning the veracity of the statement,
including Senator Ivor Greenwood’s Statement-in-Reply on 4 April 1973.
Australia, Senate, Parliamentary Debates, No.S.14, 1973, 798-807 (See: Appendix 1C).
10
J. Blaxland, The Protest Years: The Official History of ASIO 1963-1975, Vol.II (Crows Nest: Allen &
Unwin, 2015), 123.
11
ibid.
8
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Brutes (or lack thereof) not only informed Australian responses to Croatian
political activism, but also continues to inform historical understanding of it.
Croatian-Australian literature has largely been written in response to such
allegations, either explaining or defending the actions of the community, or in
substantiating counter-allegations that these were incidents orchestrated by the
secret service of Yugoslavia (commonly referred to as the UDBa - Uprava Državne
Bezbednosti), acting as agents provocateur in order to discredit Croatian political
activism.12 However, unlike other countries where Croatian terrorism was alleged,
such as Germany, Sweden and Bosnia-Herzegovina, allegations of Yugoslav UDBa
activity in Australia have remained unexplored.13 Rather, Australian-Croatian
literature tends to focus on the Croatian experience of migration and the
establishment, maintenance and contribution of the community to Australian
society. Some are triumphant, such as Drago Šaravanja’s The Snowy and
Croatians, some historical, such as Ilija Šutalo’s Croatians in Australia: pioneers,
settlers and their descendants, some encyclopaedic, such as the entries found in
both editions of James Jupps' The Australian people: an encyclopaedia of the
nation, its people and their origins, and others memoirs, such as Mate Alač’s Into
the World.14
This literature is often celebratory, and acts either as a validation of the
Croatian identity and culture, or as a symbolic ‘middle finger’ to the forces that
brought Croatians here. That there was no independent Croatian state from 19451995 gave a distinct flavour to the community, which often manifested in the
preservation and promotion of a Croatian identity separate from that of being
Yugoslav. Australian-Croatian literature has reflected this, asserting the
See: D. Darby, Why Croatia? (Cheltenham: Douglas Darby, 197-?).
L. Shaw, Trial by Slander: a background to the Independent State of Croatia, and an account of the AntiCroatian Campaign in Australia (Canberra: Harp Books, 1973).
13
See: B. Vukušić, Tajni rat UDBE protiv Hrvatskoga Iseljeništva (Zagreb: Klub Hrvatskih Povratnika iz
Iseljeništva, 2001)
M.J. Marković, Udbini Sinovi (Ljubuški:Press Holding, 2004).
14
J. Jupp (ed.), The Australian People: an encyclopedia of the nation, its people and their origins, 2nd
Edition [1st edition, 1988] (Oakleigh: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
D. Šaravanja, The Snowy and Croatians (Sydney: D. Šaravanja, 1999).
I. Šutalo, Croatians in Australia (Kent Town: Wakefield Press, 2004).
M. Alač, Into the World (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1992).
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‘Croatianness’ of the community and framing it as a diaspora of Croatia first, and
as an Australian community second, if at all. However, these histories also follow
the general pattern of migrant histories in Australia by positioning the
achievements of the community within the accepted scripts and imagery of postwar migrant contribution to Australian society. In doing so, Australian-Croatian
literature attempts to bring Croatians in from the cold of their reputation as
extremists and terrorists by emphasising their economic contributions through
work, their sporting contributions through football, and their cultural
contributions through their language, customs, and traditions.
Australian-Croatian histories, like many migrant histories, give a social,
cultural, and emotional face to the experience of migration, and the private and
public struggles of building a ‘new life’. Although these histories have created,
and continue to create, important understandings of what the migrant
experience means to migrants and Australians alike, this paradigm has also
proven problematic and limiting, contributing to the creation of (lower case)
migrant histories which more often than not, sit outside the (upper case)
‘History’ of Australia. Whether upper- or lower-case, each history can be
recounted, described, and explained largely outside of the other, save for a few
important points of agreed intersection, such as the post-war Displaced Persons
(DP) Scheme or Whitlam’s introduction of multiculturalism. As a result,
Australian-Croatian histories are characterised by a relative absence of
engagement with Australian history, and Australian history characterised by a
relative absence of engagement with Croatian history.
As a consequence, Croatians in Australia have largely been written ‘about’ by
others, often as the footnotes, highlights, or catalysts to ‘real’ Australian history
migrants so often are. When one type of history mentions the other at these
agreed intersections, it is namely to add contextual colour. For example,
Murphy’s ASIO raid is positioned in Australian historical accounts within the
battle of the political Left and Right, the allegation of Croatian terrorism just
another example of the difference between them. Australian-Croatian histories,
on the other hand, pass the Raid over as yet another obstacle the community has
13

faced in its struggle for political and cultural recognition, perpetrated by a
zealous leftist politician, characterised either as a naïve and gullible Australac
duped by the Yugoslav Government, or as a malevolent communist-supporting
henchman. In each case, the other side is simply dismissed, without any real
consideration as to why exactly the Raid happened at that particular time and
place, why it was Murphy who carried it out, nor why Croatians and their
activism featured in the incident.
Aside from the lack of dialogue between Australian and Croatian literature
and the integration of English- and Croatian-language sources, there has also
been a significant lack of engagement with the subject from academic historians,
who have had almost nothing to say about the Croatian community, let alone
Croatian political activism. In fact, a large amount of the scant academic
literature that does exist is found outside the discipline altogether, and is usually
centred on sociological research into identity, nationalism and diaspora relations,
such as Val Colic-Peisker’s Migration, class and transnational identities: Croatians
in Australia and America, and Zlatko Skrbiš’ Long Distance Nationalism:
Diasporas, homelands and identities.15 There has been little historical study
exploring the influence of international political relations and contexts had on
perceptions of the Croatian community and its advocacy of Croatian
independence. Particularly, no attention has been paid to how Cold War
considerations dictated the political desirability of an independent Croatia as
opposed to a united Yugoslavia, and the foreign policy implications this had on
Australia.

V. Colic-Peisker, Migration, Class, and Transnational Identities: Croatians in Australia and America
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008).
Z. Škrbis, Long Distance Nationalism: Diasporas, homelands and identities (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing
Ltd, 1999).
15
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This replicates the general pattern of studies of European migration to
Australia identified by Bosworth and Wilton, whereby researchers have only been
interested in the history of migrants upon their arrival to Australia, doing
very little to ask how much of a migrant’s politics or culture came from a past
which still exists for the migrant, how much the migrant still exists outside
Australia, how much a migrant retains or even re-invents a nationality from the
country of origin.16

Conversely, migrants themselves have not been eager to submit their experiences
to historical analysis due to a perception of Australia as a naïve, uneducated and
uncultured host country unable or unwilling to understand the nuances and
intricacies of European history; a sardonic twist on the Balkanist discourse that
has shaped Australian perceptions and responses. This silence is further
complicated by the fact that the Europe from which post-war migrants came
from was a field of fierce and bloody ideological battles, with the Yugoslav
territories one of the most marked examples of it. As such, Bosworth and Wilton
argue that some post-war migrants, including Croatians, had a vested interest in
keeping their pre-Australian lives ‘hidden’. While some had malevolent reasons
to deny their activities during this period, the experiences of others were so
terrible they were glad of the opportunity to escape to the furthest end of the
earth and simply forget.17
Finally, where histories have been written by migrants, ‘there is major
evidence of a presence of hierarchies and biases which have been carried from
Europe to Australia.’18 Only the story of the ‘right’ type of migrant is recorded at
the expense of others, serving to both reinforce and legitimise the hierarchy of
one over the other. The legacies of these silences reverberate in AustralianCroatian histories, particularly in the absence of a comprehensive, longitudinal
analysis of Croatian migration to Australia which

encompasses

both

chronological and geographic contexts in Australia and Croatia, and in the
invisibility of Croatians who fall outside of the post-war definition of the
R. Bosworth and J. Wilton, ‘A Lost History? The Study of European Migration to Australia’, Australian
Journal of Politics & History, 27(2), 1981, 223–24.
17
ibid., 229–30.
18
ibid., 225.
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‘community’, such as non-Catholic Croatians, those from the political left
(including Croatian Yugoslavs), non-Croatian ethnic minorities, and arguably,
Croatian women.
This thesis argues that in order to break this cycle of histories which talk at
each other rather than with each other, historians need to put the Australian
back into Australian-Croatian history, developing new avenues of historical
inquiry which build on and expand the ways in which Australian-Croatian history
is understood, and which address the community’s intersection with Australia’s
imagined nation and the longitudinal rhythms of Australian history. This thesis,
therefore, seeks to bridge this gap by contextualising post-war Croatian political
activism. Put simply, neither the activism of Croatians nor Australian responses
to them occurred in a vacuum. Both Croatian migrants and Australian hosts were
situated within complex domestic, transnational, and international contexts that
informed their understandings and shaped their actions and reactions. It is
precisely here that the paradox of the literature concerning Croatian political
activism in Australia is created.
Where an abundance of academic literature rests, and with which AustralianCroatian literature has seldom intersected, is in the broader issues and contexts
which shaped the unique experience of Croatians in Australia, such as those of
Australia’s history and experiences with immigration, foreign policy, national
identity, and the construction of the ‘Other’ in Australian society. Although these
works do not reference Croatian political activism directly, they provide
theoretical and comparative tools with which the history of Croatian political
activism in Australia can be approached and analysed. For example, the works of
James Jupp, Andrew Jakubowicz and Stephen Castles on immigration and
ethnicity, Richard White, Mark McKenna, David Carter and Marilyn Lake on
Australian identity and nationhood, and Henry Reynolds, Heather Goodall, Tom
Griffiths, Anna Haebich, and Peter Read in the field of Australian Indigenous
history, all frame the socio-political context of Australia that Croatians were
perceived and evaluated within, and against which their activism was understood
by Australian authorities. Similarly, the work of Ghassan Hage on Arab16

Australians, and Hsu-Ming Teo and Nancy Viviani on Vietnamese-Australians
deal with communities that, like the Croatian community, have been stigmatised
by their political activism and status as diasporas of international conflict. In fact,
it was the political activism of Croatians that bequeathed the Vietnamese
community the ‘pungent epithet for Vietnamese refugees: Yellow Croats; in one
phrase, the sum of all these fears.’19
While there is a relatively small body of literature which explicitly addresses
Croatian political activism in the post-war period, there is a vast array of primary
material that has remained unexplored or underutilised. The foremost example of
this is the large quantity of ASIO, Commonwealth and State Police reports,
governmental department files and reports (largely from the Immigration
Department and Department of Foreign Affairs), and the personal papers of
various politicians who through their appointments or constituents had a vested
interest in monitoring Croatian activism, found in the National Archives of
Australia in Canberra and in corresponding State Archives. As Croatian
organisations often attracted the attention of Australian legal and political
authorities from their very foundation, these archival sources are useful in tracing
the development of Croatian activism, particularly of that associated with
organisations and persons of interest to the authorities. Furthermore, often
included in these files are ephemera related to Croatian activism that would
otherwise be difficult to locate. The sheer quantity of these archival materials20
means that a great number of research trajectories could and should be pursued
that were not possible within the scope of this thesis, but which would shed
important information on many of the issues discussed. As an example, a
comparative study of the reports from ASIO and the Commonwealth Police Force
would provide important answers to the question of whether ASIO’s estimation

19
N. Viviani. The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia (Carlton: Melbourne
University Press, 1984), 56.
20
For example, series A432 originating from the Attorney-General’s Department includes two items
which are over 180 pages in length apiece, detailing various reports on Croatians and Yugoslavs for the
month of November 1972 alone. See:
NAA: A432, 1972/7051 PART 1,
NAA: A432, 1972/7051 PART 2
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of Croatian activism was influenced by the politics of Menzies and his Cold War
myopia as has been alleged.
Despite the wealth of information contained in this primary material, there
are significant limitations which hamper the research of academic historians, and
perhaps help to explain why this topic has received limited attention. The
foremost of these limitations is the issue of access. Many of these files have yet to
be examined for release, and requesting access can become a protracted process
as many of them, particularly those from ASIO which are not subject to the
Freedom of Information Act 1982, require special permissions from various
Commonwealth agencies or are not subject to the usual conditions as outlined by
the Archives Act 1983.21 As a result, some requests for access have been rejected,22
and even when access is granted, it is usually with exceptions. These barriers to
access have resulted in the fragmentation of information, and though this is not
unique to the case of Croatian political activism, it does nonetheless pose a
significant impediment to historical research. This is further compounded by the
absence of, or difficulty in, contextualising this primary material. Primary sources
‘in the archives’ are rarely the objective and balanced documents they present
themselves to be, and need to be contextualised in order to be critically analysed.
Particularly in the case of an organisation like ASIO, where often the origin of a
report is redacted, it can be difficult to discern the contexts, preconceptions, and
intentions through which the information contained within these sources has
been presented. It is therefore recognised that these sources present only partial
accounts that are difficult to contextualise, and that there exists material relevant
to the thesis, but to which access is denied.
Nonetheless, for the purpose of this thesis these archival documents were
useful in two ways – in elucidating some important minutiae of Croatian
21
For example, requests to have files examined that I placed in March 2013 have been only been
released as recently as August 2017, well after this thesis was submitted for examination, and even then
some information has been deemed withheld.
22
For example, see:
NAA: A1838, 73/1/3/13 PART 31
NAA: A1838, 73/1/3 PART 10
NAA: A1838, 1500/1/24/4 PART 1
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activism, such as the dates, names, and details of particular events or people of
interest, and in tracing general trends, both in the changing attitudes of
Australian authorities and the changing nature of Croatian activism. In fact, it is
after a wide reading of these documents that two central arguments of the thesis
were first hypothesised – that there were three distinct paradigm shifts around
which the responses of Australian authorities could be grouped, and that
Croatian activism adapted to these paradigm shifts at least in rhetoric, if not in
nature.
Federal parliamentary debates (Hansard) have also been utilised to trace
these general trends. The decision to focus on Federal, rather than State, Hansard
was guided by the scope and limitations of the thesis. The Federal Parliament,
with representatives from every State and Territory, could reflect the general
response of Australian authorities to Croatian activism. The digitisation of
Federal Hansard also presented a great opportunity to compile diagnostic
information about political responses to Croatian activism, such as how many
times the issue was raised in any given year, who was raising the issue, and in
creating a snapshot of how this debate was shaped from 1949-1989, This proved
to be particularly useful in tracking the change in debate from the 1960s to the
early 1970s, and in discerning which aspects of Croatian activism caught national
attention. Nonetheless, it is recognised that just like archival primary material,
these sources present a partial account of parliamentary responses to Croatian
activism. A comparative analysis of State and Territory parliamentary debates
would tease out the regional differences in responses to Croatian activism, as well
as provide a more nuanced explanation as to where, when, how, and why
Croatian activism became a matter of concern to some members of Parliament
and perhaps not others.
Newspaper articles were used to monitor media responses to both Croatian
activism and the responses of Australia’s legal and political authorities to this
activism. Newspapers and their journalists reflected the ‘pulse’ of the debate, as
they were situated in the nexus between the general population and the political
and legal elite. Like Hansard, newspaper articles were chosen with the scope and
19

limitations of the thesis in mind. First, the three main daily newspapers of
Sydney, Canberra, and Melbourne (the Sydney Morning Herald, Canberra Times,
and the Age respectively) were chosen as the main sources of primary material
because these cities were the greatest sites of Croatian political activism during
the periods researched. Second, these newspapers were chosen as they were in
high circulation in these cities, and therefore a likely source of news media for
the majority of inhabitants. Finally, the ease of access and analysis to these
newspapers through their digitisation allowed for diagnostic analyses that would
become too cumbersome to complete with non-digitised newspapers.
There are many limitations to this approach. In choosing to focus on
newspapers, other media responses, such as television and radio, have simply
been omitted. Newspapers, however, were the only constant media source
throughout the periods researched, were readily accessible to many, and were
considered a trusted source of information. By confining the geographic location
of these newspapers to Sydney, Canberra, and Melbourne, analysis becomes EastAustralian-centric, and omits any regional differences or perspectives on Croatian
political activism – it could very well be that the rest of Australia was not as
concerned with Croatians and their activism as these cities were. Finally, the
choice of the three newspapers targeted is problematic in and of itself as all three
newspapers are owned by Fairfax Media – Sydney Morning Herald from 1841, The
Canberra Times from 1964, and The Age from 1972. This means that, at least from
1972, all three newspapers would have been under the influence of the same
publisher, which has important implications for the editorial direction of the
newspapers and their perspectives on Croatian activism. Again, like archival
material and parliamentary debates, the contextual considerations of these
articles, the journalists who wrote them, and the newspapers that published
them, could and should be investigated through comparative studies with other
newspapers, journalists, and media sources in order to provide a more nuanced
explanation of media responses to Croatian activism.
The absence of oral interviews in this thesis was a deliberate decision rather
than an oversight, and one reached with difficulty. The most pressing reason for
20

this decision was scope – plugging the gaps in the literature, as it were, will be an
undertaking far larger than the scope of this thesis, and one I quickly realised in
the early months of my research when I was attempting to do just that. Thus, to
interview every person, or only key figures, or even a fair sample of them,
relevant to the 50-year period would not have been feasible, particularly because
this thesis was not intended to be an oral history project. More importantly,
however, it would not have challenged or resolved the issues identified in the
literature review. Most of the key figures from the period (taken to mean those
in positions of power, leadership, or authority) have already made their thoughts
known elsewhere, and though they may bring a new fact or unknown perspective
to the history, the general narratives of their responses would, I believe, remain
the same and thus perpetuate the fractures already present in the literature. ‘
The lack of primary sources originating from the Croatian community, and
the dearth of historical research into this means that the overwhelming majority
of the ‘bottom-up’ history Croatian political activism needs remains behind
private doors, uncollected and diminishing with the passage of time and deaths
of older community members. Where these sources (both primary and
secondary) have been found, however, I have used my language capabilities to
address the lack of integration between English- and Croatian-language sources
identified in the literature review. Where applicable, quotations have been
personally translated, with the original Croatian form provided in the footnotes.
Croatian script has been used where applicable; however, quotes and anglicised
terms have been left in their English formats (e.g. Ustaša, Ustasha and
Ustashism). However, these too suffer from the same limitations outlined above
for both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources, such as the newspaper
Spremnost and the ephemera found within archival files, are only partial accounts
that provide limited snapshots of how only some Croatians viewed their activism.
Secondary sources, such as the body of Australian-Croatian literature relied on to
help construct Croatian organisational life, are also partial accounts often written
in order to justify the Croatian community in the Australian public sphere, and
need to be contextualised with this in mind. Though these primary and
21

secondary sources have been useful in determining some minutiae of Croatian
activism and in tracing general trends, the absence of comparative academic
research has made it difficult to contextualise their content.
As one of the first (if not the first) doctoral theses to examine Croatian
political activism in Australia, this thesis attempts to develop a generalised
representation of Australian responses in the period of 1947-1989. It therefore
perpetuates some of the issues identified in the literature review in the name of
scope. The Croatian ‘community’ is used as short-hand for the customary postwar definition as those who organised around overtly Croatian organisations that
were of the ‘proper’ political inclination, and in particular those associated with
the Catholic Church, folkloric, and football organisations. As such, non-Catholic
Croatians, those from the political left (including Croatian Yugoslavs) and nonCroatian ethnic minorities from Croatia are overlooked, while the male-centric
history of this community, particularly in its leadership, has served to obscure the
histories of women within the community and in regards to its political activism.
Furthermore, this thesis does not distinguish between the different communities
across Australia, and focuses predominantly on those communities in New South
Wales, Canberra, and Victoria. Though problematic, these parameters were both
how the community defined itself and how the public sphere defined the
community, and therefore defines the ‘Croatian community’ Australian
authorities were responding to in this period. This thesis is but a beginning; it is
beyond the scope of it to look at everything.
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CHAPTER 1:
CROATIAN MIGRATION TO
AUSTRALIA

Charles Billich, Marija Kraljice Hrvata (2004), Mary Queen of Croats Church, Wollongong

Migration movements are total social phenomena, in the
sense that most structures of social reproduction and of
human agency play a role in them: economic, demographic,
social, familial, individual, and psychological factors all come
into play. 1
Ulf Brunnbauer
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In the introduction to her book, The Sting of Change: Sicilians in Sicily and
Australia, anthropologist Constance Cronin remarked that those
who emphasize the group and the culture have by and large failed to realize that
cultures or societies do not immigrate and they do not acculturate. Individuals
or, at most, families immigrate – taking with them their values, beliefs, and a few
material possessions. Their societal institutions do not follow with them, and
although individuals may attempt to establish some of their pre-emigration
institutions, circumstances force the alteration of these institutions and
eventually the values which relate to them. 2

She argued that those who study migration must always bear in mind that
migrants do not bring with them entire political, religious or economic systems,
but rather, ‘they brought only themselves and their ideas.’ 3 These ideas, Bosworth
and Wilton argue, are best described as ‘partially formed and sustained versions
of the institutions and traditions of their old world’ which are then ‘further
adapted in the new environment.’ 4 This chapter demonstrates that the past does
not desert the migrant when they emigrate, but rather resonates in their new
environments. Croatian political activism in Australia was rooted in elements and
ideas from the old world clashing with and adapting to their new environment in
Australia. Sometimes these partially formed and sustained ideas from the old
world find semblances in their new environment, and sometimes they jar, forcing
these ideas to adapt and change.
The history of Croatians in Australia often begins with Australia’s post-World
War II (WWII) immigration program. Croatians were one of the many groups of
Federal Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell’s ‘New Australians’ who helped
create multicultural Australia. While it is true that this post-war period was the
most significant in the expansion of the community, it is not so readily known
that Croatian settlement in Australia dates back to the early 1800s. Given this
long history, it is somewhat surprising to find that there is no comprehensive or
seminal work which documents it, both chronologically from the first arrivals in
U. Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe: Emigrants, America, and the State since the Late
Nineteenth Century (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), 6.
2
C. Cronin, The Sting of Change: Sicilians in Sicily and Australia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1970), 9.
3
ibid.
4
Bosworth and Wilton, ‘A Lost History?’, 227.
1
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the 1800s and geographically from the reasons for leaving Croatia to the choice of
Australia as the destination. 5
The challenge of historically documenting Croatian migration and settlement
may in part explain the reason for this absence, as it is only from 1996 that
Australian officials began recording Croatians as a separate group. Instead, they
were recorded as citizens of the empire or state that the territories of Croatia fell
under. Prior to World War I (WWI), Croatians were variably recorded as
Austrians, Austro-Hungarians, Italians, or according to their regional origins,
such as Dalmatians. Archival sources from this period are further complicated by
the scarcity of naval documents and passenger lists, the Anglicisation and
misspelling of names on existing records, the purposeful fabrication of names,
dates, and places of birth, and the illiteracy and inability of Croatian settlers to
speak English. 6 In the interwar years, Croatians were recorded as ‘South Slavs’ or
‘Jugoslavs’. With the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
at the end of WWII, ‘Yugoslav’ became the official nationality of Croatians until
its dissolution in the 1990s.
Even when available, however, interpreting census data can be problematic.
For example, as at the 2011 Census, there were approximately 126,267 individuals
of Croatian ancestry living in Australia, of which 38,316 were born in Croatia. 7
This seemingly simple statistic of the number of Croatian-born, however, had to
be constructed - there are actually 48,828 Australians who were born in Croatia,
but only 38,316 of them identify as being Croatian. This leaves 10,512 individuals
For example, Tkalčević covers the history of Croatians in Australia from the early 1800s, but is more
descriptive than analytical, and does not give much consideration to the wider historical contexts, both
in Croatia and Australia, which influenced the community and its actions. The academic contributions in
Jupp’s The Australian People also cover the entire period of Croatian migration, but each entry is selfcontained. Šutalo has completed the most detailed investigation of early Croatian migration, but his
section on post-war migration only includes an overview of the period.
See: Jupp, The Australian People [1st Edition], 335-346
Jupp, The Australian People [2nd Edition], 235-251
Šutalo, Croatians in Australia
M. Tkalčević, Povijest Hrvata U Australiji (Melbourne: Cross Colour Printing, 1999)
6
Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 1–7; Tkalčević, Povijest Hrvata U Australiji, 13.
7
The following statistics have been constructed using the ABS Census TableBuilder and data from the
2011 census, see: http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/tablebuilder for more
information.
5
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who were born in Croatia but do not think of themselves as Croatian. Conversely,
12,393 individuals were neither born in Australia nor Croatia, and of these 4,850
were born in the former territories of Yugoslavia.
That the census is self-declaring further complicates this question of
inclusion and exclusion in that only those who identify as being of Croatian
ancestry will be recorded - there may be more that are of Croatian ancestry but
do not self-identify as such. Of those who declare Croatian ancestry, there is no
indication how much of this ancestry is borne out in their identity - some may
only carry a Croatian surname, while others may be extremely active in Croatian
organisational life, speak Croatian fluently and travel to Croatia frequently. It is
clear that at least 34,426 individuals of those included in the figure of 126,267 are
of mixed ancestries, listing Croatian as their second ancestry group, and
suggesting that they may identify with their first ancestry group more closely.
These issues highlight that the Croatian community - though often cited - is
difficult to define, and can mean whatever the historian needs it to mean; from
anyone with a tenuous link to Croatia, to only those that are actively involved in
the narrowly defined ‘real’ Croatian community, such as overtly Croatian
organisations that are of the ‘proper’ political inclination, or members of a
Croatian Catholic church community. 8
Like most migrant histories, the experience of migration itself (the journey
and the establishment of a ‘new life’), and the experience of the community once
settled (the history of the community) have been the focus of Croatian-Australian
histories. Scant attention, however, has been paid to two other important aspects;
the push factors of migration, the reasons for leaving Croatia in the first instance,
and the pull factors of migration, the reasons for settling in Australia in the
second. Jupp reminds us of a third, and in the case of Australia, extremely
influential element influencing migration patterns - ‘the role of the state in
8

For further discussion on the unreliability of census data in researching Croatians in Australia, see:
B. Škvorc, ‘Nekoliko napomena o broju Hrvata, Hrvatskom Jeziku, školama i Hrvatskim medijima u
Australiji’, Društvena Istraživanja, 7(1-2), 1998, 189-206.
R. Mesarić-Žabčić and D. Mlinarić, ‘Some Reflections on the Research Project of the Institute for
Migration and Ethnic Affairs (Zagreb) in Relation to Australia’, Croatian Studies Review, 3-4(1), 2004,
125-141
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turning the tap on or off and in favouring and encouraging some classes of
immigrant over others.’ 9 Although the logical relation between these three
aspects is tacitly acknowledged, the historiography of Croatian migration tends
to treat each in a vacuum, as though the experience of one has very minimal, if
any, effect on the others.
This overlooks the fundamental influence these factors of migration have on
the composition of a community, in that the push factors of migration motivated
certain Croatians to emigrate, which in turn influenced how they organised, and
the ideas, causes, and activities around which they organised. Without
understanding the push factors of Croatian emigration, and therefore the
characteristics of the Croatians emigrating, the Croatian community becomes a
homogenous group of people that simply ‘exist’ in Australia. This obscures the
context of the community’s unique development in Australia and overlooks
important influences on the trajectory and actions of these people, which
differentiated them from other migrant groups.
Likewise, that their destination was Australia was not purely fortuitous. Just
as there were reasons for when and why particular Croatians emigrated, there
were also reasons for when and why these particular groups came to Australia
rather than anywhere else in the world. Without understanding the role of the
Australian state within this, the host country can be reduced to an arbitrary
migration destination, with very minimal influence in the composition,
organisation, and actions of migrant communities, which, at least in the case of
Croatians in Australia, is simply not true. Like push factors, these pull factors
influenced how and why Croatians in Australia organised themselves, which in
turn differentiated the Australian diaspora from other Croatian diaspora’s
throughout the world.
This approach to Australian-Croatian history has served to obscure both the
development of the Croatian community and the fact that the political activism

J. Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera: The story of Australian Immigration (Melbourne:
Cambridge University Press), 12.
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of the post-war community was not as novel or unique as the literature suggests.
Rather, Croatians in Australia have consistently engaged in political activism
since the turn of the 20th century, with the activism of the post-war community
but one of the many forms it has taken. Whether because of the issues with
documenting Croatians in Australia, the simple loss of history that comes as
different stories gain prominence in collective memory, or a more wilful
forgetting, the omission of this historical analysis limits our ability to recognise
and explain influences on the political activism of the post-war community, as
well as Australian responses to them.
This chapter attempts to unravel this comprehensive history in order to
better understand the longitudinal trajectory of Croatian migration to Australia.
In doing so, it will contextualise the political activism of the post-WWII period in
an unprecedented way by expanding the history of the

community

chronologically and geographically beyond the limitations of earlier works.
Section 1.1 will look at the less well-known period of Croatian migration to
Australia prior to World War I. Though this emigration was small, Croatia’s
experience under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Croatian National
Revival it produced significantly shaped ideas about Croatian identity and
nationhood that would influence the pre-WWI and inter-war communities in
Australia, and Croatian activism in the post-war period. Section 1.2 covers WWI
and the inter-war period. The internment of Croatians in camps across Australia
during WWI, and the experience of migration and settlement at the height of the
White Australia Policy served to organise and politicise the community in
somewhat surprising ways. That Croatia found itself under another two
constitutional monarchies in the inter-war period, and the experience of three
failed states in less than 50 years resulted in different and disparate visions for
Croatian statehood and its future.
Section 1.3 explores WWII and its aftermath both in Croatia and Australia.
Not only was this period the direct cause of the first wave of post-war Croatian
migration, but understanding the experience of Croatia during WWII is crucial to
understanding the post-war community, and is an experience which still
28

reverberates throughout the community today. The experience of WWII also
profoundly reoriented Australia’s relationship to the world and with immigration.
Without this reorientation and the post-war immigration program it generated,
the Croatian community in Australia would not have developed at the rate and
size that it did, nor would it have attracted the unparalleled diversity of intake
that created the multicultural Australia of today. Finally, Section 1.4 provides an
abridged account of the four waves of post-war Croatian migration that coincide
with the timeframe explored in the remainder of the thesis. By covering this very
broad and at times seemingly extraneous ground, this chapter will provide the
foundations needed to reimagine the historical narrative of Croatian political
activism in the post-war period. After all, in the same way we look to the past to
understand the present, it is difficult to understand the immediate past without
looking at the distant past.
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1.1. CROATIAN EMIGRATION PRIOR TO WWI
Croatian migrants experienced Australia at its various stages of social
development, from Federation, development of outback industries and urban
sprawls, world wars, the great Depression, racism, changes in migration and the
application of multicultural ideas. 10

Just who was the first Croatian to arrive and when varies across sources.
However, all seem to agree that Croatian migration to the Australian colonies
originates somewhere in the early 1800s. 11 By the 1880s, Croatian barques were a
regular sight in Australian ports, and as Šutalo argues, their repeat arrivals
suggest that Australia was a regular trade destination for Croatian sea
merchants. 12 Croatian crewmen occasionally deserted these ships and settled in
Australia permanently, while for others, a number of shipwrecks forced Croatians
to settle in Australia, at least temporarily. 13 By 1890, over 850 Croatians had lived
in Australia, and were almost exclusively single men of peasant origin from the

10
W. Lalich, ‘Migration Generated Expansion of European Influence and the Role of Croatian Diaspora’,
in E. Smith (ed.), Europe's Expansions and Contractions: Proceedings of the XVIIth Biennial Conference of
the Australasian Association of Europen Historians (Adelaide, July 2009)(Unley: Australian Humanities
Press, 2010), 152.
11
Tkalčević argues that the first traceable Croatian, A Cumberlitch (Čuberlić or Candrlić), arrived in 1800,
though there are indications that attest to even earlier arrivals. Šutalo and Stenning argue that the first
arrival for whom we have documentary evidence is Stefano Posić, a convict of Croatian descent, charged
with larceny in England and transported to Australia in 1813 under the name of Stephano Haskitt, which
he later changed to John Stanton. See:
M. Stenning, Croatian and Slav Pioneers: New South Wales. 1800s-1940's (Glebe: Fast Books, 1996), 2–3.
Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 15.
Tkalčević, Povijest Hrvata U Australiji, 13
12
Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 114.
13
The most famous of these was the shipwreck Stefano, which struck the Ningaloo Reef south of Point
Cloates, Western Australia on 26 October 1875, of which 3 survivors ended up living with and learning
the language, customs, and ceremonies of an Aboriginal tribe - amongst the first Europeans recorded to
have done so. Two of these, Miho Bacić (Baccich) and Ivan Jurić (Jurich) eventually returned to Croatia
and recorded their recollections. The original manuscript of these recollections was published by
Gustave Rathe, descendent of Miho Baccich in 1992, while the hand-written duplicate copy can be
found in the National Museum of Rijeka in Croatia. See:
G. Rathe, The Wreck of the Barque Stefano off the North West Cape of Australia in 1875 (New York:
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1992).
N. Smoje, ‘Shipwrecked on the North-West Coast: The Ordeal of the Survivors of the Stefano’, Journal of
the Royal Western Australian Historical Society, 8(2), 1978, 35-47.
Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 114–15.
Tkalčević, Povijest Hrvata U Australiji, 25–29.
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coastal regions of Dalmatia. 14 Despite their relatively small number, the
contribution of these early Croatians to the development of Australia was
significant. They worked in the gold fields of Western Australia and Victoria, as
seamen and fishermen, established hotels, wineries and farms, and were among
the first of Australia’s entrepreneurs, establishing multiple business ventures and
trades, as well as making significant contributions to society, culture, and
industry. 15
These pioneer Croatian migrants, as Šutalo names them, were the product of
a particular context. In Croatia, the lead up to the 1800s had been turbulent, with
gains and losses of territory, changes in administrative control, and the
disbanding and reinstating of the Croatian Parliament (Sabor). Centuries of
oppressive and exploitative rule by the Austro-Hungarians in Northern Croatia,
and by the Venetian Republic, France, and Austria along the Dalmatian coast,
stunted economic development as each empire sought to consolidate their
political and economic power through their territorial acquisitions. The advent of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1868 and the reunification of northern Croatia
with Dalmatia did not bring any assistance or relief. Rather, the Empire
deliberately encouraged Croatian emigration by exacerbating the conditions of
economic deterioration. This exacerbation was also intended to keep the
peasantry politically powerless, while preventing industry competition with
others in the Empire. 16

Very few Croatian women migrated at this time, and those that did were overwhelmingly wives
accompanying their husbands. Single Croatian women did not begin migrating to Australia in larger
numbers until the 1890s with the establishment of chain migration patterns, and it is only in the mid1890s that we see marriages between Croatian-born men and women occurring. See:
Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 61–90.
15
ibid., 91-186
16
B. Banović, ‘Push and Pull Factors in the Emigration from Croatia to Australia from the End of the 19th
Century to Present Times’, Migracijske i Etničke Teme, 6(1), 1990, 9.
For more information, see:
B. Banović, ‘Emigracijska politika Austro-Ugarske i iseljavanje iz Hrvatske u razdoblju 1867–1914’,
Migracijske i Etničke Teme, 3(3-4), 1987, 313-323
S. Vranjican, ‘Dostignuća I Promašaji Gospodarskog Razvoja Hrvatske U Proteklom Stoljeću’, 12(3-4),
2005, 334–37.
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This process was further encouraged by the introduction of assisted
migration which encouraged non-Slav’s to move to the region. The monarchy
hoped that economic underdevelopment and the dual process of Croatian
emigration and non-Slav immigration would help legitimise and secure the
sovereignty and authority of the monarchy in this politically unstable territory of
the Empire. Although the policies operated identically across both northern
Croatia and the Dalmatian coast, the significantly poorer economic conditions in
the coastal and island regions resulted in higher numbers of emigration. Without
fertile land for subsistence agriculture to fall back on, Banovic estimates that
more than 100, 000 Dalmatians emigrated in the period prior to WWI,
constituting an exodus of almost 20% of the total population of the region. 17
These push factors of Croatian emigration affected a particular Croatian – the
peasant of Dalmatia - and explains why the overwhelming majority of Croatian
migrants to Australia during this period were from this region. Croatian
historians describe this type of emigration as ‘s trbuhom za kruhom’ – literally
‘with stomach after bread’ - these Dalmatians were pushed out in the search for
subsistence. This particularly affected the single male peasant. Faced with little
prospect of employment to support oneself, let alone a wife or family, he left to
create his fortune elsewhere. 18 This also accounts for the relative invisibility of
Croatians throughout the colonies prior to the 1890s. As peasants, many were
illiterate and uneducated, did not speak English, and were not wealthy enough to
afford the expensive passage to Australia. They were, however, experienced
fishermen or seamen and thus worked their passage to Australia. This method of
migration found their names anglicised, misspelled, or incorrectly recorded, and
in some cases, purposefully fabricated. 19 Further contributing to this invisibility
was the imperative of marriage and procreation. Exacerbated by a lack of existing

Banović, ‘Push and Pull Factors’, 10.
For a detailed analysis of various causes of Croatian emigration in this period, see: ‘Overseas
Emigration from the Balkans until 1914’ in Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe, 37–92.
19
Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 1–7.
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family structures, Croatian males simply integrated into the lives of their
Australian wives. 20
Unlike the Croatians who would come after them, these settler migrants were
not highly organised or visible as a community in Australian society. That is not
to say, however, that they did not share a sense of community based on their
Croatian identity. As Šutalo explains,
[Croatians] worked and ran businesses together, socialised and lived together and maintained ties with other Croatian settlers in Australia. There is written
evidence that over 54% of Croatian settlers had connections with other Croatian
settlers in Victoria… They were each other's marriage witnesses, attendees at
funerals and godparents to each other's children. They sometimes travelled great
distances to be a marriage witness or to be present at a funeral of a Croatian
friend. 21

Similarly, though their activism was not highly visible, these early Croatians were
involved, at least individually if not collectively, in Australian public and political
life. This involvement was closely tied to the employment of early Croatian
migrants, particularly on Australian goldfields and in mining districts. Others still
supported various political causes through wider community ties. 22
At the turn of the century, patterns of chain migration began to form.
Croatian migration was aimed first at Western Australia, and from there
Croatians either settled or migrated eastward. In 1890, the first ‘mass’ migration
of Croatians took place from the town of Račišće on the island of Korčula. 23 They
settled in Boulder-Kalgoorlie in Western Australia, whose goldfields soon became
home to the largest community of Croatians in Australia.

An abrupt

deterioration of economic conditions in Dalmatia heralded the onset of these
mass migrations, and accounted for the larger number of Croatian arrivals to
Australia from the 1890s, particularly with the collapse of the winemaking and
Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 61–62.
ibid., 61.
22
For example, Šutalo documents at least three prominent Croatians, Thomas Pavletich, Mattio
Orlovich, and Archbishop of Adelaide Matthew Beovich as supporting the ‘Irish cause’ in Australia,
influenced by their ties to the Catholic Church. See: ibid., 71–81.
23
Approximately 60% were single men and 30% married men who had left their wives in Croatia,
mirroring those that had migrated before them. The remaining 10% of male migrants, however, were
accompanied by their wives. See: C.A. Price, Southern Europeans in Australia (Melbourne: Oxford
University Press, 1963), 175.
20
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shipbuilding industries that had provided some level of economic subsistence in
the region. 24
The economic disenfranchisement of Croatia under Austro-Hungarian rule
was amplified by the Empire’s so-called ‘Magyarisation’ policy, which threatened
to erase Croatian identity by enforcing the use of the Hungarian language and
resisting the unification of Croatian territories. 25 In response to this, a group of
young Croatian writers, under the leadership of Ljudevit Gaj, established the
Illyrian movement in Zagreb in the early 1830s. This was a cultural and political
movement aimed at addressing the position of Croatia within the Empire, its
principle goal the establishment of a standard Croatian language as a counter to
Magyarisation. This linguistic pursuit sat alongside the development of a
Croatian cultural identity and history of nationhood, often referred to as the
Croatian National Revival (Hrvatski Narodni Preporod).
Based on the theory that South-Slavs were descendants of ancient Illyrians,
the movement also advocated a pan-South-Slavism based on linguistic and
cultural grounds. The breadth of the movement, however, resulted in the
development of two main strains which would shape the next 150 years in the
region; a Croatian nationalist movement aimed at the unification and
independence of the Croatian people, and a Yugoslav movement, aimed at the
integration of all South-Slavs. 26 In the 20th Century, both would use figures and
ideas from the Illyrian movement to justify their causes. 27 The CroatianHungarian Agreement of 1868 (commonly referred to as the Nagodba) reinforced
these cultural developments by granting Croatians autonomy over internal affairs
in the ‘Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia’. This prompted a boom in the institutional
I. Goldstein, Croatia: a History (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 97.
G. Vermes, ‘South Slav Aspirations and Magyar Nationalism in the Dual Monarchy’ in I. Banac, J.
Ackerman, and R. Szporluk (eds.), Nation and Ideology: Essays in Honor of Wayne S. Vucinich (Boulder:
East European Monographs, 1981), 177-200.
26
For a discussion on the reasons for this division, and comparisons between Ante Starcevic and Josip
Juraj Strossmayer, see: Tanner, Croatia; A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, London: Yale University
Press, 1997), 94–107.
27
For more information on the Illyrian Movement and its development, see:
E. Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1975).
Drapac, ‘Imagining Savage Europe and Inventing Yugoslavia: 1850-1914’ in Constructing Yugoslavia, 22–62.
Tanner, Croatia, 66–81.
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development of Croatia, including the renaming of the Matica Ilirska to Matica
Hrvatska, (now one of the oldest Croatian cultural institutions still in operation),
the re-establishment of the University of Zagreb in 1874, and the construction of
the Croatian National Theatre in 1895.
This period of cultural and national development led to the migration of
Croatians with a framework of ideas and language that expressed a Croatian
national identity not available to those that migrated earlier in the century. This
is best encapsulated in the lamentations of Pavle Vidas, a Croatian traveller who
lived in Australia from 1889-1894, and whose diary is one of the precious few
written sources detailing the lives of Croatian pioneers. He notes,
Upon our arrival in Sydney, my friend from Hreljin and myself, met a Croat from
Primuda in Croatia who had a Hotel in Sydney. We told him that we were from
Croatia and he responded that we were Austrians as there was no country called
Croatia. Žali Bože, he didn’t even know where Croatia is, but is a Croatian like us!
At the time, at his hotel were several other Croats who also agreed with him and
stated that there was no Croatian ethnicity. When we heard such stupidities, my
friend and myself, although without money and no other place to go, decided to
leave the Hotel rather than waste our time with those ignorant idiots. 28

Exposed to the Illyrian movement, the Croatian National Revival, and the
development of a Croatian national identity, Vidas was appalled to find Croatians
in Australia unaware of their cultural and ethnic heritages, either uneducated or
unwilling to express their nationality. Though the tension between ‘real’
Croatians and those whose allegiances lie elsewhere was a defining characteristic
of the post-war community, this exchange demonstrates that the negotiation of
Croatian identity, closely tied with the political activism of the community, was
not a new phenomenon nor unique to the post-war period.
Although Croatians were more visible in Australia from the 1890s simply
because they were more numerous, they also began organising as a distinct
community. Like Vidas, the influence of the Illyrian movement can be found in
the organisation of these migrants not only as Croatians, but as ‘South-Slavs’,
incorporating the pan-Slavist ideals of the movement. This is best demonstrated
T.A. Mursalo, Isejenistvo Pavla Vidasa, (Johannesburg: Hensman Graphics, 1985), 18, as cited in M.
Tkalčević, Croats in Australia: An Information and Resource Guide (Burwood: Victoria College Press,
1988), 8.
28
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in the establishment of the first identifiably Croatian organisation, the CroatianSlavonic Society of Boulder-Kalgoorlie in 1912. It seems that at least at this
juncture in time, a Croatian identity and pan-Slavist ideals were not the mutually
exclusive pursuits they became after WWII. It is not difficult to imagine that as
an overwhelming minority in the face of such distance and isolation, organising
with people from a similar geographic area with similar cultures and languages,
under the banner of South-Slav may have had its own advantages, not least
because it was reinforced by Australian authorities who did not differentiate
between them.
Australia was not by any means the preferred destination for Croatian
emigration before WWI. As Banović points out, the emigration of at least half a
million Croatians from 1868 up until WWI constituted approximately 35% of the
total emigration from the Austro-Hungarian Empire for this period. Of this,
approximately 5% came to Australia - the overwhelming majority migrated to the
United States. 29 This can be attributed to the pull factors (or lack thereof) of
migration which determined Australia’s desirability as a migration destination.
Despite the exodus of people from Europe into new settler societies that
characterised the 19th Century, Australia was largely bypassed by these migrants
on the move.
The most significant reason for Australia’s marginalisation in the great
migrations of the nineteenth century was the most obvious – the tyranny of
distance. 30 Australia also had too small of an economy and population to produce
the opportunities afforded by North America, and was blemished by the stigma
associated with its convict population. These barriers to migration also held true
for Croatian emigration. Australia was too distant and too expensive a
destination, and not only was it easier to migrate to the United States, but
employment opportunities were better and easier to come by for the new migrant
Banović, ‘Push and Pull Factors’, 10.
This expression and theory was made popular by Geoffrey Blainey in his book of the same name, The
Tyranny of Distance: How distance shaped Australia’s history (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1966).
For the average European migrant, Australia was simply too far, too hard, and too expensive to reach.
Australia’s distance and expense also meant that emigration to Australia was with a view to
permanence, and thus held a high probability of never again returning home.
29
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in the United States, where wealth was faster and easier to accumulate in its
industrial-mining industries as compared to Australia’s agricultural industry. 31
Despite these barriers, Banović argues that Australia still remained an
attractive migration destination for Croatians - a sparse population that lent itself
to growth opportunities, an abundance of free agricultural land for farming, a
relatively developed livestock industry (most notably in sheep husbandry), rich
deposits in gold and opal for mining, and a relatively unrestricted immigration
policy. Western Australia was especially attractive to early Croatian migrants, as
it had similar conditions and industries to those in Dalmatia. The proximity to
the ocean and fishing industries was reminiscent of the rhythms of coastal life in
Dalmatia, while the climate and soil were similarly suited to winemaking. Finally,
as chain migration patterns were established towards the end of the century,
some Croatians migrated to Australia with the assistance of family and friends
who could, at the very least, secure temporary accommodation, assist in finding
employment, and help alleviate and navigate the social and cultural anxieties of
migration. 32
Due to the distance and expense involved, Australia’s relationship to
immigration in the 1800s was unburdened with the question of large numbers of
unassisted or unwanted arrivals, as was the case in the United States, and those
who reached Australia were able to be controlled, subjugated, or ostracised as
needed. The introduction of assisted passages to British subjects not only allowed
the colonial governments to decide when and how migrants came to Australia,
but also which migrants came. These conditions developed a long tradition of
determining the selection of incoming people, and thus gave Australia the ability
to, in effect, design its population. It comes as no surprise then, that one of the
first acts of Federal Parliament, the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, addressed
the role of immigration in the new federation. Though this Act was the central
piece of legislation which ushered in what would become known as the White
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Australia Policy, it was also only one in a series of acts, amendments, and
programmes which would develop over the years of White Australia’s existence. 33
The social logic of the White Australia Policy was steeped in rationales of
race determinism and mass nationalism which posited humans on a sliding scale
of whiteness. Proponents argued that racial homogeneity was essential to
national unity, prosperity, and the establishment of a democratic society, and
that non-Europeans, as a culturally and biologically different race, were incapable
of identifying with, or subscribing to, the values of white British Australia. This
social logic found economic expression in the prevention of entry of cheap goods
and cheap labour into Australia. It was argued that the manufacture of goods by
British Australians, coupled with government assistance in the development of
industries would keep living standards high by providing employment. The
prevention of ‘coloured’ labour would keep wages fair and reasonable by
preventing their entry into industrial relations as ‘cheap’ labour, and had the
added bonus of keeping the race homogenous, which was thought necessary for
the peaceful regulation of industrial relations.
This social and economic logic was buttressed by Australia’s geopolitical
reality and the profound anxieties caused by it. The tyranny of distance which
determined Australia’s peripheral status in the great migrations of the nineteenth
century also found expression as a fear of invasion. Perceived as an isolated
outpost of Western civilisation, Australia’s distance from Britain, coupled with
the sheer size of the Australian continent comparative to its very small
population, created a perception that Australia was liable to be overrun at any
given moment by those ‘lesser’ races surrounding it. 34 This anxiety was

As Markus explains, the policy ‘was concerned with racial purity in the widest sense,’ and can be
broadly categorised into three facets. The first is that with which the policy is most readily associated,
the control of population movement and the exclusion of non-European migration to Australia. The
second included measures to reduce the number of non-Europeans already in Australia, and finally, it
also aimed to segregate and ultimately eliminate the Indigenous population for the sake of racial
homogeneity.
See: A. Markus, ‘Of Continuities and Discontinuities: Reflections on a Century of Australian Immigration
Control’ in J. Jayasuriya, D. Walker, and J. Gothard (eds.), Legacies of White Australia: race, culture, and
nation (Crawley: University of Western Australia Press, 2003), 176.
34
Ibid., 177–78.
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particularly pronounced due to Australia’s uncomfortable proximity to the
‘awakening’ Asian continent, whose Chinese, Japanese, and Indian populations
were on the move in comparable numbers to those from the West. The
experience of Chinese immigration during the gold rushes of the 1850s only
served to reiterate the legitimacy of these anxieties, and for 60-odd years after its
introduction in 1901, the White Australia Policy enjoyed bipartisan and
overwhelming public support. As Kelly points out, this longevity and near
universal support was ‘testimony to the powerful economic and social logic
implicit in the policy.’ 35
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1.2. CROATIAN EMIGRATION IN THE INTERWAR
YEARS
Australia limited entry not only to British subjects from Asia, but also to southern
Europeans, who were regarded as being not quite ‘white’. 36

WWI served to strengthen Australia’s ties with the British Empire and
reinforced the White Australian vision of the future; that for reasons of national
unity and security, Australia should be predominantly British, that nonEuropeans should be denied entry, and that the indigenous population must
remain segregated from white British society. The issue of cheap labour was
exacerbated by wartime conditions, and led to the internment of various ethnic
groups deemed ‘enemy aliens’. Alongside others then considered ‘Slavs’,
approximately 740 Croatians were interned first in camps on Rottnest Island and
Torrens Island in Western Australia, and upon their closures in 1915, transported
across the country to the Holsworthy Internment Camp at Liverpool in New
South Wales. Ostensibly interned because of their official status as AustroHungarian citizens, Fischer argues that the real reason for the internment of
Croatians was ‘a campaign by mine workers unions over the question of ‘enemy
labour’ in the goldfields of Boulder-Kalgoorlie where [Croatians] were a sizeable
minority in the workforce.’ 37 While some were released at the end of the war,
most of the Croatian internees were deported from Australia in September 1919,
as citizens of the then non-existent Austro-Hungarian Empire. 38
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This internment and subsequent deportation occurred despite the fact that
many Croatians were outspoken in their opposition of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. Its rule over Croatia was considered culturally and economically
oppressive by the community in Australia, and had directly or indirectly caused
their migration in the first place. The first Croatian political organisation can be
dated to as early as 1910, with the establishment of a Peasant Party in Broken Hill
that produced its own small publication, Peasant News. 39 By WWI, it is clear that
Croatians were active in their denunciation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The
Croatian-Slavonic Society in Boulder-Kalgoorlie openly and actively collected
funds for the allied war effort and encouraged men to enlist, 40 while in North
Queensland, Croatians were encouraged to renounce their Austrian citizenship
and instead declare themselves Serbo-Croat or Croat. 41 Such was the activism of
the Boulder-Kalgoorlie community that in December 1915, the Boulder Police
Station and the Kalgoorlie Miner reported that tensions between those
advocating for or against the Austro-Hungarian Empire threatened to escalate in
violence and spill into the streets. 42
Interestingly, this political activism did not include a vision of Croatian
unification and the establishment of a Croatian state. Rather, as Tkalčević
explains, while some advocated to remain within the Empire (presumably under
better conditions), Croatian political activism mostly advocated either a panSlavist ideal of the unification of one people, or the utilitarian unification of the
different ‘South-Slavs’ against common threats. 43 Nevertheless, the anti-AustroHungarian position of Croatians was ‘clearly recognised by the Australian
Government which actively tried to recruit volunteers from among Slav
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migrants,' 44 and a Croatian contingent of the First Australian Imperial Force (AIF)
was created for the front in Salonika. The servicemen in the AIF contingent,
however, met a similar fate to their internee counterparts:
After the war some tried to get assisted passage back to Australia, [and] despite
being trained by Australians and travelling to Europe to fight for Australia, they
were not allowed to return on the navy ships with other Australians. 45

Their deportation and the failed repatriation of AIF servicemen reverberated
throughout the community, the legacy of which would inform the interwar
period.
In the aftermath of WWI, the introduction of immigration restrictions and
quotas in the United States redirected some of the immigration out of southern
Europe to Australia. A significant proportion of these Southern Europeans were
Croatian, and as conditions in Croatia deteriorated, a significant growth in
Croatian migration to Australia might have been anticipated. The Australian
Government, however, moved to restrict this immigration. The influx of
Croatians and other southern Europeans after the war was perceived as a threat
to employment prospects and conditions, and the wartime preoccupation of
labour re-emerged as the social, cultural, political, and economic nexus of the
White Australia Policy in the interwar period. In 1924 and 1925, the Australian
Government introduced quotas on those deemed problematic to Australia’s
Working Man’s Paradise. 46 This included Southern Europeans, who were
perceived as ‘not quite ‘white’, 47 and a potential source of cheap labour which
could undercut the employment prospects of British Australians.
Though these measures significantly restricted the entry of Croatians in the
interwar period, there was nonetheless a relative growth in Croatian migration. It
was also a period of significant expansion in community, social, sporting and
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cultural activity, with over 22 Croatian clubs formed. 48 As Banović argues, this
was because the pre-war economic pull factors of Australia also held during the
interwar years, and were even augmented by a number of additional reasons.
Australia’s accelerated urbanisation and industrialisation, the increased exchange
of information about Australia as a migration destination through chain and
return migration patterns, and the movement of Croatians already in Australia
into better paid employment, resulted in a better ability of those already in
Australia to help cover the costs of travel and initial settlement of new migrants,
and thus convince family and friends to migrate. 49 The most influential of pull
factors according to Banović, however, was the relative standards of living
between both countries. When considering the comparative differences in real
wages, living standards and earning potential between countries, Australia
boasted the highest standard of living during the interwar years, surpassing that
of both the United States and Canada. 50
Following WWI, Croatia found itself under another monarchy - the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Justified by the argument that the three were equal
'tribes' of a single, 'tri-named' nation, the Kingdom ostensibly fulfilled the panSlavist ideals of the Illyrian movement. 51 For Croatians, however, the reality
resembled more their subordination and grievances under the Austro-Hungarian
Empire than the promised equality with its South-Slav neighbours. The fear of
Magyarisation under Austro-Hungarian rule was replaced with a fear of
Serbianisation under the new monarchy. The issue of language reappeared, as
Serbian and the Cyrillic script became the lingua franca of the central
government. 52 Disputes over education, the centralisation of government, the
reduction in the powers of the Croatian Ban, and the dissolution of the Sabor yet
again, were all reminiscent of issues under Austro-Hungarian rule. Under the
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guise of agrarian reform, the government dispossessed Croat institutions of lands
which had been granted to them in perpetuity by the Austro-Hungarian
Government, while shutting down a number of departments at the University of
Zagreb, and somewhat bizarrely, transporting large quantities of books from
Croatia to Belgrade under the pretence that they were no longer needed in
Croatia. The monopoly of Serbians in governmental positions contributed to the
rising discontent, with Croatian republicans and communists finding themselves
barricading against the creeping monarchism of the Serbian Karadjordjević
dynasty. This was all underlined by a series of disputes, outrages, and
assassinations over the procedures of government and voting that dominated
politics for most of the 1920s. 53
Stjepan Radić, founder of the Croatian Peasant Party in 1904 (Hrvatska
Seljacka Stranka –HSS) was a leading figure in Croatia under Austro-Hungarian
rule and became a key politician within the new Kingdom. He campaigned under
a platform of opposition to the Kingdom itself politically, and Serb hegemony
culturally. Credited with turning the Croatian peasantry into a viable political
force, Radić and his party enjoyed overwhelming support throughout Croatia, in
spite of the considerable challenges imposed by the central government. 54 On 20
June 1928 these political tensions came to a head when Puniša Račić, leader of the
People’s Radical Party of Serbia (Narodna radikalna stranka – NRS), pulled out a
revolver and shot at five HSS representatives on the floor of the Parliament. Two
died instantly, and two were wounded but later recovered. Radić was the fifth
casualty, seriously wounded in the stomach.
The assassination attempt triggered a political crisis from which the Kingdom
never recovered. Less than an hour after news reached Zagreb, approximately
19,000 people gathered on the main square demanding the Sabor be reinstated in
order to separate Croatia from the Kingdom. As Radić succumbed to his injuries
ibid., 51-65.
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on 8 August 1928, the prevailing sentiment was that the attack on the leaders of
the HSS was an attack on the Croatian people. Radić’s funeral on 12 August
attracted crowds in the hundreds of thousands, and ‘resembled more the funeral
of a great monarch than of a one-time republican politician.’ 55 The death of Radić
‘turned into a political manifestation of massive proportions,’ 56 with the triune
Kingdom losing whatever legitimacy it may have held with the Croatian people.
Rather than allowing Croatia to separate, on 6 January 1929, King Aleksander I
Karadjordjević annulled the constitution, dissolved parliament, banned all
political parties, introduced harsh censorship of the press, and named a new
Government under a system of royal dictatorship. On 3 October 1929, this royal
dictatorship became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia served to further convince Croatians of their
political, economic, and cultural dispossession at the hands of Serb nationalism.
From April 1929, influential opposition leaders were arrested and imprisoned,
bands of ‘terrorists’, composed mostly of the police, were organised in order to
subdue dissidents, and a suite of legal reforms were introduced in an attempt to
reduce expenditure, corruption and regional differences. 57 However, as Bellamy
outlines,
Most critically for the historical statehood narrative, [the King] abolished the
former constituent entities (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and
Serbia) and introduced nine regional Banovine, which bore the names of rivers.
The name Croatia was removed from official use for the first time since it was
established in the medieval Triune Kingdom. To rub salt into the wounds,
Croatia and Dalmatia were again split into two entities. 58

Therefore the Croatian migrating during the interwar years was not dissimilar to
those pre-WWI; both were citizens under constitutional monarchies not of their
own choosing, both consisted of predominantly male peasants pushed out due to
economic reasons, and both saw their cultural identities threatened by a
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pervasive and persistent ‘Other’. The failure of yet another constitutional
monarchy - the third in less than 50 years - would have engendered some shared
anti-monarchic sentiments between the pre-war and inter-war migrants,
particularly when constitutional monarchies were the indirect cause of both
migrations.
Inter-war Croatian migration to Australia was also one marked by transience.
Between 1924-44, over half of those who came to Australia eventually returned to
Croatia, while during the Great Depression, more Croatians departed than
arrived. 59 Part of this can be attributed to the policy of emigration pursued by the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia which Hranilović describes as ‘round-about emigration’;
ideally workers would migrate in search of employment, earn their wealth
abroad, and return to the Kingdom when the nest-egg was large enough. 60 This
transience meant that information about conditions in Croatia under the
unstable politics of the Kingdom made its way to Australia, while information
about Australia and its Working Man’s Paradise made its way back to Croatia. 61 It
also meant that Croatians who migrated in this period would have had a minimal
influence on the composition and character of the community as a whole simply
because they did not have the opportunity to establish themselves within the
Australian milieu as did their pre-WWI counterparts.
The interwar years were characterised by a newfound public visibility of the
community, driven in part by an increase in their political activism. International
socialism was common to the political language of both Australia and Croatia. In
Australia, its ideals were considered possible answers to the economic, social, and
political problems facing the working class, including access to work,
employment conditions, and unionisation. 62 Poor working conditions in
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Australia, coupled with this rise of socialist and communist ideals within the
mass unions of industries Croatians were employed in, contributed to the
increased visibility of Croatian political activism, and soon found Croatians
participating alongside other Southern European and Australian workers. This
was made possible because these movements were able to overcome the ethnic
divisions that separated Southern Europeans from British Australia. Local
Australians and immigrants (of the working class at least) were able to find
common ground in shared employment experience, and a common language in
the ideals of international socialism or communism. 63
This political activism was centralised in 1928 with the establishment of the
Borbeni Radnički Pokret (Militant Workers Movement) in Broken Hill. The Pokret
was a left-wing organisation that supported the international socialist movement,
and in 1931 began publishing the first Croatian-language newspaper in Australia,
Borba (Struggle). At its 1932 National Conference it was decided that the
organisation relocate to Sydney and be renamed the Savez Jugoslavenskih
iseljenika u Australiji (Association of Yugoslav Immigrants in Australia - Savez).
This was done to better reflect the membership and political orientation of the
organisation, which embraced not just Croatians, but all South Slavs. Borba was
renamed Napredak (Progress) in 1936, and became the official newspaper of the
organisation. 64
The Savez initiated a number of political actions in support of the
international socialist movement, often co-ordinating with local labour and trade
union movements in industrial actions across Australia. The most notable of
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these included strikes in the mines at Broken Hill, 65 on the wood-lines of Western
Australia, 66 and in the cane-cutters strikes in Queensland. 67 Savez members were
active in trade unions, with some rising to prominent positions. 68 Such was the
political activism of the Savez that from January 1937, the Commonwealth
Investigation Branch (CIB) began surveillance of its members. 69 The leftist
political sentiment found within the pages of Napredak was also of interest to
authorities, and from 1940-1942 the Australian Government banned Napredak
from circulation.
With over 30 branches throughout Australia by the beginning of WWII,
Lalich argues that the Savez was an organisation of such size and scope that it is
difficult to find parallels both within and outside Croatia. 70 Aside from
participation in local industrial actions and newspaper publication, the Savez
concerned itself with a wide range of activities, including Croatian-language
instruction, the formation of drama societies and tamburica orchestras, and the
establishment of sporting and other recreational clubs. Unlike previous Croatian
organisations in Australia, the Savez was also actively concerned with
developments in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, disseminating information and
providing support for union and trade movements as well as communist-led
organisations within the Kingdom, and in fundraising for various causes. 71
Though the arrival destination of Croatian migration started to move
gradually from Western to Eastern Australia, the community in BoulderKalgoorlie retained its importance in the interwar period. It is no surprise that
the interwar frustrations of poor working conditions, the rising racialisation of
labour forces, and inherent disputes in industrial relations which characterised
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the 1930s, culminated in what was reported as a ‘Night of Unbridled Rioting.’ 72
The growing resentment and suspicion of the sizeable non-British mining
populations turned the accidental death of a British-Australian during a brawl
into a demand for all mine-owners to dismiss southern European miners and
employees. The ensuing rioting resulted in three deaths, including that of
Croatian Josip Katić, the looting and destruction of southern European shops,
hotels and clubs, including the hall of the Croatian-Slavonic Society, and the
torching of more than 50 homes in the residential area populated by southern
Europeans. Such was the violence, local forces were unable to control the rioters,
advising migrants to flee and take refuge in the surrounding bush until the arrival
of reinforcements from Perth some three days later. Though subsequent judicial
inquiries exonerated the southern Europeans, and even resulted in official
compensation and charitable drives, the anxiety and insecurity the riot bred
slowly created an exodus of the southern Europeans to Perth and its surrounding
farms and vineyards, and the decline of Boulder-Kalgoorlie as the epicentre of
Croatian migration. 73
In Croatia, international socialism was touted as the answer to the problems
of constitutional monarchy and capitalism, and a communist Yugoslav state the
only real political expression of pan-South-Slav unity. The Croatian peasantry,
under the influence of Radić, had become politicised in the interwar years, and
politics in the aftermath of Radić’s assassination trended towards extremism,
with the emergence of both left and right wing political movements as answers to
the problems of constitutional monarchies - a situation not dissimilar to political
developments throughout the rest of Europe. Coupled with the fact that the
Yugoslav Communist Party had a strong following in Dalmatia prior to its
suppression, this meant that those emigrating during the interwar years were
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more likely to be sympathetic to communist ideals, or to be apolitical. 74 As Price
explains,
more politically conscious peasants and labourers tended to stay in Europe in
order to take part in political activities; the less politically conscious were
inclined to leave their native land and settle overseas. 75

Some were politicised upon arrival in Australia, ‘shocked by the hostility to
immigrants, especially in the industrial areas where unemployment was high.’ 76
For others, there was not much choice; more than 90% of Croatians in Australia
were organised around the Savez during the interwar years, and the few
monarchists who existed were completely ostracised. 77 That communism was
already a feature of Australian political life and the Croatian community, while
far-right movements such as fascism were less so, obscured any non-communist
Croatians that may have migrated during the interwar years.

In the purge of opposition leaders following the proclamation of the royal dictatorship, communists
and communist sympathisers found themselves targeted; according to Ramet, between 1929 and 1930
alone, 36 trials involving 357 communists were conducted, while others were murdered or alleged to
have committed suicide after being taken into custody.
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1.3. WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH
Violence occurred in many directions. Religious, ethnic, social and political
motives for persecution overlapped, both nationally and locally. Boundaries
between victims and perpetrators were often blurred; collective violence
was interactive, procedural and permanently changing. 78

The interwar years politicised the people of Yugoslavia, particularly
Croatians, and resulted in competing visions for Croatian statehood and the
future it should take. WWII and the unconditional surrender of the Royal
Yugoslav Army on 17 April 1941 plunged the territory of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia into a ruthless war between rival forces. This had devastating
consequences throughout the entire region, and cast a long and dark shadow on
the post-war community – one that still reverberates in the present day. The
struggle for Croatia was concentrated between the Croatian Ustaša, Serbian
Četnik, and Yugoslav Partisan forces. However, a number of ancillary forces,
militias, and groups were also involved, all of whom collaborated with and fought
against each other in the name of the various ideals and aims they represented. 79
Both the Ustaša and the Četniks were nationalist-oriented movements
concerned with the emancipation and independence of their people. Led by Dr
Ante Pavelić, the Ustaša was a movement that advocated ‘with all means
possible – including armed uprising – to liberate Croatia from alien rule and
establish a completely free and independent state over the whole of its national
and historic territory.’ 80 The Četniks were led by Draža Mihailović, and
comprised of Serbian royalists whose aim was to ‘realize a vision of an ethnically
homogenous greater Serbian state, which they intended to advance, in the short
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run, by a policy of collaboration with Axis forces.’ 81 The Yugoslav Partisans, on
the other hand, were an anti-Axis and anti-nationalist force led by Josip Broz
Tito who advocated for a fully realised ‘Yugoslav’ society organised under a
communist state, in which all the various groups in the Yugoslav region would
become equal via a social revolution. By the end of the war, Tito’s Partisans
would reign victorious, but not before over 1 million victims across the territory
of Yugoslavia had perished. 82

1.3.1. THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA
Pavelić first achieved national prominence in 1927 as a deputy of the
Trumbić-Pavelić bloc, a hard-line Croat nationalist party, and though it did not
enjoy widespread support, the bloc was popular in Zagreb. A day after King
Aleksander suspended parliamentary government in 1929, Pavelić set up the
Ustaša - Hrvatski Oslobodilački Pokret (Croatian Liberation Movement) in
Zagreb. 83 Pavelić and his followers were quickly forced into exile in order to
escape imprisonment by the royal dictatorship of King Aleksander, and in
November 1929 the courts in Belgrade sentenced Pavelić to death for publicly
advocating the overthrow of the state. As Tanner explains, this helped to
legitimise Pavelić as a national leader in the poisoned political atmosphere of
Croatia in the aftermath of Radic’s death and the dissolution of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes - ‘Pavelić’s sentence contrasted markedly with that of

Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 145.
The literature concerning the territories of Yugoslavia during WWII is extremely vast, highly partisan,
and somewhat inaccessible for those not extremely well versed in the topic. However, Tomasevich’s,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia is highly esteemed and often recommended as a starting point.
Particularly important is his discussion of demographic and real wartime losses of the ‘Alleged and True
Population Losses’ chapter. This includes contextual information regarding the calculation of such
figures, incorporating the issue of historical over- and under-representation of these figures. Sabrina
Ramet’s chapter ‘World War Two and the Partisan Struggle, 1941-1945,’ albeit considerably shorter, is
also a worthwhile read, framing the experiences of WWII in relation to the challenges of state-building
and legitimacy which would come to define the establishment and collapse of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945, 718-750.
Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 113-162.
83
Tanner, Croatia, 124–25.
81
82

52

[Puniša] Račić, who was sentenced to only twenty years, in spite of killing three
deputies in the parliament.’ 84
While in exile, the Ustaša engaged in a series of operations which frustrated
Belgrade authorities, reaching their zenith in 1934 with the assassination of King
Aleksander on a state visit to Marseilles, France. This further cemented Pavelić’s
reputation and that of the Ustaša as synonymous with the struggle for Croatian
independence. The assassination, however, also led to the internment of Pavelić
and his associates by Italy’s Prime Minister Benito Mussolini, driving the
movement underground where it silently continued to organise and recruit
members in Zagreb by Pavelić’s right-hand man Slavko Kvaternik, and in cities as
disparate and distant as Vienna, Pittsburgh and Buenos Aires. 85
Following the German invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941, the Ustaša
seized the opportunity to realise its dream. On 8 April, a number of Ustaša
supporters revolted against their officers in the Yugoslav army and proclaimed
Croatia’s independence in Bjelovar. On 10 April, Kvaternik proclaimed the
establishment of the Independent State of Croatia - Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska
(NDH) on Zagreb Radio, declaring Pavelić its Poglavnik (leader) with the backing
of both Italian and German authorities. For the Italians, Pavelić was ‘their man’
through his association with Mussolini and his residence in Italy. Fearing that the
German invasion would get in the way of their plans for Dalmatia, the Italians
tried to ensure Pavelić’s leadership as soon as Mussolini had been informed of
German plans to invade. 86 For the Germans, the leader of the HSS, Vladko Maček,
had been their preferred leader, as they were impressed by his widespread
popularity, control of military, and credibility in dealing with the Yugoslav
government in the years preceding 1941. In late March, German agents in Zagreb
had contacted Maček and offered him governance of an independent Croatia,
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however Maček refused to collaborate with the Germans. 87 Thus, with seemingly
no other viable candidate, Pavelić and his Ustaša came to power by default.
Even with the Ustaša in power, the NDH was not exactly the independent
state Croatians had yearned for. Ustaša power was restricted and the territories
divided into German and Italian occupation zones. In the German zone however,
German presence was minimal after political and economic interests had been
secured, and the Ustaša was free to implement its vision for the state. The regime
portrayed itself as the next iteration of Croatian nationalism, laying false claim to
the legacies of key figures in Croatia’s past to legitimise their leadership. 88 Armed
with a political programme prepared during their exile, and with Pavelić
governing via decree rather than parliamentary process, the Ustaša introduced a
suite of racial and discriminatory laws that brought the brutality of the regime
quickly to the fore. The regime called for the eradication of Serbs, Jews and the
Roma, as well as Croats and Muslims found guilty of 'un-Croatian behaviour’, i.e.
any non-Ustaša Croatians who expressed alternative political opinions. 89 There
was an expectation by the regime that it was not enough to simply be Croatian,
but that
In the Ustasha state, created by the Poglavnik and his Ustashas, people must
think like Ustashas, speak like Ustashas, and – most important of all – act like
Ustasha. 90

Thus, to have been anything other than an Ustaša in the territory of the NDH was
to put oneself at risk of persecution and death. 91
Though Pavelić and his regime enjoyed the limited support of the Croatian
people initially, it was short-lived and as early as the end of 1941 dissatisfaction
with the regime was rife, due to both the brutality of the regime and to the
annexation of almost the entire Croatian coastline (where 90% of the population
was Croatian) to Italy through the Rome Agreement of 18 May 1941. Support for
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the Ustaša was strongest amongst the less educated classes and the poor regions
of the Dinaric Alps, and from Croatians throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina who
were happy to have been territorially incorporated into the NDH. These regions
also bore the brunt of the mass violence of WWII, where ‘Ustaša violence became
radicalized, justified or even provoked by counter violence committed by the
Četniks or the Partisans and was affected by events that were beyond the Ustaša
leadership’s control.’ 92
That the regime fashioned itself as a natural expression of the desire for a
sovereign Croatian state resulted in an overlap of nationalist sentiment between
the regime and the people. Due to the disproportionate power and influence
granted to the Ustaša by German authorities, it has been argued that the regime
was suffered by the people in exchange for the longed-for independent state; a
warped sense of quid pro quo. While Bellamy suggests that this argument may be
more reflective of Croatian historical revisionism in the 1990s, 93 historians appear
to make a distinction between support for the Ustaša and support for a sovereign
Croatian state, arguing that while most Croatians supported the state, only a
minority supported the Ustasa regime itself. 94 Croatians were for the most part
still faithful to the HSS, or more sympathetic to the communists than the Ustaša.
For members of the HSS, the instruction by Maček to co-operate with the new
government via radio on the day of the NDH’s establishment had been
instrumental in ensuring the support of the Ustaša in the early days of the
regime. 95 Maček’s ‘ambiguous proclamation,’ Ramet argues, ‘played a role in
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encouraging almost all village mayors to cooperate with the new regime.’ 96 It
seems that, at least for those who were decidedly anti-communist, there was little
else to choose.
The demarcation between regime and state also manifested itself in the
organisation of the armed forces, itself an amalgamation of three disparate, and
often competing, forces – the Croatian Home Guard (Domobrani); the Ustaša
Militia; and the Croatian Gendarmerie (Hrvatsko Oružništvo). The Domobrani
were the official army, navy, and air force of the state, and comprised of both
volunteers and conscripts, including officers who had served in the armies of
Austria-Hungary or the interwar Kingdoms. 97 The militia, on the other hand was
the party army of the regime and enjoyed the privilege of its post. It was mostly
populated with volunteers who were members of the movement, its officers not
professionally trained but faithful and loyal to the regime and its Poglavnik. As
Tomasevich explains,
Ideologically, a wide gulf existed between the militia and the army. The army was
not politically indoctrinated, while the militia was indoctrinated in Ustasha
ideology and was dedicated to the defense of the Ustasha regime and its leader. 98

This ideological rift left the two forces vying against each other for both
legitimacy and resources. The regime discriminated against the army in favour of
the militia, and both were deeply mistrustful of the other, at times in direct
conflict and at others endeavouring to subsume the other within its own
structures. 99 The Croatian Gendarmerie, on the other hand, was somewhat
different in nature to both the army and the militia and consisted of professional
officers, and was at first a special attachment to the army, but transferred to the
militia in June 1942 - a move greatly resented within the Gendarmerie. 100 Further
complicating the issue was that ‘Croats served not only in the Croatian armed
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forces, but also, on the basis of various agreements, in purely German units, in
mixed German-Croatian units, and even in an Italian-Croatian legion.’ 101
This confusion of rival factions, formation, disbandment, and reformation
under different authorities, was exacerbated by a general lack of resources,
cohesion, and allegiance to any one particular cause, force, or leader.
Unsurprisingly, this led to a high number of desertions from the NDH to the
Partisans, particularly from the Domobrani who were not only the least
supportive of the regime, but also bore the brunt of both Ustaša discrimination
and German exploitation. By the time of the unification of the Domobrani and
the militia under the formal control of the Ustaša and Pavelić in late 1944, those
that were left within the ranks of both forces were the uncompromising faithful,
unwavering in their support for either the Ustasha or a non-communist
independent Croatian state.
Wary of the impending victory of Tito and his Partisans and what this might
mean for them, anti-communist forces on Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian sides,
including Muslims, fled the country with a large number of civilians. By midMay 1945, these troops and their dependents had crossed into Austria and
surrendered to the British, convinced their shared anti-communist sentiments
would keep them safe from Tito and any reprisals he may enact. This fear proved
to be not unfounded - for Tito, these individuals represented an imminent and
egregious threat to his legitimacy and the establishment of his communist state.
However, as Ramet explains, ‘for reasons which continue to be the subject of
controversy, the British disarmed them and sent these refugees back to
Yugoslavia, turning them over to the Partisans.’ 102 Tito’s Partisans proceeded to
massacre these refugees at Bleiburg, Kočevski Rog, and other places along the
death marches that became known as the ‘Way of the Cross,’ with some
survivors walking up to 1,000km to the end destination. 103
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1.3.2. TITO’S YUGOSLAVIA
In the immediate aftermath of WWII, the rise of non-communist, anti-fascist
parties were perceived as a threat to the legitimacy of the new state, and ‘in order
to establish their organizational monopoly… the communists had to smash the
incipient pluralism; to accomplish this, they were prepared to use the
instruments at their disposal, including extralegal ones.’ 104 Thus, in Tito’s
Yugoslavia, to have been anything other than a communist Partisan during the
war was to put yourself at risk of persecution and death, and there was no one
Tito saw as more of a threat to his power than the Ustaša;
Tito for his part wanted to annihilate as many of the Ustashe[sic] as possible.
Now that control over the whole of Yugoslavia was within his grasp, he was
determined not to allow the NDH to recoup its strength in exile, or filter back
into the country as an anti-Communist fifth element. 105

To achieve this, Tito followed the same strategies as other communist leaders
throughout East Central Europe to pacify opposition: the liquidation of
opponents, including prominent individuals, as well as civilian anti-communists;
trials against ‘uncooperative’ prelates; the deposition of heads of rival regimes;
defamation and de-legitimation of non-communist politicians; banishment of
kings and royal families; strict censorship of the press; and the destruction of
political pluralism and parliamentary life. 106
Leaving Yugoslavia, either to escape persecution, out of protest, or simply in
the search of economic opportunity, was not a straightforward solution. As part
of his process of legitimisation and power consolidation, Tito effectively closed
over- and under-estimation. Some Croatian émigré writers place the number of refuges at 25,000, while
others at upwards of 300,000, with the total number of victims anywhere between those figures. Most
historians, however, now seem to accept Vladimir Žerjavić’s estimations of Croatian casualties (and that
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125,000 Ustaša forces, Croatian army troops and Muslims were killed during the war and on the
Austrian border in 1945. Of these, 60,000 were killed on the border in 1945, with almost 50,000 killed in
connection with the events at Bleiburg, and the further 10,000 in Slovenia and elsewhere. When Serbian
and Slovenian victims are added in, a total of 70,000 deaths can be attributed to events at Bleiburg and
Kočevski Rog.
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the borders of the Yugoslav state. This, Zimmerman argues, led to a profound
reorientation in attitudes towards migration. Where migration was once seen as
an ordinary response to various political, social, and economic conditions in the
years preceding WWII, it was now an act akin to treason, and ‘those that went
abroad were generally severing their ties with the Yugoslav political system and
migrating for reasons that were either political or viewed as being political.’ 107
The strict regulation of the movement of Yugoslav and non-Yugoslav persons
alike in an attempt to insulate the people of Yugoslavia from the outside world,
predominantly from émigré dissidents, meant that those escaping potential
persecution had to do so by illegally crossing the borders of Yugoslavia.
If emigration from Yugoslavia was a politicised act against the state, Tito and
his government also politicised the act of repatriation as support for the state.
The establishment of a communist Yugoslavia with the charismatic Tito at its
head promising a new egalitarian utopia proved sufficiently alluring to those that
had emigrated in the interwar years, whether out of nostalgia or out of socialist
idealism. From 1945-1949, approximately 15,000 Yugoslavs throughout the world
repatriated to Yugoslavia, while in 1948 and 1949, approximately 4060 Yugoslavs
returned via the government-owned ships Partizanka and Radnik. 108 What started
as a spontaneous collective act of repatriation in response to the end of WWII
became an organised and politicised action by the Yugoslav government who
purchased the ships in 1947 in order to aid the return of diaspora Yugoslavs.

1.3.3. WWII AND AUSTRALIA
The outbreak of the Second World War only added to the swirling discontent
Croatians in Australia found themselves in towards the end of the interwar
period. As with WWI, Croatians were once again vilified and interned as enemy
aliens, and much of this echoed the internment practices of WWI. Croatians were
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again interned not because of their Croatian identity but because of their
Yugoslav citizenship. Interment was again concentrated in Western Australia,
and union pressure in a protracted industrial dispute once more underscored the
reason for their internment. 109 With communism the perceived solution to
problems both in Australia and Croatia, Croatians in Australia lent their support
to Tito and his Partisan troops during WWII, establishing the Yugoslav Red Cross
Fund in response to the Axis attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941. In 1943 alone, the
Savez raised over £106 000 in financial and material support, was active in the
‘Sheepskins for Russia’ campaign, and encouraged its members to join the
Australian armed forces. 110
Tito’s repatriation efforts of 1948/9 had a significant impact on the Croatian
community in Australia. Approximately 1,250 of those that repatriated via the
Partizanka and Radnik came from Australia, 52% of which were Croatian. 111
Promises from the Yugoslav Government that repatriates would be well looked
after, propaganda which stressed the need for material and financial aid in
postwar reconstruction, as well as the need for labour in order to kick-start
industrialisation, and regular articles promoting repatriation in Napredak created
a general climate of return, which one eyewitness described as a ‘frenzied
movement of people endlessly intoxicated by an idealised patriotism!’ 112 As Lalich
points out, this repatriation effort was the ‘largest organised voluntary collective
departure of members of an ethnic community in Australia.’ 113
Though statistically small by present standards, this repatriation was felt as
an exodus and described by Calwell as such. 114 The effect of this sudden mass
departure on the community was profound;
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The small community was well acquainted with one another, socialising at work,
at picnics, evening dances, at homes, and then suddenly a large portion left,
leaving behind a void.’ 115

Aside from the numerical significance of the repatriation, the exodus also
shattered the ideological foundations of the community. It depleted the Savez of
its leaders, members, and influence, at a time when the anti-communist policies
of the Australian government were making it difficult for the Savez to remain a
viable organisation for the Croatian community to organise around, and
communism an impossible ideal to sustain under the anti-communist policies of
Menzies. 116 Further fracturing the organisation was the Tito-Stalin split of 1948,
which caused bitter factional disputes within the organisation.
At the same time that the Savez was fracturing and left-leaning, Yugoslavoriented Croatians were leaving Australia, right-leaning, nationalist-oriented
Croatians were arriving as part of Australia’s postwar immigration programme.
WWII had profoundly changed Australia’s relationship with immigration. The
Pacific Crisis had come perilously close to fulfilling colonial prophesies of
invasion from the north. Australia’s reliance on American, rather than British,
assistance heightened Australia’s long-standing sense of isolation from the rest of
the Empire, and crushed whatever vestiges of reliance on British protection had
remained in the interwar years. The war also cemented Australia’s need for
defensive and economic self-sufficiency, as it had highlighted Australia’s limited
capacity to produce manufactured goods. Coupled with the casualties of war and
the declining birth rate, Australia was left feeling particularly exposed. As early as
1942 the Curtin Government had begun to plan for post-war reconstruction, to be
characterised by economic security, higher living standards, and social equality.
Economists advised that without large-scale population growth, Australia’s
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labour supply would not be able to sustain the economic development needed,
while demographers warned that without immigration to offset the declining
birth rate, population would decrease at an alarming pace. 117
These warnings and the concerns for security that the war had engendered
led to the belief that Australia needed to populate, and needed to do it fast if it
was to have a future. Thus, it was decided even before the war had ended that a
radical reconfiguration of immigration was needed in Australia’s post-war
reconstruction. By 1943, the Interdepartmental Committee on Post-War
Migration was established in order to investigate and report specifically on the
creation, planning, and implementation of a post-war immigration policy. 118 Two
years later on 2 August 1945, Calwell gave his first Ministerial Statement as the
newly appointed Immigration Minister. Although policy details were vague,
Calwell’s Ministerial Statement disclosed four notable departures from Australia’s
previous approaches to immigration. 119
First, Calwell associated immigration to population growth rather than
population restriction, and set quantifiable targets, rather than quotas. This
changed the nature of immigration planning from the short to the long-term, and
from a predominantly reactive enterprise to a proactive one. Second, where
economic prosperity was once seen as a pre-condition for immigration, Calwell
now positioned immigration as the means to economic prosperity. Third, while
Australia’s future was once thought to be dependent on rural development and
agriculture, Calwell fashioned industrialisation and suburbanisation as the twin
pillars of post-war reconstruction. Finally, though not directly, Calwell suggested
that a move away from Australia’s long-standing tradition of sourcing migrants
exclusively from Britain should be considered.
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Shortly after this Ministerial Statement, Calwell convened the Immigration
Advisory Committee and charged it with a fact-finding mission on the emigration
potential of Britain and western Europe. The committee found ‘considerable
popular enthusiasm, and strong governmental and business support for
emigration from the UK, but only mixed prospects in northern and western
Europe.’ 120 This meant that, at least initially, Calwell’s immigration policy did not
differ much from its predecessors. However, by 1947 it became apparent that
British immigration alone would not be able to overcome the labour and material
shortages needed by the expanding economy, which had reached full
employment.
Calwell thus embarked on a 12-week, 23 country tour to see whether the net
could be cast wider. What he found was a Europe brimming with refugees that
could fulfil Australia’s labour demands, and an organisation, the International
Refugee Organisation (IRO), willing to provide the elusive and expensive
shipping required to get them to Australia. Thus, the Displaced Persons (DP)
scheme was created, and though only in effect until 1953, it was responsible for
the arrival of approximately 170,000 migrants to Australia. The consequences of
this first experiment with mass non-British immigration proved far-reaching, not
only establishing that Australia’s future was no longer tethered to British
immigration alone, but also opening the door for waves of assisted passage
agreements with other countries. 121 As Australia was turning its immigration tap
on, Croatia’s hitherto primary immigration destination, the United States, opted
to keep theirs down to a small trickle by re-committing to the interwar system of
immigration restrictions. These restrictions helped propel Croatian emigration
towards Australia, and by 1954 the community almost tripled its 1947 size. 122
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1.4. POST-WWII EMIGRATION
Somewhere on the seas of the Indian ocean, the boats of Yugoslav-oriented
repatriates crossed with the boats of nationalist-oriented Croatians on their way to
Australia. 123

Unlike their pre-war predecessors who were characterised by their relative
homogeneity, post-war Croatian migrants were a thoroughly heterogeneous
group. They migrated from a variety of places - rural, urban, within, and outside
modern-day Croatia - were of varying socio-economic backgrounds, and included
men and women of different ages and marital status, as well as children. Rather
than settling in regional cities built around particular industries, such as Broken
Hill and Boulder-Kalgoorlie, post-war migrants settled in Australia’s capital cities
and large regional centres, such as Newcastle, Wollongong and Geelong,
favouring the East coast over the West. Post-war Croatian migration, however,
was not a singular phenomenon, and comprised of four different waves, each
with its own particular set of characteristics and reasons for migration. Croatian
migrants can themselves also be loosely categorised into five groups; displaced
persons, political migrants, economic migrants, refugees, and family reunion
migrants. 124

1.4.1. DISPLACED PERSONS AND POLITICAL REFUGEES, 1947-1959
The first wave of post-war Croatian migration included those who came
under the DP scheme until 1953 and those who illegally crossed Yugoslavia’s
borders and entered official refugee programs as political migrants in
neighbouring countries. Given Croatia’s wartime experience, and Tito’s
persecutions in the aftermath, it is no surprise to find that this first wave was
mostly comprised of those that had served in the defeated armies of the NDH and
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their families. 125 Often categorised as refugees or political migrants, for the small
handful that could be categorised as economic migrants, the act of migration
itself had become a politicised act, at least in the eyes of the Yugoslav
Government. Whether pro-Ustaša, pro-Croatian independence, or simply anticommunist, one thing was for certain: these people were fiercely nationalistic and
vehemently anti-Yugoslav, run out of their homeland by the communist rule they
had wished to avoid, risking their own lives and those of their families in their
escape.
Across all migrant groups, the ambitious Australian post-war immigration
programme created a number of overt and covert issues which were
unanticipated, ignored, or held little political capital to policy makers. In the
absence of government assistance, ‘immigrants resorted to mutual help to solve
collectively experienced problems.’ 126 Existing Yugoslav organisations were
spurned as the concept of a ‘Yugoslav’ nationality, with a unified Yugoslav state
based on this identity, was anathema to the entire wartime experience of this new
cohort of Croatians. To have escaped the clutches of Tito’s Yugoslavia, only to
find themselves classified as Yugoslavs in Australia and directed towards
Yugoslav organisations was an insult of great proportions. 127 Thus, these ‘New
Australians’ set about establishing organisations under the Croatian name to help
with navigating the pressing issues of accommodation, work, and language, while
providing venues for social activities in order to mitigate the feelings of
displacement and loneliness migration had caused. 128
Though arguably uncharacteristic of other migrant groups, when considering
the wartime experience of Croatians migrating and establishing these new
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community structures, it is altogether understandable that the issue of Croatian
independence would become central to organisational life and give the
community a particular and political impetus for its actions. Politicised by the
interwar years, and roused by the war, these migrants believed that it was their
duty to maintain the struggle for Croatian independence now that they had
access to a democracy and its resources of free speech, protest, and political
advocacy, relatively free of the consequences such actions back home could
bring. The views of these DPs were only reinforced with the return to Australia of
the 1948/49 repatriates, who, disillusioned with the Yugoslav Government and its
promises of a communist utopia, began returning to Australia as early as the
1950s. These repatriates were at a minimum anti-Yugoslav, if not completely anticommunist. 129

1.4.2 ECONOMIC (AND POLITICAL) MIGRATION – 1960-1979
The next wave of post-war Croatian migration consisted predominantly of
economic migrants, with the largest numbers arriving after the opening up of
Yugoslavia’s borders to combat rising unemployment of the early 1960s. With
migration accepted and even encouraged by the Yugoslav state, the decision to
emigrate became available to a much wider demographic, and Croatian migration
to Australia increased to numbers unparalleled either before or after. This
emigration received legal reinforcement with the bilateral agreement between
Yugoslavia and Australia in 1970, which proved to be a significant pull factor of
Croatian emigration to Australia. The legal pull factors, Banović argues, were
augmented by the same economic pull factors that characterised the interwar
years, as the difference in real wages and the standard of living between
Yugoslavia and Australia became even larger in the post-war period. 130
Initially, Yugoslav migration was a Croatian affair. By 1971, Croatians made up
slightly more than one-fifth of the total Yugoslav population, yet accounted for
129
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39% of Yugoslavs abroad. Though the 1970 bilateral agreement led to an increase
in Croatian migration to Australia, it also led to the increased migration of other
Yugoslavs, diminishing the traditional Croatian dominance of Yugoslav
migration. That Australia officially recorded these migrations as ‘Yugoslav’ makes
it difficult to know the exact size of Croatian migration during this period.
Notwithstanding, Croatians still made up a large proportion of Yugoslav
migration, and between 1961 and 1976, the number of ‘Yugoslav-Born’ people in
Australia increased from 49,776 to 143,591. The two year period between 1970 and
1971 was the most substantial period of Yugoslav-born migration to Australia,
with approximately 53,363 arrivals. By 1972, however, the number of arrivals
halved, and from 1975, failed to reach over 5000 arrivals/year until 1994, with the
arrival of refugees from the 1990s wars of independence. 131
Not only were Croatians migrating at unprecedented levels, but they were
even more diverse than the first wave of postwar migrants. This resulted in a
greater diversity of cultural practice and across a wide variety of issues – from
questions of identity formation and tradition, wartime experience, to political
belief. This heterogeneity of views in part precipitated the gradual move from the
political and welfare organisations of the 1950s to the social and cultural
organisations that would define organisational life in the 1960s and 1970s. The
political platform outlined by the first post-war organisations did not always fully
coincide with the views of those arriving during the years of economic migration.
This was particularly the case in the aftermath of the Croatian Spring in 1971, 132
which resulted in the establishment of new organisations yet again.
Where the Croatian migrant to Australia remained homogenous, however,
was on the question of class. The majority of Croatians migrating during this
period were drawn from the working class, as this was where the greatest surplus
of Yugoslav labour lay. Unlike their predecessors in Australia, who for the most
part were uneducated and mostly illiterate peasants from villages, these migrants
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were skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labourers with at least 4-7 years of
completed schooling. 133 Due to Australia’s immigration policies at the time,
however, those that may have been better educated would have nonetheless
found themselves employed in working class positions, as this was where
Australian labour shortages lay and thus the types of jobs available to migrants.
Australia’s comparatively open post-war immigration program and consistent
high standard of living remained the predominant pull factor of immigration
during this period. As migrants poured into Australia in unprecedented numbers,
they radically reconfigured the life of the nation, prompting changes in economic
and legal structures, as well as socio-cultural and environmental change. The
reason the Australian Government was able to accept immigrants for so long,
however, was due to changes in the social and cultural place of migrants in
Australian society; that is, in the abandonment of the White Australia Policy and
the adoption of multicultural policy in its place. This afforded a wealth of
opportunity for Croatian migrants already in Australia as it allowed, and in fact
encouraged, Croatians to express their cultural identity. That multiculturalism
stressed ethnicity over nationality meant that Croatians were able to legitimately
advocate as Croatians and bypass the issues raised by Yugoslav citizenship.
Furthermore, Croatian political activism was able to resume its traditional
patterns in advocating for identity recognition through campaigns for access to
services, including that most Croatian of proxy battlegrounds, language
recognition. At the same time that Croatians were enjoying their newfound
visibility in Australian society, Croatian migration to Australia was decreasing at
a rapid rate. Whitlam’s reduction of immigration to a well-controlled minimum
significantly reduced the political and legal ease of migration Croatians had
hitherto enjoyed.
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1.4.3. PROFESSIONAL ECONOMIC MIGRATION – 1980-1990
The third wave of migration was characterised by a high proportion of
economic migrants from the professional, rather than working, classes pursuing
career advancement and a higher standard of living, often with the aim of living
in the ‘western’ world. 134 The death of Tito in 1980 ended an era spanning 35
years, and as much as time stood still out of grief, it did so out of fear as well. Tito
had left behind ‘a system in a state of paralysis, unable to cure itself.’ 135 The
greatest threat to the post-Tito regime was economic collapse. The economy had
deteriorated to near-catastrophic proportions in the last years of Tito’s life, and it
was only in late 1981 that a federal commission was established to examine the
crisis. By this time, Yugoslavia’s external debts had already ballooned to a total of
approximately $US 20bn, and the new federal government found it could not
service the debt. Though the political interest of the West in keeping Yugoslavia
in tact meant that partial moratoriums were granted and international banking
institutions continued to fund the state, the debt continued to place immense
pressure on the economy.
In the face of these economic and political hardships, some standards across
Croatia saw improvement, and the most significant of these was the Croatian
‘education boom’ of the 1970s. This boom produced a new class of professionals
engaged with both the interior life of Yugoslavia and that of the world outside.
Despite efforts by the collective leadership to minimise the burgeoning economic
and political crisis, ‘a literate, urbanized population could hardly be kept in the
dark about the growing crisis around them, especially as so many people had
extensive contacts abroad.’ 136 Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, where the Croatians
emigrating were mostly labourers and tradesmen of the working class, Croatian
migration in the 1980s was mostly made up of professionals and academics that
could not fulfil their social and professional aspirations within the Yugoslav
context. They migrated to the West in search of a higher standard of living and
V. Colic-Peisker, ‘’Ethnic’ and ‘Cosmopolitan’ Transnationalism: Two Cohorts of Croatian Immigrants
in Australia’, Migracijske i Etničke Teme, 22(3), 2006, 211-230.
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opportunities for career progression. The Yugoslav ‘brain drain’ resulted in the
migration of Croatians who were educated, upwardly mobile, and usually with
some English language proficiency.
This cohort of Croatian migrants was also encouraged from Australian
quarters, as the Fraser Government moved towards economic rationalism in
immigration policy. Whereas before the 1980s immigrants were deliberately
attracted by assisted passages and government-led recruiting drives, entry for
migrants has become comparatively more difficult and no government-based
incentives have since been provided. 137 The introduction of the Numerical
Multifactor Assessment System (NUMAS) in 1979, based on a flexible allocation
of points, paved the way for a fundamental change in the way immigration was to
be understood. It applied a human capital approach to immigration, whereby
points could be adjusted to meet particular occupational or educational shortages
or surpluses. Though it did not apply to family reunion or refugee admission,
NUMAS was nevertheless designed to only allow entry to those migrants deemed
economically viable. Like Whitlam’s reduction of immigration to a wellcontrolled minimum, Fraser’s introduction of a demand-driven system also
significantly reduced the political and legal ease of Croatian migration. However,
the introduction of NUMAS encouraged skilled, English-speaking Croatians to
migrate to Australia instead of the traditional unskilled and non-English speaking
migrants of the 1950-60s, and thus significantly changed the composition of the
Croatian community in Australia.
Unlike their predecessors, these migrants felt they ‘fitted better into the
Australian way of life than in their native environment’ where the ‘climate of
irrationality’ inadequately valued their skills. 138 Feeling out of place in Croatia,
these migrants also felt out of place with the Croatian communities they found in
Australia. This new wave was more individualistic and secular in outlook, and
experienced the ‘community’ as a straight-jacket for their middle-class
Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera, 12.
V. Colic-Peisker, ‘Two Waves of Croatian Migrants in Western Australia: Class and National Identity’,
Australian Journal of Social Issues, 34(4), 1999, 361–62.
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‘cosmopolitan’ outlook and aspirations.’ 139 Rather, this wave of Croatian migrants
looked to English-speaking and ‘Australian’ community structures to fulfil their
identity needs and provide opportunities for socialisation.

1.4.4. WAR REFUGEES AND ONWARDS– 1990-PRESENT
The final great wave of Croatian migration to Australia came with the wars of
independence in the 1990s. Perhaps of all of Croatia’s history, none has received
more outside historical attention than this period. In contrast, very little
academic research has addressed this wave of Croatian migration to Australia,
despite the fact that the influx of Croatian refugees from Bosnia changed the
community yet again by disrupting long-held narratives of Croatian nationhood
and identity. 140 Future academic research, both historical and sociological, will
fully assess their impact upon Croatian community life and structures. However,
based on personal observation and involvement within my local Croatian
community, this impact seems most evident in the reinvigoration of faith and
folklore as the organisational centres of the Croatian community. Both
Catholicism and folklore were important aspects of local life in Bosnia, as it was
across religious and cultural, rather than territorial, lines that identity was drawn.
The experiences of Bosnian Croatians both within Yugoslavia and during the war
differed, at times significantly, from those in Croatia. These migrants therefore
often found themselves at odds with the political agenda of the community in
Australia, or were apolitical altogether. In the same way the Yugoslav
organisations of the interwar period were unacceptable to post-war migrants, the
post-war political organisations misguided to the economic migrants of the 196070s, and those in turn partially or completely avoided by the 1980s cohort of
Croatian migrants, so too were the organisational centres of the Croatian
community during the war problematic to the wave of the 1990s. As a result,
ibid., 366.
The only study able to be located on this wave is focused on the difference between Croatian
Catholic migrants and Bosnian Muslim migrants, rather than between Croatian migrants. See:
V. Colic-Peisker, ‘Croatian and Bosnian Migration to Australia in the 1990s’, Studies in Western
Australian History, 21, 2000, 117–36.
139
140

71

rather than assimilating into the political or social organisations of the
community, Croatians from Bosnia tended to concentrate within church
structures and folkloric organisations.
Croatian migration to Australia has reduced dramatically since this post-war
intake, with only a small, almost negligible, intake of new migrants. Instead, a
growing number of Australian-born Croatians are migrating to Croatia, creating
what Lalich has identified as a move from traditional diaspora relationships to a
transnational social space and flow. 141 Furthermore, changes in the community
now seem to be generational rather than migrational in nature. 142 The
community is becoming increasingly ‘Australianised’ - 60% of those declaring
Croatian ancestry at the 2011 Census were born in Australia, while of those born
elsewhere, approximately 70% arrived before 1981. Consequently, it is also an
increasingly English speaking community, with less than half of those declaring
Croatian ancestry speaking the language itself. Of those who speak Croatian, only
8,037 speak very little, or no English at all, and of these non-English speakers,
67.4% are aged over 65, with a further 21.9% aged 45-64yrs. The community is
also becoming increasingly female, with women outnumbering men in every age
range from 20-69yrs. Finally, and contrary to popular perception that the
community is aging, approximately two-thirds of the community is under the age
of 50yrs. 143 This indicates that perhaps it is not the community itself that is aging,
but that younger Croatians are opting out of active participation in traditional
Croatian organisations and structures, in the same way migrational waves before
them did.
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See also: J. Čapo, ‘'The world is my oyster': Well-educated Australian-Croatian citizens in the era of
Global Mobilities’, Croatian Studies Review, 8(1), 2013, 91-112.
142
For example, see:
V. Čolić-Peisker, ‘Australian Croatians at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: A Changing Profile of
the Community and Its Public Representation’, Croatian Studies Review, 3–4(1), 2004, 1–26.
R. Mesarić Žabčić and N. Pokos, ‘Pogledi Mlađe Generacije Australskih Hrvata Na Život Iseljenika’ in V.
Kukavica (ed.), Hrvatski Iseljenički Zbornik 2007 (Zagreb: Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika, 2006), 197–202.
I. Šutalo, ‘The Future of the Croatian Community and Identity in Australia’, Croatian Studies Review, 6(1),
2010, 7–30.
143
ABS Census TableBuilder, refer to footnote 7.
141

72

The traditional structures of faith, folklore and football, however, seem to
promise a measure of longevity. Catholicism continues as a central element of
Croatian national identity both in Croatia and Australia, and the association
between church and Croatian cultural preservation has endured, if not
strengthened, over the years. There are 14 Croatian Catholic Centres currently in
operation across Australia under the jurisdiction of the Franciscan Provinces of
Bosna Srebrena in Sarajevo, Saints Cyril and Methodius in Zagreb, the
Archdiocese of Vrhbosna in Sarajevo, and the Archdiocese of Rijeka. These
centres not only provide pastoral care for their communities, but also the
infrastructure around which most social, sporting and leisure activities of the
community are organised. For example, aside from activities related to religious
practice, the Croatian Catholic Centre in Figtree is home to the Croatian Folkloric
Group Wollongong, hosts club meetings and functions for local Croatian soccer
club South Coast United, a women’s Pilates class, pensioner social days, Croatian
language instruction, and a host of social gatherings, functions, and music
concerts throughout the year. 144
Though experiencing a decline in attendance and numbers after the 1990s,
folkloric groups are experiencing something of a renaissance, with 15 groups in
operation across Australia comprising predominantly of second- and thirdgeneration Croatian children.

These groups maintain links with each other

through gala nights, the biannual inter-group festival, and the annual children’s
festival, sometimes involving visiting groups from New Zealand and Croatia.
Though not as regular, folkloric groups still participate at multicultural events,
particularly in conjunction with the Catholic Church and at local community
celebrations such as Australia Day. However, with the establishment of an
independent state, the role of folkloric groups seems to be changing from an
outward expression of Croatian identity as a serious pursuit, to that as a gateway
for second and later generation Croatians and their children to connect with their
For more information, see:
R. Mesarić Žabčić, ‘The Role of the Catholic Church in Preservation of Croatian Identity in New South
Wales, Australia’, Croatian Studies Review, 6(1), 2010, 129–40.
Croatian Catholic Centres Australia, Hrvatski katolički centri u Australiji,
http://www.hkc.com.au/index.php, accessed 09 September 2016.
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heritage, the focus on fun and entertainment rather than professional
performance.
There are currently 34 active Croatian soccer clubs, and the considerable
contribution of Croatians to football in Australia is one most readily associated
with the community. The fruits of these clubs have been borne out at the highest
echelons of the world game. There have been 47 Croatian Australians, including 7
captains, who have played for the Australian national side, and the Australian
team is sometimes referred to as the ‘second Croatian national side’. 145 A large
number of A-League players are of Croatian descent, as are many of Australia’s
most successful exports of the game. Croatian clubs have also nurtured the
talents of Australian greats such as Graham Arnold, Craig Foster, and Robbie
Slater, while the Adelaide Raiders was once home to indigenous activist Charlie
Perkins. However the greatest indicator of the strength of Croatian clubs in
Australia can be found in the annual Australian-Croatian Soccer Tournament.
Now in its 43rd year, it is the oldest ethnic football competition in Australia.
That these three avenues of cultural expression – faith, folklore and football –
continue to endure is no accident. Rather, they speak to the legacy of Australian
responses to immigration policy, migrants, and migrant communities, and in
particular the legacy of Australia’s post-war immigration programme. In the same
way this chapter has followed the history of Croatian migration to Australia and
focused on the push and pull factors of this migration, the following chapter will
attempt to do the same with Australia’s post-war immigration programme,
focusing on the construction of an identity which has mediated the relationship
between post-war Australia and its migrant ‘Other’ – the Good Australian
Migrant. It is through this national figure, with its inherent expectations and
assumptions, that Croatian political activism was and still is perceived and
understood.

A. Gray, ‘Croatian Community’s proud role in Australian soccer still reaping rewards’, Sydney Morning
Herald, 31 May 2014, available from
http://www.smh.com.au/fifa-world-cup-2014/australia-2014/croatian-communitys-proud-role-inaustralian-soccer-still-reaping-rewards-20140531-zrtuo.html, accessed 07 January 2015.
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CHAPTER 2:
THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT

National Library of Australia, nla.obj-136976103

Australia wants, and will welcome, new healthy citizens who
are determined to become good Australians by adoption.1
Arthur Calwell, 2 August 1945
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On 18 March 2002, Federal Immigration Minister Phillip Ruddock welcomed
Ms Cristina Jurado, a 29 year old woman from the Philippines, at Sydney
International Airport. 2 Jurado was Australia’s six-millionth post-WWII migrant,
and along with her husband and young children, had arrived in Australia under
the skilled migration program. That the Immigration Minister had taken the time
to personally welcome Jurado, and that this welcome was captured by the media,
was not unique. Jurado was merely the newest face in a long line of ‘milestone’
immigrants, the welcome of which was a tradition as old as Australia’s post-war
immigration program itself.
Despite the years and circumstances separating them, each milestone arrival
was contrived to reflect the aspirations of Australia’s immigration program: the
British tradesmen arriving to rebuild post-war Australia; 3 the little girls
reassuring Australians that these migrants were not a threat nor too different
from Australians, but who guaranteed the future of the nation; 4 the young
English bride here to fulfil her destiny as an Australian housewife and mother; 5
the compassionate nation welcoming families burdened by physical disability; 6
the reunion of Vietnamese husband and wife ripped apart by war, but also a
symbol of Australia’s evolution by its bicentenary year; 7 and Jurado, the female,
educated, English-speaking, professional from southeast Asia with her young
family, emblematic of 21st century Australia. At the heart of each arrival was a
two-way reflection on Australia’s immigration program; a moment of national
self-congratulation on achievements past, and a gaze cast towards Australia’s
future.
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From Arthur Calwell to Phillip Ruddock, Federal Immigration Ministers have
acted as the nation’s proxy, modelling the ‘national embrace’ expected of
Australians as good hosts. This embrace found institutional expression through
the Immigration Department and its various campaigns and publications. Local,
religious, and social organisations were enlisted to encourage migrants to mix
with their local community, while communities were encouraged to extend a
local embrace. The national embrace of migrants was reinvigorated with the end
of the White Australia Policy and the introduction of multiculturalism by the
Whitlam Government. This change not only recognised the social and cultural
changes wrought by immigration, but celebrated them as an intrinsically
Australian quality.
It is this congratulatory national embrace that has come to define Australia’s
understanding of its post-war immigration program; a politically, economically,
and socially successful ‘bold experiment’ 8 in humanitarianism, acceptance, and
cohesion, executed without conflict or violence, which radically and rapidly
changed the face of the nation and resulted in the most multicultural yet peaceful
country in the world. Though much of the program was indeed successful,
Australia’s post-war immigration history is also a contested one, neither as
simple, congratulatory, nor as harmonious as its supporters assert. Even the oftrepeated and somewhat intuitive claim that Australia has become the most
multicultural society in the world as a result of its post-war immigration program
does not stand up to scrutiny - as at the 2011 census, the United Kingdom was the
top country of birth outside of Australia, while the four largest ancestry groups
were English (36.1% of the total population), Australian (35.4%), Irish (10.4%),
and Scottish (8.9%). 9

Lack and Templeton, Bold Experiment.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Reflecting a Nation: Stories from the 2011 Census, cat. no. 2071.0, ABS,
Canberra, 2012–2013,http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/2071.0Main+Features55201
2%E2%80%932013?OpenDocument, accessed 23 October 2015.
Jupp further points out that Australia is still one of the most British societies outside the United
Kingdom, where its ‘social, intellectual, business and political elites are still overwhelmingly of British
origin; three-quarters of its people speak only English; and a similar proportion subscribe, however
nominally, to Christian denominations.’ See: Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera, 6–7.
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The narrative of the national embrace cannot be sustained by history as the
grand arch of post-war immigration, or even as a dominant component of that
history. Rather than an exercise in humanitarianism, the Australian government
used immigration as a tool of social engineering, with policy ‘influenced by
ideologies: imperialism, racism, utilitarianism, economic rationalism and
humanitarianism,’ 10 in order to create or maintain the vision of what Australia
ought to be - not necessarily what it was or could be. This vision was not
determined solely on developments within the domestic sphere and in
consideration of Australia’s own intrinsic needs, but also in response to
international developments and Australia’s position relative to the rest of the
world. As Jupp notes, the success of Australian immigration has largely been due
to deliberate planning, and though bureaucrats and politicians are assumed to
have superior wisdom in determining public policy, the implementation of a
vision of what Australia ought to be was not a value-free process. 11
If the embrace extended by the Immigration Minister was a reflection of how
the hosts ought to receive migrants into the community, the individual at the
centre of the campaign was a reflection of who the migrant ought to be. Though
the arrival campaigns presented the extension of the national embrace as
unconditional, the reality of migrant life in Australia proved that this too was an
aspirational ought, rather than a reflection of the relationship between migrant
and host. Extending the national embrace was a provisional act, and rested on a
particular caveat - that the migrant had to become a ‘Good Australian’ as quickly
as possible. 12 This too was not a value-free process and included constructing a
vision of how a migrant ought to behave.
This chapter will argue that these expectations of oughts – of what Australia
ought to be, of how Australians ought to behave, and of who migrants ought to
be and how they ought to behave – are embodied in the aspirational figure of the
‘Good Australian Migrant’. This figure is a post-war construction, defined and
ibid., 7.
ibid.
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refined by successive governments in order to convince a population accustomed
to an insular, limited, and restrictive immigration policy to accept not just a
significantly higher inflow of migrants, but an ethnically diverse one. 13 The three
broad functions of the Immigration Department – selection and entry,
settlement, and citizenship – ascribed certain characteristics and expectations
which demarcated the social space migrants were to occupy, and therefore
provide the structure for this chapter. Section 2.1 demonstrates how the selection
and entry requirements of Australia’s first major migrant recruitment campaign –
the DP scheme – defined who the Good Australian Migrant ought to be. Section
2.2 explains how settlement policy, particularly assimilation, defined expectations
of how the Good Australian Migrant ought to behave. Finally, Section 2.3 explores
the intersection between immigration and citizenship. That the Department
regulated the entire immigration process from selection through to citizenship
meant that it was ‘both the custodian of prevailing concepts about who should be
regarded as having the ‘privileges’ and duties of Australian citizenship, and was
also in a position to influence their change.’ 14 It is precisely in this nexus between
the construction of political acceptability and the mediation of citizenship that
the Good Australian Migrant finds its genesis.
Though the characteristics of these expectations have evolved as historical,
political, social, and cultural changes have exerted their influence, the
expectations themselves have not, and still cast significant shadows on the ways
in which migrants are perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. In building
the figure of the Good Australian Migrant, this chapter gives shape to something
historians have long tacitly acknowledged but have not explicitly defined – that
That immigration was central to Australia’s post-war reconstruction, and the need to turn to nonBritish migration to fulfil these aspirations, remain well-versed estimations of the genesis of the postwar immigration program, despite significant disagreement in the nature and reasons for both, such as
whether the program was a deliberate and planned exercise, or a series of ad-hoc, reactive decisions.
See: ‘Australians Post-war Immigration Experience’ in J. Collins, Migrant Hands in a Distant Land:
Australia’s Post-War Immigration, 2nd ed. (Leichhardt: Pluto Press Australia, 1991), 19–46.
‘Decision Born of Danger’ in Kunz, Displaced Persons, 11–20.
‘The Policy and Programme’ in Lack and Templeton, Bold Experiment, 1–72.
Markus, ‘Labour and Immigration: Policy Formation 1943-5.’
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the migrant is a constructed identity, imbued with a set of expectations and
conditions which mediate the relationship between Australia and its migrant
Other. Like the previous chapter, this one also covers some broad and at times
seemingly extraneous ground in order to provide the foundations needed to
reimagine the historical narrative of Croatian political activism in the post-war
period. The expectations associated with the Good Australian Migrant help
explain how Croatian activism has been misunderstood, and also how this
misunderstanding can be manipulated in the name of political expediency. Put
simply, when Croatians do not meet this checklist, they are read as ‘bad’.
The Good Australian Migrant has become one of the many versions of ‘being
Australian’ that comprise the pantheon of figures within Australia’s national
identity. It sits alongside other recognisable figures such as the Bushman, the
larrikin, the digger, or the lifesaver. 15 It is an aspirational figure and does not
encompass the entire range of migrants or migrant experiences in this country, in
the same way Ward’s construction of the ‘Australian character’ did not reflect the
lived experience of most Australians. 16 As Nail explains,
A figure is not a fixed identity or specific person but a mobile social position.
One becomes a figure when one occupies this position. One may occupy this
position to different degrees, at different times, and in different circumstances.
But there is nothing essential about a person that makes the person this figure. 17

Therefore, the Good Australian Migrant captures the figure of the migrant in
Australia’s national imagination, and the attributes against which the actions of
those who may occupy this position are understood and evaluated; against who
we believe migrants ought to be, rather than who they actually are or could be.
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2.1. SELECTION AND ENTRY
Reading through the [Immigration Officer] manuals of 1969 to 1972,
one gets a very definite idea of what Australian policy-makers expected an immigrant to be.
Young, white, able bodied, and male emerge as the attributes of the intended model immigrant. 18

2.1.1. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS LABOUR
Chifley and Calwell argued that the only way to ensure the success of
Australia’s post-war reconstruction was through a significant and rapid increase
in Australia’s population and labour supply, and that the fastest way to achieve
this was through mass immigration. That the labour capacity of migrants was the
foremost motivation for selection was proven in the initial intakes of the DP
scheme; of the migrants recruited, 93% were available for job placement. 19
However, in order to ensure that these migrants could in fact find employment
and work alongside Australians without disrupting industrial relations, Calwell
needed the support of the trade unions that mediated industrial relations, and of
the labour force that would be expected to work alongside migrants.
In order to appease trade unions, historically opposed to immigration for fear
of disrupting Australia’s ‘Workingman’s Paradise’, Calwell included a number of
caveats that served as pre-conditions to immigration; that no migrant would
enter Australia until he or she was tied to continuous employment, that proper
housing and other social amenities could be established to allow for ease of
settlement, that the demobilisation, rehabilitation and re-employment of exservicemen and women would be resolved as a priority, and that adequate
shipping could be secured for their transportation. 20 Unlike customary surplus
forces that are repatriated once the labour need dissipates, Calwell justified the
permanency of these migrants through Australia’s need to populate ‘for reasons
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of defence and for the fullest expansion of our economy.’ 21 In outlining these
conditions of immigration, Calwell effectively delineated the social space
migrants would occupy as one of non-competition – migrants would not compete
with Australians in employment, housing, or transportation, and thus would not
disrupt the status quo presently enjoyed by Australians. This tenet of noncompetition, Calwell believed, was essential in preventing the growth of
opposition to the migration policy in general, and the long-term benefits to both
the nation and the migrant would justify the initial costs. 22
Non-competition in employment was formally expressed in the 1-2 year work
contracts DP migrants were required to sign in return for their assisted passages.
This carte blanche, as Kunz describes it, 23 ensured that the type and location of
work during the migrant’s initial years in Australia was completely at the
discretion of the Immigration Department, without any regard for the wishes of
the migrants, their individual circumstance, or any education completed prior to
arrival. Migrants were made to understand in the interview process that they
could not choose where or in what capacity they were to work during this time,
and that they were unable to change that employment without the consent of the
Department. Thus, the occupations of migrants were simply categorised as
‘labourer’ for males, and ‘domestic’ for females, and it was not guaranteed that
members of a family would be sent to the same place during the contract’s
duration. The contract system signified to both migrants and the Australian
public that the economic contribution of migrants was to be first and foremost in
the interest of the nation, and not the individual or their personal prosperity.
Though the function of the migrant as economic has not changed over the
years, the nature of the economic contribution and its manifestation in selection
criteria has. Until the election of the Whitlam government in 1972, post-war
immigration policy followed a ‘Populate or Perish’ model, characterised by an
open and supply-driven ethos. This model focused on the number of migrants
Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, No.HR.13, 1945, 4911.
Kunz, Displaced Persons, 145.
23
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arriving and operated under the assumption that immigration was an economic
stimulant, making high-level immigration and economic growth mutually
reinforcing pursuits. In the face of precarious economic conditions in the late
1960s and early 1970s, and in particular rising unemployment, proponents of
reducing immigration argued that high-level immigration was a hindrance rather
than a help to the economic wellbeing of Australia. Using the rationale that
prevailing economic conditions warranted only a small immigration intake of
those migrants with skills in areas of severe and urgent labour shortages, the
Whitlam government reduced immigration to some of the lowest levels on
record. 24 Despite this sharp and almost overnight change in immigration policy,
the logic behind the change remained thoroughly economic.
This change in immigration policy was reflective of wider developments in
economic and political circumstance and thought which saw economic
rationalism gain prominence as the dominant philosophy within government
ministries and departments. 25 In 1979, the Fraser Government institutionalised
economic rationalism in immigration policy with the introduction of NUMAS. If
the ‘Populate-or-Perish model’ of immigration focused on the quantity of
migration, the model underpinning NUMAS focused on the quality of migration,
i.e., the human capital of migrants. This model of immigration was demanddriven, based on an allocation of points that allowed entry only to those with the
employment, education, and language capabilities needed to meet particular
occupational or educational shortages or surpluses. Thus, where the Populate-orPerish model emphasised an economic contribution, the introduction of NUMAS
emphasised a very particular type of economic contribution, designed to only
allow entry to those migrants deemed economically viable, with the point
allocation system flexible enough to adapt quickly to changes in the economic
D. Cox, Migration and Welfare: An Australian Perspective (Sydney: Prentice Hall, 1987), 185–86.
Collins, however, argues that Whitlam’s change in policy was more philosophical than economic.
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environment. Though it has been altered to suit needs as they arise, this model of
immigration remains the foundation of the current system of skilled migration to
Australia. 26
The reduction of the Good Australian Migrant to his or her economic utility
contradicts Australia’s popular understanding of its immigration history as one
guided by benevolence and humanitarianism. This is particularly true of Calwell’s
DP scheme, which is often held up as a hallmark of Australian humanitarianism,
but is also from which the economic primacy of the Good Australian Migrant
originates. 27 While national histories often present a romanticised understanding
of the past, in the case of Australia’s post-war immigration history, the
pragmatism of successive Australian governments was especially ‘obscured by
Labor legendeering, and by the air of self-congratulation in which Menzies’
Liberals enveloped [immigration] by the mid-1950s.’ 28 This was only reinforced
with the introduction of multiculturalism, which tied the pragmatism of previous
governments to principles of assimilation and legacies of the White Australia
Policy, and not to the economic essentialism of immigration policy itself. As
Collins explains,
The prime reason for immigration has been the need to provide adequate labour
reserves for the expansion of Australian capitalism. The precise way this reserve
For a simple overview of Australia’s current system, see:
K. Hoang, ‘Explainer: what is Australia’s ‘points system’ for immigration?’, The Conversation, 22 June
2016, https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-australias-points-system-for-immigration-26065,
accessed 23 June 2016
27
Historians differ in their estimation of the Displaced Persons Scheme. For example, Stats argues that
‘despite the wide acclaim both then and since, Australia’s Displaced Persons Scheme was designed
explicitly to meet national rather than humanitarian interests.’ Kelly reiterates this sentiment, even if
allowing for the possibility of humanitarian motive, arguing that ‘the nation’s immigration policy began
as a quality control exercise. Calwell and Chifley were not just humanitarians. They were engaged in a
determined nation-building exercise.’ Lack and Templeton, however, are most scathing, describing
Australia’s post-war immigration policy as ‘calculatingly and selfishly opportunist’ and ‘plagued, even
compromised, by deep internal inconsistencies.’ Kunz, like Kelly, suggests that perhaps humanitarianism
and pragmatism were not necessarily mutually exclusive pursuits, arguing that ‘Australian insularity and
xenophobia made it almost inevitable that to continue the program, charity had to be served up as
utilitarian gain, and calculated gain as charity.’ See:
K. Stats, ‘‘Characteristically Generous’? Australian Responses to Refugees Prior to 1951’, Australian
Journal of Politics & History, 60(2), 2014, 187.
Kelly, 100 Years, 67.
Lack and Templeton, Bold Experiment, 2.
Kunz, Displaced Persons, 256.
28
Lack and Templeton, Bold Experiment, 3.
26

84

army is tapped – numbers, skills, country of origin and so on – does reflect
immigration lobbies and ‘demand side’ issues but this does not negate the
primacy of the labour supply function of immigrants. 29

Thus the grand arch of post-war immigration is far better framed by economic
considerations, particularly the supply of labour, with political, social, and
humanitarian considerations secondary. 30
As Cox highlights, this has important implications in understanding the
function of immigration policy. If the logic of immigration policy stems from
economic considerations, then ‘immigration cannot be perceived as a solution to
international situations unless the economic needs of the country of immigration
happen to coincide with the set needs in question.’ 31 This implies that in order for
an immigration program to be perceived as desirable and successful, the
economic considerations of the host country must coincide with the
humanitarian considerations of a refugee or surplus population. This may explain
why the post-war immigration program is remembered as successful, while those
thereafter are not remembered as optimistically; Europe’s need to resettle its
refugee population coincided with Australia’s post-war reconstruction efforts and
this mutual benefit is the core of the program’s genesis and perceived success.
By extension, the Good Australian Migrant is first and foremost an economic
entity, and any political, social, and humanitarian aspects are secondary and
subservient to the labour capacity of a migrant. This gives rise to a second
implication - if the economic contribution of migrants is the motivation for an
immigration program, then that program will not be geared to the well-being of
the migrant. Rather it will consist of only those measures essential to ensure that
contribution, and ‘only when other concerns are converted into political pressure
J. Collins, ‘Immigration and Class: The Australian Experience’, in G. Bottomley and M. de Lepervanche
(eds.), Ethnicity, Class and Gender in Australia (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 5.
30
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will a comprehensive set of welfare provisions be introduced.’ 32 This in part
explains the persistence of assimilation policy and the marginalisation of
migrants in semi- and un-skilled employment well after inherent social
disadvantages were recognised; it is not until sufficient political pressure is
developed, such as the establishment of an ‘ethnic lobby’, 33

that it became

politically expedient for the Government and its authorities to place migrant
welfare on the agenda.
Just as the justification for immigration has been couched principally in the
rhetoric and logic of economics, the primary function of the Good Australian
Migrant is also economic, measured by labour capacity, often determined by
their ability to close shortfalls in industries and occupations. This means that the
Good Australian Migrant serves to secure the economic prosperity of the nation,
but without entering into direct competition with Australian workers. The Good
Australian Migrant must also contribute significantly to the nation’s bottom line
before they earn the right to receive its spoils, particularly in the form of welfare.
However, in return for bearing these costs, the Good Australian Migrant receives
the opportunity to provide a better and more secure life for themselves and their
family, one not possible in their country of origin. This better life is attributed to
Australia’s economic and political stability, with its system of fair wages and safe
working conditions designed to lead to the financial independence of anyone
willing to work hard enough for their lot. Even though settlement outcomes are
improving as skilled migration increases, particularly of those with tertiary
qualifications and strong English-language skills, the expectation that migrants
must take up the work that is available to them, rather than the work they want
or are qualified for, still remains. As Collins recently lamented, ‘the cliché of
highly educated immigrants driving cabs for a living or getting jobs as unskilled
labourers is sadly still very true today.’ 34
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2.1.2. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS MALE
The Good Australian Migrant is almost invariably a ‘he’. This is mostly due to
historical circumstance – the national infrastructure and building works at the
heart of Calwell’s post-war reconstruction required ‘manpower’, and as the term
suggests, manual labour was exclusively the province of men. The official press
release of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) cemented the maleness
of the migrant by emphasising the need for ‘horny-handed sons of toil.’ 35 That
Australia’s post-war immigration program was built around importing this
manpower is reflected in the early intakes of the DP scheme; seven males were
recruited to every two females. 36 This gender imbalance in selection and
recruitment, coupled with the economic imperative of labour, meant that in the
initial years of the program, ‘’migrant’ became synonymous with ‘worker’ and
more specifically a ‘male worker in a manual job.’ 37
The maleness of the Good Australian Migrant was reiterated in immigration
publicity such as the ‘There’s a man’s job for you in Australia’ poster campaign
and the promotional film Men Wanted, both of which ‘reinforced the muscular
vision of Australia as a strong nation of youth and opportunity.’ 38 General
recruitment campaigns depicted Australia as a place of ‘industry and sunshine’,
where displaced migrants could replace the gloom and misery of their current
situation in Europe with a stable home, good health, and economic prosperity in
Australia. 39 These campaigns drew on the symbols of family and suburbia that
characterised the social rhetoric of 1950s Australia. Though this symbolism
depended on the presence of women as wives, mothers, and daughters, the
procurement of the house in which the family makes a home, and the economic
J. Persian, ‘‘Chifley Liked Them Blond’: DP Immigrants for Australia,’ History Australia, 12(2), 2015, 92.
Kunz, Displaced Persons, 46.
37
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prosperity of that family was (and arguably still is) coded as a male pursuit, one
the Australian male provided for his female counterpart.
Publicity and educational campaigns in Australia focused overwhelmingly on
the male migrant, either in equipping him with the information necessary to be a
productive worker, or in selling his virtues as a worker to the Australian public. 40
These campaigns were built on stories that celebrated the successful assimilation
of male migrants, which repeated a similar pattern – first the Good Australian
Migrant learned the language and customs of his new home, then through work
and play learned the ways of the Australian male, completing his process of
assimilation via marriage with an Australian girl. The most famous example of
this assimilation pattern can be found in They’re a Weird Mob, published in 1957
by

John

O’Grady

under

the

pseudonym

Nino

Culotta. 41

This

‘male

migrant/female Australian’ trope was also codified in the Australian Women’s
Weekly, in which migrants were presented almost exclusively as male, the
‘typical’ Australian woman was assumed to be Anglo-Australian and Australianborn, and stories focused either on the male migrant assimilating successfully
through work or marriage to an Australian girl, or in etiquette pages advising
how Australian women should behave towards migrant men. 42
The happy ending promised by assimilation stories, however, did not
translate so easily to reality, as intermarriage between migrants and Australians
remained significantly low. Coupled with the gender imbalance of the early
intakes, this soon precipitated a number of social consequences that threatened
A. Haebich, Spinning the Dream: Assimilation in Australia 1950-1970 (North Fremantle: Fremantle
Press, 2008), 118–36.
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the success of the publicity campaigns, and in turn, support for the immigration
program itself. The most publicised of these were ‘bachelors of misery’ 43 - single
male migrants unable to make a marriage, and as such plagued by loneliness,
alcoholism, mental breakdown, and suicide. The cause of this misery was often
reduced to the ‘imbalance of the sexes’ in migrant selection. Government, media,
and sometimes the migrants themselves, therefore argued that the simple
solution to this problem lay in the increased intake of single migrant women. 44
The construction and conflation of the migrant as male in the initial years of
the immigration program, and particularly under the DP scheme, had two
important consequences. On the one hand, it resulted in the masculinisation of
the immigrant population, while on the other it marginalised migrant women
and their experiences in immigration discourse. 45 Much like their Australian
counterparts in the 1950s, the role of migrant women in Australian society was
confined to the domestic sphere, where they were expected to fulfil their duty as
Australian wife and mother. However, Kunek argues that this role too served a
covert economic imperative; migrant women were to ‘act as a stimulus to
consumer demand through the formation of families which would effect[sic]
workforce expansion and create employment.’ 46 This characterisation of migrant
women

as

‘‘immigrant

wives’,

‘breeders

for

Australia’,

and

‘unskilled

dependents’’ 47 obscured the fact that migrant women were more likely to
undertake paid work outside of the home than Australian-born women in the
post-war period. 48 Thus migrant women became both ‘factory and marriage
fodder,’ 49 marginalised in both the public and private spheres, and 'simply did not
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exist on the dominant social agenda with needs and legitimate aspirations in
their own right.' 50
The implications of this marginalisation and invisibility magnifies when we
consider that, contrary to the historical narrative, ‘there was a more or less
balanced intake, with only slightly fewer women,’ in total immigration from the
beginning of post-war immigration through to the early 1970s. 51 The early
construction and conflation of the migrant as male in the initial years of the
immigration program, the rhetoric of the ‘imbalance of the sexes’ and ‘bachelors
of misery’, and the ushering of Australian women out of employment and into
the home all conspired to reinforce the centrality and predominance of the male
migrant at the expense of the female migrant. In the same way migrant welfare
was not an issue until sufficient political pressure could be applied, it would take
the social and cultural revolutions of the 1960s and the rise of women’s rights in
the 1970s to challenge the marginalisation of migrant women. 52
Though the Good Australian Migrant as male can be easily explained by
historical circumstance, the perseverance of it in the face of social changes and
A. Jakubowicz, M. Morrissey, and J. Palser, Ethnicity, Class and Social Policy in Australia (Kensington,
NSW: Social Welfare Research Centre, University of New South Wales, 1984), 28.
51
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political pressures is more difficult to explain. Yet as much as the social changes
and activisms of the 1970s and onwards challenged the position and associated
gender norms of women in Australian society, they did not displace the
hegemony of male identities in the national imagination, nor the construction of
Australian identity as male in general. 53 The enduring maleness of the Good
Australian Migrant is certainly not unique, but true of most figures in the
national pantheon. As Elder asserts,
Iconic images of the quintessential or typical Australian are not of bush folk, but
bush men; they are not of participants of war, but male diggers; they are not of
volunteers at the local nursing home, but of male volunteer lifesavers who
patrol the beach. 54

The bushman, the digger, and the lifesaver are all identities which are male by
default and female on second thought. Even mateship – that all-Australian term is a masculine ideal, representing a relationship and a behaviour that in its purest
form only occurs between men, even if it can be loaned to relationships between
men and women, or between women.

Though six-millionth migrant Jurado

demonstrated how far the Australian migrant had come, as highly educated,
English-speaking, cosmopolitan, Asian, and as female, the fact that her reasons
for migration were tied up in notions of family, home, and motherhood
demonstrates that the more things change, the more they stay the same. 55

2.1.3. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS HEALTHY
The Good Australian Migrant must be healthy and able-bodied in order to
fulfil his expectation of gainful employment upon arrival. This means that he is
also young, as youth and health often go hand in hand, or at least young enough
to contribute his fair share in labour and taxes before he becomes reliant on the
For a more detailed analysis of the construction of Australian identity as male/masculine, see:
C. Elder, Being Australian: Narratives of National Identity (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2007), 65–92.
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state in his old age. In the same way initial intakes of the DP scheme favoured
males over females, it also favoured those in the 20-29yr old age bracket. As Kunz
highlights,
The predominance of young age groups among Australia’s DP’s probably reflects
not only the drive for young people, but also Australia’s stringent health criteria
to which mainly older refugees fell victim. 56

The stringency was such that even those working within the scheme recognised
its overzealous nature - one senior IRO official described some of the criteria as ‘a
bit absurd’ because it did not always reflect accepted medical guidance, 57 while
an Australian doctor later recounted that ‘many of the earlier applicants, refugees
and immigrants, were excluded from coming to Australia really without a good
reason. They were simply rejected because they had old scarring.’ 58
As with gender, the youth and health demanded of migrants was closely
tied to their economic function in Australia’s post-war reconstruction efforts. The
male labour that was necessary for the industrial and agricultural work migrants
were to complete in service of the nation was physically demanding, both in
strength and endurance, and Calwell wanted ‘the best that is in the field.’ 59 For
female migrants, youth and health were also necessary in order to fulfil their role
as ‘prospective breeders’, and officers were ingenuously instructed that ‘women of
child-bearing age should be capable of bearing children.’ 60 This narrow selection
of the young, healthy, and able-bodied quickly found Australia accused of
‘skimming the cream’. However, as Persian pointedly notes, the cream was always

Kunz, Displaced Persons, 47
As cited in ibid., 48.
58
H. Martin, Angels and Arrogant Gods (Canberra: AGPS Press, 1989), 40.
For examples of the health criteria and examination process, see:
Kunz, Displaced Persons, 46–48.
K. Neumann, Across the Seas: Australia’s Response to Refugees - A History (Collingwood: Black Inc.,
2015), 111.
J. Persian, ‘Displaced Persons (1947-1952) : Representations, Memory and Commemoration’ (Doctoral
Thesis, University of Sydney, 2011), 101–3.
59
Persian, ‘Chifley Liked Them Blond’, 99.
60
ibid.
56
57

92

the objective, as ‘the Australian government plan was to import a workforce, not
give succour to refugee dependants.’ 61
The association between migrant health and employability was reinforced by
another premise; that the migrant should contribute to, rather than burden, the
public purse. The economic relationship between the migrant and the host
society was and remains a one-way street, at least until the migrant has earned
his keep. As one selection officer rationalised, ‘we did not want people to come to
Australia and then end up in public hospitals.’ 62 Australian selection teams were
also instructed to reject those presenting with minor complaints out of a concern
that the DPs would ‘utilise these disabilities to claim unfitness for work in
particular localities or particular jobs.’ 63 That is, lest they used these disabilities to
game the contract scheme before their time was up.
As early as late 1948, however, the government itself was forced to relax some
health and age criteria as ‘the best in the field’ became increasingly scarce. The
principle of ‘net gain’ began to guide the selection process, allowing for the entry
of those deemed less desirable on the assumption that these initial ‘inadequacies’
in the short-term would be offset by gains in the long-term. 64 As the bias
favouring the 20-29 year old age bracket slowly diminished, and despite the
moderation of health criteria, the expectation that migrants should contribute to,
rather than burden, the public purse conspired to keep migrants relatively young,
and health an important criteria in the selection process. 65 There were only a
handful of instances where this expectation was vetoed, and only after pressure
from both within and outside Australia, such as the compassionate intakes of
1949 which saw sick parents or close relatives accepted, 66 and the compassionate
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intake prompted by the World Refugee Year in 1959-1960, which saw refugee
families with a physically handicapped member accepted. 67
These compassionate intakes, however, have been few and far between, and
the frequency of rejections based on disabilities that may ‘cost the taxpayer’ attest
to the economic utilitarianism, rather than humanitarianism, inherent in
immigration policy. As recently as 24 February 2017, the family of a 16 year-old
girl with autism was denied permanent residency based on her disability. The
rhetoric of economic utility permeates the reasoning behind the decision –
immigration health checks found that the girl would ‘result in significant cost to
Australian taxpayers,’ and the Assistant Immigration Minister refused to
intervene as it was ‘not in the public interest.’ Even advocates for the girl
remaining in Australia coded their arguments in the rhetoric of economic utility,
albeit of her mother - her employment as a doctor in two medical practices was
emphasised and described as ‘of immense public interest’, and she was described
as someone who has ‘done nothing but contribute to our country.’ 68
Australia’s preoccupation with health, however, has a long history of priority
in immigration selection and control that pre-dates the Good Australian Migrant.
As Bashford argues, health has been a historically important site of inclusion and
exclusion in attempts to secure Australia territorially and culturally, and has
formed part of the legal and technical constitution of prohibited foreigners. 69
Though employability did drive the post-war justification for health and medical
selection criteria, it was also a legacy of a much longer history which positioned
health as an important signifier of un/desirable migrants. This has persevered in
immigration selection criteria in both skilled and humanitarian intakes,
Neumann, Refuge Australia, 37–41.
I. Ting, ‘Daughter’s autism may force doctor to depart’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 February 2017, 2.
69
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exemplified in the September 2015 announcement that Australia would be
resettling 12,000 Syrian refugees in a special humanitarian intake. 70 In addressing
concerns over this intake, Immigration Minister Peter Dutton emphasised the
rigour of the selection process, in particular the ‘health and security’ checks
involved, 71 and that even after selection, refugees would have to submit to a ‘final’
health check. 72 That health was held up as important as security and character
checks, particularly in the face of current fears over terrorism demonstrates the
strength of the legacy of health as a signifier of un/desirable migrants.

2.1.4. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AND ‘COLOUR’
For its first two decades, post-war immigration operated in the shadow of the
White Australia Policy, and entailed an explicit, if not institutionalised, racial
component to selection criteria which posited the Good Australian Migrant on a
sliding scale of ‘whiteness’. 73 A conscious effort was made to ensure migrants
would look sufficiently enough ‘like us’ so as to assure the Australian public that,
by virtue of this fact, the New Australian would become the 'disappearing
migrant’; that is, instantly assimilated. 74 Calwell was acutely aware of the political
capital questions of race held in determining long-term support for his
immigration program. This was, in effect, the genesis of the ‘Beautiful Balts’
campaign; Calwell was adamant that the first shipload of migrants to Australia
were to be a purposeful sample of ‘ideal types’ to act as the scheme’s young,
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single, healthy, educated, preferably male, fair-haired, fair-skinned, and blueeyed ‘Trojan Horse’. 75
The positive reception of these Beautiful Balts, coupled with the quickly
diminishing numbers of ideal types, emboldened Calwell and Australian officials
to widen the limitation of nationality in order to continue ‘’creaming off’ the
single and healthy. 76 There continued, however, a hierarchy of preference based
on representation of race and perceived cultural affinity. This was reflected in
degree of effort devoted to recruitment and in the progression of eligibility; in
1947, Ukrainians and Slovenes had become acceptable candidates for the
program, with Czechs, Poles and Yugoslavs soon thereafter. By the end of 1949,
all ‘European races’ became acceptable. 77 Calwell continued to refer to the DPs
and ‘Balts or ‘Baltic People’ well after the limitation on nationalities had been
lifted. Kunz describes this as ‘a typical Calwell touch… for years all non-British,
non-Mediterranean immigrants were by unsuspecting Australians referred to as
‘Balts’.’ 78
The racial composition of migrants slowly decreased in importance as it
became increasingly incompatible with foreign policy objectives, as Australians
became increasingly comfortable with the migrant presence, and as migrants
began to advocate for their needs and rights. The dismantling of the White
Australia Policy, the introduction of multiculturalism, and the advent of nonEuropean migration contested the expectation that migrants must look ‘like us’.
Nonetheless, the legacy of the White Australia Policy continues to cast a
significant racial shadow. Though the Good Australian Migrant is no longer
posited on an overt sliding scale of whiteness, there remains a marked difference
in the treatment of those that look Anglo-Celtic or northern European, and those
that do not. As academic and media presenter Waleed Aly has written, Australia
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may not be an overtly racist country anymore, but it does have high levels of lowlevel racism, ‘the subterranean racism that goes largely unremarked upon and
that we seem unable even to detect.’ 79
Nonetheless, as the ethnic composition of migrants diversified, the
introduction of NUMAS and the ‘human capital’ model to immigration policy
standardised other demographic traits, such as levels of education, profession,
and language capability. The net effect of these changes across employment,
gender, health and ‘colour’ amount to one of an ethnically and gender diverse
Good Australian Migrant, but one who is now more likely to be English-speaking,
highly skilled or specialised, and of a targeted profession where a shortage exists.
This has served to reinforce rather than diminish the expectation that a migrant
will contribute, rather than be a burden, on the public purse, particularly as the
concern over population growth that once underpinned the principle of net gain
has become less relevant, and by some quarters, rejected. Though women are
more likely to migrate and enter employment than ever before, and are no longer
‘invisible’ or classified as dependent migrants, the default gender of the Good
Australian Migrant remains male, as do the expectations of health and relative
youth.
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2.2. SETTLEMENT
I could see him all the time and he would look at me sort of pleadingly.
But this fellow really was a very dark gypsy with crinkly black hair, and although
I was sympathetic towards him, I visualised him walking down Martin Place and as
such he would have been a ‘stare object’… He was muscular, he looked a hardworking type and
just the pleading look about him, ‘please, can’t I go?’ I often think, ‘Well, why didn’t I take a punt?’
But for his sake as well as Australia’s, I rejected him. 80

2.2.1. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS ‘LIKE US’
The expectation that migrants would look ‘like us’ was only one in a number
of measures designed to reassure the Australian public that the intention of postwar immigration was to strengthen the nation, not to change it. The logical
extension of looking ‘like us’ was that migrants would also learn to behave ‘like
us’, and this expectation was coded in the rhetoric of assimilation. Exactly what
assimilation meant or how it should be implemented, however, was contested
from the outset. Opinions ranged from an enforced and immediate assimilation
that restricted any outward expression of cultural difference, to a gradual process
of cultural attainment over generations. 81 By 1954, Wilfred D. Borrie had observed
that
As popularly used in Australia the word [assimilation] implies a variable and a
constant; a minority being made like a majority; immigrants conforming to and
accepting the habits and customs, the lore and culture of the Australian-born
population. 82

Assimilation conflated the physical appearance and cultural behaviour of
migrants, with the process deemed complete when the migrant was no longer
able to be distinguished from the Australian-born by either appearance, speech,
or behaviour. 83 Much like a sliding scale of whiteness informed the selection
process, assimilation posited the Good Australian Migrant on a sliding scale of
Tom Stratton, Immigration Selection Officer, as quoted in Martin, Angels and Arrogant Gods, 35.
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‘Britishness’ based on ‘prejudicial judgements about which ethnic groups were
most desirable in terms of perceived cultural affinity or assimilability.’ 84 This
cultural hierarchy of preference guided the establishment of migrant reception
and training centres run by the Immigration Department, the largest of which
was at Bonegilla. 85 Though their purpose in the first instance was to provide
accommodation and allow for the processing and allocation of employment
under the terms of the two-year work contract, these reception centres also
sought to aid in the entry of the migrant into their local communities. 86 In effect,
these centres helped jump-start the process of assimilation by deconstructing the
DP migrant, and reconstructing him or her as the more palatable Good
Australian Migrant ready for introduction to the Australian community.
Though assimilation was a national objective, it was to be achieved at the
local level. Employment organisations, churches, and schools were enlisted as
‘agencies of assimilation’ as these were the sites where the process of assimilation
(or lack thereof) was most tangible.

87

The institutional face of assimilation at

both the national and local levels was the Good Neighbour Council, whose
principle objectives were
To assist the settlement and assimilation of migrants into the ‘Australian Way of
Life’, to educate Australians to accept and welcome migrants, and to encourage
a greater appreciation amongst all Australians of the privileges and benefits of
citizenship. 88

Launched in January 1950, the Good Neighbour network of committees and
branches quickly expanded to comprise of 300 local branches and 10,000
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volunteer members. 89 Intellectual and political reinforcement of assimilation
came in the form of the Australian Citizenship Conventions held between 1950
and 1970. These forums served an important symbolic function as ‘positive proof
of the broad consensus supporting the immigration program.’ 90
If these were the agencies of assimilation, Haebich argues that the process
itself had four overlapping phases that were intended to prevent the growth of
ethnic enclaves, keep government expenditure to a minimum, utilise migrant
workers for national projects, and calm any public anxieties about their
presence. 91 The first phase was that of ‘Australianisation’, including those basic
services of English-language and outreach teaching that were provided by
reception centres and agencies of assimilation at the local level. The second phase
lay in joining the workforce, which was for the government a vital stage in the
assimilation process as it ensured the cultural and financial well-being of the
migrant. Living in the community was the third phase and addressed the social
well-being of migrants, who were expected to join local groups in order to
immerse themselves in the social landscape of their community. They were
directed to seek assistance in medical and welfare needs from the relevant state
and federal departments like all other Australians, while children were to be
immersed in their local schools. The final phase of the assimilation process was
naturalisation, with Australian citizenship tangible proof that assimilation was
complete. 92 Through this process, the ‘disappearing migrant’ who looked ‘like us’
during selection, would turn into the ‘invisible migrant’, indistinguishable from
other Australians in both image and conduct. 93

For more information on the Good Neighbour Council, see:
Haebich, Spinning the Dream, 178-182.
Jordens, Redefining Australians, 82-87.
Tavan, ‘Good Neighbours’, 77-89.
90
Tavan, ‘Good Neighbours’, 79.
For more information on the Australian Citizenship Conventions, see:
Haebich, Spinning the Dream, 136–37.
Jordens, Redefining Australians, 79–81.
91
Haebich, Spinning the Dream, 171.
92
ibid., 170–78.
93
ibid., 123.
89

100

The rhetoric of assimilation related to a wider set of ‘symbols of persuasion’
deployed by the government as part of its post-war social reconstruction
agenda. 94 As Haebich explains, these symbols were the ‘imagined ideals of a
lifestyle to strive for and codes of behaviours to emulate’, and ‘brands used to
promote the nation, suggest its history, unify the people and sell its resources and
products.’ 95 The first of these was the ideal of an ‘Australian way of life’, which
was ‘a prescription for behaviour which covered all social relationships, including
language, living habits, work and industrial relations.’ 96 This way of life revolved
heavily on the rhythms of the ‘Australian Family’ – Dad as breadwinner going to
and from work, Mum as homemaker tending to the needs of house and home,
and 2 or 3 children growing up, attending school, and eventually forming an
‘Australian Family’ of their own. Finally, the ‘Australian Suburbs’ were the site
where these national symbols came together - the home and garden in which the
family unit practiced the Australian way of life. Successfully living this ‘Australian
way of life’ as an ‘Australian family’ in the ‘Australian Suburbs’ was closely tied to
consumerism. As White explains,
The familiar picture of suburban family life, with its focus on home and garden,
and on a catalogue of family possessions such as refrigerators, washing
machines, radiogrammes, television sets, and of course, the family car, was the
basis of post-war affluence and the vast new consumer economy which the
manufacturers and governments encouraged. 97

In this way, an ‘Australian way of life’ was a far more tangible and less
controversial way of measuring ‘being Australian’ than the national or typical
Australian ‘type’ that had preceded it since the early nineteenth century. 98
Distilling the essence of being Australian through a ‘way of life’, rather than a
national ‘type’, also served the intellectual needs of the times. As White explains,
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‘the idea of a ‘way of life’ fulfilled both general Western needs and more specific
Australian ones.’ 99 The anxieties produced by Cold War ideology, which framed
the rise of communism in the East as a burgeoning clash of civilisation with the
democratic West, meant that nothing less than a ‘way of life’ was at stake. The
anxieties produced by Australia’s post-war immigration program also threatened
a ‘way of life’, a culturally British one which was perceived as threatened by nonBritish immigration. Therefore, an ‘Australian way of life’
Provided a mental bulwark against communism, against change, against cultural
diversity; it could call forth a common emotional response to the Cold War and
to immigration, in defence of stability and homogeneity. 100

The social uniformity and stability the ‘Australian way of life’ promised was
framed as both the best defence against these threats, and a much-needed respite
in the midst of such global and domestic insecurity both in the aftermath of
WWII, and in the burgeoning Cold War that followed.
Despite its widespread use, exactly what the Australian way of life was, which
lifestyle to aspire to, or which codes of behaviours to emulate, was contested
from the beginning. As Lack and Templeton highlight,
Chifley and Calwell, as aggressive Australian nationalists, expected 'New
Australians' to adopt an Australian culture; Menzies and Holt upheld the notion
of British civilisation under the Southern Cross. Labor expected migrants to
'learn to speak Australian'; Liberals hoped they might acquire the King's
English. 101

If it was difficult for the Australian-born to find consensus on what the Australian
way of life was, it was particularly difficult for migrants to discern, let alone learn
and live by. Moreover, the ideals and standards of the rhetoric did not always
match the lived reality of Australians. This is captured in the oft-cited example
from journalist Elizabeth Webb, quoting one of Calwell’s New Australians as
exclaiming,
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What is this Way of Life? No one yet tells me what this is! Yet always they tell
me I must adopt it! I lead a quiet life; I break none of your laws – what more
must I do? The man who makes his money gambling is honoured by your
Government – he pays no income tax. So perhaps I give up my honest livelihood
here and go always to the races? Or perhaps I begin to behave like you behave in
pubs. I drink beer until I am stupid. Or learn to ‘put in the boot’ and bash the
other fellow with a bottle, always an empty bottle, when he disagrees with me?
Is this the way of life I must learn? Thank you. No. I stay a bloody Reffo!’ 102

It is precisely in this ambiguity, however, that White recognises the conceptual
strength of an ‘Australian way of life’;
Since it was never defined, and often was simply a formula for expressing a
general prejudice against outsiders and a distaste for non-conformity, all
migrants could be criticised for failing to adopt ‘the Australian way of life’. 103

Thus, the political capital of the Australian way of life, and of assimilation in
general, lay not so much in defining what it was, but in defining what it was not –
an exercise in which the Australian-born could assume moral authority.
Further adding to this ambiguity was that although assimilation was central
to ensuring support for the immigration program, there was a ‘disjunction
between assimilation as ideology and assimilation as practice.’ 104 As rhetoric,
assimilation was an oft-deployed means of calming anxieties, expressing a vision
for the nation, policing migrant behaviour, and stressed as central to the success
of the immigration program. However, the implementation of assimilation policy
did not match the rhetoric, and was instead ‘left to poorly briefed, poorly
resourced and understaffed government agencies, aided by a voluntary system
run by amateurs.’ 105 Though this disjunction has important implications for the
study of Australia’s post-war immigration program, particularly with questions of
how it was implemented, in building the Good Australian Migrant it is the
rhetoric that defined expectations, rather than the lived reality of post-war
immigration. The Good Australian Migrant is, after all, a vision of what the
migrant ought to be, not what he actually was, is, or could be. Therefore, it is the
rhetoric of assimilation and the associated symbols of persuasion that defined the
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social, cultural, and geographic expectations of the Good Australian Migrant as
one who should adopt Australian values, be ‘family-oriented’, and live in the
suburbs, rather than in the city or rural Australia.
Though evolved, these expectations still inform much of how Australians
perceive themselves and the Good Australian Migrant today. The Australian
suburbs are still thought of as the geographic heart of the Australian nation,
while the nuclear Australian Family is the heart of Australian society, as reflected
in state structures which either assume or advantage the suburban nuclear
family. 106 The enduring gender wage gap, discrepancy between maternity and
paternity leaves, and lack of comprehensive and accessible childcare continue to
reaffirm a pattern of family life with Dad as breadwinner and Mum as caregiver,
even if the expectation of Mum remaining ‘at home’ has diminished. Discourses
regarding marriage equality, reproductive rights, divorce, custody arrangements,
and even asylum seekers all invoke the sanctity and protection of the ‘Australian
family’, while politicians regularly appeal to the ‘working family’ as a voting bloc.
Though the ‘Australian way of life’ has changed in meaning from a British
dualism or homogeneity to a multicultural diversity and heterogeneity, the
expectation that the Good Australian Migrant must adopt Australian values,
however they may be coded, remains. Though the word assimilation is no longer
used, Haebich argues that the ideals of assimilation still exert influence in current
debates about national identity, citizenship, and immigration. She terms this
‘retro-assimilation’, which
…mixes 1950s dreams of an assimilated nation with current ideas of nationhood
using today’s spin to create an imagined world based on shared values, visions
and agreements where all citizens will be treated equally and the same and
share fully in the benefits of Australian society, once they agree to cast off their
differences and become the same. 107

Retro-assimilation therefore draws on a grab-bag of clichés from the past to
explain the present, without any critical interrogation of this past, or of the
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original meanings and significance of them. 108 The notion that there are selfevident and shared ‘Australian’ values is an example of such a cliché, and ignores
the fact that even in the seemingly homogenous 1950s, there were different ways
of being Australian and little consensus on which values were to be promoted.
Like the New Australian of the 1950s that did not know whether to adopt the
family-man rhetoric or pub-culture reality of the Australian way of life, the
migrant of today may well ask precisely which ‘Australian values’ should be
emulated – the rhetoric of tolerance, pluralism, and acceptance preached by our
political and intellectual elite, or the xenophobia, islamophobia, and homophobia
that is increasingly permeating both realpolitik and the lived reality of
Australians?
More recently, the pejorative ‘unAustralian’ has become common in
articulating ways of being Australian, defining it by what it is not, rather than the
more problematic what it is. This mimics the change in 1950 from a national
‘type’ to a ‘way of life’ in responding to critiques of the Australian way of life
raised by the increasing diversity of Australian society. In the same way defining
an Australian way of life retained moral authority with the Australian-born, the
use of ‘unAustralian’ as a pejorative does the same, but with a latitude that does
not require a consensus on or definition of what being Australian actually means;
we can differ in our ways of being Australian, but agree on what constitutes being
unAustralian,

drawing

boundaries

of

exclusion

rather

than

inclusion.

Nonetheless, much like the ambiguity of the Australian Way of Life in the 1950s,
labelling someone or something as unAustralian can be an arbitrary expression of
general prejudice or distaste for non-conformity, often reflecting existing political
and ideological divisions, which can place competing expectations on the
present-day Good Australian Migrant.
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2.2.2. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS GRATEFUL
The expectation that the Good Australian Migrant would become ‘like us’ was
justified in the language of gratitude. As Murphy explains,
The presumed magnetism of Australianism was always there and if sometimes it
did not seem to work, then the belief that the country was doing ‘these people’ a
favour in rescuing them from poverty in Europe was that they should respond
by being ‘like us’’. 109

This expectation of gratitude essentially framed assimilation as a quid pro quo –
Australia would allow migrants into the country, offering security and prosperity,
and all that was asked in return was that they would become ‘like us’ out of
gratitude. The positive attributes of an Australian way of life meant that migrants
would naturally recognise the advantages of becoming ‘like us’ in the first
instance. If migrants could not recognise these benefits, or disagreed with it, the
expectation of gratitude meant that they should do it anyway.
The expectation of gratitude not only ensured cultural homogeneity and
stability by obliging the Good Australian Migrant to become ‘like us’, but also
deflected any criticism of this way of life. As Kunz explains,
The dogma that newcomers are ‘lucky to be here’ absolved the community from
the responsibility to help the New Australian’s in any meaningful way. Indeed, it
put the onus of contented gratefulness on the immigrant, and ensured that any
criticism from them be rejected as ingratitude. 110

This ensured that any changes to the Australian way of life could not come from
migrants, and further cemented the moral authority of the Australian-born in
determining the limits of the nation. This, Kunz argues, served to frame criticism
as an exception; ‘if an immigrant had any complaint, he must have been
exceptional: an ungrateful person, badly selected.’ 111 Thus not only was it
expected that the Good Australian Migrant would become like us, but that he
would also to keep any opinions he had about becoming like us to himself.
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The expectation of gratitude operated in much the same way as the
expectation of health. If physical health was an important signifier of
un/desirable migrants in selection, gratitude was a measure of moral health, and
an important signifier of un/desirable migrant behaviour upon settlement.
However, ingratitude was both a transgression of Good Australian Migrant
behaviour and an explanation of the immorality of transgressions in general. This
introduced yet another conditionality that framed any criticism as an exception –
if a migrant could not appreciate the good being bestowed upon them, then they
were always free to ‘go back’ to where they came from. The language of gratitude
was therefore used to police migrant behaviour first by reducing the actions of
migrants to displays of ingratitude, and secondly in denouncing them as
superfluous as there was always the simple alternative of leaving.
Though social, political, and cultural developments since the 1950s have
changed when and how gratitude is deployed, it is still undeniably a feature of
Australia’s relationship with its migrant ‘Other’. Particularly in this era of
unprecedented global mobility, the reproach of going ‘back to where you came
from’ in policing migrant behaviour and dismissing their criticism, has added
gravitas due to the unprecedented ease and relative low cost of travel. However,
the expectation of gratitude is no longer confined to migrants only, but extends
to their descendants as well. This is exemplified in Dawn Fraser’s comment
during the 2015 Wimbledon tournament that young tennis stars Nick Kyrgios and
Bernard Tomic should ‘go back to where their parents came from’ if they want to
continue with their perceived poor conduct both on and off the court. 112 The
logic behind Fraser’s comment, Attard surmises, is that ‘Kyrgios is like he is
because he's not one of us and if he doesn't want to be like us, he should go back
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to where his parents came from.’ 113 Kyrgios’s bad behaviour, in other words, is a
product of his otherness in name, appearance, and lineage, despite being
Australian-born. That his (and Tomic’s) perceived bad behaviour could stem
from his Australian upbringing – especially in Australia’s culture of
hypermasculinity and sport – is not even entertained by Fraser.
The persistence of the expectation of gratitude is closely tied with the
exaggeration of Australian humanitarianism in immigration history. If Australia’s
post-war immigration program was the exercise in humanitarianism it is so often
held up to be, then perhaps an expectation of gratitude was not so unreasonable.
However, Australia’s post-war immigration program was first and foremost about
Australia and its requirements of population and labour, and not about rescuing
migrants from their countries of origin. As Markus explains,
The idea that immigration was of great national value never came to occupy a
central place in public rhetoric; Australians have found it difficult to move
beyond the understanding that they were conferring a great favour by allowing
immigrants to enter the best country in the world. 114

Gratitude, therefore, can be argued to be a misplaced expectation, and one which
should be at the very least reciprocal. Though it is undeniable that Australia has
provided security, opportunity, and prosperity to generations of migrants
searching for a better future for which they may be grateful for, the economic,
social and cultural contributions migrants have made to the development of the
Australian nation means that we too should be grateful for the security,
opportunity, and prosperity it has afforded us. In fact, it can be argued that a
greater expectation of gratitude should fall on the Australian-born given the
disproportionate gains host societies enjoy from immigration in comparison to
migrants.
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2.2.3. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS A BLANK CANVAS
The expectation of assimilation, Tavan argues, rested on ‘a view of
immigrants as people devoid of history or subjectivity, whose identity could be
created in accordance with the needs and desires of the Australian community.’ 115
The most effective way for the Good Australian Migrant to ensure successful
assimilation, therefore, was to cast away all vestiges of their past self. Like the
economic carte blanche DP migrants were once expected to sign, the Good
Australian Migrant was expected to sign away his previous identity, memory,
education, and history, and become a walking blank canvas upon which Australia
could project its expectations and aspirations. Who the migrant was, is, or
wanted to be became secondary to who and what Australia wanted him to be,
and was simply part of the price to be gratefully paid by the migrant in the quest
to become like us.
Damousi reiterates this view, arguing that the suppression of individual and
collective memory was one of the ideological bases along which assimilation was
formed, and as such, ‘migrants were expected to construct a future without a
past. It was only the future that would shape them as citizens.’ 116 This echoes
Haebich’s ‘celluloid migrant’; ‘the stock figure in promotional films who stood for
all imagined newcomers and who, denied any sense of self-determination or
individualism, submitted passively to the process of assimilation.' 117 If the
‘disappearing migrant’ embodied the expectation that migrants would look ‘like
us’, and the ‘invisible migrant’ embodied the expectation that migrants would
behave like us, then the ‘celluloid migrant’ was the one that embodied the
expectation of the Good Australian Migrant as a blank canvas.
For some migrants, particularly those in the immediate post-war period, the
ability to leave their old life behind and start anew proved desirable, and may
have even acted as an incentive for migration to Australia. The ability to forget
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the past was certainly a feature of DP migration, with Kunz describing the
introduction of IRO Identity cards as a source of ‘joyful relief’ as they ‘certified a
politically blameless past, safeguarded the holder from repatriation, guaranteed
continued

minimum

maintenance

and

opened

the

door

to

possible

emigration.’ 118 Bosworth has also recognised that some migrants have proven
reluctant in giving a voice to their individual and collective pasts. This was either
out of a perception that simple-minded and cultureless Australians lacked the
sophistication needed to understand the context from which they had emigrated,
a more sinister or overtly political need to distance themselves from their past particularly with questions of wartime allegiances, or simply because the trauma
of their experience was so great that they welcomed the opportunity to indulge in
total denial in a country perceived to be at the ends of the earth. Thus, he
explains, ‘for many a European migrant the aptest of aphorisms is that which
advises ‘happy is the man (and nation) who has no history.’ 119
Nonetheless, whether out of obligation or a wilful forgetting, a significant
characteristic of becoming this blank canvas included becoming apolitical, or at
most as sympathetic to the government agenda as any average voter. Though the
expectation of political apathy is tied to the expectation of gratitude and its
implication of accepting the Australian way of life without criticism, the
allowance for some political sympathy can be traced back to Menzian politics, its
emblematic anti-communism, and Australia’s troubled history with WWII war
criminals. On 22 March 1961, Sir Garfield Barwick on behalf of the Government
offered the following explanation of the ‘two deep seated human interests’ central
to the issue of the potential existence of war criminals in Australia as a result of
the immigration program:
On the one hand, there is the utter abhorrence felt by Australians for those
offences against humanity to which we give the generic name of war crimes. On
the other hand, there is the right of this nation, by receiving people into this
country, to enable men to turn their backs on past bitternesses and to make a
new life for themselves and for their families in a happier community. This has
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formed a precious part of the heritage of the West, in which Australia has an
honorable share.
In a given case the choice between these two human interests may present a
government with a difficult decision. In the present instance, however, the
Government came to the clear conclusion that, all questions of legal obligation
apart, if such a choice had been necessary to resolve the matter, its right of
asylum must have prevailed. Australia has established a thorough, though of
course not infallible, system for sifting and screening the hundreds of thousands
of migrants who have enriched our national life since the World War. In default
of a binding obligation requiring Australia at this point of time to do otherwise,
these, who have been allowed to make their homes here, must be able to live, in
security, new lives under the rule of law. 120

It has not escaped the attention of many scholars that the very people who could
have ‘slipped through the system’ were the same people who would be
sympathetic to the Menzian conservative agenda. 121 Barwick’s defence of the
migrant right to a new life did not arise from a noble sense of social responsibility
or a defence of the rights of naturalised citizens. Rather, Barwick simply was not
interested in who the migrants were prior to their arrival, providing they worked
hard for Australia. The economic contribution migrants were expected to make
was of a far greater importance in the early years of immigration, and as long as
the ‘bad’ individual became a Good Australian Migrant, their past indiscretions
were irrelevant.
The expectation that a migrant would become a blank canvas under
assimilation ‘disavowed a multi-dimensional identity - one in which stories and
identities from the past remained intact but which could be integrated with new
experiences.’ 122 The social changes of

the 1960s and the

advent of

multiculturalism in the 1970s challenged this wholesale disavowal, allowing
migrants a multi-dimensional identity which could integrate the old self with
new experiences. However, it seems as though a limit persists on which past
narratives are able to co-exist with the migrant’s Australian identity. Narratives
of culture, dance, song, food, hobbies, and faith are not only accepted but
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encouraged, framed as the threads of the multicultural fabric of the Australian
nation. Political pasts, however, are still routinely spurned, particularly those that
involve conflict. The directives to ‘leave your problems over there’ or to ‘stop
bringing your problems over here’ are perhaps the most illustrative of this, often
levelled whenever migrant groups clash between each other, particularly at
sporting events, or when a ‘problematic’ community engages in protest or
criticism.

2.2.4. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS CULTURAL CAPITAL
The introduction of multiculturalism as official government policy in the
1970s was a watershed in the relationship between Australia and its migrant
other. It radically changed the way Australian institutions responded to the
migrant presence, identifying and catering to needs and issues specific to
migrants and migrant communities that had hitherto been ignored. The
expression of cultural difference that had been discouraged under assimilation
was now central to multiculturalism, and not only was it tolerated, but
encouraged as an intrinsically Australian quality. Whereas the walking blank
canvas the migrant was expected to be under assimilation included casting away
ones culture, language, and everyday customs in order to become ‘like us’,
multiculturalism celebrated cultural diversity as ‘us’ and the ‘real’ Australian way
of life. Though ostensibly accepting migrants as part of the Australian social
fabric, multiculturalism did not eliminate the expectations levelled at the Good
Australian Migrant; it simply changed the way they manifested in everyday life,
and placed an additional expectation of the contribution of cultural capital to
Australia’s newfound multicultural identity.
Early critiques, particularly from the Left, argued that multiculturalism only
valued the superficial aspects of cultural identity while doing very little to address
the social inequality inherent in the migrant experience. 123 Furthermore, the
123
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cultural capital expected of migrants was limited to that deemed acceptable to
the sensitivities of the Australian-born - palatable little morsels fit for (white)
Australian consumption. In the same way migrant labour was acceptable only
when it was tied to the needs of the national economy and the tenets of noncompetition, the cultural capital of migrants was limited to the narrow and nonthreatening activities that Jupp terms ‘Pasta and Polka’ activities, or which I call
the three F’s - Faith, Folklore, and Football. Migrants were free to practice their
own religions, indulge in the folkloric traditions of their cultures in the forms of
food, dance, music, language, art, and crafts, and participate in the sports and
leisure activities that coloured their memories of the ‘old life’, with football
(soccer) becoming the most recognised face of this, and also the best example of
the limits placed on these activities. 124
This limited cultural capital, however, was not new or unique to
multiculturalism. As Jupp explains, from the very beginning of Australia’s postwar immigration program ‘public displays of exotic culture were welcomed and
officially encouraged.’ 125 Kunz even argues that the cultural capital of migrants
was exploited by the architects of the immigration program, portraying migrants
as ‘happy New Australians who were perennially smiling into cameras and ever
ready to change into national costumes after a hard day’s labour to entertain
their benefactors with charming dances.’ 126 These activities, Jupp argues, were
acceptable under assimilation because they were limited to those activities that
‘made life more interesting without challenging Anglo-Australian hegemony.’ 127
While the freedom of cultural expression and easier access to services under
multiculturalism resulted in an undeniable and tangible improvement to the lives
of Australian migrants, the enduring social and political inequality inherent in
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the migrant experience has led some historians to increasingly argue that
multiculturalism was less the watershed it is often thought to be, and more a reinstitutionalisation of Anglo-Australian hegemony under an internationally and
domestically acceptable guise. 128

For example, Galligan, Boese and Phillips argue that Australia’s national character is not a
multicultural one, but rather ‘a pluralistic liberal democracy with distinctive national characteristics that
has developed, in part, through contributions of the diverse people who make Australia their home.’
Jupp argues that ‘Australian multiculturalism at the national level has had very little to do with culture
and a great deal to do with immigrant settlement... In practice, ‘multicultural’ in Australia has meant
‘multilingual.’ Brawley argues that the liberalisation of policies in the 1960-70s was more about the
maintenance of the White Australia Policy rather than its dismantling, because ‘ultimately the only way
to save the White Australia policy was to end it and put in its place a device that maintained white
supremacy and alleviated international pressure – multiculturalism. Wills situates the need for
multiculturalism more domestically and practically, arguing that ‘the official policy of multiculturalism,
while an accession to the reality of a diversifying population, was also a way of controlling that diversity
in order to render it subservient to the already constituted nationalist imagery. See:
B. Galligan, M. Boese, and M. Phillips, Becoming Australian (Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing,
2014), 4, 173–83.
J. Jupp, ‘The Politics of Immigration, Settlement and Multiculturalism’, in A. Markus, P. McDonald, and J.
Jupp (eds.), Australia’s Immigration Revolution (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2009), 95–96.
S. Brawley, ‘Legacies: The White Australia Policy and Foreign Relations since 1973’, in L. Jayasuriya, D.
Walker, and J. Gothard (eds.), Legacies of White Australia: Race, Culture, and Nation (Crawley:
University of Western Australia Press, 2003), 101.
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2.3. CITIZENSHIP
Becoming an Australian citizen is not the same as becoming an Australian. 129

2.3.1. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS CITIZEN
At the 1956 Australian Citizenship Convention in Canberra, Minister for
Immigration Harold Holt delivered an address titled Building for a Better
Australia. In explaining the importance of taking out Australian citizenship for
migrants, Holt reasoned
We want our foreign-born migrants to become naturalized Australian citizens
since that is the final proof of their acceptance of Australia and of Australia’s
acceptance of them. 130

Citizenship - or naturalisation as it was then termed for non-British migrants –
was considered the natural end-point of migrant settlement and assimilation. If
successful assimilation was achieved when it was impossible to tell the
‘immigrant’ from the ‘national’, citizenship was the proof of achieving invisibility
for the migrant, and the measure of the success of assimilation policy in general.
Citizenship was in effect the confirmation of the status of a migrant as a Good
Australian Migrant.
This confirmation was based on the intricate connection between, and
usually conflation of, issues of citizenship and issues of immigration in Australian
history. As Davidson points out, with the exception of Aborigines and Torres
Strait Islanders, the population of Australia is entirely made up of migrants and
their descendants, and as such ‘the citizen voice can be controlled by the control
of migrants.’ 131 For a country of migration such as Australia, exclusion from
citizenship begins with physical exclusion at the border, and ‘the rules governing
the state’s relations with outsiders and then immigrants establish real rules of
Galligan, Boese, and Phillips, Becoming Australian, 171.
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131
A. Davidson, From Subject to Citizen: Australian Citizenship in the Twentieth Century (Melbourne:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 150.
129
130

115

exclusion from the body politic.’ 132 This control was at the heart of the White
Australia Policy – by excluding the migration of non-Europeans, and minimising
the migration of the non-British, the citizenry of Australia was preserved
culturally and ethnically British.
Prior to the creation of the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948, there was no
such thing as an Australian citizen, only British subjects. Australian identity was
defined relative to its similarities and differences with its British counterpart,
rather than on its own terms. The concept of citizen rights was shaped by the
history of Australia’s colonies as penal colonies, and in their pursuit of British
rights for its inhabitants equal to those back in Britain. After federation, both
Australian identity and citizen rights were defined relative to the aim of
becoming an economically, socially and politically ‘better’ version of Britain that
was ‘more British than the British.’ 133 However, developments in the post-war
period challenged these narratives of being Australian, both in terms of
Australian citizenship generally, and in the conferral of it to non-British migrants
specifically.
The formulation and definition of Australian citizenship was prompted by
Canada’s creation of the Canadian Citizenship Act 1946, the first to create a
citizenship separate from that of a British subject within the Commonwealth,
rather than any significant pressure to assert an Australian identity as separate
from British. This was given further political impetus with the establishment of
the post-war immigration program, which demanded an articulation of
Australian citizenship vis-à-vis non-British immigrants. 134 However, as Jordens
points out,
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No Australians… had any conception of what being an Australian citizen as
distinct from a British subject actually meant. This was because citizenship was
conceptualised in relation to British culture and ethnicity, not in terms of the
rights and responsibilities of the citizens of an autonomous state. 135

Therefore the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 only served to institutionalise
the understanding of Australians citizenship as defined by British culture and
ethnicity. The Act defined an alien as someone who was neither a British subject,
Irish citizen, nor a protected person. Therefore, ‘the image of Australians
enshrined in Australian citizenship legislation was that of an Anglo-Celtic
people.' 136
Because of this enduring conception of Australian citizenship based on
British culture and ethnicity, the emphasis of the Nationality and Citizenship Act
1948 was ‘on proving and affirming that you ‘belonged’ and then on acquiring not
active rights as equal citizens but passive rights to consume benefits and
privileges.’ 137 For non-British migrants, becoming culturally Australian and
affirming belonging was as important, if not more, than attaining the legal status
and rights of Australian citizenship. In the same way Australia’s status as a
country of migration meant that citizenship included the physical exclusion of
migrants, ‘the requirement that citizenship depends on belonging beforehand to
an existing, structured national family has effectively functioned to exclude great
numbers of people from citizenship here throughout Australian history.’ 138 The
most obvious of these exclusions was racial, as until 1967 the White Australia
Policy explicitly excluded non-European migration due to their perceived
inability to assimilate. However, as already argued throughout this chapter,
selection criteria and settlement policies also contributed to the exclusion of
certain people and attributes from the body politic regardless of their physical
presence on Australian territory, in an attempt to maintain the citizen voice as
culturally British as possible. This is the exclusion in operation which gave
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preference to Calwell’s ‘Beautiful Balts’ who looked similar to the Anglo-Celtic
people enshrined in citizenship legislation, in the expectation of assimilation that
sought to suppress any difference in favour of the Australian way of life, in the
health criteria which kept the body politic physically able, and in the bias
towards male migrants that favoured male labour, but also a masculine body
politic. The focus on privileges and benefits of Australian citizenship further
marginalised migrants because ‘the newcomers were not seen as having any
intrinsic social and political qualities and values which might enrich Australia.’ 139
Jordens suggests thinking of the mediation between immigration and
citizenship as a ‘citizenship bargain’. This is ‘a metaphor for the set of mutual
expectations governing how actors affected by a government program involving
rights and responsibilities normally associated with citizenship should interact
with one another.’ 140 Until 1973, she argues, ‘alien and British migrants were
offered very different citizenship bargains.’ 141 British migrants were able to
exercise all the civil, social and political rights and responsibilities normally
associated with citizenship while aliens only received a ’partial’ package of
limited participation in public life until full citizenship was granted. This not only
entrenched a perceived inequality between British and non-British migrants, but
also an inequality between citizenship through birthright, and citizenship
through naturalisation.
Changes in the citizenship bargain, Jorden explains, are usually prompted
either through non-compliance with the bargain agreed upon, or when the
bargaining resources of the parties change. 142 Despite significant monitoring and
marketing of citizenship to migrants, take-up rates during the 1950s and 1960s
remained low. Some explained this low take-up as either the product of 'migrant
ignorance and apathy’ and accused migrants of ‘[wanting] the privileges but not
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the responsibilities of citizenship.' 143 There were, however, real barriers to selling
Australian citizenship to both British and non-British migrants. Those within the
Immigration Department responsible for the promotion of citizenship uptake
found that some forms of non-compliance were due to practical barriers posed by
laws and regulations which prevented a path to citizenship for some. Conceptual
barriers to citizenship, however, were primarily the result of the discrimination
between British and non-British migrants entrenched in legislation and society
that resulted in unequal citizenship bargains. Put simply, ‘for many, the costs of
relinquishing their former citizenship were obvious, and the benefits of attaining
Australian citizenship remained obscure.’ 144
Immigration department bureaucrats were therefore amongst the first to
identify and agitate for change, either in reducing practical barriers to citizenship
by simplifying requirements or making it less costly to comply with, or in
reducing intangible barriers by advocating for the removal of discriminatory
practices, as evidenced by the amendments to and revisions of citizenship acts. 145
Though the non-compliance of migrants challenged the citizenship bargain, it
was the change in bargaining resources that the advent of the Whitlam
government heralded that significantly changed the nature of Australian
citizenship. First, the three decades of an increasingly diverse migrant intake had
the unintended consequence of a slow but certain abandonment of a BritishAustralian nationalism in favour of a new Australian nationalism based on
cultural pluralism. Thus in 1973, alongside the introduction of multiculturalism
which affirmed this new vision of Australian belonging, the Whitlam
Government also equalised citizenship requirements between British and nonBritish migrants. Second, under this new nationalism, the bargaining position of
migrants, who previously had few resources, no political power, nor the vote due
to the delay between arrival in Australia and conferral of citizenship, was
strengthened. Finally, the development of an understanding of citizenship based
on an equality of rights rather than British culture or ethnicity was assisted by
Haebich, Spinning the Dream, 178.
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145
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Whitlam Government ratification of a number of United Nation covenants on
civil, political, cultural, economic and women’s rights. 146
Despite these moves towards a rights-based and less exclusionary vision of
Australian citizenship, two constants have remained. The first is the concept of a
single national identity, which seemed to lose currency under the governments of
Whitlam, Fraser, and Hawke, but which was resuscitated in the late 1980s with
bicentenary debates regarding Australian identity, and immigration debates
regarding Asian immigration. These debates also prompted what Davidson
describes as a retrograde retreat to a communitarian ‘family’ model of
citizenship. 147 This produced the second constant in Australian citizenship – the
primacy of the nation as a ‘family’ to which a migrant must demonstrate
belonging. Thus, Australian citizenship remains a cultural citizenship through
which citizens consume as privileges and benefits, but one whose privileges and
benefits are now informed by notions of rights and responsibilities. The Good
Australian Migrant is still expected to demonstrate their belonging, albeit to an
Australian national identity based on a multicultural diversity and heterogeneity
rather than a British dualism or homogeneity, but which nonetheless entails
adopting an apparently self-evident and agreed upon set of ‘Australian values’.
Therefore the Good Australian Migrant is still expected to become both
Australian and an Australian citizen. This expectation continues to exclude those
who are perceived as unable or refusing to ‘belong’ from the body politic.
Contemporary debates about asylum seekers and Muslim immigration are an
example par excellence, in which Australian Senator Pauline Hanson can declare
to the Parliament that ‘we are in danger of being swamped by Muslims who
bear a culture and ideology that is incompatible with our own,’ 148 despite the
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fact that Muslims make up only 2.2% of the Australian population, 149 nor the long
history of Muslims in Australia, some of which pre-dates European settlement. 150

2.3.2. THE ‘GOOD AUSTRALIAN’ IN THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT
Just as it is not enough for the migrant to become an Australian citizen, it is
also not enough for the migrant to simply become Australian. The Good
Australian Migrant, as the name suggests, is expected to become a Good
Australian. Although this may seem a reasonable request to make of migrants,
exactly what constitutes this Good Australian, and more importantly, who defines
it, has important consequences in the mediation of the relationship between
Australia and its migrant Other. As Murphy notes, ‘there was always the
suggestion about the term that newcomers had to be ‘good Australians’ while the
native-born could get away with just being Australians.’ 151 This produces a
conditionality to citizenship which differentiates those that are citizens through
birth from those that are citizens through migration. This echoes the unequal
citizenship bargains of the 1950-60s under assimilation, and just like the
‘Australian way of life’, the ambiguous Good Australian is an aspirational vision
which the Australian-born are rarely expected to meet themselves.
The concept of a Good Australian was not unique to the post-war period, nor
was it only applied to post-war migrants. In the inter-war years, parliamentarians
often claimed to speak as ‘Good Australians’ when arguing a particular position,
most frequently in debates regarding protectionism and trade unionism. In the
1920s some, such as South Australian Senator Albert Alfred Hoare, used the term
to argue against immigration from Southern Europe, arguing that Southern
Europeans could not make Good Australian citizens due to their cultural or racial
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incompatibility. 152 The concept re-emerged in the late 1930s with the issue of
Jewish refugee immigration and in debates relating to the 1940 amendment of the
Immigration Act. Objecting to the proposal to reduce the period of residence
required before naturalisation to one year, NSW Senator Macartney Abbott
argued,
In my opinion, the law ought to be amended to provide for closer supervision of
the conduct of immigrants and of their habits of life, so that the authorities
might be better able to judge of the qualifications of aliens to become good
Australians. 153

In the post-war period, the ability of certain migrants to become Good
Australians was frequently deployed in discussions of naturalisation, in particular
in debates relating to proposed amendments and revisions of citizenship acts.
Because the acceptance of migrants into the body politic is conditional on
their status as Good Australians, the behaviour of migrants, both public and
private, is policed in ways the Australian-born simply are not. This extends to
community groups, and it is from here that the sins of a small migrant minority
can become representative of entire communities. All migrants of a particular
community must be Good Australians, and when transgressions occur, the
majority can and will be held accountable, with the transgression framed as a
product of a particular cultural trait that stems from their migrant Otherness.
This is why the Federal Immigration Minister Peter Dutton suggested in
November 2016 that because second- and third-generation Lebanese-Muslims
made up a sizeable proportion of people arrested on terrorist-related offences,
the Lebanese-Muslim migration intakes of the 1970s were a mistake. 154 Like Dawn
Fraser and her Kyrgios/Tomic comments, Dutton situates the misconduct of
these individuals in their ‘migrantness’, rather than in any shortcomings in their
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Australian upbringing. The transgressions of the Australian-born, on the other
hand, are cast as exceptions to the rule, with the transgression attributed to an
inherent personal quality, such as the mental health of the individual, rather than
an inherent cultural trait. 155 Therefore, whereas migrants exist in the absolutes –
Good/Bad, All/None, the Australian-born are allowed to exist in the shades of
grey, where the actions of one are not indicative of the whole.
In much the same way being Australian is most easily defined by what it was
not, one way of policing Good Australian behaviour is through the naming and
shaming of bad migrant behaviour. Often, this bad behaviour becomes overexaggerated, particularly when criminal activity is involved, and the crimes of one
or a handful of perpetrators are identified as endemic to entire communities. This
in turn is used to justify actions taken against particular communities in the
name of maintaining Australian law and order. This is demonstrated by the 2015
amendment to the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 which gave the Australian
Government the ability to strip dual citizens charged with ‘terrorism-related
conduct’ of their Australian citizenship, and in the February 2016 leaked Liberal
cabinet document which included a proposal that would see refugees admitted
under Australia’s humanitarian program monitored even after they receive
citizenship. In both instances, the Government was accused of creating a twotiered system of Australian citizenship that differentiated between citizenship by
birth and citizenship by grant. 156 Perhaps the only non-migrant group to
experience this kind of over-exaggeration and conditionality to citizenship were
Australian communists in the 1950s and 1960s. The degree of scrutiny, both
historical and contemporary, that this has spurred, including denunciations that
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the actions of the government constituted the abuse of citizen rights, speaks
volumes. 157

2.3.3. WERE CROATIANS GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANTS?
On first impression, it seems that Croatians were both the best of migrants
and the worst of migrants, oftentimes simultaneously. This is perhaps most
readily noticed in the shorthand history of the community, which identifies the
characteristics that adhered to the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant
as ‘positive’ contributions, while those that contravened expectations are
portrayed as negative qualifiers. As is the case with many other post-war migrant
communities, the economic contributions of Croatians are often framed as that
which helped ‘build the nation’. Particular distinction is given to the involvement
of Croatians in the construction of major, labour-intensive public infrastructure
projects, and their employment in key post-war industries, such as steel and
manufacturing. That histories highlight these particular economic contributions
is neither incidental nor accidental. Rather, they demonstrate key expectations of
the Good Australian Migrant – the provision of male, able-bodied labour, and
most importantly, labour which was to the benefit of the nation.
The cultural contributions of Croatians are limited in the same way, with
historical interest concentrated on the Three F’s deemed acceptable for the Good
Australian Migrant – faith, folklore, and football. Moreover, each of these cultural
contributions emphasised traits Croatians shared with their Australian
counterparts. The Catholicism of Croatians demonstrated both their shared
heritage with Irish Australians, and the cultural difference between Croatians and
other Yugoslavs, particularly of Orthodox or Muslim religions. Though Folklore
focused on cultural difference, that Croatians participated in local, regional, and
national events demonstrated a shared engagement with Australian civic life and
a visible involvement in Australia’s cultural scene. The considerable contribution
For a detailed analysis of the various legal conditions placed on the migrant citizenship process, see
‘Discourses of Exclusion, Silencing the Migrant Voice’, in Davidson, From Subject to Citizen, 149–87.
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of Croatians to football in Australia is perhaps the one most readily associated
with the community, and how better to demonstrate Australianness than
through the love of sport, particularly one that is worshipped by the British? Each
of these cultural contributions in some way bumped Croatians a little higher up
the sliding scale of ‘Britishness’, amplifying the perceived cultural affinity and
assimilability of Croatians.
While the trajectory of post-war Croatian settlement has mimicked that of
most post-war migrant communities, the Croatian community has also had a
distinctive characteristic in its very visible, at times extremely divisive, political
activism. This activism violated the expectation of the Good Australian Migrant
in many ways. The community dared to be more than just labour and cultural
entertainment, and was neither ahistorical nor apolitical. This was inevitably
coded as ungrateful behaviour that was in no way ‘like us’, and therefore did not
demonstrate a willingness to belong to the national family. During the 1960s and
1970s, allegations of political violence and terrorism exponentially amplified these
perceptions, launching the community into the national spotlight, and marking
Croatians with a reputation for extremism that still haunts the community.
However this history of the post-war Croatian community is far more
complicated than a simple balance sheet of positive and negative characteristics
based on the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant. Instead there is a
complex interplay of varying contexts, causes, and characters that have left this
general impression of the community in public memory. The following three
chapters will explore this complicated history in greater detail, and demonstrate
how each particular period, with the contexts, causes, and characters specific to
each, exerted their influence on both the political activism of the community,
and on Australian responses to it, both then and now.
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CHAPTER 3:
THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY
IS MY FRIEND
1947-1971

Lovoković, Hrvatske Zajednice u Australiji

It is understandable that some Yugoslav migrants of Croatian
origin should continue to hope for the establishment of an
independent Croatia and within a democracy like Australia
they have a right to advocate their views so long as they do so
by legitimate means.1
Sir Robert Menzies, 27 August 1964
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On 27 August 1964, Menzies delivered a Ministerial Statement on Yugoslav
immigrant organisations to ‘make some observations to the House about the
Government’s general policy in relation to migrant organisations and about
immigration from Yugoslavia.’ 2 He believed it necessary to address concerns
raised both in and outside the Parliament about the activities of Yugoslav
organisations. In particular, he provided responses to the 38 questions that Dr
James (Jim) F. Cairns had placed on notice earlier, ranging from the general –
such as the broad history of the Ustaša movement, to the specific – such as how a
group of Croatian men came to be photographed standing on an Australian army
tank. 3 However, the title of the Ministerial Statement was somewhat of a
misnomer; it was Croatian and not Yugoslav organisations causing Cairns and
others concern. Inherent in these concerns was the suggestion that Croatians
were a problematic migrant group, and that the government was not doing
enough to address their activism, whether out of ignorance or out of political
expediency.
Menzies’ response was two-fold. In a departure from the accepted rhetoric of
the 1950s, he argued that migrant organisations in and of themselves were no
longer viewed by his government as problematic. Rather, they aided migrant
integration, functioning much like any other agency of assimilation. Migrant
organisations were only problematic when they engaged in activities ‘which tend
to frustrate integration.’ 4 Menzies dismissed the suggestion that migrant
organisations were any more or less problematic than other organisations, and
considered the governmental responses some advocated as unwarranted. While
he conceded that the possibility of illegal activity always existed, he also noted
that Australian authorities were capable of investigating, and if necessary,
prosecuting either migrant organisations or individuals within them, just as with
any other individual or organisation.
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On the question of Yugoslav migrants, Menzies cautioned that ‘to
understand the attitudes of these migrants it is necessary to remind ourselves
that this part of Europe has an exceedingly complex and troubled history.’ 5 The
establishment of a communist Yugoslav state at the end of WWII, coupled with
the ‘deep differences of religious, cultural and historical kinds’ between the
peoples of Yugoslavia, resulted in a number of Yugoslav migrant communities
throughout the world establishing organisations in opposition to the communist
government. Croatians in Australia were therefore no different to others
elsewhere in advocating the establishment of an independent Croatian state.
Furthermore, Menzies reasoned that in a democracy like Australia, Croatians had
‘a right to advocate their views so long as they do so by legitimate means.’ 6 That
there may be individuals prepared to do so by illegitimate means was a proven
possibility. He explained that though isolated acts of violence had occurred
within the Yugoslav community, the suggestion that there was an organised or
systemic series of attacks associated with Croatians or their activism was
unsubstantiated. Reiterating his previous position, Menzies argued that existing
Australian authorities were capable of investigating and prosecuting such
instances without any further involvement by the government. In concluding his
Ministerial Statement, Menzies remarked:
So I make the Government’s position quite clear: This Government will not
interfere with freedom of opinion. Equally, it will not tolerate any activities which
constitute a breach of the law.’ 7

Menzies’ Ministerial Statement was met with immediate criticism. The NSW
state executive of the ALP accused him of ‘notable omissions’ and his government
of a ‘complete evasion of its responsibilities to maintain law and order among all
sections of the community.’ 8 Some 30 years later, David McKnight echoed these
same sentiments, bluntly characterising it as ‘a masterpiece of evasion, legalism
and special pleading’ and ‘the most benign statement that could possibly be
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made.’ 9 Though these observations have some merit, they are based on a limited
snapshot of the complex domestic and international contexts and historical
legacies that not only led Menzies to deliver his Statement, but compelled
Croatians to engage in political activism, provoked Cairns to raise questions, and
even help to explain McKnight’s observations so many years later. Rather than a
masterpiece of evasion, it is more accurate to argue that Menzies believed some
opinions were freer than others, and some breaches of the law were more
perilous than others, the distinction of which can be reduced to the Cold War
adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
This chapter seeks to explain these contexts and legacies, and in conjunction
with the foundations laid in earlier chapters, reimagine the historical narrative of
Croatian political activism in this period as more than the Cold War political
football it is often reduced to. Section 3.1 will contextualise the first wave of postwar Croatian emigration and the centrality of organisational life to these
communities. Croatian migrants, like many others of this period, were influenced
by their wartime experiences, and their organisations quickly developed political
undertones which sought to establish a Croatian identity as separate from
Yugoslav, framed in the advocacy for an independent Croatian state. Section 3.2
will outline Australian responses to these organisations and their activism. They
were problematic because migrant organisations were objectionable under
assimilation policy generally, the political activism of Croatian organisations
contravened the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant specifically, and
advocacy for an independent Croatian state was problematic in and of itself.
However, Australian responses to Croatian political activism were tempered by
the Cold War myopia of Australian politics. Section 3.3 demonstrates how these
paradigms were disrupted by the changes of the 1960’s in international and
domestic contexts, as well as changes within the Croatian community itself.
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3.1. THE FIRST WAVE OF POST-WAR CROATIAN
EMIGRATION
Before ethnic and multicultural initiatives received financial aid – that is, before
Australia embraced multiculturalism in the 1970s – Croats displayed a remarkable
degree of flexibility, initiative and determination in setting up a range of
structures to meet their social, cultural and welfare needs and did so
without material or moral assistance from governmental agencies,
either Australian or Yugoslav. 10

Croatians comprised the majority of the more than 26,000 Yugoslavs who
settled in Australia from 1947-1954 under the DP Scheme, and the further 2030,000 who migrated to Australia up until the early 1960s. 11 These Croatians were
either refugees displaced by WWII, or political migrants escaping the oppressive
post-war climate of Yugoslavia. Most had illegally crossed Yugoslavia’s borders,
initially escaping to countries such as France, Germany or Switzerland, or to DP
camps in Austria and Italy. 12 Unlike their predecessors who were overwhelmingly
from the Croatian coast and following established patterns of chain migration,
post-war Croatians hailed from diverse regions across Yugoslavia and different
social and occupational backgrounds. Though men still out-numbered women at
approximately 1.7:1, and unmarried young males continued to comprise a high
proportion of the intake, 13 the first wave of post-war Croatian migration was both
numerically larger and more demographically diverse than the pre-war and interwar intakes.
The post-war Croatian community came to be characterised by a high level of
organisation, establishing associations, organisations, and social groups to help
V. Drapac, ‘Active Citizenship in Multicultural Australia: The Croatian Experience’, in Jupp (ed.), The
Australian People [2nd Edn.], 64.
11
Though it is not known exactly how many of these migrants were Croatian, Kunz found that of a
sample of 19,500 Yugoslav DP migrants, approximately 10 500 were Croatian, 5800 Serbian, 1800
Slovene and 1400 of other ethnic origin, indicating that perhaps just over a half of all Yugoslav migrants
were Croatian. See: Kunz, Displaced Persons, 121.
For migration statistics 1947-1976 by Country, see:
Table, ‘Net Migration to Australia 1947-76’, in Lack and Templeton, Bold Experiment, 76.
12
Budak, ‘Post-War Croatian Settlement’, 342.
13
Kunz, Displaced Persons, 122.
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with navigating the pressing issues of accommodation, work, and language, while
providing venues for social activities in order to mitigate the feelings of
displacement and loneliness migration had caused, particularly within the
paradigms of the three F’s – faith, folklore, and football. However, the vigour of
this community in establishing organisations was driven by more than just their
social and welfare needs. Post-war Croatians purposefully rejected the Yugoslav
organisations that had served the community during the inter-war years. To have
escaped the clutches of Tito’s Yugoslavia, only to find themselves classified as
Yugoslavs in Australia and directed towards Yugoslav organisations was an ‘insult
of great proportions.’ 14
Therefore, alongside the high level of organisation the post-war Croatian
community also came to be characterised by a high level of politicisation. These
migrants believed that it was their duty to maintain the struggle for Croatian
independence now that they had access to a democracy and its resources of free
speech, protest, and political advocacy, free of the consequences such actions
back home could bring. When considering the wartime and post-war experiences
of the Croatians migrating during this period, it is altogether understandable that
the issue of Croatian identity and independence would become central to
organisational life. The high level of organisation and high level of politicisation
established in this period continued to define the community and its activism
over the next five decades, abating only when Croatian independence was
achieved in the 1990s.

3.1.1. THE CENTRALITY OF ORGANISATIONAL LIFE
Organisations established by the first wave of post-war Croatian migrants
served two broad purposes. In the absence of government-led services, Croatians
primarily established organisations to meet the social and welfare needs of
migrants upon settlement. This included navigating the pressing issues of
14
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accommodation, work, and language, and providing venues for social activities
that mitigated feelings of displacement and loneliness. The second purpose of
Croatian organisations lay in their symbolic currency; Croatian organisations
were a tangible representation of the cultural and political identity of post-war
Croatian migrants. Their very establishment was an inherently political act that
sought to differentiate and disassociate their members from a ‘Yugoslav’ identity
and community. Organisations therefore became both the arbiter of social access
and space and the arbiter of the collective cultural and political identity of the
post-war Croatian community. The power of each came to mutually reinforce the
other, making organisations and their leaders central to the definition of the
community and its boundaries.
In addressing the social and welfare needs of migrants, Croatian
organisations were no different to those of other DP groups. Australia’s post-war
immigration program had created a number of overt and covert social issues
which were unanticipated, ignored, or held little interest to policy makers. 15
These were exacerbated by an assimilation policy that viewed government
assistance as a hindrance rather than help to migrant settlement. Migrantspecific services, it was argued, would only delay assimilation and even encourage
the formation of segregated communities. Instead, the fastest way to ensure
assimilation was to push migrants into existing social structures and services in
English. In the face of such an approach, ‘immigrants resorted to mutual help to
solve collectively experienced problems,’ 16 and the very policy which purported

Early critics of assimilation included Walter Lippmann, David Cox, Jerzy Zubrzycki, and Jean Martin,
who would all become significant voices in immigration debates in the 1960s and 1970s. Of these, Jean I.
Martin (nee Craig) was particularly influential, who became widely regarded as an expert even before
the completion of her doctoral thesis in 1954. Examples of her early work include:
‘The social impact of New Australians (1953)’, as printed in Lack and Templeton, Bold Experiment, 92–
97.
‘The Assimilation of European Immigrations’ (Doctoral Thesis, Australian National University, 1954).
Refugee Settlers: A Study of Displaced Persons in Australia (Canberra: Australian National University,
1965).
Community and Identity: Refugee Groups in Adelaide (Canberra: Australian National University, 1972).
It would not be until the election of Whitlam Government in 1972 that the social and welfare needs of
migrants would be comprehensively addressed by the Australian Government.
16
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to avoid the segregation of migrants created the conditions necessitating the
establishment of migrant organisations.
Most post-war migrant communities developed following a similar pattern.
Initially, informal groups formed wherever a concentration of migrants of the
same nationality could be found – at hostels, lodgings, workplaces, or simply in
geographic proximity. The exchange of information and assistance that occurred
between members of these informal groups developed into a valuable reserve of
social capital, and access to these networks of information and opportunity
proved integral to successful migrant settlement in the initial years of
settlement. 17 As social capital accumulated, informal groups formalised, often led
by those that had previously held leading roles either in their homelands (such as
army officers or ex-politicians) or in the refugee camps of Europe, 18 and ‘most
started from scratch with cultural and language activities, entertainment, mutual
assistance, and a language newspaper.' 19 As migrants accumulated wealth
through employment, and organisations in turn accumulated financial resources
through their members, organisations rented, bought, or built facilities ‘where
the atmosphere and tastes of the old country could be recreated, and the new
generation taught traditional ways and values.’ 20 Within a few years of their
arrival, almost all migrant groups had established a national body comprised of
delegates from various local organisations. 21 These national bodies in turn
affiliated with diasporas in other countries, and co-operated with other national
groups in Australia when common goals presented themselves, such as with anticommunist activism or in campaigning for migrant access to services.
Though the initiative and enterprise displayed by migrants in their
establishment of organisations is extraordinary, particularly when considering
the lack of government assistance, limited capital, and relatively low levels of
socioeconomic status, English language proficiency, and education, it is also not
ibid.
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19
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surprising. As Persian explains, migrants arriving in Australia were already
experienced in community building through their time in the DP camps of
Europe, which had developed into ‘training grounds for community leaders and
modeled [sic] a community building process to be used after resettlement.’ 22 DP
migrants simply replicated those same processes in Australia, made even easier
with the greater resources at their disposal. For those from Southern Europe, and
especially from its rural regions, this was amplified by a long tradition of relying
on family, religious, and community networks for support and information rather
than state-provided services. 23
Post-war Croatians replicated this pattern of community development.
Initially, informal groups formed wherever Croatians found themselves, whether
at Bonegilla, one of the many migrant hostels across the country, or in the private
homes of individuals. 24 These groups quickly formalised, with the first post-war
Croatian Club established in Adelaide as early as 1950. In Sydney, the Australian
Croatian Association (Australsko-Hrvatsko Društvo – AHD) was established in
1951, and the first welfare association, Croatian Caritas, in 1952. 25 Catholic
congregations developed alongside local Australian parishes and priests in the
early 1950s, and a number of Croatian priests and nuns migrated to provide
pastoral care. 26 Croatian-language publications were also quick to develop, with
Društveni Viestnik and Hrvat the first bulletins to be published in 1951 and 1952
respectively. 27 In 1957 Spremnost was established, and from 1958 began printing
the first national croatian-language weekly newspaper, published uninterrupted
until its closure in 2007. 28 By 1958, the first Croatian national umbrella
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organisation, the Central Council of Croatian Associations (Središnji Odbor
Hrvatskih Društava Australije – SOHDA), was formed in Sydney. 29
Post-war migrants were unique to the Australian experience of immigration
as they ‘brought a specific type of past with them which was hitherto unknown in
Australia - that is, a wartime experience.' 30 This distinct experience of violence,
dispossession, and poverty influenced both the individual and collective
identities of post-war migrants, colouring relationships within migrant
communities and outside of them. As Damousi explains, 'one of the ways in
which this [wartime] experience was transposed to Australia was through a
continued connection to and interest in politics.' 31 Though this included an
interest in Australian politics and the broad international political environment,
most often this concentrated on the post-war political contexts of migrant
homelands, particularly when it intersected with Australian anti-communism.
This focus on homeland politics, Kunz argues, can be explained by
an almost obsessive feeling of historical responsibility which permeates the
thinking of refugees who, on reaching safety and freedom feel they must carry on
the fight and spread the message which the oppressed at home cannot
proclaim. 32

For reasons ranging from the simple – such as language barriers, to the more
complex – such as the discouragement of their political involvement, migrants
were limited in their access to Australian institutions, and instead turned to the
structures of their organisations to channel their political activism.
Some organisations were openly political, ‘created to advance, through
political means, the day of return to the homeland.’ 33 These organisations were
usually led by those with former ties to political organisations of the homeland,
or those with more politically extremist views. Although leadership and
community building experience, whether in the homeland or the DP camps of
Budak, ‘Post-War Croatian Settlement’, 342.
Lovoković, Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji, 293–303.
30
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Europe, explains much of how these individuals (overwhelmingly men) came to
assume leadership positions in Australia, Kunz also highlights that assimilation
policy, hostile towards the establishment of migrant organisations, ‘tended to
discourage any but extremists from seeking leadership roles.’ 34 Those
organisations that were not ostensibly political, such as social and sporting clubs,
welfare associations, and cultural groups, still held a political undercurrent,
whether through the composition of its members, tacit or explicit support offered
to various actions, activisms and causes, or simply through their affiliation with
other organisations.
As time passed and the likeliness of return to the homeland waned, political
causes gradually lost credibility, their influence diminishing in favour of more
pressing concerns. Migrant organisations increasingly centred their activities on
the social and welfare needs of migrants, either in filling the socio-emotional void
of life in an assimilationist Australia, or in the preservation of culture for future
generations. The drift away from the political concerns of the homeland towards
the social concerns of life in Australia prompted changes in community
leadership, either through the rise of new leaders within existing organisations,
or in the establishment of new organisations that displaced the influence of older
ones. These new leaders in turn reinforced the shift in focus by prioritising social
concerns over political ones.
Even with this shift, most organisations retained at least nominal support for
the political concerns that preoccupied the initial post-war years. The reason for
this was two-fold; in practical terms, the social and financial capital that had
defined early community life continued to be held (however superficially) by
those still invested in political causes, and retaining access to that capital meant
maintaining, at the very least, the pretence of support. Second, while the
feasibility of achieving political aims may have diminished, the symbolism in its
rhetoric remained a powerful force in community building and identity-making.
The political past of a migrant community provided a useful site of myth-making
34
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from which a community could pinpoint its origins, and therefore purpose, in
Australia.
For Croatians, political and social activism was more closely related than for
other comparable migrant groups; while Poles were free to be Polish, the Greek
free to be Greek and Estonians free to be Estonian despite their Soviet
citizenship, Croatians were not free to be Croatian. Instead, Croatians were
officially considered Yugoslavs in both citizenship and nationality, and Croatian
political activism was more than a politically-oriented advocacy for an
independent state in the face of communist domination. More accurately, it was
an advocacy for the very existence of their national and cultural identity, for
which political independence was the logical end-point. Croatian activists needed
to first convince Australians that they were a national group separate from
Yugoslavs, with their own identity, culture, institutions, and history that entitled
them to self-determination, and then on the basis of that self-determination
could they advocate for an independent non-communist state.
Because of this, the establishment of Croatian rather than Yugoslav
organisations was an inherently political act, whether it was a large organisation,
such as the AHD, or as small as the local soccer team. To participate in local
sporting competitions or to engage in advocacy for the provision of services as
Croatians rather than Yugoslavs was just as political an act as to directly advocate
for an independent Croatian state. Conversely, the establishment of political
organisations and advocacy for an independent Croatian state was just as social
an act, as these organisations and activisms provided a venue through which key
aspects of individual and collective identities could be performed, validated, and
rationalised. The obsessive feeling of historical responsibility earlier described by
Kunz manifested in the first wave of Croatian migrants and their organisations in
a very clearly defined raison d'être. As Skrbiš explains,
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This internally complex grouping of political migrants nurtured a specific kind of
ideology, politics and world-view, centring on the re-establishment of the
independent Croatian state and the question of Croatian ethno-national survival
amid the perceived threat from Serbia. 35

Organisations and their leaders assumed a central role in this symbolic economy,
acting as the self-appointed leaders and representatives of the community. More
importantly however, they thought of themselves as the ‘legitimate bearers of the
Croatian democratic tradition and Croatian culture in general.’ 36 According to
this view, the homeland was besieged by a communist government resolved to
eradicate it, and therefore the responsibility of preserving and passing on this
tradition and culture rested with the diaspora. This political raison d'être defined
by the first wave of Croatian migrants prevailed throughout subsequent
generations, for as long as Croatia remained under Yugoslavia, the raison d'être
remained unchanged, even if the way it was expressed and advocated for did.
The dual aims inherent to all Croatian organisations in greater or lesser
degrees – the socio-emotional and the politico-cultural - entrenched the
centrality of organisations and their leaders to the community and in the daily
life of Croatians. Organisations became the arbiter of social access and space
through the physical infrastructure they owned, the material wealth they
accumulated, and the social capital they engendered. These were the physical
places where Croatians could meet other Croatians, the social networks that
helped individuals find accommodation and employment, the friends that
provided emotional support, and the place where committees with access to
resources could organise events that filled the social calendars, fundraise for
those in need, and provide solutions to problems experienced by many but which
were difficult to surmount individually. The importance of access to these spaces
in the everyday lives of Croatians was magnified by an assimilationist Australia

Skrbiš, Long-Distance Nationalism, 37.
Z. Skrbiš, ‘The Distant Observers? Towards the Politics of Diasporic Identification’, Nationalities
Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 25(3), 1997, 603.

35
36

138

which both blatantly and subtly isolated migrants from participation in wider
society. 37
Because they were Croatian rather than Yugoslav, these organisations were
also the arbiters of collective identity. This was primarily achieved via three
abilities - to extend or deny membership to individuals based on their political
allegiance, personal histories, or particular world view; to organise and
participate in certain activities, or boycott and demonstrate against others; and to
speak publically on behalf of the community as a whole due to the generally
higher English-language proficiency of their leadership. Allowing oneself to be
subjected to the scrutiny imposed by organisations and their leaders was, Skrbis
explains, the test of one’s dedication to diasporic Croatianism. 38 It was not
enough to simply be Croatian; one had to prove their Croatianness. Failure to do
so resulted in isolation from the community and the denial of social access and
space, often with the shorthand accusation that the individual was a closeted
Yugoslav. As such, the power of each purpose came to mutually reinforce the
other; the more control over social access and space an organisation had, the
easier it was to enforce support (however nominal) for a particular political
agenda. Conversely, the stronger the support for the political agenda of an
organisation, the easier it was to accumulate social and financial capital from
which social access and space could be created.

3.1.2. EARLY POLITICAL ACTIVISM
The raison d'être of the early post-war Croatian community manifested in its
political activism via two core arguments – that Yugoslavia was an illegitimate
state that did not represent Croatia, Croatians and their interests either at home
or abroad, and that the concept of Yugoslavism as a whole was a false premise
Observing the perseverance of ‘Australian coldness’ towards migrants, Martin wrote in 1972:
‘it was one thing freely to enjoy the companionship of one’s fellow-countrymen, another to feel that
one had in fact no alternative.’
Martin, Community and Identity, 30
38
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that denied the identity, history, and sovereignty of the Croatian nation and its
people. These were further distilled to one very simple message; Croatians were
neither communist nor Yugoslav. The first wave of post-war Croatians placed a
heavy emphasis on the reestablishment of an independent Croatian state, and
consequently its activism centred on making this political dream a reality.
The first reason for this was the chronological proximity to the events of
WWII. As explained in Section 1.3, most Croatians in Australia had either fought
in the armies of the NDH, or were driven out by Tito’s Yugoslavia, and therefore
subscribed to the notion that Croatia was a conquered homeland. These
Croatians believed that with sufficient political and/or military pressure, the
fledgling Yugoslav state could be toppled and Croatia granted its independence
once more. Second, the rhetoric of a conquered homeland neatly intersected with
the anti-communism that defined Australian political life, giving the community
an entry to domestic political conversations. Third, this rhetoric of Croatian
independence and anti-communism was explicitly linked to the political right,
which aligned with the political agenda of the elected government, bestowing
upon post-war Croatians a moral authority over their inter-war predecessors.
Thus, it should not be surprising to find that political activism in this period
was influenced by the legacies of Ustashism. As Skrbiš explains,
The fact that Croatia existed as an independent political entity between 1941-45
ought to be seen as an important factor which influenced the formation of the
political consciousness of the diaspora. The entire post-Second World War
Croatian diaspora discourse was based on the transformation of this historical
fact into a source of inspiration. The re-establishment of the Croatian state was
considered an ultimate goal. 39

The state of the NDH, for all of its faults, was idealised and mythologised as a
watershed for Croatian independence. The NDH had been singularly governed by
the Ustaša, a regime that had also portrayed itself as the next iteration and
rightful custodian of Croatian nationalism. Those who migrated to Australia had
either served in the armies of this glorified state, or were at least politically
sympathetic to the regime’s independence agenda.
39
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Some political organisations held explicit ties to Ustashism, such as the
Croatian Liberation Movement (Hrvatski Oslobodilački Pokret - HOP) or Croatian
National Resistance (Hrvatski Narodni Otpor - HNO), while others borrowed
from its iconography and vocabulary to legitimise either their organisation or
agenda. In Croatian halls one could find a picture of Pavelić hanging on its walls,
usually alongside other figures from Croatia’s history. Celebrations of events
specific to the NDH were held, the most prevalent being the ‘10. Travanj’ events
celebrating the establishment of the NDH on 10 April. To be linked to Ustashism,
however tenuous, served not only to demonstrate that one was devoted to the
reestablishment of an independent state, but also as a shorthand, at least within
the community if not outside of it, that proved one was truly Croatian; that is,
not Yugoslav and not Communist.
Just as communism was able to cross ethnic lines in the inter-war years, anticommunism was able to do so in the post-war years. Anti-communism was a
characteristic common across most DP migrant groups, and Croatians were able
to draw similarities between their activism and that of other diasporas,
particularly those under the yoke of the Soviet Union. Anti-communism was also
able to bridge the gap between the old world and the new by echoing the DP
experience of migrants and Australia’s immigration policy in post-war settlement.
As Persian explains, after June 1948, the IRO’s focus in determining DP eligibility
changed from the ‘genuine’ victims of Nazism to anti-communist ‘dissidents’, and
from group to individual eligibility. DP migrants had to therefore ‘prove’ their
individual persecution in order to be identified as political refugees. This led to a
tradition of ‘new theatricality’ and storytelling which emphasised the anticommunist credentials of an individual against the Cold War ideologies of the
West. 40 This theatricality and storytelling was easily transposed to the activism of
migrant communities, as the repetition of individual stories with similar
characteristics merged into a group identity.
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Anti-communism also provided Croatians with a mode of participation in
Australian political life and a means to articulate its activism in a language that
was familiar to Australia’s political environment. Croatians enacted their activism
through participation in anti-communist events such as Captive Nations Week,
seeking membership to groups such as the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, and
participating in government initiatives such as the Australian Citizenship
Conventions. Protests, such as that in front of the Elizabethan Theatre in
Newtown on 12 October 1959 framed Croatian political activism within Cold War
and anti-communist paradigms, 41 as did pamphlets and publications, particularly
those in English. As early as 1952, Croatian organisations began petitioning
parliamentarians, objecting to their identification as Yugoslavs. 42
Anti-communism was not only an effective way to distance the post-war
Croatian community from the Yugoslav state, but also from the inter-war
Croatian community. The communist legacy of the inter-war community
contributed to the zeal with which post-war Croatians posited their anticommunism, and the motivation for this differentiation was both internal and
external to the community. Internally, communism and Yugoslavism were
anathema to post-war Croatians – anyone that subscribed to a communist or
Yugoslav vision for Croatia’s future, however nominally, was nothing less than
morally bankrupt and a traitor to the nation, either to be distrusted or openly
reviled. Externally, the Australian political climate was more accepting of the
political agenda of the post-war community, and therefore bestowed upon them
a moral authority in determining the boundaries of Croatian identity in Australia.
The more entrenched this moral authority became, the less those with alternative
versions of being Croatian were able to exert their influence. This in turn
homogenised the definition of Croatian identity, narrowing the boundaries of the
community and, coupled with the numerical imbalance between inter- and postwar Croatians (particularly after the repatriations of 1948 and 1949), perpetuated
the cycle. The characterisation of the Croatian community in Australia as both
41
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not-Yugoslav and not-communist became so entrenched that the fastest way to
cast aspersions upon someone within the community is to brand them as a
Yugoslav or a communist, even to this day.
Though Croatian political activism was superficially concerned with the
political rhetoric of self-determination and anti-communism, the practical
application of it was more aligned with questions of ethnicity and identity. This
can be explained as a legacy of the Croatian National Revival of the 1800s,
whereby political activism was inextricably tied to questions of cultural identity,
language, and the history of nationhood. Like the Austro-Hungarians and the
Serbian monarchy before them, Yugoslavs and Yugoslavism were posited as a
political and cultural threat that denied both the political sovereignty and
cultural identity of the Croatian nation and its people. It was also an
advantageous intersection between old world ideas and the new Australian
environment. The social space carved out for migrants by Australia’s post-war
immigration program allowed, and even encouraged, migrants to practice their
cultural traditions, albeit mostly within the confines of the three F’s most
available to them – faith, folklore, and football. This neatly intersected with the
cultural dimension of Croatian political activism and consequently, Croatians and
their activism were most visible when engaging with these pre-existing
structures.
The Catholic Church was perhaps the most public of platforms from which
Croatians could practice their activism, and ‘of all the local institutions it was
perhaps the church that Croatians have found most sympathetic and accepting.’ 43
Familiar with its structures and practices, Croatians were able to express their
cultural identity and political grievances simply through their participation in
common church activities such as mass, street processions, and Marian or
Eucharistic congresses as Croatians. This was reinforced by the shared anticommunist stance between the church and community, and particularly
highlighted in their shared interest in the persecution and imprisonment of
43
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Zagreb’s Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac, both a symbol of Croatian nationhood and
the communist persecution of the catholic clergy worldwide. Publications of the
church, particularly the Catholic Weekly in Sydney, often included articles
regarding the plight of Stepinac, Catholics in Yugoslavia, or Croatian migrants in
Australia. 44 This shared activism was best demonstrated in the 1955 mass held at
St Patrick’s Cathedral in Melbourne dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the
imprisonment

of

Stepinac.

Presided

by

Archbishop

Daniel

Mannix,

approximately 3000 attendees, predominantly Croatian, prayed for Stepinac’s
release. 45
Though the cultural expression of migrants is more readily associated with
the multicultural policy of the 1970-80s, it was also a feature of migrant life under
the assimilation policy of the 1950-60s. In fact, Kunz argues that the cultural
capital of migrants was not only welcomed, but exploited by the architects of the
immigration program, with the entertaining and ‘exotic’ traditions, dances,
costumes and cuisine of migrants framed as a positive by-product of immigration
for Australians to enjoy. 46 Croatians for their part were keenly aware of Australian
fascination with the folkloric traditions of migrants and used it to their
advantage; ‘the knowledge that Australians found European folk costumes to add
a ‘colourful’ dimension to public events led many Croatians to don such attire
where possible and appropriate.’ 47 Any opportunity where the community could
showcase their traditions as Croatians, rather than Yugoslavs, were seized upon
and exploited as an act of political defiance. Events such as Australia Day
celebrations, 48 immigration weeks and festivals, and trade or exhibition shows
For example, see:
‘Truth About Tito’, Catholic Weekly, 24 May 1945, 4
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often featured a Croatian stand that showcased traditional crafts, a group of
young people in folk costumes, often singing or dancing, or plates of Croatian
food against the backdrop of Croatian flags, emblems, images or maps. 49
Nowhere was the twin purpose of Croatian political activism more
intertwined than at the soccer club, perhaps the easiest structure for Croatians to
appropriate. Compared to other forms of activism, it was relatively easy to pull
together at least 11 men, enter a team under a Croatian name, pop on a version of
the tricolour or Croat Šahovnica, and travel to various local, state, and national
destinations to spread their message of defiance against the Yugoslav state. This
was made even easier as a tradition of Croatian soccer clubs in Australia already
existed, with the first, Zora, established in 1931 in Sydney. The Adelaide Raiders
(Adelaide Croatia), Melbourne Knights (Melbourne Croatia), and Sydney United
58 (Sydney Croatia), established in 1952, 1953 and 1958 respectively, would
develop into the foremost of Croatian clubs in Australia, participating in various
local, state and national competitions, and affiliated with some of the largest
names in the sport.
With little power or position in politics, the workplace or church, the soccer
club came to occupy a unique position in post-war migrant communities. As
Mosely explains,
Within soccer the immigrant’s qualifications were recognised and admired. A
lack of the English language was not serious. There was freedom to compete on
equal terms with anyone, and win in both the literal and metaphorical sense. The
game provided the European immigrant with the rare opportunity for expressing
himself. He could stake out an area in society in which his voice bore weight and
in which he had the chance to dominate. As such, there was freedom to release
pent-up emotions, be they ambition, passion, frustration or aggression. 50

Along with the ease of establishment, the freedom Croatians found within soccer
meant it also became a significant channel for their activism. As Hay notes, this
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quickly branded Croatian clubs with a reputation of hostility, clannishness, and
over-politicisation, reduced to the epithet of ‘those bloody Croatians.’ 51
If the re-establishment of an independent state and the rhetoric of anticommunism defined the theoretical foundation and ideological framework of
Croatian political activism, its practice, and arguably true purpose, was steeped in
reasons of ethno-national survival. As Drapac explains, the basic premise of most
overtly Croatian activism in the post-war period was that
Communist Yugoslavia was stifling Croatian identity. All association was
therefore directed at maintaining and shoring up Croatian identity in the face of
this perceived threat to its very existence. The error onlookers made, however,
was to assume that most of this activity was generated by a backward looking
right wing politics. Had it truly been the case that Croats yearned nostalgically
for the establishment of a revived Ustasha state, then Croatian activism would
have had only limited potential for growth and change. 52

The reestablishment of an independent Croatian state and the great return to the
homeland were the means to achieving the goals of ethno-national survival, the
myths that justified the activism and not the end itself.
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3.2. AUSTRALIAN RESPONSES IN THE MENZIAN AGE
What amazes me is that nobody blames Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians,
Hungarians, Poles or dozens of other nationalities for their talk and work for
freedom of their ex-country, although most of them were unfortunate to tolerate
and co-operate with the brutal Germans during the last world war. 53

The responses of Australia’s political, legal, and media authorities to Croatian
political activism in this period can be described as controlled. On the one hand,
Croatian political activism was problematic in the eyes of these authorities
because Croatian organisations were deemed incompatible with the aims of
assimilation generally, Croatian political activism contravened the expectations
of the Good Australian Migrant specifically, and advocacy for an independent
Croatian state was problematic in and of itself. On the other hand, the anticommunist, right-leaning, and conservative nature of Croatian political activism
played right into the Cold War political agenda of Menzies and the Coalition
Government that would hold power for 23 consecutive years.
Further complicating the situation was the relationship of the West with
Yugoslavia. On the one hand, communism was considered a direct threat to the
security and stability of the Western world and its democratic traditions, and
Yugoslavia was a communist state. On the other hand, a communist alternative
to Soviet hegemony, particularly after the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, was considered
to be strategically important for the West, particularly if that communist state
was open to relations with the West, as Yugoslavia proved itself to be.
Furthermore, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was undesirable, as it was believed
that it would either create a territorial vacuum the Soviet Union could capitalise
on to expand its territory, or it could become a catalyst for another bloody
conflict that had the potential to escalate into World War III.
Croatian political activism therefore raised suspicions, not least because
Croatian activism was not a new phenomenon to Australian authorities.
53

A.A Tomasovic, ‘Croatian Fascists’, Catholic Worker, May 1963, 15

147

However, an increasing frequency of violent incidents amongst Yugoslavs,
coupled with a military incursion into Yugoslavia in 1963 that involved nine
Croatians from Australia, legitimised concerns many had raised about Croatian
political activism. Nonetheless, these incidents were deemed as belonging to an
overwhelmingly small minority, rather than indicative of Croatian political
activism as a whole. In light of the general hostility towards migrant political
activism at the time, that the Coalition granted this benefit of the doubt owed
more to the conservative, right-leaning, and anti-communist characteristics
Croatian political activism shared with the Coalition political agenda than it did a
particular concern for the civil liberties of Croatians.

3.2.1. PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF ACTIVISM
Croatian organisations attracted the attention of Australian legal authorities
before their activism began in earnest. ASIO held a particular interest, and
commenced surveillance and information operations on the premises and
members of organisations from their very establishment. 54 Croatian organisations
were deemed problematic from the outset because migrant organisations in
general were ‘regarded as contrary to assimilationist goals and the national
interest, and therefore a danger to be avoided.’ 55 Throughout the 1950s, ethnic
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communities and their organisations were referred to as ‘national groups’, a term
which
reflected mainstream fears that migrants would remain isolated from Australian
society in ethnic enclaves, and that their organisations would perpetuate the
political and social problems of their homeland in Australia. 56

If the goal of assimilation was to make migrants ‘like us’, migrant organisations and especially ethnic-specific ones - were a tangible barrier to assimilation. They
were believed to discourage engagement with Australian institutions and
communities and English-language learning, and heightened the visibility of
migrants rather than serving to make them invisible or indistinguishable from
the Australian-born.
Moreover, the surveillance of Croatians and Croatian organisations was not a
new phenomenon in Australia. During WWI, Croatians, particularly those
organised around the Croatian-Slavonic Society, were placed under surveillance
due to their status as enemy aliens. 57 In the inter-war years, the Yugoslav
organisations Croatians were organised around attracted the attention of legal
authorities due to their involvement in trade unionism, and political ties with
communism and international socialism. Such was the political activism of the
Savez that from January 1937, the CIB began surveillance operations on its
members which continued for almost two decades. 58 Particular attention was
paid to publications emanating from the community, 59 and from 1940-1942 the
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Australian Government banned Napredak, the official newspaper of the Savez
from circulation due to its communist sympathies.
If the mere existence of Croatian organisations or communities was
problematic enough to warrant the interest of legal authorities, that they were
openly political and engaged in activism was even more so. Not only were
Croatian organisations contrary to assimilationist goals, but the fact that they
were Croatian rather than Yugoslav organisations meant that they were
inherently doing the very thing that was feared most - perpetuating the political
and social problems of Yugoslavia. By disputing their identification as Yugoslavs,
Croatians were resisting who and what Australia wanted them to be and were
anything but the blank canvas they were expected to become. Not only did they
hold on to their past self, cultural identity, and histories, but actively promoted
and advocated for them. That Croatian political activism was considered a direct
challenge to the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant is encapsulated in
the following question to the Senate from NSW ALP Senator James Ormonde in
1963:
I ask him [Minister assisting the Minister for External Affairs John Gorton]
whether any attempt is made to tell intending migrants, whether they be
Croatians or otherwise, that when they come to Australia they must leave many
of their national habits behind them and that they are going to a country
where private armies have not any standing and where the type of organization
that they are interested in and have been brought up to respect is not an object
of respect in Australia... I point out that at naturalization ceremonies new
Australians are told that they are expected to be good Australian citizens and
are expected to observe Australian standards and ideals… They are a
minority group organized to keep alive hates they were not prepared to leave
behind in their own country. 60 [own emphasis]

Thus Croatians were perceived as resisting the expectation to become ‘like us’ – a
resistance experienced as a rejection of the presumed magnetism and superiority
of the Australian way of life.
Croatians earned themselves the reputation of being ‘too political’ not only
by engaging in political activism (a contravention of the expectation of being
apolitical), but also in placing conditions on their contribution of cultural capital.
60
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Croatians were happy to make cultural contributions through faith, football, and
folklore, but they demanded their right to political expression in return. By
incorporating their political activism with their cultural contributions, Croatians
were resisting the passive exploitation of their cultural capital and making
demands the standards of the Good Australian Migrant dictated they were not
entitled to make. These transgressions attested to the fact that Croatians were
definitely not demonstrating their gratefulness at the opportunities life in
Australia afforded them.
In direct contrast, however, Croatians viewed their activism precisely as that as a tangible expression of their gratefulness. The high naturalisation rates of
Croatians attests to the importance they attached to Australian citizenship, 61 and
as Drapac explains, Croatian organisational life and its political activism
was a means by which individuals who had little education, poor English
language skills and limited economic and professional opportunities exhibited an
attachment to and an understanding of democratic processes and values in the
pluralist society they had embraced as their own. 62

Rather than taking them for granted, Croatians believed it their moral duty to
exercise their newfound rights as Australian citizens and mobilise their
organisations to make use of the democratic resources of free speech, protest,
and political advocacy. In doing so, Croatians were able to ‘experience the
fullness of Australian civil society’ and engage in an active citizenship. 63
Croatians understood and enacted their citizenship based on a wholehearted
acceptance of the rhetoric of Australian citizenship as the equality of rights,
rather than the reality of Australian citizenship as privileges and benefits based
on norms of British culture and ethnicity. 64 They were engaging in an active
citizenship, whereas the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant only
sanctioned a passive or minimalist citizenship that kept the migrant invisible but
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answerable to Australian civic responsibility. Therein lies one of the biggest
paradoxes in the history of Croatian political activism in Australia – Croatians
were problematic not because they rejected Australian citizenship, but because
they actually enacted it.
If

Australian

authorities

were

generally

concerned

with

migrant

organisations, they were especially concerned with Croatian organisations
because Croatian political activism was problematic in and of itself. Advocacy for
an independent Croatian state was in direct competition with the political
desirability of a Yugoslav state within Cold War paradigms. As Drapac explains,
‘there was a degree of inevitability to this process’ as it ‘coincided with two
features of intellectual and political life in Australia and abroad.’ 65 The first was
the international standing of Yugoslavia within the Cold War context. It was in
the interest of both the East and West to support a united Yugoslavia, not least
because it provided a buffer zone between the two camps. For the West,
‘Yugoslav unity was intrinsically good and politically beneficial.’ 66 After the TitoStalin split of 1948, Yugoslavia was touted as a communist alternative to Soviet
hegemony. It became ‘the acceptable, indeed the attractive and humane face, of
the new communism’ and attracted the positive attention of the New Left in
Europe and abroad. 67 More importantly, Yugoslavia was of strategic importance
to the United States. As Lees explains, Yugoslavia was a crucial to America’s
“wedge” strategy to create divisions between the Soviet Union and other
communist states;
Although developed for use in both Europe and Asia, the wedge received its most
sustained application in U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia, where it also revealed its
greatest strengths and weaknesses. 68

This strategic importance only rose as Yugoslavia built and promoted its policy of
Non-Alignment and relative openness to the West.
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The disintegration of Yugoslavia was also feared, so much so that from the
1948 Tito-Stalin split, ‘Yugoslavia’s continued existence depended upon aid
received from the West.’ 69 The prospect of Yugoslav disintegration had only two
foreseeable outcomes – it would either create a territorial vacuum an
expansionist Soviet Union could capitalise on, 70 or become a catalyst for another
bloody conflict that had the potential to escalate into World War III. For the
Soviet Union, separatist movements, even if based on the principles of national
communism, were perilous. The events of the Poznan Protests and the
Hungarian Uprising in 1956 justified these fears, and any Croatian separatist
aspirations were branded as ‘ideologically and geo-politically dangerous.’ 71 This
fear of disintegration, Drapac explains, ensured that both the United States and
the Soviet Union provided Yugoslavia with the material and moral support it
needed at different times. 72
The second feature of intellectual and political life that made Croatian
activism problematic was the international scholarship of fascism and the Second
World War and the rhetoric which followed from it. Yugoslav scholarship in
particular linked Croatian activism with Ustashism, and ‘official Yugoslav
historiography did not make any distinction between the Ustaša movement and
Croatian patriotism or between the regime in Croatia from 1941 to 1945 and the
state itself.’ 73 This contrasted markedly with the way Serbian collaboration was
portrayed. As Drapac explains, even though both Croatian and Serb forces
collaborated with the Nazi regime during WWII, Yugoslav scholarship treated
Ustaša collaboration as a ‘generalized phenomenon’ that applied to all Croatians,
and Serb collaboration as representing the acts of a small group of traitors or
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individuals.’ 74 This resulted in placing a collective guilt on the Croatian nation for
the war crimes perpetrated by the 1941-45 regime, and discredited any aspirations
for independence as inevitably linked to the chauvinism and brutality of the
Ustaša regime. 75
Croatians were not alone in their anti-Yugoslav activism. Serbians,
Macedonians and Slovenians also advocated against Yugoslavia, Tito, and
communism. 76 However, Croatians became the face of anti-Yugoslav activism for
the very simple reason that Croatians were the most numerous, both in Australia
and as a proportion of Yugoslav emigrants in general. This was reinforced by the
vested interest of the Yugoslav Government generally and Tito personally in
portraying Yugoslav separatism as a Croatian affair. Croatian emigrants and their
activism were viewed as the largest threat to Yugoslav unity and state legitimacy.
The historical reality of the NDH proved that Croatian separatism could
theoretically, if not realistically, result in the disintegration of the Yugoslav state.
Separatism was therefore actively discredited first by portraying it as a Croatian
pursuit, and then by emphasising the ideological links between Croatian activism
and Ustashism. This effectively denounced any Croatian political activism as a
fascist pursuit in resurrecting the brutality of the Ustaša regime.
Aside from the obvious power the Yugoslav Government wielded in
promoting this particular narrative of Ustashism, it was also perpetuated by the
limited paradigms of Ustaša scholarship both within and outside of Yugoslavia.
As summarised by Bartulin, between 1945-1990 the literature predominantly fell
into one of three models. The most ubiquitous was the Marxist-Yugoslav model
Drapac, Constructing Yugoslavia, 161–62.
Writing about the conflation of the adoption of the Šahovnica as a national emblem (the Croatian red
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perpetuated by Yugoslav scholarship. Within this model, the NDH was defined
exclusively as a Nazi/Fascist puppet state and Croatian separatism framed as a
fascistic or extremist movement. Closely related was the Catholic or clericofascist model, which defined the NDH through the paradigm of political
Catholicism and Ustashism as a Catholic-Croatian type of fascism. The third
model developed in response to these first two models. Emerging from émigré
circles, and articulated by anti-Yugoslav Croat intellectuals in the émigré journal
Hrvatska revija (Croatian Review), the Nostalgic-Apologetic model defined the
NDH as a simple realisation of independent Croatian statehood. Under this
model, the mass crimes of the Ustaša regime were either downplayed or ignored,
collaboration

with

the

Nazi

regime

explained

variably

as

inevitable,

opportunistic, or Croatians simply making the most of a terrible situation. 77
There still remain deficiencies in Ustaša scholarship, some of which relate
directly to Croatian political activism. As Drapac points out, exactly what Ustaša
support signified is not clear;
Generalisations about Ustaša support have not to date provided the nuanced
profiles we have for collaborators elsewhere. Nor do we have studies that relate to
the ideological lineage of the NDH and the reception of propaganda policies to
the way in which the regime developed and then imploded… Normally analyses
of European collaboration discuss motivation and intention when assessing
people’s behaviour. Opportunity, geographical location, careerism, self-interest,
disillusionment, racially-derived ideological commitment, the process of
‘barbarization’ resulting from total war and people’s simple strategies for survival
from day to day led to different kinds of behaviour and had different
consequences. 78

Like in all wars, the reasons for enlisting are varied, ranging from the intimately
personal to the highly idealistic, and applies to those who found themselves
fighting for the NDH under its many guises. While it is true that some wholeheartedly supported the Ustaša program in all of its brutality, for others the
choice may have been more pragmatic, or not a choice at all. Some may have
joined out of a desire to protect or avenge their families and villages against those
they perceived would take away their freedoms, whether culturally or religiously.
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For others, being an Ustaša may have simply been an expression of Croatian
nationalism and the yearning for a state not subordinated to foreign rule. Others
still may have simply joined the militia instead of the Domobrani because the
former was better supported and equipped, and a means of escaping the dire
poverty the war had unleashed across the region. Finally, war hysteria and the
lure of adventure may have been enough for some, and joining the Ustaša was
more a coincidence than a considered choice.
The lack of academic interest in the motives for enlistment is compounded
by a lack of academic interest in the various armies themselves, especially
regarding the Ustaša militia. The reasons for this, as outlined by Tomasevich, are
numerous;
Because these forces were under German or Italian operational command during
most of the war; because many accusations of terrorist and unlawful actions were
levelled against them, especially the militia, both during and after the war;
because they belonged to a defeated puppet state that disappeared at the end of
the war; and finally, because after their defeat and surrender they were to a large
extent destroyed by the victorious Partisans, very few studies have been written
about them. 79

Korb also highlights that ‘empirical analyses of the collective violence committed
in Yugoslavia during the Second World War are still rare.’ 80 This has led to a
deficient scholarship steeped in Balkanist rhetoric. Acts of violence are depicted
within a “genocide narrative,” and do not require explanation as they are either
the result of repulsive barbarians or heinous outside control. This mirrors
Drapac’s argument that WWII in Yugoslavia is mistakenly perceived as an
‘exceptional’ war - ‘It was exceptionally brutal and racist. It was exceptionally
complex and tragic.’ 81 This Balkanist discourse in literature concerning WWII in
the region, Korb argues, often neglects what happened on the ground. 82
Australian authorities in Australia operated and continue to operate within
these paradigms in their estimation of Croatian organisations and political
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activism. Links to Ustashism were a cause for concern and were one of the
predominant reasons for the early surveillance of Croatian organisations and
individuals. The reason why support for the establishment of an Independent
Croatia could be equated with support for the politics of wartime collaboration
and the Ustaša was, as Drapač points out, fairly straightforward
In Croatian club rooms around the country hung pictures of Ante Pavelic… Why
would one not associate the activities taking place within those clubrooms with
the Ustasha, or at least with a tacit acceptance of the nature of the Ustasha
regime? 83

That Croatia existed as an independent political entity between 1941-45 was an
important factor in shaping the political activism of émigré communities, and the
mythology of the NDH and Ustashism exerted a significant influence amongst
first wave Croatian migrants. However, as Skrbiš explains,
to make the myth functional, the possibly embarrassing historical facts, such as
collaboration with Nazis and Fascists had to be dismissed as lies or ‘explained’ in
terms of historical inevitability. 84

This nostalgic-apologetic model of Ustaša history allowed individuals and
organisations to freely and openly associate themselves with Ustashism as it
simply symbolised the struggle for an Independent State of Croatia, rather than
support for the wartime collaboration of the Ustaša regime during World War II.
Ustashism was also a point of contention within the Croatian community,
and controversies over ‘the picture of Pavelic’ became increasingly common when
the second wave Croatians began emigrating in the 1960s:
What others outside Croatian club culture could not immediately perceive was
the extent to which the presence of images of Ante Pavelic in Croatian clubs was
a source of considerable tension among its members.’ 85

As Skrbiš documents, images of Pavelić (along with Ustashism as a whole) were
deemed outrageously offensive, unnecessary and outdated, or simply a historical
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truth. 86 Why Ustashism was able to endure as an acceptable symbol of Croatian
activism, however, lay in the lobbying power and influence the first wave of postwar migrants were able to retain. This particular cohort of Croatian migrants,
through their leadership positions, were the arbiters of social access and space
and the collective cultural and political identity of the post-war community in
the period before government support was available under multiculturalism. The
community was essentially forced to ‘fall in line’ with Ustaša mythology in order
to retain the access to social capital and space those organisations provided.
However, even after their withdrawal from leadership, this cohort was sufficiently
loud and held enough clout to make demands upon the generations that
followed. As one of Skrbiš’ respondents succinctly explained - ‘to keep the peace
you keep the picture.’ 87
These qualifications are not intended as an apologia for Ustashism. Rather
they are an explanation of what it symbolised to a particular cohort of Croatians
at a particular point in time, and how this symbolism informed their
understanding of the world and their activism. The use of an ‘idyllic’ time in a
nation’s history is not a new political tool. For Croatians in Australia, the
mythology of the NDH and Ustashism was understood as an ‘idyllic time’ when
Croatia was independent and nationalism was ripe. To make this myth
functional, the harsh realities of the NDH had to be explained away or denied.
The endurance of this mythology is attributable more to isolation than
extremism. As the context in Croatia changed, first under Yugoslav rule, and later
as an independent nation, Croatians in Australia found themselves cultural
refugees lost in a sea of time. Unable to relate to their homeland, nor find
acceptance in their new environment, Croatians clung onto these myths as
lifeboats which justified their existence in Australia.
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3.2.2. PROOF?
Assimilation policy, the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant, the
political desirability of a Yugoslav state, and links with Ustashism rendered
Croatian political activism ideologically problematic in different ways. These
ideological concerns, however, were legitimised by incidents of violence and
unlawfulness that increasingly posed a genuine concern for Australian
authorities. It cannot be claimed that Croatian political activism was
unequivocally problem-free. As is true for all activism, there are always those
prepared to resort to extralegal, illegal, and violent means to further their cause,
and Croatian political activism was no different.
That antagonisms and hostilities existed between ‘Yugoslavs’ was not
unfamiliar to Australian authorities, in a large part owing to the activism of
Croatians. These incidents were widely regarded as isolated and individual
instances of issues, frustrations, and in some cases, simplistic tit-for-tat violence,
borne of the WWII hangover still nursed by the community. It was mostly the
hostilities that erupted on the football field that caught media attention in the
first decade of post-war settlement. The hostility between Croatian, Serbian, and
Yugoslav teams was, according to Mosely, the most publicised example of conflict
between ethnic clubs in NSW competitions between 1949-1959. 88
However, these isolated incidents took on a more sinister significance when
news broke on 5 September 1963 that nine Croatians travelling on Australian
documents (two of them with Australian passports) had been arrested by
Yugoslav authorities in July after attempting an ill-fated military incursion into
Yugoslavia. 89 That the men had travelled from Australia to carry out this
incursion was of a nominal concern to Australian authorities, as the dual
citizenships of the individuals meant that the government viewed it as a matter
between Yugoslavian citizens and the Yugoslavian Government. More pertinent,
however, were allegations by the Yugoslav Government that the incursion was
Mosely, ‘European Immigrants and Soccer Violence’, 21.
‘Terrorism Plans ‘Admitted’, Canberra Times, 6 September 1963, 5.
‘Yugoslav Police Arrest Nine Emigrants on Terrorist Charges’, Sydney Morning Herald, 6 Sept 1963, 3.
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orchestrated by an underground Ustaša organisations called the Croatian
Revolutionary Brotherhood (Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo - HRB), that was
recruiting and training Croatian terrorists in Australia. 90
In light of the ideological concerns raised by Croatian political activism, the
1963 incursion was perceived as the smoke to the fire (and for some the actual
fire) that Croatian political activism could potentially be. News of the incursion
resulted

in

unprecedented

attention

from

Australian

authorities,

parliamentarians, and the media into the nature and intentions of Croatian
organisations and their activism. In September and October 1963, questions were
raised in both houses of Parliament which drew on the ideological problems of
Croatian political activism to question the Government’s response to the
incursion and the HRB. 91 Leading the charge was Cairns in the House of
Representatives and Ormonde in the Senate. Their questions – mainly regarding
alleged links between Croatian activism and Ustashism - over the next year would
come to occupy the bulk of responses provided alongside Menzies’ Ministerial
Statement in August 1964.
Aside from general reporting on developments in Yugoslavia and in the
Australian parliament, newspapers increasingly reported on the Croatian
community and its activism, calling on leaders (and leaders calling on
newspapers) to provide responses to events on behalf of the community.92

Established in 1961, the HRB first came to police attention after 1963 incursion. Consequent police
pressure, surveillance and pursuit of the HRB, its members, and its activities led to the decline of the
HRB, and by 1968 the organisation was considered to have become defunct.
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Naturally, this resulted in a greater public presence of the community and a
larger platform from which to publicise their views and activism. 93 This
newfound media interest, however, also came at a cost as newspapers
increasingly framed Croatian political activism as a problematic phenomenon. 94
More than anything, Croatian political activism was problematic because it defied
the expectation that migrants become ahistorical and apolitical upon their
arrival, as demonstrated by the editorial from The Age following news of the
incursion Australians generally know little about, and want to have no part in, the
Croatian-Yugoslav dispute. Their one concern with the matter is that migrants
from that part of the world should leave their differences behind when they come
to this country to make a new home… Australia has amply proved that a genuine
welcome awaits the migrant seeking a new life and new opportunity here. That
welcome does not extend to political trouble-makers. 95

News of the HRB and the 1963 incursion somewhat blindsided Australian
authorities, particularly ASIO, as very little was known about the group at the
time. 96 The initial response of Australian authorities was one of increased
attention to Croatian organisations and Croatian political activism, but limited by
existing

paradigms.

For

the

Commonwealth

Police

Force

(CPF),

the

organisational charters of Australia’s various police forces and their jurisdictions
tempered any expansion of investigation capabilities. Though the CPF instituted
a policy of interviewing all male Yugoslavs applying for travel documentation in
the hopes of preventing further incursions, ‘most areas in which the CPF might
have taken an interest were covered by state laws and state police jurisdictions’. 97
ASIO on the other hand, was tempered by both its organisational charter and
culture. Spry was adamant that ASIO officers only engaged in matters of security
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interest, and wanted to ‘ensure that there was no blurring of the line between
ASIO’s investigative function and the CPF’s executive function.’ 98
Thus on 28 October 1963, Spry presented a summary of ASIO’s ‘extensive
investigations’ into the HRB to Immigration Minister Alick Downer. While ASIO
could confirm the existence of HRB and its recruitment of young single men, it
could not substantiate claims that terrorist or sabotage training had taken place –
only ‘some form of elementary training… on a small scale without efficient coordination or control.’ The report concluded that as a group, Yugoslavs ‘cannot
be singled out as constituting any special security threat to Australia’, while the
HRB was ‘insignificant as far as the security of the Commonwealth is concerned
and should be regarded as an extreme manifestation of a more widely felt desire
for an independent Croatia.’ 99 Spry generally characterised Croatians as good
anti-communists, not hostile to Australia’s democratic government, and a
comparatively well-settled migrant group. Though some may interpret these
assessments as evidence of ASIO’s left-leaning bias, even Blaxland admits that ‘in
the main, Spry was right, except for a very small group.’ 100
On 25 November, an interdepartmental meeting between senior officers of
the Departments of Prime Minister, Immigration, External Affairs, AttorneyGeneral, and ASIO had been scheduled in order to discuss the HRB. The meeting
served to highlight the differing priorities and assessments of each of the
departments. While ASIO emphasised the broader political context of Croatian
activism and the case of the HRB, the Prime Minister’s Department was narrower
in outlook, focusing on the particulars of Croatian nationalism and the optics of
the situation. In contrast, the Attorney-General’s Department focused on the
particulars of prosecution, particularly in the relative difficulties in prosecuting
organisations as opposed to individuals. As would be expected, External Affairs
was concerned with the potential for diplomatic embarrassment, while the
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Immigration department was concerned with how this activism compromised
assimilation. What they could all agree on, however, was that
applicants for migration should be warned at the selection interview that they
would be expected to forget their national feuds on going to Australia and that
activities such as those of the [HRB] are not encouraged here. 101

Despite their differences, the one thing common between all departments was
the notion that Croatian political activism was problematic because it
discouraged Croatians from becoming Good Australian Migrants upon their
arrival.
With Menzies calling an early election for November 30, domestic political
concerns took priority and Croatian political activism faded from the national
spotlight. The issue of the 1963 incursion returned with the trial in Yugoslavia of
the nine men in April 1964. 102 However, it was the explosion of a bomb in Sydney
on 7 May that firmly placed the Croatian community and its activism back in the
spotlight. While the incursion and subsequent trial were abstract events that
occurred well away from Australia, the bombing was a tangible act of violence,
the aftermath of which was laid out for all of those opening their weekend
newspapers. The only victim of the blast, 35-year old Croatian Tomislav Lesic,
accused Communist agents for the attack, warning other Croatians that they
could be next. Others alleged that Lesic was a known ‘extremist’ who in all
probability had built the bomb himself and suffered the misfortune of having it
detonate too early. These allegations and counter-allegations prompted fears that
a ‘Croat war’ in Sydney was imminent. 103
As both houses of Parliament debated the bombing and the circumstances
surrounding it, Croatian political activism turned into a bona fide political
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football, deployed by both sides of Government to justify their political
agendas. 104 Like before, this political football was mostly kicked by Ormonde in
the Senate, but the most volatile player was Cairns. Both inside and out of
parliament, Cairns argued that Croatian organisations, and the Croatian
Liberation Movement in particular, were ‘Nazi-type Ustasha’ organisations, their
aims synonymous with fascism and Ustashism, and that the government was
deliberately protecting and shielding them. 105 Such was Cairns’ condemnation
that it resulted in two highly publicised political stoushes. The first was between
Cairns and A-G Snedden, over Cairns’ patronage of the Yugoslav Settlers’
Association and alleged communist links, which escalated to the point of a noconfidence motion against Sneddon on 20 May. 106 The second came between
Cairns and Wentworth, who first clashed during a television appearance
discussing the situation in the Yugoslav community in May, 107 and would cause
uproar in the House debating the same issues in September later that year. 108
As would be expected, newspapers across Australia reported on the debates
in parliament, repeating claims made by both sides of government. Newspaper
editorials for the most part emphasised two points – that the debates in
parliament were more partisan than of substance, and that the far greater issue at
hand was the importation of historical feuds from abroad which was unbecoming
of Good Australian Migrants. 109 Despite qualifications by parliamentarians and
newspapers alike that these incidents of violence were the actions of a minority,
what these debates in fact served to do was, in true Good Australian Migrant
fashion, hold the majority of Croatians accountable for the transgressions of an
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overwhelming minority, and delegitimise Croatian political activism as a
whole. 110
Croatians responded to the incursion, bombing, and debates that followed in
much the same way as Australian authorities. Mirroring their qualifications,
Croatians denied allegations of the existence of terrorist-training organisations,
but conceded that the potential for extremist elements within the community
existed, particularly amongst young single men. They stressed that any incidence
of violence was the work of a minority, and that the overwhelming majority of
Croatians were law-abiding, their activism committed only to advancing Croatian
independence through democratic and nonviolent means. 111 Croatians took
umbrage to their characterisation as Fascists or Nazis, and also made counterallegations that these incidents of violence and the 1963 incursion were the work
of Yugoslav agents provocateur, aimed at discrediting Croatian political activism
in general, and HOP specifically. For their part, the leaders of HOP - the main
target of Cairns’ accusations – sought a deputation before Immigration Minister
Hubert Opperman in a bid to clear the misrepresentation of their organisation
and Croatian activism in general. 112
Though 1964 saw an increase in the frequency of disturbances between
Yugoslavs, various authorities and police forces reported that they had been
unable to substantiate claims of wider organisation and co-ordination of violent
acts by any Croatian individual or organisation. 113 The CPF argued that though
there was some evidence that an organisation was still in existence possibly
recruiting individuals to undertake incursions, it could only be the HRB, as all
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other Croatian organisations were moderate and non-violent in outlook. 114 The
NSW Police located the catalyst for the disturbances in NSW, SA, and WA in the
increased allegations of Fascist sympathies amongst Croatians from proCommunist organisations, which intensified the anti-Communist campaign by
Croatians in response. Moreover, it argued that it was the very ‘airing of
ethnical[sic], political, and religious hatreds’, made worse by their discussion in
Federal Parliament, that had led to this escalation. 115
It was in this context of allegations and counter-allegations, politicking and
electioneering, explanations and qualifications that Menzies gave his Ministerial
Statement. In many ways, these events served to prove both sides of the debate
‘right’. On the one hand, that the HRB existed, the 1963 incursion occurred, and
that violence between Yugoslavs was escalating meant that there were some
problematic aspects to Croatian political activism, and that perhaps insufficient
attention was being paid to these by Australian authorities. On the other hand,
the alleged equivocation by Menzies that these incidents were not indicative of
all Croatians, that they were not of great import to national security, and that
they did not warrant the extreme responses as advocated by those such as Cairns,
proved itself on the right side of history, as did the argument that the
transgressions of a minority should not impinge on the civil liberties of the
majority of Croatians and their right to political activism. However, that Menzies
and his Coalition government held Croatian civil liberties in such a high regard
was the result of a conspiracy of contexts that afforded Croatians latitude in their
activism seldom afforded to others.
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3.2.3. AUSTRALIAN COLD WAR MYOPIA
The identification of Croatian political activism as an anti-communist,
conservative, and democratic advocacy of the right of the Croatian nation to selfdetermination and political independence played into the wider Cold War
myopia that not only defined Australian political life, but worldwide. As Manne
argues, Australia’s post-war acceptance of migrants and refugees was in part
guided by the ideological setting of the Cold War – those escaping communism
were supported by the political right, the Catholic Church, and anti-communist
intelligentsia, while those fleeing right-wing regimes were supported by the
political left, the trade union movement, and left-wing intelligentsia. 116 Brawley
echoes this sentiment, arguing that ‘refugees in this post-war era were important
pawns. Every refugee accepted by the West was yet another indictment of the
Communist system.’ 117 In this ideological framework, every Croatian accepted by
Australia and every time Croatians were politically active and visible was an
indictment of communist Yugoslavia and of Titoism.
This ideological legitimacy also had practical applications. The electoral
advantage gained by opposition to communism was in part responsible for the
Coalition’s ability to govern for 23 consecutive years. Menzies’ failed 1951
referendum to ban the CPA was a victory for H.V Evatt and the ALP, however,
‘though Evatt had won this battle, the fallout was so costly that it was Menzies
who won the war.’ 118 Fractures within the ALP as a result of the referendum, as
well as the perception that members were communist sympathisers, conspired to
keep the ALP out of office. 119 On the other hand, the Petrov affair, the Korean
War, and Australia’s proximity to South-East Asia coupled with the popularity of
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the Domino theory, conspired to keep the Coalition in office and sustained the
political currency of Menzies’ ‘reds under the beds’ moral panic. 120
Opposition to communism also fed into wider schisms in Australian political
life. For the trade union movement, the post-war period saw the CPA, the
Catholic Social Studies Movement (the ‘Movement’), and the ALP in a three-way
struggle for control. 121 Within this, Croatians were a welcome ‘numbers boost’ on
behalf of the Movement and the ALP, particularly in the face of the CPAs
fractured relationship with the Yugoslav community after the Tito-Stalin split. 122
Croatians were also drawn into the sectarian division between the Protestant and
Catholic churches. In the same way Menzies saw in Croatians a pool of potential
anti-communist voters, the Catholic Church saw in Croatians a pool of potential
parishioners. As already explained, the shared anti-communism and common
interest in the case of Stepinac led to the public embrace of Croatians and their
activism by the Australian church, and it certainly helped that the Archbishop of
Adelaide, Matthew Beovich, was the son of a Croatian migrant.
The anti-communism of Croatian political activism held one other, lessevident practical application. The fact that Croatian political activism attracted
the attention of Yugoslav authorities, and that ASIO knew that Yugoslav secret
agents were monitoring them, gave Australian authorities an opportunity too
great to pass up;
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In the Byzantine world of the security services, low-level violence, mostly
directed against foreigners, paled beside an opportunity to garner information
against rival spies. 123

The more public the Croatian activism, the more likely the Yugoslav Government
was to initiate intelligence operations in Australia. In return, ASIO could initiate
counter-intelligence operations, and collect invaluable information about the
techniques of a communist intelligence service. The problematic few engaging in
violence was a small price to pay for such an intelligence coup, especially when
that price was being paid by the Croatian community.
That Croatians were also proving themselves Good Australian Migrants
helped to mitigate adverse views on their activism. Croatians excelled in fulfilling
their expectation of labour and contributing to the economic prosperity of the
nation. They were often associated with the construction of major, labourintensive public infrastructure projects, the most notable being the Snowy
Mountains River Hydro-Electric Scheme, 124 and employed in large numbers in
key post-war industries, such as steel, manufacturing, building and construction,
and agriculture. Croatians were highly interactive with their local communities,
mainly through the local church and football competitions, but also through
their participation in local community events, happy to contribute their cultural
capital. Perhaps most important of all, the comparatively high naturalisation
rates of Croatians was proof of their status as Good Australian Migrants. Not only
did naturalisation demonstrate their acceptance of Australia, but also indicated
that arguably, Croatians were more invested in Australia than other migrant
groups.
The gradual move from assimilation to integration policy also tempered
responses to Croatian political activism. Criticism of assimilation came early in
the 1950s from those that were involved in the provision of services to migrants,
such as teachers, health workers and employers, and who experienced first-hand
the inequalities assimilation policy produced. Over the next decade, the research
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of academics, such as Jean Martin, Jerzy Zubrzycki, and James Jupp, also began to
reflect the failure of assimilation, and demographers Wilfred D. Borrie and
Charles A. Price became particularly influential change agents due to their
positions as principle academic advisers to the Immigration Department. 125 By
1964, the department had officially abandoned the term ‘assimilation’ for
‘integration’, the negatively connoted ‘national groups’ for ‘ethnic communities’
and ‘ethnic organisations’, and as a whole had ‘developed a less fearful attitude
towards the existence of ethnic minorities and their organisations.’ 126 In this
context, Croatian organisations found a legitimate role and space in Australian
society that was simply not the case under the more hard-line assimilation policy
of earlier years, and which removed at least some suspicion over their
establishment. 127
As 1964 drew to a close, Croatian political activism subsided as an issue in
parliament. Though this might have been inadvertent as issues of governance
took precedence - such as budgeting and legislating - it could also be interpreted
as an admission on behalf of the ALP that perhaps this issue was doing more
electoral harm than good. The fallout from the Cairns fiasco which occupied
much of 1964 proved detrimental, contributing to the perception that the ALP
was sympathetic towards communism at a time when the ‘red scare’ still held
political currency. The 1963 and 1966 elections bookended this period, and the
overwhelming victory of the Coalition in 1966 with the ‘Play it Safe’ slogan
indicated that anti-communism was an important electoral issue. Though
Senator Tony Mulvihill would take up the mantle of Cairns and Ormonde and
regularly raise the issue in the Senate throughout the rest of the 1960s, Croatian
political activism would not be resurrected in proper until 1970.
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3.3. THE PARADIGMS SHIFT
The perception of a high degree of politicisation within Croatian clubs became a
source of some consternation by Australian authorities as close diplomatic ties
were being forged with Yugoslavia from 1966. 128

The decade of 1963-1972 saw an escalation of violence within the Yugoslav
community, including 14 bombings, 11 documented threats of violence, six
incidents of vandalism, four incidents of violence involving weapons, four arrests,
two murders, and a second incursion into Yugoslavia in June 1972, this time
involving six Australian citizens and a further three who had previously lived in
Australia. 129 Though some of this escalation in violence can be explained by the
increased public attention of 1963/4 which escalated hostilities between Yugoslav
migrants, it is also attributable as simply a statistical phenomenon. The opening
up of Yugoslavia’s borders from the early 1960s increased Yugoslav migration to
unparalleled rates, and particularly of non-Croatian Yugoslav migrants.
The increased effort of Australian authorities to forge closer diplomatic ties
with Yugoslavia culminated in a bilateral agreement between Yugoslavia and
Australia on 21 July 1970. This included an assisted passage scheme that would
result in 53,363 arrivals in 1970 and 1971 alone. 1970 was also the year Croatian
political activism resurfaced as an issue in parliament. This was partly because of
the shadow Croatian activism increasingly cast over the emerging diplomatic
relationship between Australia and Yugoslavia, but also because the paradigms
within which Croatian political activism was perceived and understood had
undergone profound shifts that placed Croatian political activism increasingly at
odds with Australia’s social, political, and cultural environment.
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3.3.1. THE SECOND WAVE OF CROATIAN EMIGRATION
Though the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 afforded Tito the space needed to
introduce an alternative model of communism, it also left an ideological vacuum
in exactly how this ‘Yugoslav Way’ would translate into practical forms of
governance. Thus, the 1950s were defined by a number of internal divisions
within the Communist leadership in regards to the substance and form the
‘Yugoslav Way’ would take, none more pronounced than the failure of
agricultural collectivisation and the ensuing Milovan Djilas affair. 130 As the
economic woes of Yugoslavia steadily worsened, liberal and conservative factions
began to emerge around two dominant issues; centralism vs decentralism of the
state, and liberalisation vs protectionism of economic policy. 131
By 1961, Belgrade was beginning to acquiesce to pressures from party liberals,
and introduced three reform measures to temper increasing internal divisions
and Yugoslavia’s economic woes; the relaxation of wage controls, the
reorganisation of financial markets, and the opening of the Yugoslav economy to
world markets. It is this last reform that was to have a significant impact on
Croatian migration, as it brought the illegal migration that had characterised the
decade earlier out of condemnation and into tolerance as an economic
consequence. However as inflation quickened and economic problems continued
to grow, the reforms of 1961 were found to be insufficient, and compelled the
federal government to enact a series of sweeping economic reforms in 1965. As
Milovan Djilas was one of Tito’s closest associates, reaching the height of his power in 1953 when, as
deputy chair of the Federal Executive Council, he was considered to be the Party’s leading ideologue and
a possible successor to Tito. In October, and with Tito’s encouragement, he began publishing a series of
articles in the Belgrade-based Borba, the official newspaper of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
(LCY), on the need for party and state development and reform. However he became increasingly critical
of the situation in Yugoslavia, particularly of the leadership of the LCY. Seeing this as a threat to their
leadership, Tito and other leading communists expelled Djilas from the Central Committee of the party
in January 1954, and dismissed him from all political functions, along with 23 others, and a further 20
who were disciplined for their connection with Djilas. Djilas continued to publish his criticisms,
denouncing the Yugoslav regime as totalitarian, repressive, and self-serving, earning a total of nine years
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Zimmerman explains, not only did these reforms institutionalise the demands of
reformist communists, but they also elevated
the notion of open borders to the level of state policy. Rather than a stance of
tolerance or resignation, the open borders policy had come to be identified in
official utterances as one of the key defining features, along with market
socialism and self-management, of what was distinct and positive in the Yugoslav
socialist variant and an element that set off Yugoslavia from the Soviet model. 132

With migration accepted and even encouraged by the state, the decision to
emigrate became available to a much wider demographic.
Yugoslav migration to Australia increased to numbers unparalleled either
before or after. Between 1961-1969, the average rate of migration increased from
approximately 3000 arrivals per year to over 12000 in 1969. The bilateral
agreement between Yugoslavia and Australia in 1970 legally reinforced this
emigration, and the two year period between 1970 and 1971 alone saw
approximately 53,363 arrivals. Between 1961 and 1976, the number of ‘YugoslavBorn’ people in Australia increased from 49,776 to 143,591 – almost a threefold
expansion in only 15 years, not including those born in Australia. 133
It is difficult to know the proportion of Croatians within these numbers as
Australia did not officially distinguish between the various Yugoslav groups.
Though Yugoslav migration in the post-war period had been predominantly
Croatian, 134 the opening of the borders in the 1960s and the bilateral agreement
of 1970 led to the increased migration of non-Croatian Yugoslavs to Australia.
The numeric expansion of the community, coupled with the new diversity in
ethnic make-up, led to a diversity of views in matters of Yugoslav affairs that
diminished the dominance Croatians enjoyed in the 1950s. As can be expected,
with this greater diversity, a greater degree of disagreement and hostility between
the various groups followed. The greater size and diversity of the community also
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meant that, if for no other reason, incidents of violence would statistically
become more frequent.
Despite their comparative decline, Croatians continued to constitute the
largest proportion of Yugoslav migration, and the period between 1960-1972 was
characterised by an exceptionally rapid expansion of the community. Officially
classed as economic migrants, these were the first Croatians to come to Australia
as documented immigrants. The social profile of second wave migrants was even
more diverse than the first, with an unparalleled diversity across class, education,
gender, age, and place of origin. This diversity also included political orientation
and views, and as Tkalčević explains, many of these second wave Croatians
argued that the identification of émigré Croatians exclusively with right-wing
ideologies was false. For these Croatians, particularly those arriving after 1971, the
political platform as outlined by the first wave and their organisations did not
always fully coincide with their views, and some even established their own
organisations to reflect this. 135
The 1960s also prompted the community to become more focused on life in
Australia. The lack of government assistance in the face of this influx of Croatians
meant that organisations were occupied with meeting the more straightforward
demands the settlement of newcomers required. The social and cultural life of
Croatians in Australia boomed as memberships swelled, interests expanded, and
resources accumulated. Attention also turned to the preservation of language,
culture, and tradition across generations. Not only were a greater number of
children migrating to Australia, but a generation of Australian-born Croatians
were being raised that had no experience of Croatia, and were growing up in an
English-speaking world. Thus, the practice of establishing a local Hrvatska škola ‘Croatian School’ came into being, with the first schools opened in Adelaide in
1961 and Sydney in 1963. Hrvatska škola would become a mainstay throughout
most communities and rite of passage for Croatian children, even to this day.
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As more Croatians poured into the community and political views became
more diverse, social and cultural clubs increasingly formed the nexus of the
community. Whereas the organisations of the first wave were clearly politically
defined, the political orientation of second wave organisations was less-defined,
instead placing priority on the social concerns of everyday life in Australia. This
did not eliminate the political concerns or activism of the community, but
instead resulted in a shift from an emphasis on political rhetoric to one of ethnonational survival. Though Croatians were increasingly at odds as to how or when
or what type of an independent Croatian state should be established, the one
thing they could all agree on was that they were not ethnically, culturally, nor
linguistically Yugoslav.
It was often argued, both at the time and afterwards, that despite their
official demarcation as economic migrants, second wave Croatians were also
political migrants, even if their politics differed from their predecessors. Though
they were not escaping the overt persecution of the late 1940s and 1950s, the
socio-political reality of Yugoslavia meant that Croatians, particularly those with
dissenting views to the Yugoslav federal government, used the structures of
economic migration to escape the Yugoslav totalitarian regime, either out of a
fear of direct persecution, or in general protest to the economic, ethnic, and
political discrimination faced by Croatians at the hands of Yugoslav officials.
Despite the correlation between these economic and political reasons, it can
be problematic to conflate the two, or argue the primacy of political reasons for
migration. The absence of archival records or comprehensive oral histories about
the reasons for migration of this wave means that it is difficult to estimate the
extent to which political considerations informed the decision to migrate.
Zimmerman and Brunnbauer both argue that the greater determinant of
migration seems to lie in entrenched patterns of chain migration. 136 Yugoslav
migrants were more likely to originate from areas where there existed a cultural
memory of migration, particularly as a well-established method of managing
Zimmerman, Open Borders, 97–98.
Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe, 260-62.
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175

adverse economic conditions. It is easier to decide to emigrate for a person whose
father or grandfather has already done so, where there is a relative or friend
already abroad who could help facilitate the move, or where there are existing
ties to a community in the diaspora, even if the connection is as tenuous as a
friend of a friend or someone from the same village. As demonstrated in Chapter
1, Croatians, particularly those from the Dalmatian region, had a well-entrenched
tradition of emigration, particularly to Australia. This cultural memory could
therefore account for the higher proportion of Croatians emigrating in the 1960s
– put simply, Croatians migrated because they already had somewhere to go and
had a tradition of going.
The pre-eminence of economic imperatives to migration in the 1960s, rather
than political persecution, is perhaps best understood by looking to the fall in
rates of migration in the 1970s. Just as Croatian nationalism was reaching its
zenith in 1971, the relative proportion of Croatians in Yugoslav migration was
already diminishing, and by the 1980s had significantly reduced. 137 If migration
was of a political nature, it could reasonably be expected that the relative
proportion of Croatians would stay steady, or even increase in the wake of the
1971 Croatian Spring and its purges. 138 However as Goldstein argues, the 1970s
was a period of economic prosperity in Croatia – the standard of living was at its
highest levels, and the average Croatian worker could expect to live a ‘Good Life’
full of consumer goods, Western fashions, German cars, and weekend trips
away. 139 This economic prosperity did not extend to the poorer republics of
Yugoslavia, and migrants from these republics formed a growing proportion of
both intra-Yugoslav migration, as well as Yugoslav outmigration. If the economic
boom of the 1970s led to a decreased rate of Croatian migration despite a climate
Zimmerman, Open Borders, 95–105.
The Croatian Spring will be covered in section 4.1.1
139
For example, the first freeway in Croatia opened in 1972, while construction on the Ljubljana-ZagrebBelgrade freeway was underway, and a number of smaller roads, tunnels, and bridges completed a new
road network which connected the country both within and outside its borders. Tourism was booming,
particularly on the Dalmatian coast, and from 1970, large luxurious hotels began appearing. Three new
universities were opened in Rijeka, Split, and Osijek, and some industries began to gain international
recognition, particularly in construction, shipbuilding, oil, pharmaceutical, chemical, and metal
industries. See: Goldstein, Croatia: A History, 185–86.
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of increased political persecution, the 1960s can be understood in the reverse – an
increased rate of migration due to the economic bust of the late 1950s/early 1960s
despite

a

climate

of

comparative

political

freedom

that

favoured

liberalist/decentralist policy, even if it was within a communist paradigm. 140
Furthermore, it is difficult to know whether individuals emigrated actively
and purposefully for political reasons, or whether their emigration was economic
and became politicised upon their arrival into a community that had already
constructed migration as political. Part of the reason why remembering this wave
of migration as political has remained unchallenged is because the conflation of
the economic with the political formed a large part of the way the community in
Australia has rationalised the cognitive dissonance generated by the act of
migration with its political activism. If one is as patriotic a Croatian as is often
asserted, the act of voluntary migration can be perceived as a cowardly or
traitorous act, or simply the easy way out - all accusations levelled at Croatians in
the diaspora to this day. However, if one is ‘forced’ to leave their homeland, as
was the case with the first wave of Croatians, this dissonance can be resolved and
their activism understood as long-distance nationalism. This goes some way to
explaining why Croatians in Australia were politically active to the degree they
were; because of the dissonance caused by the act of migration, it was not enough
to simply be Croatian in Australia, you needed to prove yourself the right kind of
Croatian. This demonstration was often encapsulated in the popular label of an
individual as a Veliki Hrvat – a ‘big’ Croatian.

Patterson has undertaken an interesting and comprehensive exploration of the relationship between
economic conditions and the legitimacy of the Yugoslav state. He argues:
‘Did this country’s consumer culture matter? Did it play a part in the life and death of Yugoslavia? The
record demonstrates that it did. Because the ideal of consumer abundance was so eagerly bought and
so successfully sold, and because that ideal became the basis of a vibrant popular culture when it was
given life in the everyday desires, thoughts, and values that were shared by ordinary people, Yugoslavia
first flourished when times were good, then faltered when it became clear that ever increasing
abundance could not prove sustainable. Because the culture of plenty and pleasure had been so much
of what made the country a success and held it together, the undoing of that culture in the 1980s was
felt all the more acutely when Yugoslavia at last fragmented and fell to pieces.’ See:
P.Patterson, Bought & Sold : Living and Losing the Good Life in Socialist Yugoslavia (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2011), 17.
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3.3.2. THE END OF THE MENZIAN AGE
Though historians bookend the period of the ‘Sixties’ at different times with
different events and in different places, all agree that significant social, political,
and cultural changes occurred in Australia somewhere between the late 1950s
through to the mid-1970s. Anti-Vietnam protests, student activism, indigenous
civil rights activism, LGBT activism, women’s liberation, the sexual revolution,
environmentalism, counter-culture, and youth revolts are all hallmarks of this
period of social upheaval. Though the various movements were distinctive and
divergent, Piccini argues that there was a significant enough interrelation and
interconnection between the movements, both domestically and internationally,
that can characterise the 1960s as a transnational ‘movement of movements.’ 141
It is important to remember, however, that the 1960s as they are shaped in
cultural memory are also distorted and limited. Historians now generally accept
two important qualifications to the historiography of the period. The first is that
though politics and protest were important and influential features, only a
minority of the population was ever really involved. As Robinson and Ustinoff
point out,
the reality is that the vast majority of Australians were neither hippies nor dopesmokers; involvement in youth protest movements was, in the main, an
experience for middle-class university students; and sexual liberation was a hotly
contested debate. 142

Second, the question of whether and how these broad upheavals impacted the
daily life of Australians remains ambiguous. Some, such as O’Hanlon and
Luckins, have found that there are very real reflections of the ‘new values’ of the
1960s in the everyday life of Australians, while others, such as Smaal, argue that
perhaps the rhetoric did not always match the lived experience of people. 143

J. Piccini, Transnational Protest, Australia and the 1960s (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 9–10.
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Nonetheless, the social transformations of the 1960s had an important impact
on Australia’s political environment. Elected leader of the ALP in 1967, Whitlam
recognised that these upheavals, along with demographic and economic changes
of the post-war period, had created new political constituencies the ALP could
exploit to win office. Burgeoning migrant communities desperate for government
assistance; an expanding white collar middle-class more likely to respond to an
aspirational, values-based political program than the working-class solidarity and
union strength platform Labor had traditionally relied on; and new cultures less
focused on class, religion, or anti-communism as the basis of political
identification and more on the ideals of equality, rights, and community all
delivered a political platform from which an election campaign could be
formulated. 144 At the same time, those agitating for change ‘ultimately arrived at
the same conclusion as older challengers to the established order. It would
require legislative change – action by the state – for marginalised groups to
achieve equality.’ 145 Thus, Piccini explains,
the election of Labor’s Gough Whitlam in December of 1972 is often pictured as
the radical wave [of the 1960s] finally making landfall, while that government’s
inglorious dismissal three years later captures the tide’s quick retreat. 146

One of the crowning achievements of the Whitlam government was its
official policy of multiculturalism, which introduced the formal government
assistance migrant communities had so desperately wanted and needed. Not only
did this policy accept the cultural differences of migrants that had been
discouraged under assimilation and integration, but encouraged these differences
as an intrinsically Australian quality. Multiculturalism afforded a wealth of
opportunity for Croatian migrants and their activism. The emphasis it placed on
cultural expression, coupled with the inter-relatedness of the cultural and
political in Croatian activism, provided Croatians with the ability to engage in
activism across many platforms not previously available to them. That
multiculturalism stressed ethnicity over nationality meant that Croatians were
Peel and Twomey, A History of Australia, 233–37.
ibid., 237.
146
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able to legitimately advocate for their causes as Croatians and bypass issues
raised by their Yugoslav citizenship. Furthermore, Croatian political activism was
able to resume its traditional patterns in advocating for identity recognition
through campaigns for access to services, including that most Croatian of proxy
battlegrounds, language recognition.
Just as multiculturalism was one of the outcomes of the transformations of
the 1960s, so too was a purposeful repudiation of the anti-communist position
that had defined the 1950s and the 23 years of Coalition government rule. As
Whitlam enacted a number of changes in order to establish Australia’s newfound
neutral stance in international affairs, the pivot away from anti-communism as a
political ideal represented an end to the latitude Croatian political activism
enjoyed. The loss of this political currency, coupled with the political diversity of
the second wave of Croatian migration led to a shift in Croatian political activism.
Whereas emphasis once lay on the ‘not-communist’ message of Croatian
activism, the focus now lay on the ‘not-Yugoslav’ message. However, changes in
the international political environment limited the political currency of the ‘notYugoslav’ message as well.

3.3.3. THE COLD WAR THAW
The events of WWII made legitimising a new Yugoslav state between fiercely
nationalistic groups, scarred by an unending series of hostility and brutality
against one another, a difficult feat to achieve. In order to do this, the Tito regime
invoked what Ramet has termed the ‘legitimating triad’ of Tito’s Yugoslavia ‘Brotherhood and Unity’, Self-management, and Non-alignment. ‘Brotherhood
and Unity’ (Bratstvo i Jedinstvo) served as the moral pillar upon which Yugoslav
state legitimacy was built. It invoked the mythology of WWII and Partisan victory
as a triumph of anti-fascist resistance and a symbol of inter-ethnic cooperation
between the Yugoslav peoples under communism. The 1948 Tito-Stalin split
required an articulation of Yugoslav communism that distinguished its political
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and economic formula from that of the Soviet Union. 147 This was to be achieved
through the concept of self-management, which was deployed as both an
economic and political pillar.
The final pillar, Non-Alignment, combined the principles of brotherhood and
unity and self-management and applied them to the world stage by promoting a
‘third way’ in international politics. This meant Yugoslavia could stand in
solidarity with others to create a foreign policy movement that was independent
of the Soviet bloc or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), while
demonstrating its progressiveness relative to both. Though non-alignment as a
concept was introduced to the international political lexicon in the early 1950s, it
was not until 1961 that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was institutionalised,
with Tito convening the first Conference of Heads of State or Government of NonAligned Countries in Belgrade.
As Brotherhood and Unity distinguished Tito’s Yugoslavia from the
bloodshed of WWII, and the principle of self-management distinguished between
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Non-Alignment served to distinguish Yugoslav
foreign policy from both other communist countries and the Western world.
Tito’s leadership of NAM from 1961-4, coupled with the liberal/decentralist
reforms enacted in Yugoslavia during the 1960s bolstered Yugoslavia’s desirability
and strategic importance in the West;
Taken in sum, these programmatic components struck many observers as
amounting to a new vision of politics, a new dream; and at the height of the
Titoist experiment, delegations from all over the world would visit Yugoslavia to
study self-management and see what might be applicable in their own
countries. 148

Self-management became the topic du jour for economists and politicians
worldwide, either as a possible solution to internal criticisms of the communist
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system, a possible conflict resolution tool within companies, or simply because of
its unique combination of socialist and market economy principles. 149
Yugoslavia’s standing as a communist alternative to the Soviet Union was
bolstered as revelations about the excesses and horrors of Stalinism came to light
and ‘made it difficult for all but the most fanatical of Europe’s Left to idealize the
Soviet Union and favour it over Yugoslavia.’ 150 This was augmented by
Yugoslavia’s growth in geopolitical importance as the Cold War moved from the
brink of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 to official détente in 1969. Though this
importance was symbolic rather than practical, ‘leadership of the non-aligned
nations brought Tito a certain stature on the global stage. 151 As the West became
increasingly enamoured with Yugoslavia and charmed by Tito, proclaiming
oneself not-Yugoslav, anti-Yugoslav, or anti-Tito did not carry the same clout as it
did in the previous decade. As Western countries, including Australia scrambled
to establish political and diplomatic ties with this symbolic powerhouse of the
‘Third Way’, Croatians and their activism became increasingly problematic.
The net effect of these changes in paradigms was that even though the
Croatian community was at its most diverse demographically and politically, the
social transformations of the 1960s and the introduction of multiculturalism
shifted the emphasis of Croatian activism from the political goals of the
reestablishment of an independent state, to questions of ethno-national survival
and Croatian identity in Australia. However, the Cold War thaw, and Australia’s
reorientation in foreign policy meant that even though Croatians were more and
more able to engage in their activism across different platforms, it was less and
less politically acceptable to do so. This divergence would come to define the
period of 1972-1979.

H. Klasić, Jugoslavija I Svijet 1968 (Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2012), 351.
Drapac, Constructing Yugoslavia, 212.
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CHAPTER 4:
NOT REDS UNDER BEDS, BUT
CROATS IN THE BUSH!
1972-1979

The Age, 28 March 1973, 9

Overnight, the Croatians went from fellow travellers of the
right and a bastion of anti-communism, to being former
fascists and terrorists against a friendly socialist Jugoslavian
government.1
Roy Hay
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On 27 March 1973, Murphy rose to deliver his Ministerial Statement on
Croatian Terrorism.2 Though less than a decade separated Murphy’s Statement
from that of Menzies, their positions regarding Croatian organisations and their
activism could not be more different. Murphy’s Statement took almost an hour to
deliver, and included the tabling of 62 documents, amounting to more than 2000
pages, drawn from police, ASIO, and departmental files. The purpose of his
Statement was twofold – to expose the evidence and existence of Croatian
terrorism in Australia, and to demonstrate the persistent denial of this threat by
previous governments, particularly the former Attorney-General, Liberal Senator
Ivor J. Greenwood. Murphy’s Statement consisted of six main themes; that there
was evidence of Croatian terrorism in Australia, that there was evidence of
Croatian terrorist organisations in Australia; that there was evidence of Croatian
terrorists residing in Australia; that Croatian terrorism was able to develop in
Australia due to the indifference and bias of previous governments; that
Greenwood was particularly culpable of inaction through his tenure as AttorneyGeneral; and that Murphy and the Whitlam Government were determined to
enact changes.3
Like Menzies’ Statement in 1964, Murphy’s Statement was met with
immediate criticism. However, this criticism was more than a disagreement with
Murphy’s position or his allegations of Croatian terrorism. As Senator Reginald
Withers remarked:
Rather than spend some 60 minutes in this place trying to destroy his
predecessor in office as Attorney-General it would have been far better for
Senator Murphy to justify his own actions over the last 12 days, which have put
the total security of this nation at risk.4

These actions were the events of Friday 16 March 1973, when at 7:40am, 27
Commonwealth Police officers entered the headquarters of ASIO in Melbourne.
Acting on the orders of Murphy, officers sealed all safes, cabinets, and containers
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on the premises, and held guard until Murphy’s arrival at 9:45am. After
addressing and thanking staff in the auditorium for their ‘co-operation’, Murphy
held a conference with ASIO’s Director-General, Peter Barbour, and officers from
both ASIO and the Commonwealth Police, during which he ‘inspected certain
files’.5 Approximately three hours later, Murphy left ASIO, phoned Whitlam to
advise him of the day’s events, and caught a late afternoon flight for his home in
Sydney. Thus, Murphy’s ‘Raid’ on ASIO was born.
This was an unprecedented event in Australian political history. Never before
had Australia seen a minister, much less the first Law Officer of the country, raid
the department for which they were responsible. In the 11 days between the and
his Ministerial Statement, Murphy maintained that the reason for his ‘visit’ to
ASIO’s headquarters was to gather information to ensure security arrangements
were adequate for the visit of the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Džemal Bijedić, from
20-22 March. ‘The most stringent security measures are necessary for the Prime
Minister’s safety,’ Murphy explained, ‘because of the existence in our midst of
Croatian revolutionary terrorist organisations. These were tolerated by the
previous Government which even denied their existence.’6 Murphy had in fact
indicated as early as 1 March that he would be delivering a statement based on his
investigations into Croatian terrorist organisations that would ‘show quite a
different picture from that painted by the previous Attorney-General.’7 However,
his Raid on ASIO raised the expectations of his statement, which now needed to
provide an explanation and justification for his actions on 16 March.8
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This much-awaited explanation, however, was nowhere to be found in
Murphy’s Statement, save for a fleeting mention at the end which ostensibly
linked the Raid with the issue of Croatian terrorism;
I should like to add a word about events of last week. I am advised that terrorists
came to Canberra last week with the intention of killing the Yugoslav Prime
Minister… In this situation, I make no apology for any steps which I took last
week to ensure that the intentions of violent terrorists were thwarted.9

It was only at the insistence of the Opposition in Question Time following the
statement that Murphy directly addressed the Raid, explaining;
The reason for my action in seeing to it that certain safes and containers were
sealed was that I wanted certain information preserved. The reason for my visit
was to ascertain certain information.10

Even though Murphy faced an almost daily barrage of questions both inside and
out of the Parliament for nearly two months after the Raid, he refused to
elaborate on his motives, even when ‘he was so driven into a corner that he
simply refused to answer further questions – a humiliating failure for any
minister’.11 Hostility in the Senate came thick and fast, and ‘the ferocity of the
subsequent parliamentary debates was equalled only by their frequency.’12 On 5
April, the Senate seemed to be close to boiling point,13 and passed a motion of noconfidence in Murphy – ‘the first time a censure motion had been carried against
a minister in the Australian Senate.’14

What it does want is a full and frank explanation from Senator Murphy of the whole Ustasha-ASIOGovernment affair.’
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The sheer spectacle of the Raid, coupled with the high drama that ensued in
its aftermath, has meant that the search for an explanation of Murphy’s actions
has taken precedence, both at the time and in subsequent studies of the Raid.
However, in this quest to find answers to what was not in his Ministerial
Statement – why Murphy raided ASIO - many have failed to ask an equally
important, though less glamorous question – why did Murphy deliver this
particular Ministerial Statement? It is this question that Section 4.1 seeks to
answer. Much like Menzies’ statement of 1964, there are a number of complex
domestic and international contexts and historical legacies that led Murphy to
deliver this particular statement. In the same way Croatians and their activism
were deployed as a Cold War political football, the political environment of
1972/3 constructed the ‘Croat problem’ as a proxy battle for wider political
debates, a short-hand for the positioning of political parties against one another.
Like the debates of 1963/4, the debates of 1972/3 dissipated as domestic political
concerns took over.
Section 4.2 examines the response of Croatians to Murphy’s allegations of
violence, extremism, and terrorism. Like their 1950s-60s counterparts, Croatians
modified their activism as circumstances arose, deploying resources available to
them to explain, defend, or speak back to these allegations. Just as Croatians in
the previous period framed their activism in the rhetoric of anti-communism,
Croatians in the 1970s framed their activism in the rhetoric of rights – both to
their identity as Croatians, and to their rights of protest and activism as
Australian citizens. The introduction of multicultural policy also influenced
Croatian responses, as it provided Croatians with the ability to engage in activism
across platforms not previously available to them. This activism within the
frameworks of rights and responsibilities, multiculturalism and identity
recognition, coupled with the scars of Murphy’s Ministerial Statement led to the
establishment of the Croatian ‘Embassy’ in 1977. This was a considered and coordinated attempt to address and redress the reputation of extremism, violence
and terrorism Murphy had branded the community and its activism with.
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Finally, Section 4.3 will explore the case of the Croatian Six. The arrest of six
Croatian men on terror-related charges seemed to vindicate Murphy’s Ministerial
Statement, and threatened to undermine the efforts of Croatians in repudiating
the allegations levelled at them. However, responses were mitigated by paradigm
shifts under way in the late 1970s, such as the advent of non-European
immigration. In the same way the paradigm shifts of the 1960s resulted in the
responses of the Whitlam government era, these changes in international and
domestic contexts would define responses to Croatian activism in the 1980s. If
the previous period was defined by the Cold War adage that the enemy of my
enemy is my friend, this period was defined by the moral panic and the
movement from Menzies’ ‘Reds under the beds’ to Murphy’s ‘Croats in the bush’,
and from Murphy’s ‘Croats in the bush’ to a rebooted ‘Yellow Peril’.
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4.1. MURPHY’S FURPHY
In contrast to the last Government's policy of trying to sweep this problem under the rug, we
propose to bring it into the full light of day… These documents establish beyond doubt
that Croatian terrorist organisations have existed and do exist in Australia today. 15

I have argued elsewhere that the reason for Murphy’s Raid on ASIO lay less in
any overt threat of Croatian terrorism and more in the covert contextual
considerations surrounding the Raid. These included the foreign policy benefits
the Whitlam Government could gain by the appearance of ‘dealing with’ the
Croatian problem, Murphy’s deep suspicions of ASIO and the generally strained
relationship between ASIO and the ALP, Murphy’s personal hubris, including his
adversarial and impulsive character, and bitter rivalries with Greenwood, the
political right, and to a lesser degree, Whitlam himself.16 This section instead
focuses on the question of why Murphy singled out ‘Croatian terrorism’ as his
explanation for the Raid. Though there is necessarily some overlap with reasons
for the Raid itself, there are unique reasons why Murphy’s statement targeted
‘Croatian terrorism’, instead of right-wing extremism, politically-motivated
violence, or even Ustaša terrorism.
In the lead up to the 1972 election, Croatian activism was gaining momentum
in Australia, due to the increase in Yugoslav migration to Australia as a result of
the 1970 agreement, and developments in Croatian activism both worldwide and
in Croatia itself. This increased activism was accompanied by an increase in
politically-motivated violence, and responses to Croatian activism and these
incidents became a symbolic point of difference between the Liberal Party and
the ALP. Once elected, both Whitlam and Murphy concerned themselves with
bringing the issue of Croatian activism under control, but for different reasons –
for Murphy, the issue was one of law and order, or more precisely lawlessness and
disorder, while for Whitlam, Croatian activism and the increased targeting of
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Yugoslav diplomatic missions was a foreign policy issue. Whether intentionally or
inadvertently, the actions of the Whitlam government resulted in what is best
described as a moral panic.

4.1.1. DEVELOPMENTS IN CROATIAN POLITICAL ACTIVISM
As explained in Section 3.3, the decade spanning 1963-1972 saw an escalation
of violence within the Yugoslav community in both frequency and severity, which
increasingly targeted Yugoslav diplomatic missions. Murphy attributed this
escalation to the ‘curious defeatism and lack of initiative in successive Liberal
governments’ reaction to these outrages.’17 Though the latitude afforded Croatian
activism by previous governments may have emboldened some to act in ways
they might not have otherwise, there are more nuanced explanations for this
escalation in violence

which

take

into

account important

contextual

considerations. The growing momentum of Croatian activism, the increase in
non-Croatian Yugoslav migrants with political agendas of their own, and the
international phenomenon of politically motivated violence beginning in the late
1960s far better explain these developments than the simplistic reason offered by
Murphy.
Croatian activism was gaining momentum in Australia during this period for
three primary reasons. The first was the statistical growth of the community from
1966 covered in Section 3.3.1. This made Croatian political activism larger and
more visible in the public sphere. For example, whereas an anti-Yugoslav
demonstration in Sydney’s Double Bay in 1968 attracted approximately 600
protestors, an anti-Yugoslav demonstration in the very same place just 3 years
later attracted almost 3000 protestors.18 The second reason for this momentum
lay in developments in government policy which afforded migrants increasing
freedom to advocate their views and express their identity. Lopez describes the
Australia, Senate, Parliamentary Debates, No. S.13, 1973, 529.
‘Flag Burnt at Consulate’, Sun Herald, 1 December 1968, 7.
‘Croatians protest against Tito’, Sydney Morning Herald, 29 December 1971, 9.
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period from 1966-1970 as ‘Proto-Multiculturalism’ and argues that this period of
ideological development coincided with the ‘high-water mark of integrationsim
in migrant settlement and welfare policy.’19 Though not as promising as the
multiculturalism that would come after it, this period nonetheless provided
Croatians a far greater legitimacy to organise and advocate than had been
extended under assimilation.
The third and most important reason for this increased momentum,
however, lay in the developments in Croatia itself known as the Croatian Spring
(Hrvatsko proljeće, or masovni pokret - MASPOK). This nationalist reawakening
began as a reform movement within the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC),
and ended as a mass cultural and political movement. It developed around the
notion that Croatia and Croatians were being economically, culturally, and
politically disenfranchised by a process of ‘Serbianisation’ within the Yugoslav
government and its institutions. The LCC, the Matica Hrvatska, and the
University of Zagreb were the main institutions around which this movement
organised. As with the national revival of the 19th century, the Croatian Spring
would be led by intellectuals, and the activities of the Matica Hrvatska would be
central in reinvigorating nationalist sentiment. The issue of language acted as a
proxy issue representing all facets of the dispute, and became the foremost
example of this ‘Serbianisation’, just as it had during the Illyrian movement and
in the inter-war years.
Though there were many antecedents, the catalyst for the Croatian Spring
proper came with the 1967 ‘Declaration concerning the Name and Position of the
Croatian literary language,’ which Čuvalo describes as the ‘first open
manifestation of nationalism by Croatian intellectuals.’20 The declaration was a
response to the publication of the first two volumes of the SerboCroatian/Croato-Serbian dictionary, which presented Serbian expressions as the
standard, and either omitted Croatian expressions altogether, or classed them as
local dialects. Published in the Zagreb weekly Telegram on 17 March, the
19
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declaration was signed by over 140 Croatian intellectuals, at least 18 Croatian
cultural institutions, and most controversially, internationally renowned writer
Miroslav Krleža.

It renounced the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement, which had

established the Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian language, and instead argued that
Croatians had a constitutional right to their own language. Continual efforts to
unify the Croatian and Serbian languages, the declaration continued, had
essentially downgraded Croatian to a local dialect, and therefore eroded this
right. Because of the scope of its signatories, the declaration was perceived as the
most direct and overt attack on the Belgrade Government and its language policy
to date, and resulted in the forced removal of some from public life. Thus, the
language issue ‘became one of the most heavily politicised and nationalised
subjects in Yugoslav Croatia.’21
The Matica Hrvatska was perhaps the most vociferous of all Croatian Spring
participants. After falling into relative obscurity after WWII, an energetic new
membership revived it in the 1960s, including Većeslav Holjevac, the popular
former Mayor of Zagreb, Franjo Tuđman, a former general turned historian who
would become Croatia’s first democratically elected president in 1990, Marko
Veselica, Vlado Gotovac, and Šime Đodan. Under their stewardship, the Matica
was transformed into ‘a vibrant powerhouse of popular nationalist agitation.’22 It
publicised its views namely through print, most notably its journal, Kritika, which
‘caricatured Belgrade as a metaphor for the ruthless, bourgeois, backward Serbs
who were oppressing the more advanced Croats;’23 its bi-monthly literary
magazine Kolo; and a vast number of pamphlets and booklets ‘which popularised
their ideas about the renewal of Croatia’s nationhood, culture and economics.’24
However its weekly, the Hrvatski Tjednik, became a phenomenon in its own
right. First published in April 1971, the paper quickly skyrocketed to masscirculation, out-performing its competitors almost instantaneously, and created a
public, nationwide profile for the intellectuals operating out of the Matica.
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Alongside its sister publication devoted to economic issues, Hrvatski Gospodarski
Glasnik, a wide variety of issues were covered, from Croatia’s economic
exploitation and decline, demographic change, and the status of Croatians in
Bosnia, through to the designs on postage stamps and lack of Croatian words on
railway timetables. Its regular column distinguishing correct Croatian from
common Serbian expressions became one of its most emblematic features.
The Yugoslav-wide debates about centralism vs. decentralism of the state,
and liberalisation vs. protectionism in economic policy featured heavily in the
debates of the LCC throughout the 1960’s, and communist conservatives such as
Vladimir Bakarić, Milutin Balić, and Jakov Blažević found themselves increasingly
losing power to a democratic and nationally-oriented faction of younger
communists that had grown up under Tito, who claimed that the centralist and
protectionist policies of the central Yugoslav government was resulting in the
economic disenfranchisement of Croatia. Headed by Savka Dabčević-Kučar, this
liberally oriented leadership included prominent members such as Miko Tripalo,
once President of the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia, who rose
through the ranks to occupy a variety of important positions within both the
Croatian republic and federal communist party systems, Pero Pirker, the mayor of
Zagreb from 1963-1967, and Dragutin Haramija, the Prime Minister of Croatia.
The furore over the 1967 Declaration only encouraged the reformers, and in 1968
Dabčević-Kučar was appointed the Head of Party in Croatia, while Tripalo
became the Yugoslav Presidency member for Croatia. The complaints of the
reformers, Tanner explains, ‘boiled down to two principle points: that there were
too many Serbs in the army, the police and the Party in Croatia, and that too
much money, especially hard currency, was being exported to Belgrade.’25
The first confrontation between the two factions came at the Tenth Plenum
of the Croatian Central Committee in January 1970. The session was convened in
response to a campaign by Miloš Žanko in the later months of 1969 aimed at
discrediting Dabčević-Kučar’s leadership via a series of articles published in
25
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Borba that attempted to portray her leadership as a fascist revival. The majority of
the committee strongly backed Dabčević-Kučar, and though her victory was ‘less
significant than it appeared… The public perception in Croatia was that DabčevićKučar had won her fight and the result of the Tenth Session caused a tremendous
stir.'26 She was seen to have made the Croatian Communist Party’s independent
vision for Croatia public and outside of central party organs, and from this point
on ‘drew steadily closer to the ideology of Matica Hrvatska and the nationalists.’27
It is also from this point that the Croatian Spring left the confines of the
communist party and the walls of the Matica, and moved into the streets as a
mass movement. Rallies were held in favour of Dabčević-Kučar’s leadership
where the Croatian Šahovnica flag, rather than the Yugoslav red star,
predominated, patriotic songs of the Croatian homeland were revived, often
played in restaurants across Croatia, and Croatians begun to reclaim their history,
reviving nationalist heroes such as Stjepan Radić, founder of the Croatian Peasant
Party, Petar Krešimir IV the Great, the 11th century Croatian King under whom the
Croatian realm reached its territorial peak, and Josip Jelačić, the 19th century Ban
of Croatia.28
The University of Zagreb was another prominent institution of the Croatian
Spring, which in 1969 was set to celebrate the 300th anniversary of its
establishment. Preparations for the celebration ‘gave the reformers a platform to
spread their views,’29 which was reinforced by the election of Ivan Čičak (an
outsider and avowed liberal) to the post of university pro-rector. The university
also distinguished itself when its students formed the first independent students
organisation in Yugoslavia, the Croatian League of Students, with Dražen Budiša
at its head. Following patterns in Europe and the United States, the student
movement in Croatia became one of the most politically aware and active of
social groups. This student movement would become the most radical and
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enduring symbol of the Croatian Spring, with Čičak and Budiša later emerging as
influential political figures.
Student advocacy culminated on 22 November 1971, when 3000 members of
the Croatian Students Union gathered in Zagreb, and unanimously voted to begin
a strike at 9am the following day. Their demands were ‘a synthesis of the
immediate and strategic goals of the Croatian Spring,’30 including the various
linguistic, economic, military, and political demands raised in the preceding
years. By 25 November, similar student actions supporting those in Zagreb
formed in Split, Rijeka and Dubrovnik, and ‘within a matter of days, at least
30,000 university students across Croatia were on strike.’31 At the insistence of
Dabčević-Kučar herself, the protest ended peacefully after a few days, but was not
without consequences.
The problem of increasing Croatian dissidence across political, economic and
cultural grounds was exactly what Tito feared would destabilise and delegitimise
his administration, particularly in light of the Hungarian crisis in 1954 and the
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, Tito’s reaction to these
developments in Croatia
followed a pattern repeated several times in the era of the Croatian spring: Tito
would arrive from Belgrade, incandescent with rage and full of ideas that had
been put into his head by the Serb generals, the secret police and the Party
officials in Serbia. After seeing matters for himself, he would go away mollified
and apparently convinced that matters were less serious than he had first
thought.32

The onset of mass student protests, however, both enraged and embarrassed
Tito, who was in the United States on a state visit at the time.33 Disappointed his
attempt to appease Croatian demands for liberalisation and decentralisation had
only served to feed the beast he saw as Croatian nationalism and separatism, he
became convinced of the need for swift action.
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On 1 December 1971, Tito convened the Yugoslav Presidency in
Karadjordjevo, and harshly reprimanded Croatian Communists for allowing
nationalism to grow unfettered. The leaders of the Croatian Spring, including
Dabčević-Kučar, Tripalo and their closest associates, were removed from all
offices and banned from public life, and replaced with loyal ultra-conservatives.
Rank and file members were expelled by the hundreds, which caused an even
greater imbalance in the proportion of Serbs within the party. As spontaneous
demonstrations broke out in response to the forced resignations of the popular
leadership and expulsion of Croatian party members, police repression was swift
and heavy-handed, and thousands were ‘detained, harassed in various ways or
forced into the sidelines of public life.’34 The Matica Hrvatska was closed down,
and figures from the Matica, editors of the Hrvatski Tjednik, and student leaders
were put to trial and jailed for their activities during the Croatian Spring.
The aftermath of the Croatian Spring had important ramifications for Croatia
and its diaspora communities. Tito’s purges effectively suppressed every form of
political opposition in Croatia until the democratic elections of 1990, rendering it
the ‘silent republic.’35 With the removal of governmental, institutional, and grassroots avenues of political activism, the Croatian body politic descended into an
apathy from which it did not emerge for almost two decades. For Ramet, this
apathy was the product of nationalist Croatians simply ‘dropping out’ 0f political
activism, as the aftermath of the Croatian Spring left them ‘deprived of any input
into the politics of the society’36 Goldstein, on the other hand, believes that this
apathy may have been in part the result of the economic progress in the 1970s,
which ‘right up till 1978-9, was the period when the standard of living was at its
highest.’37 Regardless of its cause, the apathy of the homeland shifted the onus of
the advocacy for Croatian independence to the diaspora, and in the wake of the
Croatian Spring, the activities of Croatians abroad intensified. The Croatian
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diaspora, including the community in Australia, was no longer an outpost of the
Croatian independence movement - it was now the crucible of it.
As Croatian political activism was gaining momentum in Australia, the
community was experiencing a comparative decline as a proportion of total
Yugoslav migration. The opening of Yugoslavia’s borders in 1966 and the bilateral
agreement between Yugoslavia and Australia in 1970 led to the increased
migration of non-Croatian Yugoslavs and a diversity of views in matters of
Yugoslav affairs. This included non-Croatians who were pro-Yugoslav, nonCroatians who were anti-Yugoslav, and even some Croatians who were either
pro-Yugoslav or at least not anti-communist. If the Croatian Spring had proved
anything, it was that advocacy for Croatian independence was not exclusively the
province of the right. As can be expected, with this greater diversity in views both
within the Croatian community and with other Yugoslav communities, a greater
degree of disagreement and hostility between the various groups followed.
In the same way Croatian activism was gaining momentum due to the
increased size of the community, so too was the activism of other anti-Yugoslav
communities, including Macedonian, Slovenian, and even Serbian communities.
Evidence suggests that the activism of these communities may have also included
the types of violence usually attributed to Croatians.38 However, as argued in
Section 3.2.1, because anti-Yugoslav activism was both intentionally and
inadvertently portrayed as a Croatian affair, some acts of violence may have been
misattributed to Croatians. This was exacerbated by the limited understanding of
Australia’s political and legal authorities in the complexities of the Yugoslav
community, whose predominantly Anglo-Saxon personnel lacked the necessary
historical, cultural and language resources, knowledge, and capabilities needed to
interpret and contextualise these developments.39 For these personnel, issues in
the Yugoslav community often boiled down to a separatist Croatian element,
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whose irrational political agenda, steeped in the right-wing dogmas of WWII,
antagonised an otherwise peaceful migrant community.
Though these contexts help to explain why Croatian activism became more
visible, and why there was cause for greater disagreement within the Yugoslav
community itself, neither necessarily account for the escalation in violence. This
is better explained by the phenomenon of politically-motivated violence, which
had increasingly become a feature of various movements and their activism
worldwide.40 Political violence was a common feature in the struggle for civil
rights in America, apartheid in South Africa, and the Troubles in Ireland. 1968
was a hallmark year for this violence, with the events of March in Poland, May in
France, the Prague Spring, the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr and Robert
F. Kennedy in America, the Chicago Riots, and a number of anti-Vietnam protests
around the world.41 July 1968 even saw the first mass protest in Yugoslavia since
WWII, when students in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, and Sarajevo went on strike
to protest student conditions and the wider economic issues stemming from the
1964 reforms.42 These various movements worldwide all involved individuals that
believed violence was sometimes necessary for social change, particularly when
democratic modes of protest failed to yield results. Therefore, though political
violence was illegal, it was not an altogether illegitimate means of protest during
this period.
Croatian political activism was not immune to these developments. Croatian
political violence was significantly greater in Western Europe and America
The reasons for this worldwide phenomenon vary. For example Vanhala argues that this type of
violence was encouraged by the introduction of live global television coverage that meant local struggles
could be writ on a global stage faster and more dramatically than ever before. Chalk on the other hand,
believes that this phenomenon was facilitated factors such as ‘the proliferation of militant New Left
ideologies in Western Europe and the US, the rise of Palestinian extremism abroad, ethno-nationalist
and religious imperatives that became gradually more fanatical in nature and increasingly frequent state
sponsorship.’ See:
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compared to Australia, both in the frequency and in the intensity of violence. As
Pluchinsky highlights, from 1962 to 1977, 60% of all Croatian attacks took place in
Western Europe, primarily West Germany, Sweden, France, Austria, Norway and
Belgium. Of these, over 67% occurred in West Germany and Sweden alone.43 The
most dramatic of these incidents happened in Sweden, when in 1971, the Yugoslav
ambassador to Sweden, Vladimir Rolovic, was assassinated by members of the
Croatian National Resistence (Hrvatski Narodni Otpor – HNO), and in 1972, when
a Swedish aeroplane was hijacked by three Croatians. The issue, however, was
most pressing in West Germany, where violence occurred most frequently and
over the longest period. Despite this, a West German Governmental report in
1972 clearly stated that ‘the vast majority of Croats in the Federal Republic are
docile. [The problem of terrorism was] a matter of only a tiny, virulent
minority.’44 Much like the Australian authorities, the West German authorities
were ‘no more effective in bringing to trial the perpetrators of these acts of
violence, that appear to be politically motivated, than has been the case in
Australia.’45
To give Murphy and his Ministerial Statement credit, violence and extremism
was increasingly becoming an issue within Croatian political activism. However,
his insinuation that this was an inherent phenomenon to Croatian activism, or
explanation that the government had failed to keep it in check, was at best far too
simplistic, and at worst deliberately misleading. Instead, the aftermath of the
Croatian Spring and the added onus of responsibility it placed on diaspora
communities lent Croatian activism in Australia a new sense of purpose,
importance, and urgency. The increasing rate of Croatian migration to Australia
only added to this momentum and resulted in a larger and more noticeable
activism. As the Yugoslav community expanded and diversified in origin and
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political opinion, activisms increasingly came into conflict with one another. This
conflict sometimes became violent as individuals took cues from the worldwide
phenomenon of politically-motivated violence and the belief that political
violence was a legitimate, and even necessary, means of protest and social
change.

4.1.2. OLD FRUSTRATIONS, NEW PARADIGMS
An explanation for why Murphy framed the issue of Croatian political
activism in the way he did can be found in Australia’s political environment
between the 1969 and 1972 federal elections, where the ‘Croat problem’ became a
proxy battle in a wider struggle to define a new set of Australian values and way
of life within the paradigms created by the social and political changes of the
1960s. Whereas the Liberals were conservative, staunchly anti-communist, and
the party of Cold War ideologies that persecuted innocent Australians for their
left-leaning politics, the ALP fashioned itself as the party of change and
progressiveness, eager to usher in the post-Cold War era, and concerned with
those who posed a real threat to the security of Australia.
The issue of Croatian political activism was only one in a wider debate
regarding protest, violence, and government responses. Anti-Vietnam war
activism, student activism, indigenous civil rights activism, LGBT activism,
women’s liberation, environmental activism, and various other left-oriented
movements all involved clashes with police and resistance from the Coalition
Government. As with Croatian activism, individuals within these movements
engaged in political violence as a means of protest and social change. Whitlam
and Cairns, two of the leading voices on the issue of Croatian activism in the
1960s, as well as other ALP Minsters, became advocates for some of these protest
movements, at least in aim if not in method. Cairns was, in fact, the chairman of
the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign in Victoria, a passionate advocate for the
anti-war movement both in- and outside the parliament, and was even amongst
200

the first leading the 100,000 strong Moratorium march in Melbourne on 8 May
1971.46 For Cairns and many others, the heavy-handedness with which the
Government addressed these protest movements stood in complete contradiction
and hypocrisy to the leniency afforded Croatians and their activism.47 In the same
way support for the protest movements of the late 1960s/early 1970s became a
symbolic point of difference between the ALP and the Coalition, so too did their
position regarding Croatians.
This ideological battle was situated in a narrower struggle within the political
left over how to define itself, as various ideological splits had resulted in
competing strains of left-wing politics. Communist factions developed along the
varying ideologies of Maoism, Trotskyism, Stalinism, Marxism, and Leninism,
and after the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948, Kruschev’s ‘Secret Speech’ in 1956, and the
Prague Spring in 1968, varying degrees of pro- and anti-Soviet sentiment. These
fractures in turn filtered into the trade union movement.48 For the most part the
protest movements of the late 1960s/early 1970s that were the cause of so much
social and civil unrest also originated from the left. Like their worldwide
counterparts, these various movements all fractured along violent and nonviolent lines, which only exacerbated the fact that political violence was
historically more closely associated with left-wing movements in Australia, and
particularly with trade unionism. Not surprisingly, the left faction of the ALP
itself fractured as various members navigated these fissions.49
Croatian activism was therefore an attractive target for this proxy battle for
three reasons - it was a right-oriented activism with which ALP members had
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little history of affiliation, but with whom the Liberals were allegedly
intertwined;50 the political violence that was typically the source of denunciation
for left-oriented activism was becoming an increasing problem within Croatian
activism; and it was an easy target because it emanated from a community of the
migrant ‘Other’ that sat uncomfortably within the paradigms of the Good
Australian Migrant. Problematising Croatian activism allowed those inside the
political system to articulate a vision for Australia that maintained the values and
ideals the Left represented, but which also distanced them from the associated
political violence that was both unbecoming and unelectable of a politician. It is
no surprise then, to find that the Senators most vocal about the ‘Croat problem’ –
Murphy, Mulvihill, Arthur Gietzelt, Douglas McClelland, and Justin O’Byrne were those from the ALP Left with affiliations to trade unionism or various
protest movements. This made them easy political targets for accusations of
radicalism and denunciations as communist.
The results of the 1969 election, where the ALP came within four seats of
winning, affirmed Whitlam’s leadership of the party and the new vision it was
offering to Australians. Perhaps emboldened by this result, the ALP increasingly
raised the issue of Croatian activism and its associated violence in parliament
from 1970. In the Senate, Mulvihill upheld the mantle that had passed from
Cairns to him in the late 1960s as the ideological crusader against Croatian
activism. Much like Cairns did in the 1963/4 debates, Mulvihill framed his
questions within the ideological problems that had defined Croatian activism in
the previous period – namely the links to Ustashism, Fascism and Nazi Germany,
and the political undesirability of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.51 Interestingly,
Murphy for the most part was silent on Croatian activism, only rising to speak on
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the issue within the rhetoric of law and order to question the competence of
Attorney-General Greenwood.52
The House of Representatives did not have an ideological crusader such as
Mulvihill. Cairns, who had served this purpose in the 1963/4 debates, was now
preoccupied with his role in the anti-war movement. Whitlam, however,
repeatedly raised the issue as one negatively effecting Australia’s diplomatic
obligations. As he explained during the debate regarding the Public Order
(Protection of Persons and Property) Bill 1971;
There can be no doubt that one of the alarming trends in the world today is for
citizens to insult, to harass, to molest, to kidnap and to kill diplomats or consuls.
It is a trend which every civilised nation must condemn. If there is to be any hope
of good relations in the world and peace between nations then the official
representatives of nations are entitled to respect… The violence in this
community against missions has come from the right wing. It has come from the
Ustashi, from migrants to this country who supported Hitler and Mussolini in the
break-up of Yugoslavia…53

For Whitlam, the problem of Croatian activism lay less in its ideological concerns
and more in the practical impediments to diplomacy and government it posed.
The precariousness of Australia’s diplomatic position was only exacerbated by the
ideological origins of Croatian activism. By 1972, there had been three bombings
of the Yugoslav Consulate-General in Sydney (January 1967, November 1968, and
June 1969), a bombing of the Yugoslav Consulate-General in Melbourne (October
1970), and an attack on the Yugoslav Embassy in Canberra (November 1969). As
Whitlam explained, these not only jeopardised Australia’s reputation and
capabilities within the diplomatic world, but repairs and funding Commonwealth
Police to manage the issue also came at a ‘not inconsiderable’ cost to Australian
taxpayers.54
These contexts culminated in two events that cemented Croatians and their
activism as both problematic and politically symbolic, which mirrored those that
had initiated debates in 1963/4. The first came on 5 July 1972 when news broke
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that Croatians from Australia may have comprised the 19 men involved in a
second incursion into Yugoslavia.55 The second event came on 16 September 1972,
when close to midday, two bombs targeting Yugoslav premises exploded on
Sydney’s George Street. Like the 1963 incursion and the 1964 Lesić bombing,
these events appeared to confirm the long-held ALP allegation that in their
unsubstantiated zeal to persecute left-wing activism, Coalition governments had
abrogated their responsibility to control and curb the real threat to Australians right-wing extremists.
On 16 August 1972 the Yugoslav Government presented an Aide-Memoire to
the Australian Government that confirmed the involvement of six Australian
citizens in the incursion, and a further three who had previously resided in
Australia. More disturbingly for Australian authorities, however, were the series
of allegations regarding Australia’s implication in the incursion, which included
that the headquarters of this group were located in Australia, that the Australian
Government was providing shelter to the ringleaders, and that the HRB, thought
to have become defunct by Australian authorities since 1967 had been
reorganised in early 1972 as the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation
(HIRO).56 ASIO, Commonwealth Police, and various governmental departments
were tasked with investigating the claims of the aide-memoire, which even
resulted in the dawn raids of Croatian homes in NSW and Victoria by
Commonwealth and State police.57 However, initial media and political responses
were somewhat muted, whether out of distraction, - the last budget of the
McMahon government was released on 15 August and election speculation was
gaining momentum - or out of detachment - as with the 1963 incursion, this was
an abstract event that had happened well away from Australia.
The George Street bombing, on the other hand, happened in the heart of
Sydney, and though it did not result in casualties, 16 individuals were wounded
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by the blasts, both premises suffered extensive damage, and both bombings were
accompanied by threats of further violence.58 Like the 1964 Lesić bombing, this
tangible act of violence had a more profound effect on politicising the issue of
Croatian activism than did the incursion. They were immediately ascribed to
Croatian terrorists, with Cairns, the Yugoslav Ambassador to Australia Uroš
Vidović, and prominent Yugoslav community member Marijan Jurjević, declaring
them a confirmation of organised Croatian terrorism in Australia.59 Newspaper
editorials echoed these sentiments in varying degrees,60 with the Canberra Times
going so far as call for an immediate suspension of all Yugoslav migration to
Australia;
Since enough terrorists have slipped through the net to create a crisis in this
country and since police action to stop their activities have been of no avail the
next logical step is to close the pipelines.61

On 19 September, both houses of Parliament debated the bombing, with the
Government facing heavy questioning throughout question time. In the House of
Representatives, Whitlam described it as the ‘biggest mass crime in Australia,’
and moved a motion calling on the Government to set up specialist intelligence
and police organisations to address overseas terrorist movements in Australia.62
In the Senate, the ferocity and frequency of questioning was such that the
President at one point exclaimed
Honourable senators have asked 43 questions in an hour and 10 minutes… I think
honourable senators might consider whether we should go on with the business
of the Senate.63

Murphy too moved a motion to refer the matter of alleged Croatian terrorism to
the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence for urgent inquiry and
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report, which prompted a lengthy debate.64 Though both motions from Whitlam
and Murphy failed, the status of Croatian activism as a political football became
firmly entrenched.
In the face of these escalating allegations, Croatians remained steadfast in
their activism and responses. Like the 1963 incursion, the 1972 incursion was
explained as the actions of a naïve and foolish minority, while the community in
Sydney in particular vehemently objected to the claim that the bombings were
the work of Croatian terrorists. As in 1963/4, counter-allegations were raised that
the escalating acts of violence were the work of Yugoslav agents provocateur,
aimed at discrediting Croatian political activism abroad, particularly in light of
the events of the Croatian Spring.65 However, on 10 October Prime Minister Billy
McMahon called the federal election for December 2nd, and as the attention of
both parties turned to campaigning, debates about Croatian activism subsided,
even if Mulvihill remained relentless in his prosecution of the ALP case on
Croatians.

4.1.3. FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
This interplay of domestic political forces both in Croatia and Australia
becomes even more complex when we consider the foreign policy aspirations of
both Tito’s Yugoslavia and the Whitlam Government. Yugoslav foreign policy was
an important factor in the legitimisation of Tito’s regime and personal rule in the
face of ideological and economic challenges throughout the 1960s. The more
pronounced these challenges became, the more important success in foreign
policy became to Tito and his Government. In Australia, Whitlam’s reorientation
of foreign policy away from the Cold War divide and closer to the principles of
non-alignment was also tied to questions of legitimacy, proven by Whitlam’s
Australia, Senate, Parliamentary Debates, No. S.38, 1972, 918-976.
‘Croatian leaders deny bomb plot,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 September 1972, 8.
For copy of press release issued on 18 September 1972 by the Central Council of the Croatian
Association in Australia which denounces the bombings and the fear that the bombings are part of the
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establishment of the ‘Duumvirate’ immediately after his election from which he
enacted as much foreign policy change as possible. Tito and Whitlam therefore
found natural allies in each other, and the intersection of the foreign policy
aspirations of these two governments had profound consequences for the
Croatian community in Australia.
As was the case with the rest of the world, the 1960s in Yugoslavia were
characterised by political, social, and economic upheaval. These resulted in two
significant threats to the legitimacy of Tito and his regime – increasing
ideological dissent internal to Yugoslavia’s communist paradigms, and a rapidly
growing diaspora throughout the world that was increasingly able to articulate
alternate visions for Yugoslavia’s future. This political threat was made even more
precarious by the worsening economic situation in Yugoslavia during the 1960s,
including growing unemployment, inflationary pressure, perennial balance-ofpayments deficits, unused capacities, and rising inventories of unwanted goods.66
Thus, as Neibuhr explains, ‘the more Tito’s state failed to deliver on its domestic
promises, the more leaders needed success in some other area.’67 Foreign policy
was to provide the arena for this success.
The first threat to Tito’s legitimacy – internal dissent – originated from Tito
himself. The Tito-Stalin split of 1948 and Tito’s continued advocacy for policy
creation independent of the USSR inadvertently raised the same question for the
republics of Yugoslavia; if Titoism argued that Yugoslavia was entitled to create
policy independent of the USSR based on the prevailing conditions of the
Yugoslav country, then the logical extension of this argument was that the
republics of Yugoslavia should be entitled to create policy independent of
Yugoslavia based on their prevailing conditions. The introduction of selfmanagement as policy only exacerbated this logical disconnect, for ‘once it was
conceded that individual enterprises had a right to run their own affairs, the
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republics naturally demanded the same rights at state level.’68 Thus, the republics
found themselves in the curious position of being denied the right to
autonomous decision-making, while it was simultaneously extended to the state
as a whole above them, and to individual enterprises below them.
As the economic woes of Yugoslavia steadily worsened, liberal and
conservative emerged around two dominant issues; centralism vs decentralism of
the state, and liberalisation vs protectionism of economic policy. The more
economically developed republics of Croatia and Slovenia were keeping the entire
Yugoslav state afloat, financing the less developed regions such as BosniaHercegovina and Serbia to their own detriment. The increasingly centralist
policies of Belgrade however, meant that these very same republics had
decreasing political power and autonomy, with less and less say in where the
surpluses they generated went, and left them feeling exploited. This internal
debate about the practical application of the ‘Yugoslav way’ invariably resulted in
animated political debates, reforms, and dissident scandals. In the 1960s, the
increasing momentum of liberal factions from Slovenia and Croatia was
reinforced by the economic reforms of 1961 and 1965, and the fall of Aleksandar
Rankovic, hardline centralist and UDBa chief, in 1966. These events precipitated
the spread liberalism across all of Yugoslavia’s republics, and led to a number of
social and political movements, of which the Croatian Spring remained the
foremost example.
The second threat came as a result of the 1961 and 1965 economic reforms
that opened Yugoslav borders to organised migration. As Zimmerman explains,
The trickle of the 1950s became by the mid-1960s a rivulet… With the economic
reforms, the rivulet became a flood – a flood which abated only with the
stagflation and recession that followed the 1973 jump in global oil prices.69

The sheer size and rate of Yugoslav emigration meant that Yugoslav political and
academic attention turned to the issues of those abroad. By 1970, total
outmigration from Yugoslavia amounted to roughly a million workers, which
68
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constituted approximately one-fifth of the Yugoslav workforce and was twice the
population of Montenegro at the time. These relative figures, Zimmerman argues,
made Yugoslavs abroad a ‘seventh republic’ of the Yugoslav state that Tito and his
Government felt needed governing.70
Size, however, was not the only reason for this – the overly Croatian
demography of the seventh republic was also a cause for concern.71 The loss of
control over citizens that accompanied migration posed significant ideological
challenges to the Yugoslav government;
[The seventh republic was] a place where the major media were independent of
Yugoslav authorities, where the mores of modern Western industrial capitalism
and “bourgeois” democracy prevailed, and where there existed and operated
groups fundamentally opposed to the Yugoslav idea, to communism, or to both.72

Tito perceived post-war Croatian communities throughout the world as a threat
to his legitimacy from the very outset of his leadership after WWII. As long as
Yugoslavia’s borders remained closed, and emigration was defined as an act akin
to treason, the threat from the seventh republic was relatively contained and
easily denounced. The legitimisation and institutionalisation of migration with
the reforms of the 1960s, however, exponentially increased this threat, not only in
the ability of anti-Yugoslav sentiment to spread abroad due to the increasing size
of communities, but also in its ability to filter back into Yugoslavia, either
through the movement of temporary workers, or through holiday-making
permanent migrants.
Yugoslav foreign policy, therefore, sought to counter the threat of increasing
internal dissent and the rapid development of a sizeable, predominantly
Croatian, diaspora by way of three principal methods. First, it attempted to boost
Tito’s legitimacy domestically through his reputation and successes with
nonalignment on the world stage. Second, it attempted to retain a measure of
control over Yugoslavs abroad by leveraging Yugoslavia’s reputation and position
in international relations to negotiate its diplomatic relationship with host
ibid., 106–31.
For a comprehensive discussion of the changing demography of Yugoslavs abroad, see ibid., 83–89.
72
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countries of sizeable Croatian diaspora. Finally, Yugoslavia used the channels of
these first two methods to ideologically delegitimise Croatian dissent both
domestically and abroad.
The symbolic status of Yugoslavian nonalignment legitimised Tito’s
government in three important ways. First, it reinforced Tito’s leadership and
authority as the elder statesman of Yugoslav politics. Though the political and
social unrest of Yugoslavia in the late 1960s may have weakened the cohesive
strength of Yugoslavia, it had strengthened the authority and influence of Tito
himself. Tito’s charisma and achievements through NAM only reinforced his
reputation domestically - as Niebuhr summarises, ‘If [Tito] could solve the
world’s problems, why would he not be able to solve those facing Yugoslavia?’73
Second, involvement in NAM earned popular support for the regime, not only
due to the impression of credibility, capability, and influence, but because it
aligned the regime with ‘progressive’ movements throughout the world,
particularly the decolonisation movements of various countries. Finally, as the
reputation of Tito and his regime strengthened internationally, the easier it
became to marginalise and delegitimise opposition groups or detractors both at
home and abroad. It is here that Niebuhr situates the real power of nonalignment
– ‘its ability to secure “international legitimacy” for national liberation
movements (presumably including Tito’s) because of gains in international
affairs.’74 The symbolic status of nonalignment domestically, therefore, far
outstripped any practical clout internationally, and this held as true for any other
country as it did for Yugoslavia.
The international standing Yugoslavia was able to accumulate through its
nonalignment, its strategic importance as a communist alternative to Soviet
hegemony, and the academic and political curiosity in its principle of selfmanagement all acted as positive leverage in Yugoslavia’s ability to negotiate
diplomatic relations with the host countries of sizeable Croatian diaspora.
Zimmerman argues that there was a perceptible shift in the way the Yugoslav
73
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government approached managing the seventh republic. From 1965-1972, the
general picture of Yugoslav management was
one of Yugoslav authorities governing the workers prior to their departure and
negotiating with the Western European states and Australia about the ways those
states would govern the workers during their stay abroad [authors emphasis].75

However, growing internal dissent, such as that of the 1968 Belgrade student
demonstrations and the Croatian Spring in 1971, the rapid growth of the seventh
republic as a result of migration reforms, and broader events, such as the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, meant that from the early 1970s,
Yugoslav decisionmakers[sic] acted increasingly as though they had to treat the
workers, while abroad, as nearly as possible as a matter of domestic politics. The
Yugoslav government began to implement measures to govern the migrants - to
control, to inform, to socialize, etc. - while they were abroad, rather than limiting
itself to measures prior to departure, or to negotiations [about how those states
would govern].76

The Croatian demographics of the seventh republic, only added a political
impetus to this change.
As discussed in section 4.1.1, the increasing rate of migration of nonCroatian Yugoslavs resulted in a diversity of views in matters of Yugoslav affairs.
This complicated the managing of the seventh republic as it was no longer viable
to simply dismiss it in its entirety as a hostile enemy of the state. The Yugoslav
government now had to find a way to manage pro- and anti-Yugoslav
communities, both in relation to the Yugoslav state and in relation to each other.
By 1976, this division of the diaspora was officially entrenched in the Yugoslav
government lexicon as the positive diaspora and hostile/enemy emigrant groups,77
and resulted in two broad approaches to managing the seventh republic.
For pro-Yugoslav groups, the Yugoslav government actively sought to retain
or ensure the loyalties of their citizens upon emigration, and from 1970,
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turned their attention to providing services intended to retain the Yugoslav
workers’ identity with the homeland and with the “right” values, as well as to
provide for the political socialization[sic] – what in the old days used to be
termed “civic training” – of Yugoslav youths abroad.78

This included producing and disseminating Yugoslav print and media targeted at
those abroad, the provision of material for children’s education abroad, and the
ability to access social welfare benefits.79 For anti-Yugoslav groups, the police
state was increasingly used to control dissidence through intimidation. Though
this was primarily exercised upon the return of migrants to Yugoslavia, Vukusic
argues that from 1966, the relaxation of repression in Yugoslavia as a result of the
fall of Ranković was correlated with a sharp increase in the intensity of UDBa
activity against Yugoslav emigrants abroad. This particularly targeted Croatians,
and from 1966-1971 alone, he argues that the UDBa executed 23 Croatian
emigrants, with a further 5 unsuccessful assassination attempts.80
In light of the worldwide growth of Croatian communities, and in the face
of numerous liberation and decolonisation movements, an important goal for
Yugoslav foreign policy became to prevent Croatian activism from reaching the
status of a national or liberation movement. Though the delegitimisation of
Croatian dissent was not a phenomenon unique to the 1970s (see sections 1.3.2
and 3.2.1), the Yugoslav government framed their denunciations in particular
ways so that they would carry greater salience. The first was its portrayal of
Croatian activism as a terrorist pursuit. Given the international condemnation of
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80
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terrorism and political violence in the period from 1968, this was the most
effective way to undermine the actions of Croatian diaspora worldwide. The
second drew on the history of Yugoslav delegitimisation and portrayed this
terrorism as an extension and evolution of the fascist ideology from which
Croatian political emigration and activism emerged. Finally, the Yugoslav
government drew on its perceived strategic importance to portray Croatian
activism as dependent on, and a tool of, Soviet expansionist aspirations to
destabilise Yugoslavia.81
It is therefore not difficult to imagine a connection between the increasing
violence attributed to Croatians in Australia with Tito’s foreign policy aspirations
and need to legitimise his regime domestically - the community has steadfastly
maintained as much. These allegations and counter-allegations are not, however,
mutually exclusive events – both Croatian extremists and Yugoslav agents
provocateurs may have been responsible for the escalating violence of the late
1960s/early 1970s, and evidence to date seems to suggest this was the case. By
1973, ASIO was convinced that Yugoslav intelligence agents were operating in
Australia, drawing on sympathisers to act on their behalf, or penetrating
extremist Croatian organisations through agents provocateur.82
In the same way non-alignment afforded Tito and his government a moral
platform from which to marginalise internal dissent, so too did its
delegitimisation of Croatian activism and dissent abroad. Internal criticism,
particularly that emanating from Croatia, was often dismissed as ‘nationally
inspired’, and as Drapac explains,
this obsession with nationalist deviationsim cleared the way for still more inflated
analyses of Yugoslav ‘successes’ and militated against pluralism. It also ensured
the old argument, that there was nothing wrong with Yugoslavia, but that its
people were troublesome, could never subside.83

Constructing dissent as an external rather than internal phenomenon, and
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delegitimised any grassroots movement within Croatia and the other republics. It
is not surprising, therefore, that Tito would describe the student demonstrations
of the Croatian Spring as a ‘long and carefully prepared counter-revolutionary
activity initiated from abroad [own emphasis],’84 even if the catalysts for the
movement were internal to Yugoslav politics. This approach justified both Tito’s
internal policies on dissidence (in the name of protection from an external
threat), and his external policy on Croatians abroad, and impressed ‘upon the
world that the Yugoslav state was not made more precarious by dictatorship, but
by the pre-existing nationalist evil.’85
Just as foreign policy was central to Tito’s legitimacy, so too was it to
Whitlam’s. At the opening of Parliament on 27 February 1973, the GovernorGeneral’s speech identified the ‘recognition of new and momentous directions in
the pattern of international relations’ as one of the four principle grounds upon
which the Whitlam government was elected to rule.86 However, such was the
importance of foreign policy to Whitlam that on 5 December 1972, only three
days after the election, Whitlam had the Governor-General swear himself and
Lance Barnard in as Prime Minister and deputy Prime Minister respectively,
rather than allow McMahon to remain caretaker Prime Minister until a full
cabinet could be determined. The purpose of this ‘Duumvirate’ was so that
Whitlam could fulfil the campaign promises that did not require legislation. This
including enacting foreign policy changes that would symbolise Australia’s new
direction in international affairs; on 8 December Whitlam ordered the closure of
the Rhodesian Information Centre in Sydney; on 21 December, Australia formally
recognised the People’s Republic of China; and on 22 December, Whitlam
announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with East Germany.
This purposeful repudiation of the anti-communist position of the previous
government was intended to steer Australia towards closer relations with nonaligned countries. It is possible that Yugoslavia saw an opportunity to exploit
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Whitlam’s foreign policy objectives to further its own objectives, particularly in
the management of the seventh republic. As Strangman explains, because Tito
had been a founding member of NAM,
Yugoslav support would be important for Australian acceptance in this group. It
is likely that Yugoslav diplomats were pressing for something to be done about
the alleged Croatian terrorists in Australia, before extending the olive branch to
Australia in the foreign affairs field.87

More specifically, a NAM summit meeting was to be held in Algeria from 5-9
September 1973, and it was hinted that ‘… Australia would like to attend such a
meeting, or at least have the right to be there in an observer role.’88 For the sake
of his foreign policy, it was in Whitlam’s best interest to be seen as dealing with
the issue of Croatian activism in Australia, and Bijedić’s pending visit to Australia
from 20-22 March 1973 provided Whitlam with the perfect opportunity to shore
up Yugoslav support.
With the foreign policy stakes so high, it is no surprise to find both Whitlam
and Murphy concerning themselves with the issue of Croatian activism
immediately after their election. Whitlam, acting as the Attorney-General under
the Duumvirate, conveyed his dissatisfaction with ASIO’s handling of the issue to
Director-General Peter Barbour, explaining that he thought ASIO should be
doing more to ‘control’ Croatian terrorist groups.89 On 12 December, before his
appointment as Attorney-General, Murphy requested to view Attorney-General
Department files on Croatian extremists. Once sworn in, Whitlam tasked Murphy
with preparing and ensuring security arrangements for the Bijedić visit were
adequate, who in turn instructed ASIO, Commonwealth Police, and various
governmental departments to investigate and prepare risk assessments that
would inform security arrangements. Murphy emphasised the ‘great importance
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he [attached] to ensuring that no harm comes to the Yugoslav Prime Minister
during his visit to Australia.90
These investigations would set off the chain of events leading to the Raid on
ASIO, including the establishment of task forces, inter-departmental committees,
and in the case of ASIO, ‘Operation Amber’, which brought together ASIO
officers from around the country with knowledge of Croatian affairs to monitor
Croatian extremists in relation to the Bijedić Visit;91 repeated instances of the
rivalry between ASIO and Commonwealth Police interfering with preparations; a
former Commonwealth Police officer with a deep suspicion of ASIO acting as an
advisor to Murphy who both exacerbated and distorted this rivalry; a leaked
ASIO report that was understood to suggest ASIO was concealing information
regarding Croatian terrorist activities in Australia; a midnight visit to the ASIO
office in Canberra; and an agitated Murphy, who needed to ensure the Bijedić
visit passed without incident, the Yugoslav delegation was impressed with the
‘handling’ of Croatians in Australia, and that his statement to parliament would
deliver on his promises.
It was in this context that Whitlam ‘welcomed Mr Bijedić as the first leader of
the Yugoslav Government to visit Australia and outlined the new orientation of
Australia’s foreign policy.’92 The visit proved to be free of any incident and
somewhat of an anti-climax.93 For its part, the Croatian community had
organised a three-hour demonstration at Parliament House prior to the Bijedić
visit on 18 March, attended by over 3000 people.94 Although another
demonstration had been planned for the day of Bijedić’s arrival, it was cancelled
by community leaders ‘because of the hysterical atmosphere that has been
NAA: A6122, 2147, ‘ASIO Minute Paper – Visit of Yugoslav Prime Minister (8 March 1973)’
Blaxland, The Protest Years, 326.
92
‘PM promises action against terrorists’, Canberra Times, 21 March 1973, 1.
93
There were two inconsequential incidents – a bomb scare at Parliament House regarding two parcels,
inside which only letters were found, and a builder detained under the Commonwealth Bridge after
gelignite was found in his car, bur for which he had a legitimate purpose. See:
D. Wilson, ‘We won’t tolerate terrorists: Whitlam’, The Age, 21 March 1973, 1.
‘Whitlam pledges firm line’, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 March 1973, 1.
94
‘Police praise restraint of demonstrators’, Canberra Times, 19 March 1973, 1.
‘ASIO raid illegal: claim’, The Age, 19 March 1973, 1.
‘3000 Croatians protest outside Prlt House’, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March 1973, 3.
90
91

216

created… Any persons who did attempt to demonstrate would be regarded by the
community as agents provocateur.’95
The symbolism of a communist head of state visiting so early in Whitlam’s
prime ministership, and the publicity that it would generate, would be a powerful
legitimisation of Whitlam’s foreign policy aspirations. More practically, the NAM
summit in Algeria was looming, and Australia needed a sponsor – who better
than one of the founding constituents to provide this sponsorship. For
Yugoslavia, the visit presented a unique opportunity to exploit the change of
government in order to further its own foreign policy objectives in managing
Croatians abroad. As Strangman explains, similar diplomatic pressure had been
applied to both Austria and America in 1972, but with little success. Was the
Yugoslav Government’s achievement with the Bijedić visit to Australia,
Strangman asks, ‘the culmination of a diplomatic strategy pursued by the
Yugoslavs since 1972?’96 Just over a month after the events of the Raid, the Bijedić
visit, and Murphy’s Ministerial Statement, the answer, at least according to Peter
Samuel, seemed to be yes;
The sole beneficiaries of the Croatian liberation activity are the authorities in
Belgrade. What Murphy has overlooked is the fact that the threat to Belgrade
comes not from anti-Communist nationalists or reactionaries but from ethnic
and factional rivalries within the ruling Communist Party in Yugoslavia and from
the Russians. The people in power in Belgrade find it very helpful to have foreign
based ‘fascists’ and ‘counter-revolutionaries’ being seen to make incursions. It
creates in Yugoslavia a diversion, an atmosphere in which to call for unity, and an
outside evil with which internal dissidents can be associated in propaganda,
prosecutions and suppression. That is why Yugoslav Government agents are
involved in what is ostensibly anti-Yugoslav activity in Australia.97

4.1.4. ‘CROATIAN’ TERRORISM?
Stripped of its context, Murphy’s Statement presented a troubling tale.
However, in the context of these developments within Croatian activism, the
three-year debate that deployed Croatians and their activisms as a political
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football, and the foreign policy considerations of both Yugoslavia and the
Whitlam Government, the statement was, as Withers immediately recognised,
merely a ‘reiteration of statements about a reign of terror – most of which we
[The Senate] have heard time and time again.’98 Even though Murphy presented
an overwhelming amount of documentation, he failed to connect a single
terrorist act to any one terrorist, let alone uncover a coordinated, concerted effort
by an entire organisation that would impugn Greenwood or the previous
government. However, this was no mere oversight or happenstance. By the end of
Greenwood’s Shadow Ministerial Statement on 04 April 1973, it was clear that
Murphy had presented a deliberately constructed statement, long on allegation
and short of evidence, made in the knowledge that he would be protected by
parliamentary privilege. Though Murphy was measured and calculated in his
selections,

simplifications,

and

silences,

Greenwood

had

no

trouble

demonstrating just how easily Murphy’s allegations could be dismantled. Each
and every of his assertions could be, and was, contested.99
The narrative of Croatian terrorism as put forward by Murphy was a
deliberate construction of evidence, rather than a considered reflection
supported by evidence. His allegations rested on a guilt-by-association approach.
Croatian organisations were judged as terrorist simply because of their
association

with

‘undesirable’

principles

such

as

Ustashism,

by

their

‘revolutionary’ or anti-Yugoslav aims, or because of their association with
questionable individuals. Individuals were judged as terrorist simply because of
their political beliefs, affiliations to Croatian organisations, or previous criminal
offences, even if these offences were not of a terrorist nature. The history of
conflict within the Yugoslav community was simplified to a narrative of fanatic
Croatians terrorising peaceable Yugoslavs. Most incriminatingly, especially for
the first officer of the law who prided himself on his civil rights record, incidents
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that were perpetrated against Yugoslavs were attributed to Croatians even when
the perpetrators could not be found.
Perhaps Murphy sincerely believed while in opposition that there was
credible evidence of organised Croatian terrorism in Australia that was being
suppressed by either the Government or ASIO. However, after the Raid, Murphy
understood that with the evidence he held, his case would not succeed in a court
of law, but that it might be successful in influencing public opinion and the
political agenda. Barbour had informed him as much in a letter sent to Murphy
on 23 March, after the Raid but before the Ministerial Statement, which explicitly
told Murphy,
The conclusion appears inescapable that a terrorist organisation existed in
Australia until 1968. There is ample information to indicate that individuals
and/or groups exist in Australia prepared to use violence in support of their
objectives. However, sufficient evidence has hitherto been lacking to enable
prosecutions and other executive Government action to be taken to control the
problem in Australia.100

Despite the Raid, and despite Murphy’s insistence, ASIO’s assessment of Croatian
activism remained unchanged. Murphy knew this, but dismissed it in favour of
his narrative. After all, his was the burden of persuasion, not of proof.
Knowing that he did not hold sufficient evidence for even one charge against
a single Croatian that could be pursued in court, why did Murphy persist with
this particular Ministerial Statement? Perhaps Murphy believed that it was only a
matter of time before credible evidence, admissible in court, was found. Perhaps
both he and Whitlam were so consumed with securing their legacies that they
could not see the forest for the trees, and pressed on undeterred. Perhaps
Murphy had backed himself into a political corner because he had promised a
statement on Croatians that would refute the claims of his predecessor. To
provide a statement that claimed anything less would be first, a humiliating
admission that the last three years of ALP posturing on the issue were completely
misguided, and second, a concession of defeat only weeks into Murphy’s tenure
as Attorney-General, made all the more spectacular due to his unprecedented
100
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Raid on ASIO. The most likely answer, however, seems to be that Murphy sought
to replicate the success of Menzies by creating a moral panic of the ALP’s own,
that served both domestic and international objectives.
Cohen defines a moral panic as a period when ‘a condition, episode, person
or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and
interests.’101 Bratich makes a further distinction between moral panics and
conspiracy panics,
Conspiracy panics help to define the normal modes of dissent. Politically it is
predicated on a consensus ‘us’ over against a subversive and threatening ‘them’…
threat detection in a conspiracy panic is not focused on the visible (as in
behavioural conduct), but on the virtual [signs of danger].102

Murphy’s Ministerial Statement, as well as his explanations in the Senate
thereafter, displayed the characteristics of both. Cohen’s ‘Inventory’103 needed to
create a moral panic - Exaggeration, Distortion, Prediction and Symbolisation –
all featured in Murphy’s explanations. It was not the credible evidence of
individual or organisational engagement with terrorist activities that made
Croatians and Croatian organisations terrorist, but the possibility that they could,
as exhibited by their political activism. Murphy’s assurance that he would ‘cut out
the cancer of terrorism from our body politic,’104 not only demonstrated the
consensus ‘us’ (Australians) against the subversive ‘them’ (Croatians), but also
Murphy’s strategy to ‘problematise’, rather than incorporate, Croatian dissent.105
Moral panics are not just a method of identifying and labelling threats, but
are also a potent political tool, and ‘as conceptual devices they provide the
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underpinning for material practices.’106 Moral panics have been utilised many
times to justify or legitimise a government and its policies, and Murphy had
experienced first-hand the power a moral panic can wield. However, in order to
be a credible panic, Murphy needed his subject to pose a large enough threat –
real or imagined – to justify a change in government policy. ‘Ustasha’ violence or
terrorism, as these acts were hitherto described, was a limited threat. The Ustaša
label was only applicable to a handful of Croatian organisations, and an even
smaller number of Croatians who held onto an early post-war vision of Croatian
activism. This narrowness was in fact one of the reasons why Menzies could
argue in 1964 that there was nothing unique about the minor minority of
Croatians caught up in criminal acts that would justify a targeted or specialised
action against Croatians in general.
On the other hand, to have made right-wing extremism or politicallymotivated violence the subject of the statement would have made the threat too
broad or too great for the government to surmount. If Murphy’s Statement had
been about right-wing extremism in general, it could have been dismissed as just
another perpetuation of the ideological war between the political left and right.
This could have also alienated some of the centrist or right-leaning voters that
had voted for the ALP precisely due to their disaffection with the prolonged cold
war ideological battles of the preceding 23 years. Politically-motivated violence
was not the monopoly of the right, and was in fact more closely associated with
the political left from which Murphy hailed. To have attempted to manufacture a
moral panic over politically-motivated violence would have left Murphy open to
embarrassment and criticism due to his personal history and affiliations.
‘Croatian terrorism’, it seems, was the ideal political opportunity for Murphy.
The Croatian community was large enough to ascribe a potential threat to particularly with the surge of arrivals in 1970/1 - but small enough to seem a
manageable task. More pragmatically, the only way to make a connection
between those mentioned in his Statement was through their ‘Croatianness’.
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Most importantly, however, Croatians were simply an easy target due to their
status as an ‘Other’. Within Australian paradigms, Croatians were a migrant
‘Other’ with an uncomfortable relationship to the expectations of the Good
Australian Migrant. The fact that Croatians also originated from the Balkans only
added to their ‘Otherness’ - as Skrbiš points out, ‘the Balkans is the Other in the
popular Western imagery.’107 The baggage of the Balkan Brute and of the Good
Australian Migrant made Croatians an inherently suspicious group, whose
unrelenting activism made the possibility of a threat seem credible. That there
were individuals within Croatian organisations prepared to engage in violence
and criminal activity was sufficient proof that there was a problem with the
whole – Good Australian Migrants, after all, exist in the absolutes. However, like
the need for a moral panic to seem a manageable threat, the group being targeted
also needs to seem redeemable. The economic and cultural contributions of the
Croatian community, as well as its Catholicism and relatively ‘Western’ identity
compared to the rest of the Balkans, demonstrated that there was sufficient
‘good’ associated with Croatians to provide enough hope for change.
By making the subject ‘terrorism’, rather than violence or extremism, Murphy
sought to exploit the political advantages the label of terrorism resulted in. As
Hocking explains, the ability to determine when and how the label of terrorism is
deployed is a potent political weapon, not only in labelling enemies, but also in
what it then allows a government to do in response;
The use of the ambiguous and problematic central term ‘terrorism’ in itself
compounds the problems of an uncertain ‘counter-terrorism’ mandate ostensibly
enacted in its name. In particular, it allows for the ready adoption of extreme
measures that would otherwise be strongly resisted. The types of governmental
response advocated in order to counter both terrorism and the threat of
terrorism may in turn be disproportionate to the actual dangers presented by
incidents of political violence in quite different political and social contexts.108

Although the ALP had a majority in the House of Representatives, it did not have
control of the Senate. By framing these issues as ‘terrorism’, Murphy not placed
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counter-terrorism measures at the disposal of the Government, but also had in
effect backed the Opposition into a political corner. If the Opposition opposed
any measures, the Government was able to portray them as deliberately
hampering Labor’s reform agenda in order to protect terrorists. On the other
hand, if the Opposition supported any measures, it would essentially be
conceding Murphy’s point that they neither could nor would deal with Croatian
terrorism themselves when they were in power.
Without conclusive evidence, allegations of Croatian terrorism remain just
that. A Croatian has never been found guilty of a terrorist offence in Australia,
and the one exception, the case of the Croatian Six, seems to have been
orchestrated by Yugoslav intelligence. Evidence of Yugoslav subversion is a little
more forthcoming, however this too has been difficult to conclusively prove or
disprove. Insofar as the Coalition can be accused of underestimating or avoiding
the issue of Croatian extremism for the sake of their political agenda, so too can
the

ALP

be

accused

of

underestimating

or

avoiding

the

issue

of Yugoslav subversion for theirs. The consequences of both shortcomings have
been borne by the Croatian community alone - either beholden to the actions of
a minor extremist minority of Croatians that the Australian Government under
the Coalition could not or would not bring under their control, or beholden to an
elaborate plan of Yugoslav espionage that the Australian Government under the
ALP could not or would not bring under control. In either case, Croatians in
Australia were nothing more than an expendable pawn in the political posturing
and manoeuvring of the major parties in their search for power.
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4.2. CROATIANS RESPOND
If he has any proof, let him take it to the courts... Let him bring the case to justice.
But he has made these allegations without any proof.
That is shocking for an Attorney-General to do.109
We are 13,000 miles away from Croatia.
Senator Murphy is 30,000 miles away from the facts.110

The initial response of the Croatian community to Murphy’s allegations was
predictable. Community leaders unequivocally denied the existence of organised
Croatian terrorism, while those individuals and organisations that Murphy had
named in his Statement challenged him to take his allegations to the courts.
Counter-allegations of Yugoslav espionage were asserted, and leaders urged the
community not to react to the provocations.111 As a show of strength and to
demonstrate the nature of Croatians and their activism, on 8 April, a 5000-strong
crowd packed the Hordern Pavilion in Sydney for 10. Travanj celebrations.
Representatives

from

various

ethnic

communities,

as

well

as

NSW

parliamentarian and founding President of the NSW Captive Nations Council,
Douglas Darby, participated in this affirmation of Croatian identity, culture, and
activism through word, song, and dance.112
Though the actions of Murphy tarnished the community with a reputation it
is still yet to shake, it did provide Croatians their first opportunity to engage with
Australian political processes in the form of the Senate Select Committee on the
Civil Rights of Migrant Australians, established on 17 May 1973. Though the
double dissolution in 1974 and Dismissal in 1975 prevented the committee from
ever producing a final report, participation in this process had a profound effect
on the nature and approach of Croatian political activism. It entrenched the
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change from political rhetoric to questions of ethno-national identity that had
begun with the second wave of post-war Croatian migration in the 1960s by
providing the community with a new framework of ideas and rhetoric through
which to express their activism – the rhetoric of civil rights. This was reinforced
with the introduction of multicultural policy, which stressed ethnicity over
nationality, and allowed Croatians to advocate on the basis of their ethnic
identity, rather than place of citizenship. Multiculturalism also influenced the
practicalities of Croatian political activism. Not only did it provide a greater
opportunity for Croatians to express their identity and activism, but also enabled
the community to cultivate a reputation that countered the problematic one the
Whitlam Government had assigned it. This newfound framework of rights and
responsibilities, ethnic identity and multiculturalism converged in the
establishment of the Croatian ‘Embassy’ in 1977, which actively sought to
manipulate Australia’s legal and political processes in order to legitimise Croatian
political activism.

4.2.1. THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON THE

CIVIL RIGHTS

OF

MIGRANT AUSTRALIANS
In the very early hours of 1 April, a mere four days after Murphy’s Ministerial
Statement, a combined force of Commonwealth and State Police raided
approximately 80 Croatian premises in Sydney and Wollongong, rousing
unsuspecting men, women, and children from their sleep, and reportedly in some
cases, failing to produce warrants.113 Though it was unclear whether these raids
were as a result of Murphy’s Statement, the timing of them only added to the
swirling discontent over Murphy’s handling of the ‘Croatian affair’. Though nine
individuals were charged as a result of the raids, these were only for minor
offences, and produced nothing more than would be expected from a random
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sample of 80 households. Despite the large amount of confiscations, particularly
of publications and documents, the raids did not yield any evidence to support
Murphy’s allegations of Croatian terrorism or help prosecute just one Croatian
for a single terrorist act.114 On the very same day, approximately 300 Croatians
gathered in Canberra to establish a Croatian Civil Rights Committee in order to
gather funds for the legal defence of any Croatians who may face deportation as a
result of Murphy’s actions. Interestingly, this committee was initiated by a nonCroatian, Leslie (Les) Shaw, a regular book review contributor for The Canberra
Times and CSIRO employee, who would become a prominent advocate and
spokesperson for the Croatian community. In light of the news about the NSW
police raids, the establishment of this committee proved a shrewd move.
However the events that would transpire in the coming weeks would elevate the
importance of the Committee to a national level.
On 3 April, Murphy disclosed to the Senate that one of the catalysts for his
Raid on ASIO was the discovery of an Interdepartmental Committee meeting
report, which he believed indicated that ‘the decision reported to have been
taken at that meeting was inconsistent with the democratic process and
inconsistent with responsible government.’115 The report intimated, at least to
Murphy, that public servants may have been withholding information from the
Government about Croatian terrorism. This was eclipsed on 4 April, when
Greenwood delivered his devastating Shadow Ministerial Statement. Such was
Greenwood’s success in dismantling Murphy’s Statement, the Sydney Morning
Herald remarked that
There must be many people beginning to conclude that the Attorney-General has
been – not to put too fine a point on it – making fools of himself and his
Government and misusing Parliament to try to fool the Australian people.116

On the 5 April, Murphy suffered an enormous blow to his reputation in both
houses. In the Senate, debates reached fever pitch, and Murphy faced the
humiliation of a no-confidence motion in him passing. Adding insult to injury, on
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the same day in the House of Representatives, Whitlam declared that after proper
administrative enquiries into the report that allegedly vindicated Murphy’s Raid,
it was found to be an accidental ‘wrong report of what was said.’117 This admission
from Whitlam insinuated first, that Murphy had not undertaken ‘proper’
administrative enquires in response to the report, and second that the entire
melodrama of the Raid could have been avoided if he had just taken this simple
step.
On 10 April, the Opposition attempted to establish a judicial inquiry into the
legality of Murphy’s actions and the veracity of his allegations of Croatian
terrorism. Not only did Whitlam’s Government defeat this motion, but it
effectively gagged debate on the issue in the House of Representatives.118 This
triumph, however, was short-lived as only two days later on 12 April, Belgrade
announced that three Australian citizens captured in the 1972 incursion had been
executed by firing squad. This was carried out without any prior notification of
the Australian Government, who had in fact been told at the time of the
incursion that all nine Australian citizens involved had been killed.119 Even more
disturbing was the fact that the men had reportedly been executed only three
days before Bijedić’s arrival. Bijedić did not mention this matter during his
visit.120
The ill-conceived execution of the 1 April raids, the comedy of errors that
beleaguered Murphy in his attempt to vindicate his Raid on ASIO, the execution
of three Australian citizens without the Government’s knowledge by a supposed
friendly government they had paraded around the country less than a month
before, all steeped in an almost hysteria about possible deportations, abuses of
parliamentary privilege, and potential ramifications for Australia’s migrant
communities, resulted in the perception that Murphy was over-reaching in his
position, the Whitlam government was too inexperienced and undisciplined to
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govern, and that they were violating the rights of Croatians in the process.121 After
a failed attempt in the previous week, on 17 May the Senate Select Committee on
the Civil Rights of Migrant Australians was established. Comprising of seven
Senators – three from the government, three from the opposition parties, and one
independent, the committee was tasked to enquire and report on four matters;
whether the civil rights of migrant Australians have been infringed; whether
members of migrant communities have experienced intimidation or undue
pressure from foreign governments and/or their secret police; the circumstances
of Murphy’s Raid on ASIO; and any issues created by the dual nationalities of
migrants. Though these investigations were also to include other migrant
communities, the Croatian community was to become the central focus of the
committee.
The establishment of the Senate Select Committee, therefore, prompted the
Croatian Civil Rights Committee established on 01 April to evolve into a national
organisation. Renamed the National Croatian Civil Rights Committee (NCCRC),
its main role now was to ‘prepare a submission and represent the Croatian
community at the [Senate Select Committee] as the official voice of the Croatian
diaspora community in the media.’122 As though flexing its muscle memory and
replicating the organisational skills of the first wave of post-war Croatian
migrants, the NCCRC quickly established sub-branches in all major cities across
Australia and began the onerous task of documenting incidents of discrimination
and grievances perpetrated by both Australian and Yugoslav authorities, and the
effect of Murphy’s actions on the community.123
The first hearing of the Senate Select Committee was held in Melbourne on
19 July, and continued until November, with hearings also held in Canberra and
Sydney. Submissions were sought in regards to the four matters, and even
Barbour himself testified before the Committee on 08 August, attracting
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significant attention as it was the first time the head of ASIO had ever been called
upon to publically answer questions.124 One of the unforeseen consequences of
Murphy’s actions and allegations, however, was that it gave the community a
common goal which helped overcome the factionalism that had characterised the
community in the first two decades of post-war settlement;
It seems the more that Murphy, the police and the media attacked the Croatians,
the more united they became and in the end the NCCRC had the full support of
the Croatian community.125

The NCCRC presented ‘a homogenised view of the Croatian diaspora in defence
of the community and presenting their facts to the [Senate Select Committee]
and the Australian public.’126 This was the first time the community had
organised to actively engage in a dialogue with Australian political and media
institutions as a community, rather than under the auspices of various
organisations and their leaders, and would come to have an important impact on
future community organisation.
As with the debates of 1963/4, Croatian political activism faded from the
national spotlight as domestic political concerns took priority and curtailed
debate. The practicalities of governance were always going to be an issue for the
Whitlam Government as it had to contend with a hostile Senate controlled by a
Coalition majority. By early 1974, the Senate had rejected nineteen government
bills, including ten of them twice, and in early April, Whitlam attempted to
politically manoeuvre an upcoming half-Senate election in his favour, resulting in
the ‘Gair Affair.’ On 10 April 1974, these issues came to a head when Whitlam
announced that the Governor-General had agreed to a double dissolution,127 and
on 11 April, parliament was dissolved.
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The double dissolution effectively ended the Senate Select Committee before
a final report could be produced. Two weeks before the 1974 election, however, a
draft report was leaked and published by The Bulletin, which vindicated the
Croatian community, condemned Murphy’s Statement and actions as a violation
of the civil rights of Croatians, and inferred that the intimidation of the Croatian
community seemed to be the real purpose for these events.128 Though this meant
that the work that had been put into the preparation of submissions by the
NCCRC and the community did not result in the official recognition and redress
it might have had a final report been presented to the Senate, the participation of
the community in this process was to have a lasting influence on its activism.
First and foremost, the Senate Select Committee legitimised Croatian
activism in a way that had not been previously forthcoming. That Croatians were
invited to contribute, rather than speaking of their own initiative, was important
as it gave an amount of gravitas (however small) to the assertions of Croatians. It
also provided a legitimate public forum through which Croatians could enter into
the public record explanations of their activism and their grievances, both longstanding and as a result of Murphy’s actions. Second, it provided an opportunity
for the community to generate knowledge of and experience in the navigation of
Australian political processes. This experience would come to help the
community tailor their future activism. Third, it highlighted the advantage of
professionalism and collaboration outside of the community in developing its
activism – as Batarelo notes, without the professionalism of Shaw, it is
‘questionable to what extent the Croatian diaspora could have been properly
presented at the hearings.’129
These three developments all culminated in the fourth, and most important,
influence of the Senate Select Committee – the replacement of the outdated
rhetoric of anti-communism and political self-determination that had defined
activism in the previous period with the rhetoric of civil rights. This change had
both internal and external implications. Though the abandonment of political
128
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rhetoric had begun with the arrival of the second wave of post-war Croatian
migrants, a consensus had not yet developed on what or how this rhetoric could
or should be replaced. The rhetoric of rights encoded in the purpose of the
Senate Select Committee provided a useful alternative, which allowed Croatians
to sidestep the factionalism and antagonism that had resulted from the diversity
of political views. That this rhetoric of rights was framed by their status as
Australian citizens also helped unify the community through their common
experience of life in Australia and negotiation of identity within Australian
society.
This internal change made Croatian activism more understandable and
accessible to a wider Australian audience that had become well-versed in this
rhetoric, not least because the Whitlam government had fashioned itself as the
party of civil rights and liberties. More importantly, however, this change made
Croatian activism sit more easily with the framework of the Good Australian
Migrant. First it depoliticised the activism itself by changing the focus from
political statehood to identity recognition, reducing the perception that
Croatians were ‘too political’. Second, it framed Croatians as Australian citizens,
rather than by their Yugoslav citizenship. Finally, it changed the focus of the
activism from what was happening in Yugoslavia to what was happening in
Australia, weakening the accusation that Croatians were importing their
problems from ‘over there.’ The introduction of multicultural policy only
reinforced this change, as it legitimised the migrant presence in general and
relaxed the assimilationist expectations of the Good Australian Migrant.

4.2.2. CROATIAN POLITICAL ACTIVISM UNDER MULTICULTURALISM
Multiculturalism afforded a wealth of opportunity for Croatian migrants and
their activism. That multiculturalism stressed ethnicity over nationality meant
that Croatians were able to legitimately advocate based on their ethnic identity as
Croatians while bypassing issues raised by their Yugoslav citizenship. The
231

emphasis multiculturalism placed on cultural expression provided Croatians with
more frequent opportunities to express their identity, even if these opportunities
remained relatively within the Good Australian Migrant confines of Faith,
Folklore, and Football. Though multiculturalism seemed to depoliticise Croatian
activism within Australian paradigms, the interrelatedness of the cultural and
political in Croatian activism meant that rather than eliminating the role of the
political, Croatians simply resumed the traditional patterns and practices of
Croatian nationalism by advocating for identity recognition through campaigns
for access to services and participating in cultural events as Croatians, rather than
Yugoslavs. This included that most Croatian of proxy battlegrounds - language
recognition. The legitimate space multiculturalism opened up for Croatian
activism allowed the community to cultivate an image and reputation of Good
Australian

Migrant-ness

that

highlighted

the

economic

and

cultural

contributions of the community, and also countered the problematic reputation
the Whitlam Government had ascribed to it.
For the most part, Croatian activism in the 1970s simply replicated the
general patterns of the previous two decades. Participation in the processions,
congresses, and ‘international’ masses of the Catholic Church, in community
events, festivals, and exhibitions, and through the local soccer club, constituted
the main activities of the Croatian community. Where the change occurred,
however, was in size, scope, and frequency – the community of the 1970s was
larger, the scope of its public profile greater, and the activism more frequent
through the proliferation of government initiatives and ‘multicultural’ activities
at the local, state, and national levels. Though the political element of Croatian
activism remained – such as the stalwarts of 10 Travanj celebrations and 29
November Yugoslav Day demonstrations – the greater part of Croatian activism
was geared towards the recognition of Croatian identity in Australia as separate
from a Yugoslav identity.
This activism was bolstered by the development of the community itself. The
numerical growth of the community caused a corresponding increase in the
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demand for resources and physical space. Existing clubs and associations
renovated, moved premises, or built new clubhouses to accommodate an
expanding membership, while newer clubs sought out premises of their own.
This process of redevelopment and renewal was made easier by increasing access
to financial capital, whether from new members, earlier migrants who were
financially well-established by the 1970s, or from government grants and funding
flowing from multicultural policy. The need to co-ordinate the activities of clubs
and associations saw the rise of intergroup associations – whether because of
their growing number, easier access to multicultural initiatives, or out of a
recognition stemming from the Senate Select Committee that more could be
achieved through unification and coordination.130
The proxy battle of language recognition was fought on a three-fold front –
radio programming, ethnic language schools, and interpreter/translation services.
Though all three were heralded as tangible expressions of inclusion under
multicultural policy, each was an experience of marginalisation for the Croatian
community. Even though the precursors to what would become SBS radio
ostensibly included a ‘Croatian’ or ‘Serbo-Croat’ program, these were for the most
part controlled by the Yugoslav community. Croatian ethnic schools were
required to teach from a ‘Serbo-Croat’ syllabus set by the Yugoslav community if
they were to be formally recognised or accredited, while interpreter/translation
services were limited to either ‘Yugoslav’ or ‘Serbo-Croat’ interpreters, and
accessing these services meant dealing with a non-Croatian translator, often at
times of significant personal and private vulnerability. Activism therefore centred
on the notion that Croatians were an ethnic group separate from Yugoslavs, and
was therefore entitled to access to services in its own language and from its own
people, and to organise content and delivery based on its own culture and issues
relevant to its community, not one set by a Yugoslav agenda. The official
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recognition of Croatian as a separate language by the Australian Government in
1979 was therefore a major milestone in the activism of the community, and one
which had important social consequences. As Drapac explains,
The sense of inclusion this gave Croatians drew them into the social fabric,
whereas previously official exclusion left many who were in need of these services
outside the mainstream and without representation.131

Croatian political activism throughout the 1970s was also characterised by a
level of self-awareness and attempt to ‘manage’ the perception of its activism that
had not been as overt in the previous two decades. Croatians modified their
activism as opportunities or difficulties arose, with a view to present the
community in the best possible light and minimise the prospect of negative
publicity. The experience of Croatians under the Whitlam Government made it
clear to the community that the perception of its activism in Australian society
could have serious consequences on the everyday life of Croatians, and therefore
the importance of managing this perception.
Armed with a new political program arising from the ideas and rhetoric of
the Croatian Spring and from their experience with the Senate Select Committee,
the community was careful not to squander any goodwill that was extended
towards it. For example, like the demonstration that was cancelled during the
Bijedić visit in 1973, Croatians cancelled their Yugoslav National Day protests in
Canberra in 1975 due to the politically fraught atmosphere that had pervaded due
to Whitlam’s Dismissal and the election campaign that followed. As Lovokovic
writes, any protest or demonstration was cancelled ‘so that opponents couldn’t
exploit the protest of Croatians for their own corrupt intentions.’132 Similarly,
when Red Star Belgrade travelled to Australia in 1977 for an international friendly
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with the Australian side, a flyer was distributed throughout the community
imploring Croatians to avoid attending any games.133
Multiculturalism not only provided the community with more opportunities
to disseminate their activism and demonstrate their ethnic identity, but also an
avenue to build on any goodwill and cultivate a reputation of Good Australian
Migrant-ness through their contributions of faith, folklore, and football. As Hay
writes of his involvement with soccer in Geelong in the late 1970s,
[The] litany of criticism aimed at the Croatian club struck me as excessive and,
increasingly, at variance with my experiences. Certainly Croatians played hard to
win… Off the field the Croatians were marvellous company, friendly, passionate
and interesting people, although the youngsters could be rude, offensive,
chauvinistic, prepared to cheat and violent on occasion.134

This ‘personal experience’ of Croatians and their activism through the paradigms
of the Good Australian Migrant helped to counter the reputation for extremism
and violence the Whitlam Government had ascribed to the community. Drapac
summarises the importance of this turn to multiculturalism by Croatians,
The reality of the situation meant that the media and government-manufactured
Croatian ‘type’ was no longer sustainable because it was not rooted in the lived
experience of Croats in Australia, or indeed the lived experience of Australians
who came into contact with Croatian people. Croats did not exist in a vacuum
nor were they simply reactive. They were contesting a negative and onedimensional interpretation of their identity and positing another in its place. At
times, this led to a certain defensiveness on their part. On the whole, however,
their reaction to the slurs against them led Croats (collectively) to be more
outward looking: their behaviour was less ‘conspiratorial’ and ‘nostalgic’ than it
was flexible, forward looking and adaptable.135

Though initial attempts to manage the perception of the community and its
activism may have been more an unintentional consequence of the internal
changes within Croatian activism, an explicitly deliberate act of ‘perception
management’ was to form the basis of one of the most memorable turns of
Croatian activism in Australia – the Croatian ‘Embassy’ of 1977-1979
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4.2.3. THE CROATIAN EMBASSY, 1977-79
On 5 April 1978, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock, rose to
deliver his Ministerial Statement on the ‘Croatian Embassy’ established in
Canberra on 29 November 1977.136 This was the third statement to the Australian
Parliament involving Croatians in the space of five years. However, the tone and
reception of this Statement was markedly different from those that had come
before it. The ideological and historical deliberations that had coloured previous
statements were muted in favour of a focus on the practical, diplomatic
implications the ‘Embassy’ posed for the Australian Government. Government
concern was not with Croatian activism in general, but with the practice of using
diplomatic language as a form of protest. For the Government, Peacock
explained, the ‘Embassy’ was problematic because it ‘[impeded] the correct and
orderly conduct of Australia’s international relations.’137 The Government was
therefore
deeply concerned lest other minority groups may be inspired by the continued
existence of the self-styled Croatian Embassy to believe that they, too, may
similarly interfere in and jeopardise Australia’s relations with sovereign states.

Because the Government had found that existing legislation could only impose a
slight constraint to ‘Embassy’ operations, Peacock advised that new legislation
would be introduced that would prevent the false representation of diplomatic,
consular or other official missions.
Perhaps most uncharacteristically, the statement was met with bipartisan
support, even if, as the Leader of the Opposition Bill Hayden remarked, ‘it must
be conceded that the action comes belatedly and grudgingly.’138 The most obvious
reason for this bipartisanship was the diplomatic embarrassment the technical
legality of the ‘Embassy’ had caused the Australian Government, and the strained
relationship that had developed between Australia and Yugoslavia as a result. The
Yugoslav Government demanded nothing less than the immediate closure of the
See Appendix 1D for a copy of the full Ministerial Statement.
Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, No.HR.14, 1978, 994.
138
ibid., 995.
136
137

236

‘Embassy’. Despite Australia’s explanation that there were complex legal and
political issues involved, the Australian Government was accused of a lack of
‘political will to find a solution satisfactory to Yugoslavia.’139 As one public servant
explained, ‘it is clear that [Yugoslavia’s] concept of effective action and the speed
with which it can be taken is much different from ours.’140
The Croatian ‘Embassy’ was a unique moment in Australian history because it
was the first embassy of its kind to be seen in Australia,141 the first Croatian
activism of its type throughout the world, and because it resulted in the
legislation that continues to shape Australia’s diplomatic relations to the present
day. The historical significance of the ‘Embassy’, however, lay more in its purpose
than in its outcome. The establishment of the Croatian ‘Embassy’ can be
understood as an expression of the knowledge and experience the Croatian
community had accumulated through its activism. It was a considered and coordinated attempt by a group of Croatians to address and redress the ‘Othering’
of their community and the problematisation of its activism that had occurred
under Murphy and the Whitlam Government. This was achieved through four
key approaches – the use of a mode of dissent and protest familiar to the
Australian political environment; the emphasis of the legality of the ‘Embassy’, as
well as its basis on Australian citizenship; the framing of the ‘Embassy’ as a
symbol of a unified Croatian ‘voice’; and the presentation of Croatian activism
through multicultural ideals in order to disassociate it from its political and
problematic past.
The most obvious source of inspiration for the ‘Embassy’ can be found in the
Aboriginal Tent Embassy.142 Dešpoja, who had been a senior research officer for
NAA: A1838, 1490/5/51/1, PART 2, Inward Cablegram, ‘Relations with Yugoslavia’, 27 January 1978.
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the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, and a friend of Charles Perkins, readily
admitted that this was the inspiration for the ‘Embassy’.143 The ‘Embassy’
exploited the political language of diplomacy to portray the failure of the
Yugoslav Government to represent Croatia, Croatians and their interests, in the
same way the Aboriginal Tent Embassy drew on the political language of
diplomacy to
cogently [portray] the failure of white governments to respond to Aboriginal
demands. At its most basic, as one participant put it, the Embassy dramatised the
truth that ‘foreigners had more representation than us’.144

The use of the title of ‘embassy’ was deliberate and intended to provoke, as was
the opening date itself - 29 November was Yugoslavia’s National Day. As Dešpoja
reportedly claimed to a Commonwealth Police Officer on 6 December 1977, ‘we
are only interested in making some political gesture, something political against
Yugoslavia… Who knows it’s just to embarrass the opposition.’145 In the case of
both embassies, the symbolism of place and space had as much of a role to play
in its activism as did language. For the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, its position on
the lawns of Old Parliament House was both highly provocative and a stark
political statement about the position of Indigenous people in Australian society;
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To stand on the road, with the big White building behind, and the small Black
encampment in front, is to stand in a tense middle ground between two worlds of
mutual incomprehension.146

The address of the Croatian ‘Embassy’, 34 Canberra Ave, also had political
symbolism. It was situated two kilometres from Parliament House (now Old
Parliament House), a few hundred metres from the Soviet Embassy, whose
alleged support of Croat separatism was a cause of worldwide concern, and in the
suburb known to be the home of diplomats and legitimate embassies.
The Croatian ‘Embassy’ however, was not familiar to the Australian political
environment simply because it emulated the Aboriginal Tent Embassy. Rather,
Croatians were engaging in a form of activism that had heavily influenced the
protest movements of the previous decade in Australia - that of ‘disruptive
staging’ as proposed by Scalmer in his exploration of collective action in
Australia.147 Disruptive staging is a political performance, where activists create
‘stages’ out of public places (or make private places public) from which ‘actors’
can make claims on others. This staging is intended to be disruptive, either by
involving a deliberate illegality, drawing a negative reaction from the state
(usually police), or preventing the routine use of a particular space by other
actors. Disruptive staging is also a performance of contestation, where claimants
‘make their demands in the direct presence of their personal or institutional
objects.’148 Essential to this form of activism is the theatrical;
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[Activists] present themselves as if on stage, keen that we will comprehend not
only their actions but their beliefs, motives, identities. We do not merely learn
that they oppose the Vietnam War or support Aboriginal land rights, we also
know why that may be so, and what may motivate them… Props and preparation
are used in order to make the performance more convincing… There is, equally, a
concern with symbolism...149

Finally, media attention is important to the action of disruptive staging, as the
target audience of the activism is not those that will physically bear witness, but
those who will learn about it in the media.150
In the case of the Croatian ‘Embassy’, the stage was a humble rental in a
Canberra suburb, disrupting not only the routine use of that rental, but also the
routine use of the political language of diplomacy and causing an international
embarrassment for the state. The props of language, insignia, titles and flags were
employed to make the performance more convincing, and through the actors
‘playing’ the Charge d’Affaires and Secretary, Australians learned why Croatians
had been advocating for independence for so long. By setting up an embassy,
instead of a community or information centre, the activists were creating a
performance of contestation, mobilising a physical proxy to counter the Yugoslav
Embassy (and by extension the Yugoslav Government) and contest its claim of
representing the Croatian community. The ‘Embassy’ therefore existed as a
sustained physical protest against the legitimacy of the Yugoslav state in a way
which drew on the Australian experience of protest to provide a point of
reference from which Croatian dissent could become familiarised and
understood.
If the establishment of a quasi-embassy was a means to contextualise and
familiarise Croatian activism within the Australian political environment, the
emphasis on the legality of the ‘Embassy’ and its function as an expression of
Australian citizenship was an attempt to redress Murphy’s problematisation of
Croatian dissent. Indeed, the entire idea of the ‘Embassy’ was an almost
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Machiavellian exercise in rebranding Croatian activism. As Čizmić states, from
the outset the organisers were
playing the ‘legal’ card right until the end. They knew that the Embassy would
eventually be closed, but they wanted to turn its closing into a ‘Croatian win’.
They wanted to show that Croatians were not terrorists, but that they obeyed
Australia’s laws, and if the appropriate courts rule for its closure, they need to be
respected.151

This emphasis on legality and portrayal of Croatians as law-abiding citizens was
closely related to the emphasis of the nonviolent nature of the ‘Embassy’, with
Dešpoja frequently denunciating violent methods of protest as unacceptable.152
Along with emphasising the legality of the ‘Embassy’ and the law-abidance of
Croatians, ‘Embassy’ activists addressed the problematisation of Croatian dissent
by emphasising that Croatians were simply exercising their right to protest just
like any other group in Australia with a grievance;
[The embassy] is only possible because Australia is a free country. This is possible
only because in Australia the fact that I am a Croat, and that I believe Croatia has
the right to be free, and that I say so – even though to say so may embarrass
someone - is not regarded as sufficient cause to gag me, or to tie me up, or to
throw me into prison.153

The ‘Embassy’ was therefore a performance of the Australian citizenship as much
as it was a protest against Yugoslav citizenship. It was because they were
Australian citizens, rather than despite it, that the community was able to
advocate for their cause, even if for some, such as Senator O’Byrne, ‘the Croat
people are prostituting this great privilege.’154
Emulating the successes of the NCCRC and the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, the
Croatian ‘Embassy’ sought to control the representation of the community by
establishing a focal voice that could speak on the community’s behalf. It gave the
fractured and ad-hoc nature of Croatian activism continuity and cohesiveness
through its form as a sustained protest, not confined to any one community,
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organisation, or political creed. This conferred the ‘Embassy’ with a moral
authority and ability to control which activisms, organisations, and associations
were considered legitimate, and more importantly, which were not. In much the
same way as post-war Croatian organisations, the ‘Embassy’ became an arbiter of
the collective identity through its ability to bestow and withdraw ‘official’
support. The Charge d’Affaires was most prominent as a guest of honour at
various functions within the community, the host of various meetings of heads of
organisations, as well as the face of the community to the ‘outside’, mainly
through newspaper and television reportage, but also as a guest speaker to nonCroatian functions.155 The ‘Embassy’ itself also became a place of protest and
demonstration.156
Because of this status as the arbiter of collective identity, ‘Embassy’ activists
attempted to disassociate Croatian activism from its highly politicised past, as
much for the community itself as for those outside of it. Like the Senate Select
Committee and activism under multiculturalism, the endorsements and
proclamations of Dešpoja as the Charge d’Affaires helped entrench the change in
Croatian activism from the rhetoric of direct action against Yugoslavia to a
symbolic protest based on the socio-cultural identity of Croatians. The regular
‘Embassy’ column in Spremnost emphasised that the symbolic could be just as
powerful, for example, reiterating that;
with one simple on-going protest… within the law – without risking any lives or
damaging any government property – the embassy delivered a large political blow
to Yugoslavia.157

Dešpoja frequently asserted that the ‘Embassy’ did not support any particular
political belief or system of government, and even went so far as to argue that
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Croatians were not necessarily against the existence of Yugoslavia, just that ‘we
don’t want our country to be a part of theirs.’158
There was also recognition that Croatian nationalism needed to be rebranded
in order to remove the stigma of it as the province of old men, nostalgic for a
fascist state that could have been. This was best reflected in the choice of a
Charge d’Affaires. From its very establishment, the organisers of the Croatian
Embassy were
aware that [the Charge d’Affaires] needed to be an individual that spoke English
fluently and had a good understanding of Australia’s socio-political
environment… it is not desirable for the person to be someone who during the
Second World War had anything to do with the political life of the Independent
State of Croatia, as pro-Yugoslav migrants will use that relentlessly to discredit
the Croatian embassy.159

They found this person in Dešpoja, who was not only all of these things, but also
a university-educated former public servant of the Australian Government, and a
young 39 years old. Alongside age and education, gender was also an important
tool used to diversify and ‘soften’ the image of Croatian nationalism. This was
also embodied in the appointed secretary and aide to the Charge d’Affaires, 21yr
old Dinka Sidić, who was depicted as the epitome of the young professional 1970s
woman. In 1979, she was promoted to Charge d’Affaires in August 1979 when
Dešpoja could no longer perform the role.160 These markers of youth, education,
and gender all referenced the ‘new nationalism’ and post-Cold War era the
Whitlam Government was perceived as having ushered in.161
The ‘Embassy’ also capitalised on the opportunities multiculturalism had
extended in order to rebrand Croatian activism. The precedence of ethnic
identity over nationality was invoked to argue the case for Croatian ethnic
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separateness, rather than the complicated history of the Balkans and Croatian
statehood. The multicultural symbols of faith, folklore, and football continued to
be the main sites of Croatian activism, in what can be described as an exercise in
positive public relations. The involvement of the ‘Embassy’ in the promotion of
the relatively unintimidating issue of Croatia’s distinctive cultural and linguistic
traditions through the proxy battles of radio programming, ethnic schooling, and
translation services also gave the ‘Embassy’ tangible objectives, even if they were
not directly articulated until it was faced with closure.162
These attempts at re-branding Croatians and their activism were reflective of
a wider recognition of the necessity to enter into a conversation with the
Australian public, to explain why they undertook the activism that they did, in
ways that made that activism familiar and easily understood. This deliberate
attempt at ‘perception management’ resulted in what Dešpoja described as one of
the earliest and biggest successes of the ‘Embassy’;
Croatians are this time the SUBJECT and not the OBJECT of discussions
surrounding the Croatian question. Croatians started this debate. And the
development and outcome of this unique dialogue relies heavily on them.163

Through the ‘Embassy’, the Croatian community was finally being spoken with,
rather than just about, an active participant, rather than a passive observer, in the
Australian political environment.

The aims of the ‘Embassy’ were officially recorded in Hansard in a notice of motion by Bruce
Goodluck on 5 June 1979. These aims included the formal recognition that the Croatian people are a
distinctive ethnic group and not “Yugoslavs”; that the Croatian language was a distinct modern
language; that this recognition enable the community to have their own ethnic broadcasts in the
Croatian language; that Government departments and other institutions for interpreters, social and
welfare workers, other liaison officers and other assistance be made available in the Croatian language
and through Croatians; and to obtain Government support for the review of government and
administrative discrimination in matters of citizenship, employment and passports; and the Government
should recognise the genuine aims and grievances of the Croatian community.
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4.3. PARADIGMS SHIFT AGAIN
This was the origin of the pungent epithet for Vietnamese refugees, Yellow Croats; in
one phrase, the sum of all these fears.164

Two events in the late 1970s threatened to undo much of the re-branding of
Croatian activism that the ‘Embassy’, the NCCRC, and the community as a whole,
had engaged in throughout the decade. On 02 September 1978, Commonwealth
Police arrested 19 Croatian men after raiding what appeared to be a military
training camp near Eden. Just five months later, on 09 February 1979, NSW police
announced that it had arrested six Croatian men on charges of conspiracy to
bomb various public buildings. These arrests reverberated throughout the
Croatian community, not only out of fear the political atmosphere of the
Whitlam Government would return, but also because the involvement of
Yugoslav agents provocateurs were suspected. At least in the case of the ‘Croatian
Six’, this would eventually be proven a well-founded fear.
Though both events seemed to vindicate Murphy’s original allegations of
Croatian terrorism, there was little of the public or political outcry that had
accompanied such news at the start of the decade. This may have been because
both arrests were on the grounds of conspiracy, rather than after a crime had
been perpetrated, and therefore were not as visceral or as tangible a crime as the
bombings of the early 1970s had been. This nature also constrained any political
or media commentary in the name of due process and the presumption of
innocence. It may have also been an indication that Croatians had somewhat
succeeded in disassociating their activism from extremism and terrorism.
However the more likely reason can be found in Australia’s preoccupation with
the humanitarian issues raised by the end of the Vietnam War and the outbreak
of the Lebanese Civil War that led to the institutionalisation of non-European
immigration in 1979.
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4.3.1. MURPHY’S VINDICATION?
On 2 September 1978, Commonwealth Police arrested 19 Croatian men after
raiding what appeared to be a military training camp in thick bushland outside of
Eden. At the time of the arrests, the men were dressed in uniforms of jungle
greens, black berets with a red-and-white checked badge, and net masks over
their faces. A large cache of weapons and detonators were found, and curiously,
several rolls of film which the men maintained proved they were simply making a
film. Police, however, believed they had found one of the secret ‘training camps’
of an underground Croatian army that had been the subject of rumours since
Croatians first rose to national prominence in 1963. The day after,
Commonwealth police searched a number of homes in Sydney and Canberra,
seizing large quantities of documents that seemed to confirm the men had been
preparing for another military incursion into Yugoslavia.165 Almost two years
later, eight men would be convicted of training others for the purpose of entering
a foreign country with intent to engage in hostile activities, while another five
were charged with allowing themselves to be trained.166
Front page media coverage was limited to the initial days after the arrests,
with follow-up articles relegated to cursory reporting of court proceedings, as
would normally be the case. In Parliament, the matter was only raised twice - by
Harry Jenkins in the House of Representatives and only in order to denunciate
media reports of Macedonian involvement, and by Gietzelt in the Senate, who did
attempt to link the arrests as vindication of Murphy’s 1973 allegations, but whose
question to the Government was dismissed as it would be ‘totally improper and,
indeed, deplorable, if I [Attorney-General Peter Durack] were to make any
statements implicating or implying in any way the guilt of the people in those
proceedings…’167 However, before committal hearings for the Eden arrests could
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even begin, the ‘Croatian Six’ (as they would become known) had been
arrested.168 Media coverage followed the same pattern as the Eden arrests, so that
by the time the guilty verdict was handed down on 18 February 1981, the men
were described as ‘Yugoslavs’ who were ‘accused Croatian nationalists.’169
For the Croatian community, both cases whiffed of Yugoslav intelligence.
Croatian responses to the Eden arrests varied. Some alleged outright that the
camp was a Yugoslav set up. Some asserted that even if they were not, these men
were deluded in thinking they could liberate Croatia by mounting any sort of
activity from Australia, particularly after the purges of the Croatian Spring in 1971.
Others simply denounced any connection between these men and the wider
community, while others still expressed incredulity at the circumstances. Few
even repeated the claims of the men themselves that they were simply making a
film.170 The potential involvement of Yugoslav intelligence in the case of the
Croatian Six was even recognised by ASIO at the time of the arrests. Blaxland
reveals that ASIO had long held the suspicion that Yugoslav agents were active in
Australia, had penetrated Croatian organisations, and were even believed it
responsible for some of the violence attributed to Croatians.171 By 1978, ASIO had
assessed that approximately one third of Yugoslav representatives in Australia
were in some way connected to Yugoslav intelligence, and had appeared to have
even prevented the assassination of a Croatian.172
Suspicion centred on Vico Virkez, who had originally turned himself in to the
Lithgow Police and ‘confessed’ about the bomb conspiracy. ASIO had long
suspected Virkez of being an intelligence official working with the Yugoslav
Consulate in Sydney. In fact, just mere hours before he walked into Lithgow
Police Station on the 08 February, ASIO had intercepted a phone call from Virkez
‘Bomb plot against Serbians alleged’, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 February 1979, 1.
‘Men planned bomb protests, court told’, Canberra Times, 10 February 1979, 1.
169
‘Six Yugoslavs jailed for 15 years’, Canberra Times, 18 February 1981, 14.
170
See: P. Quiddington, ‘Police search Croat homes’ Canberra Times, 3 September 1978, 1.
‘Mixed reaction by Croats to police raid’, The Age, 4 September 1978, 5.
P. Molloy, ‘Croatians just making film, says relative’, Sydney Morning Herald, 4 September 1978, 1.
171
Blaxland, The Protest Years, 120–58, 416–17.
172
J. Blaxland and R. Crawley, The Secret Cold War: The Official History of ASIO 1975-1989, Vol. III (Crows
Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2016), 141
168

247

to the Sydney Consulate about the very same allegations he was to make to the
Lithgow Police.173 Public suspicions were first raised when Virkez only received a
sentence of 26 months, compared to the 15 years of the ‘Croatian Six’. Even more
suspicious was the fact that after 10 months of his sentence, Virkez was released,
and upon his release he returned to Yugoslavia. However, it would not be until
1989, when The Australian published a series of articles Barry Lowe, that Virkez’s
true identity, and the involvement of notorious Yugoslav agent Vinko Sindicic
would be revealed. It was also uncovered that high-ranking public servants in the
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of the Prime Minister and the
Department of Defence were informants, possibly agents, for the Yugoslav secret
service.174 In 1991, Four Corners journalist Chris Masters not only interviewed the
Croatian Six, who detailed their experiences of police corruption, missing
evidence, and forced confessions, but also tracked down Virkez in Yugoslavia,
who admitted that he was in fact an agent provocateur that had framed them.175
Though the Croatian Six were released when it became clear that Virkez had
fabricated his confession, applications for a judicial review of the original
convictions have consistently been dismissed. The most recent call for a judicial
review occurred in 2013 as a result of the 2012 reinvestigation of the case by
Fairfax journalist Hamish McDonald. The release of his e-book Framed, and
accompanying articles in the Sydney Morning Herald gave long-awaited credence
to what many had been alleging since the first arrests in 1979 – that these men
were the victims of a gross miscarriage of justice at the hands of the corrupt NSW
policemen, framed by the Yugoslav intelligence hell-bent on discrediting
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Croatian activism in Australia, and ultimately betrayed by every Australian
Government since.176
It is now known that the case of the Croatian Six was a deliberate attempt by
Yugoslav intelligence to portray Croatians as extremists and terrorists, and some
suggest that perhaps the Eden arrests were as well.177 This indicates that
Croatians, through the NCCRC, multiculturalism, and the ‘Embassy’ had
succeeded in re-branding Croatian activism sufficiently enough in Australia to
warrant Yugoslav interference. The Yugoslavs failed on this account, at least
partly, because Croatian activism was no longer as tied to extremism and violence
as it was perceived to be at the start of the decade, evidenced by the
comparatively muted response from Australia’s politicians and media. This
response may also be a simple reflection of the fact that both the Eden and
Croatian Six arrests were for conspiracy to commit a crime, rather than actually
committing one – it is difficult to manufacture outrage or media attention for
something that did not happen. However it seems that the most likely reason can
be found in the fact that Croatian activism was no longer as politically symbolic
as it was at the start of the decade. Murphy’s moral panic over ‘Croats in the bush’
had, by the end of the decade, been superseded by the anxieties the onset of nonEuropean immigration had caused.

4.3.2. NON-EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION
The late 1970s saw two major intakes of non-European refugees that
challenged Australia’s political and social environment. The end of the Vietnam
War and the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, both in 1975, led to the arrival
of Vietnamese and Lebanese refugees whose racial, religious, and cultural
See: H. McDonald, Framed, eBook (Fairfax Media, 2012).
H. McDonald, ‘Terror Six Claim It Was Fix’, Sun Herald, 12 February 2012, 16.
H. McDonald, ‘Bid for Review of Croatian Six Terrorist Convictions Again Fails’, 11 February 2013, 4.
H. McDonald, ‘Just Another Disgraceful Chapter in the Sorry Saga of the Croatian Six’, 11 February 2013, 9.
177
John Schindler, for example, claims that the group that ran the Eden military exercise, the HRB, was
in effect directly under Yugoslav control. See: H. McDonald, ‘Framed’, Sydney Morning Herald, 11
February 2012, 14.
176

249

identities challenged the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant in ways
Croatians simply did not. As such, these newer arrivals displaced Croatians as the
pre-eminent migrant ‘Other’ in Australian society. The politics of their arrival and
settlement in Australia would diminish the political currency of Croatian
activism, as new divides between the major political parties emerged. Particularly
with advent of Vietnamese boat arrivals in 1976-1977, the moral panic over ‘Croats
in the Bush’ was slowly replaced with that most traditional of Australian moral
panics – non-European immigration. Though this did not completely erase
Croatians and their activism from the public sphere - no less because of the
actions of the community itself in keeping itself visible – it certainly depoliticised
its symbolism in the Australian political environment.
Australia’s immigration policy since Federation had explicitly, and later
implicitly, been informed by the desire to prevent non-European immigration to
Australia. Though the Whitlam Government had formally abolished the White
Australia Policy and introduced the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, race
continued to cast a long shadow on the way Australians perceived themselves
and the world around them. The sliding scales of ‘whiteness’ and ‘Britishness’ still
exerted a significant influence in determining the figure of the Good Australian
Migrant. Both the Lebanese and Indochinese refugees of the late 1970s challenged
the racial, religious and cultural expectations of the Good Australian Migrant.
Though Lebanese migration to Australia dated back to the 1880s, these waves
predominantly consisted of Lebanese Christians who were generally considered
to be a part of the White, European world. The intake of 1976-7, on the other
hand, was predominantly of Lebanese Muslims, whose religious identity posited
them further down the sliding scales informing the Good Australian Migrant. For
the Indochinese refugees, there was no ambiguity in their non-European identity
and non-Christian religious identity. This was further complicated by the ‘boat
arrivals’ that became symbolic of the late 1970s - though a very small proportion
of the total number of arrivals, their ‘self-selection’ revived Australia’s deep-
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seated anxiety and perceived vulnerability to the ‘Yellow Peril’.178 The cultural
identities of both groups – Arab and Eastern - were also situated outside the
Western world, making them seem more foreign and not ‘like us’ to Australian
sensitivities.
The Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern identities of the Lebanese and the
Asian, predominantly Buddhist, Eastern identities of the Indochinese thus
challenged the Good Australian Migrant in ways Croatians simply did not.
Though Croatians did carry the baggage of Balkanism and the legacies of
Australia’s relationship with Southern Europeans, they were still unequivocally
European. The Catholic identity of Croatians was shared with a sizeable
proportion of Australia’s population, and Croatians were able to enter into a wellestablished Australian Catholic Church that exerted significant institutional
power. Finally, Croatians were not only geographically part of the Western world
(even if on the periphery), but their culture and history was steeped in Western
tradition.
However, like Croatians, both the Lebanese and Indochinese refugees
challenged the expectation that migrants would be apolitical, or at least no more
political than the general population. As is the nature of refugee migration, both
intakes were the result of conflicts. This made Australians uneasy about the
prospect that, like Croatians and many of the other post-WWII intakes, these too
might continue the political struggles of the homeland once settled in Australia.
This fear was particularly pronounced in the case of the Indochinese refugees,
whose potential liberation activism could cause problems of ‘legal control,
diplomatic headaches with the new government in Vietnam, and a backlash
among Australians,’179 not least because Whitlam had established diplomatic
relations with North Vietnam in February 1973. Their anti-communism was
another point of contention, at least for the ALP. Influential members within the
party believed that Indochinese migration had the potential to distort the
political balance of Australian domestic politics in the same way European anti178
179
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communist refugees did after WWII that was in part responsible for keeping the
ALP out of office for 23 years.180 Finally, Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam
War had caused deep divisions within Australia, and the issue of Indochinese
refugees revived these divisions.
In spite of these racial and political fears, in 1979 the Fraser Government
established the Orderly Departure Program, negotiated with Vietnam in attempt
to control and manage the refugee flow. Though these refugees were the Fraser
Government’s greatest challenge at the time, its management of the crisis and
implementation of the program also became its most distinguished legacy.
Reminiscent of the assisted migration programs that had characterised the 195060s, this program institutionalised Asian immigration to Australia for the very
first time, and heralded the end of immigration as a predominantly European
affair. By the end of 1982, almost 70,000 Indochinese refugees had settled in the
country, and by the late 1980s, Asia had become the main source of immigrants
to Australia, displacing both the United Kingdom and Europe.181
Non-European immigrants, therefore, slowly displaced Croatians as the preeminent migrant ‘Other’ and diminished the political symbolism that had
previously imbued Croatian activism. Backlash against Fraser’s immigration
policy was already beginning to grow before the decade closed, particularly
against immigration from Southeast Asia. As Crowley summarises, some of this
backlash was racially inspired and some of it was political. However, some was
also the expression of a genuine concern - the social and economic consequences
of a high level of Asian immigration at a time of high unemployment.182 These
anxieties would coalesce in the 1980s and come to ask serious questions of
multiculturalism in general – the answers of which would once again influence
responses towards Croatian activism.
According to Clyde Cameron, Whitlam declared at a Cabinet meeting in 1975 that he was ‘not having
hundreds of fucking Vietnamese Balts coming into the country.’
As cited in: P. Mares, Borderline: Australia’s Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers (Sydney: UNSW
Press, 2001), 67.
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CHAPTER 5:
HOPE AND HOOLIGANS
1980-1989

Sydney Morning Herald, 6 May 1980, 6.

To the working class, to the working people and citizens, to the
people and nationalities of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia – Comrade Tito is dead...1
Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia &
The Presidency of the SFRY, 4 May 1980
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With these words delivered on a lazy spring Sunday afternoon, Yugoslavia
learned of the death of its charismatic and enigmatic leader. Though his death
was anticipated due to his age and ailing health, the outpouring of grief in
Yugoslavia was considerable, and many can still remember where they were when
they heard Tito had died. As citizens lined the tracks to watch Tito’s iconic Blue
Train make its way from Ljubljana to Belgrade for the final time, leaders from
around the world paid their tributes. Tito’s funeral, held four days later, is still
considered to be one of the largest state funerals ever held, with delegates from
all over the world paying their respects to the pioneer of the ‘Third Way’. It was
the end of an era spanning 35 years, and as much as time stood still out of grief, it
did too out of fear, for Tito had left behind ‘a system in a state of paralysis, unable
to cure itself.’ 2
Despite careful preparations for life after Tito, ‘what legitimacy the state had
enjoyed disappeared with Tito.’ 3 Such was the political currency of Tito that
following his death, the collective leadership that succeeded him operated under
the slogan ‘After Tito – Tito!’ However, this leadership only exacerbated
Yugoslavia’s pre-existing problems, inequalities, and resentments, with its
rotating Presidency, changing political and economic structures, and an
increasingly complicated decision-making process requiring consensus between
parties that had less and less in common. As the central party began to lose its
elder statesmen, and without any real successor or unifying figure to fill Tito’s
void, the political quagmire Tito had spent his lifetime averting slowly unravelled
the Yugoslav state. 4
However, not everyone met the news of Tito’s death with sorrow. For some
Croatians, especially those in the diaspora, Tito’s death was the first moment of
As cited in Tanner, Croatia, 203.
Goldstein, Croatia: A History, 188.
3
Drapac, Constructing Yugoslavia, 247.
4
For detailed information on the political crisis following Tito’s death, see:
Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 329–40.
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hope for Croatian independence since the purges of the Croatian Spring a decade
earlier. Spontaneous jubilations broke out as the news spread throughout
Croatian clubhouses across Australia, and in Canberra, a celebratory
demonstration was swiftly planned to coincide with the day of Tito’s funeral. 5
Though it would still take a decade for Yugoslavia to collapse, the sentiment of
the moment - that Tito’s death signalled the death of Yugoslavia - would prove
prescient.
As Bongiorno writes, the ‘Eighties’ also represented a decade of hope in
Australia, even if it began and ended in national pessimism and economic
recession. Optimism, energy and excess fuelled this hope, while the reforms of
Hawke-Keating government completely reconfigured the nation. 6 For migrant
communities, the implementation of the Galbally Report recommendations
represented a decade of improved access to services, access to government grants
and initiatives, and greater opportunities to participate in the social and cultural
life of the nation. However, even in this spirit of hope and optimism, Croatians
could not escape the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant, and found
themselves once again rallying against a reputation of violence – albeit this time
in the soccer stands. The disquiet over soccer violence, however, was reflective of
a more general anxiety about multiculturalism that would cast long and dark
shadows over the hope of the decade, culminating in the FitzGerald Immigration
Policy Review of 1988.
Though this decade would come to a sombre end for Australia – replete with
an economic recession, political scandal, anti-multiculturalism, and a crisis of
national identity – for the Croatian community, the end of the decade would be
one of triumph. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia’s loss of
geopolitical and strategic importance meant that Croatian political activism in
Australia finally found the domestic and international legitimacy that had been
denied it for four decades. Therefore, Section 5.1 will outline the nature of post5
6
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Tito Croatian political activism in Australia. Though the greater part of this
activism repeated the patterns of previous periods, Croatians also responded to
the unique developments in Australia’s political, legal, and social environments
in order to articulate their vision for Croatia after Tito. Changes in the political,
legal, and social environments of Yugoslavia also influenced Croatian political
activism in this period, as a third wave of Croatian migrants prompted some
change in the nature of the community and its activism. Section 5.2 explores
Australian responses to this activism. Though Croatian activism was no longer as
politically fraught a subject, the issue of soccer violence, itself a reflection of a
growing anxiety over multiculturalism, threatened to define the majority by a
minority once more. Section 5.3 demonstrates that Croatian political activism
finally gained the legitimacy denied to it for over four decades as both the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia unravelled. In Australia, the moment this legitimacy was
entrenched can be pinpointed to one precise moment - the shooting of a
Croatian teenager by a Yugoslav consulate official.
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5.1. CROATIAN ACTIVISM IN A POST-TITO
WORLD
By the end of the twentieth century, Croatians in Australia had finally gained a credible
and respectable identity, having clawed back ground lost in the media-driven offensive
of the 1960s and 1970s. How far they were the architects of this rebirth and how far
they benefitted from changed circumstances here and in Yugoslavia has yet to
be determined. 7

If the Whitlam Government ‘invented’ Australian multiculturalism, it was the
Fraser Government that put it into practice, while the Hawke Government
oversaw the highpoint of multicultural activity. In 1977, Fraser commissioned a
review of migrant services and programs under the direction of Frank Galbally,
QC. Endorsed by Fraser in 1978 and continued by Hawke, the recommendations
of the ‘Migrant Services and programs: The Report of the Review of Post-Arrival
Programs and Services to Migrants’ (more commonly referred to as the Galbally
Report) would come to define the practical implementation of multiculturalism.
The Adult Education programme, a variety of community grants-in-aid, Migrant
Resource Centres, the Telephone Interpreter Service, the Australian Institute for
Multicultural Affairs, and the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) were just some
of the services and organisations established directly as a result of the Galbally
Report.
For Croatians, the implementation of the Galbally Report recommendations,
coupled with Croatian language recognition in 1979, resulted in a decade of
improved access to services, access to government grants and initiatives, and
greater opportunities to participate in the social and cultural life of the nation.
Though most of the activism in this period repeated the patterns of previous
periods, Croatians did modify some of their activism in response to the changing
environments of both Australia and Yugoslavia. Also influencing Croatian
activism in this period was a third wave of Croatian migrants whose
7
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demographics and politics differed from those of the previous waves, and who
reinforced some of the generational changes that were occurring within the
community.

5.1.1 MULTICULTURAL EXPANSION
Spurred by the opportunities of these new initiatives, the development of
Croatian communities that had begun in the 1970s simply gained momentum in
the 1980s. The financial capital of organisations that had accumulated over the
previous periods was now reinforced by access to grants, loan schemes, and other
initiatives, and led to a building and redevelopment ‘boom’ within the
community. New clubhouses and facilities continued to be established, as did the
relocation or redevelopment of older ones. 8 The largest projects in the
community come in the construction of churches. In 1983, the Croatian Catholic
Centre in Wollongong opened, the first in Australia to be built by and for
Croatians. The church, hall, and priests’ residence were constructed in a record
one year. Similar projects began in Blacktown and St Johns Park in NSW,
Springvale in Victoria, and Hobart in Tasmania. As the physical space of the
community expanded, so too did the number of groups and associations that
resided within them. Folkloric groups, soccer clubs, and various cultural groups
reflecting the diverse interests of communities multiplied, both as the number of
second- and third-generation children increased, and as generational differences
resulted in different needs, and sometimes even disagreement.
Croatian activism in the post-Tito world, therefore, continued predominantly
according to the same rhythms as before – through participation in faith, folklore
and football, the annual 10 Travanj celebrations and November Yugoslav Day
demonstrations, and through the protest of and petitioning against events as they
arise. The recognition of Croatian as a separate language in 1979 allowed
The Croatian Club in Punchbowl, which would become a backbone of the community, opened in 1983
after relocating from Marrickville.

8

258

Croatians to participate in new multicultural initiatives such as ethnic radio and
television broadcasting, translation and interpreter services, and in producing
government publications specific to the Croatian community. Croatian language
recognition also led to the incorporation of the traditional Hrvatska škola into
state education structures. Therefore from 1981, students in NSW are able to sit
the Croatian language exam for their Higher School Certificate, and from 1983
enrol in the Croatian language program at Macquarie University. In 1984, the
Croatian Studies Foundation was established, and by 1994, this and the language
program would evolve into the Croatian Studies Centre that is still in operation at
Macquarie University. Another tradition arose from these activities – that of the
Croatian Summer School or Ljetna škola– which from 1984 would bring together
Croatian language students from across Australia in the summer school holidays
for an intensive course in language, history and culture.
From these endeavours, a new form of Croatian activism developed – that of
youth/student activism. Though some youth and student groups had been
established as early as the mid-seventies, it is not until the early 1980s that groups
such as the Croatian Student associations in NSW and Victoria, the Croatian
Catholic Youth groups of Victoria and Canberra, and the Croatian Youth groups
of Adelaide and WA rise to prominence and begin to advocate in their own right.
Fundraising for the Croatian language program at Macquarie University,
organising

student

seminars

and

conferences,

and

participating

at

demonstrations and protests as the Croatian youth form the basis of this
activism. In 1986, these groups combined under the auspices of the Federation of
Croatian Students and Youth of Australia (FCSYA), who begin to co-ordinate
activities at a national level, and who would play an important role in the
wartime activism of the 1990s.
In the same way Croatian activism reflected the rhetoric of anti-communism
from 1947-1971 and the rhetoric of rights from 1972-1979, Croatian activism in this
period reflected the rhetoric of discrimination that had been enshrined with the
Racial Discrimination Act in 1975, and that had gained momentum under various
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state and federal acts. In 1977, the Anti-Discrimination Act passed through NSW
Parliament, while in 1984, an Equal Opportunity Act passed through both the SA
and WA Parliaments. These were reinforced by the passage of the Sex
Discrimination Act through the Federal Parliament in 1984, and the
establishment of the Australian Human Rights Commission in 1986, which
became responsible for monitoring and investigating infringements of federal
anti-discrimination legislation.
This shift to the rhetoric of discrimination was contemporaneous with
another shift – that of a return to the rhetoric of political independence. Though
this shift was reflective of the death of Tito and the hope this represented, it was
also indicative of some of the success of Croatian activism on the question of
Croatian identity in Australia. The recognition of Croatian as a separate language
in effect recognised Croatians as not Yugoslavs. As the community could now
access services as Croatians in their own right, they were able to freely conduct
their business as a separate ethnic group. This shift in rhetoric was also
reinforced by international geopolitical developments – as the political situations
in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia became increasingly precarious throughout
the decade, the question of Croatian independence became less far-fetched than
it had been in previous periods.
One of the manifestations of hope in the Post-Tito world was an attempt by
the Croatian diaspora to foster better relations with its homeland. For the most
part, this involved establishing communication with prominent individuals or
groups within Croatia, and where possible organising visits to Australia.
Sometimes, however, Australian groups also returned to Croatia, however not
without controversy. In 1982, the folkloric group Koleda travelled to Croatia to
participate in the International Folklore Festival of Zagreb, an event established
in 1966 which continues to this day. 9 Koleda was the most pre-eminent of
Croatian folkloric groups in Australia, and had become the face of Croatian
International Folklore Festival Zagreb, accessed 2 February 2017, http://www.msf.hr/Smotra/en/enindex.html
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culture and identity in Australian society through its participation at various
multicultural festivals, exhibitions, and at the forefront of demonstrations and
protests. When news of the tour became known, discontent and suspicion
emerged. Some opposed the tour on the grounds that it seemed to be an official
visit, rather than just a group of Croatians travelling to Croatia, and as such could
only be of benefit to the Yugoslav state. Others were more direct in their scorn,
accusing Koleda and the tour organisers of abandoning the Croatian cause and
community in Australia. 10
Neither were matters as straightforward when Croatian groups came to
Australia, and it seems that the hopes and aspirations of the community were not
exactly congruent with those of the homeland. As a flyer distributed in response
to news of the Koleda tour commented;
All of our attempts at getting close to these sports clubs of ours from Croatia,
have been without exaggerating, catastrophically disappointing. They did not
want to come to our Croatian clubs, and told us that they were bothered by those
pictures on the walls. We swallowed that, and tried to accommodate them by
organising places where those images would not compromise them, yet the
answer was the same: We cannot – the consul or the ambassador won’t allow us. 11

More success seems to have been found in fostering connections between
diaspora communities, rather than with the homeland. This was particularly the
case with Croatian priests, and also included visits from those residing in Croatia.
The freedom of these priests to visit Croatian communities compared to the
‘catastrophically disappointing’ sporting groups can be explained by their
submission to and sponsorship by the Croatian Catholic Church, rather than the
Yugoslav state; their purpose of religious ministry, rather than official
representation of the state; and because the politics of the Croatian Catholic

Lovoković, Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji, 219–20.
As cited in ibid.
Original Text: ‘svi naši pokušaji zbližavanja tim našim športskim klubovima iz Hrvatske, da ne
pretjeravamo, bili su katastrofalno razočaravajući. Oni nisu htjeli doći u naše hrvatske klubove i rekli su
nam da im smetaju one slike na zidovima. Progutali smo to, i pokušali udovoljiti što smo organizirali
mjesto gdje ih slike ne će kompromitirati, a odgovor je bio isti: Ne možemo, konzul ili ambassador nam
ne daje.’
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Church was closer to that of the diaspora, particularly in their shared anticommunism.

5.1.2. THE THIRD WAVE OF POST-WAR CROATIAN EMIGRATION
After Tito’s death, the precariousness of the collective leadership and state of
Yugoslavia led to a resurgence in the repression of political dissent, and ‘anyone
who expressed heterodox opinions too noisily, or was brave enough to take a
stand against injustice in public, ran the risk of persecution.’ 12 Individuals were
imprisoned once again for disseminating views deemed antagonistic to the state
or to communism, the media was kept under intense scrutiny, student
movements and universities were targeted, and the ‘struggle against nationalism’
reappeared as the principal goal of the LCC. Though the LCC still retained a
limited monopoly over the police, army, legal system and state budget, it was
increasingly unable to exert any real power in bringing political dissidents to
account. This repression was gradually abandoned as state and party structures
lost the strength and respect needed to impose their will on the people. 13
The greatest threat to the new regime, however, was not political dissent but
economic collapse. The economy had deteriorated to near-catastrophic levels in
the last years of Tito’s life, and it was only in late 1981 that a federal commission
was established to examine the crisis. By this time, Yugoslavia’s external debts
had already ballooned to approximately $US 20bn, and the new federal
government found it could not service the debt. Yugoslavia was only kept intact
throughout the decade because of the enduring political interest of the West in
keeping it afloat. Though partial moratoriums were granted and international
banking institutions continued to fund the state, Yugoslavia’s debt continued to
Benson, Yugoslavia, 140.
This was best exemplified in the release of the “White Book” in March 1984 under the auspices of the
Information and Propaganda Centre of the Central Committee of the LCC. Though it listed an index of
approximately 200 cultural figures deemed politically unsuitable, the Croatian Communists did not have
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place immense pressure on the economy. The inability to import sufficient oil
reserves resulted in the shortage of petrol and oil derivatives in the same year of
Tito’s death, and by 1985, inflation reached a record 70%. 14

Imported

consumables such as coffee and washing powder all but disappeared from
Yugoslav shelves, and shopping trips ‘preko granice’ (over the border) became an
altogether natural phenomenon. Unemployment doubled between 1984-1992,
and those that were employed were often unpaid for months at a time. Even
though workers began to strike more regularly, the more sinister threat of
absenteeism and low productivity loomed large, and the newspaper Komunist
estimated that in 1982 alone, almost 10% of Yugoslavia’s workforce was absent
every day, while working hours averaged less than 5 hours a day. 15
The Croatian economy had its own additional difficulties. As money dried up
across the state, so too did the public and private funding for the infrastructure
projects Croatia’s construction industry had relied on in the economic boom of
the 1970s. Similarly, as economies across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
contracted, so too did the once assured markets for Croatia’s metal and
machinery construction industries, and as confidence in the Yugoslav economy
plummeted, Croatia’s shipbuilding industry, once the third largest in the world,
withered away. 16 There were, however, two industries which provided Croatia
with some economic reprieve. The transportation industry thrived thanks to
Croatia’s geographic position both in relation to Europe, and to other Yugoslav
republics, 17 while tourism boomed in the 1980s, reaching the record figure of
67,665,000 tourist nights in 1985. 18
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As debate over the roots of the economic problems grew, the political debate
of the early 1960s resurfaced, again concentrating on the twin issues of
conservative vs liberal economic policy and centralism vs decentralism. As before,
those advocating for a liberal economic policy and market reform favoured
further decentralism in order to grant each republic the ability to tailor economic
solutions for their own conditions, while conservatives argued that this was
precisely what had created this economic mess, and therefore the solution was to
recentralise and reintroduce a system of social distribution to even out regional
differences. Once again, the more developed republics were in favour of
liberalisation and decentralisation (dubbed the ‘Slovenian model’), while
underdeveloped republics favoured social distribution and recentralisation (the
‘Serbian Model’). 19 This dichotomy made reaching a consensus on initiatives to
improve the economic condition of Yugoslavia even harder to reach, as any
initiative would meet resistance from an opposing faction, and even when
consensus was found, everything that ‘was done was wrong or came too late.’ 20
In the face of these economic and political hardships, some standards
across Croatia saw improvement. The most significant of these was the Croatian
‘education boom’ of the 1970s, which resulted in the increase of general literacy
and the numbers of individuals completing higher education. This produced a
new class of professionals in Croatia engaged with both the interior life of
Yugoslavia and that of the world outside. Autonomy increased in many fields,
most notably in health, science, media, and university curricula, and the principle
of ‘moral and political correctness,’ that is, alignment with Yugoslav Party
principles, was replaced with criterions of professionalism. Life expectancy
increased while infant mortality decreased, and the rapid urbanisation of the
1960s and 1970s meant that a larger proportion of Croatians were living in cities
and large towns. 21

H. Haug, Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia : Tito, Communist Leadership and the National Question
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 310–11.
20
Goldstein, Croatia, 190.
21
ibid., 191–94.
19

264

Despite efforts by the collective leadership to minimise the burgeoning
economic and political crisis, ‘a literate, urbanized population could hardly be
kept in the dark about the growing crisis around them, especially as so many
people had extensive contacts abroad.’ 22 Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, where those
emigrating were mostly labourers and craftsmen of the working class, Croatian
migration in the 1980s was mostly made up of professionals and academics who
found they could not fulfil their social and professional aspirations within the
Yugoslav context. They migrated to the West in search of a higher standard of
living and opportunities for career progression. The Yugoslav ‘brain drain’ of the
1980s resulted in the migration of Croatians who were educated, upwardly
mobile, and usually with some working knowledge of the English language.
However, unlike their predecessors, these migrants felt they ‘fitted better into
the Australian way of life than in their native environment’ where the ‘climate of
irrationality’ inadequately valued their skills. 23 Feeling out of place in Croatia,
these Croatian migrants also felt out of place in the Croatian communities they
found in Australia. The principal reason for this, Colic-Peisker explains, is that
this wave of Croatian migrants
[perceived] the traditional ethno-national ‘ethnic community’ dominated by
migrants from the previous working class wave as a straight jacket for their
middle-class ‘cosmopolitan’ outlook and aspirations. 24

Whereas the two waves of migrants before them were made up of working-class
migrants whose main axis of identification was their ascribed ethnicity, this new
wave of Croatian migrants predominantly identified themselves according to
their achieved professional status. Furthermore, while the previous waves tended
to be more community-oriented, identified as Catholic, and tied to territorially
defined communities, this new wave was more individualistic and secular in
outlook, their professional identities resulting in a non-territorial and portable
identity that was not as threatened or displaced through the process of
Benson, Yugoslavia, 140–41.
Colic-Peisker, ‘Two Waves of Croatian Migrants’, 361–62.
24
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migration. 25 Therefore, they instead looked to English-speaking and nonCroatian community structures to fulfil their identity needs and provide
opportunities for socialisation.
Nonetheless, some of these migrants did join various Croatian community
groups, and form in part an explanation for the perceptible reorientation of
Croatian activism in the 1980s towards more intellectual pursuits and refined
methods of activism. Thus, the organisation of public seminars, lectures, and
conferences became more common throughout the 1980s, as did lecture tours by
prominent academics, such as Professor Mirko Vidović in June 1983 and Professor
Michael McAdams in May 1985. This was reinforced by the rise of an Australianborn generation to positions of leadership, who were both relatively welleducated and had grown up within Australian social and political paradigms, but
whose only knowledge of the homeland was that found in the memories of their
parents or in the textbooks of their classes. The establishment of Croatian studies
at Macquarie Univeristy provided institutional support and gravitas to these
pursuits, which culminated in the 1988 international conference/symposium
titled ‘Croatia and Croatians in 20th Century: Perceptions and Reality,’ coinciding
with Australia’s Bicentennial celebrations. Over 30 highly regarded academics,
writers, and intellectuals from all over the world participated in the conference,
including four from Croatia itself - Stjepan Šešelj, Pero Budak, Ante Starčević, and
Vlado Gotovac. As Škvorc writes,
It was the first time the relationship with homeland intellectuals was
rehabilitated, and the first public appearance of figures from the so-called
‘extremist emigration’ with intellectuals from Croatia. 26
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5.2. AUSTRALIAN RESPONSES
I do not suppose that Mr Grassby or any other senior proponents of multiculturalism were in the
stadium on this, the eve of Australia Day, but if they had been I think that they would have been
interested in the degree of partisanship which the large (circa 7,000) crowd exhibited on behalf of
the Yugoslavian visitors. Australia’s three goals and feats were greeted with a gloomy silence but
Zagreb’s goals and feats were greeted with rapture. A visiting Martian would have supposed that the
Australians were the visitors from foreign parts. 27

The 1980s saw two Yugoslav-born individuals in Federal Parliament for the
first time – Liberal Senator Milivoj ‘Misha’ Lajovic was elected in 1975, while
Lewis ‘Bata’ Kent became the ALP member for Hotham in 1980. Though both
men periodically drew on their personal lives to politically position themselves
within wider debates, Croatian activism as a subject of debate was relatively
absent, particularly when compared to previous periods. Indeed, that there was
no Ministerial Statement about Croatians to begin this chapter indicates the
extent of the change in Australia’s responses towards Croatian political activism.
Ustashism, however, returned to parliamentary debate as the issue of potential
WWII criminals in Australia, and their alleged ties to the Liberal Party, was
revived. This was first raised by the case of Lyenko Urbanchich in 1979, and
resulted in a decade-long debate that culminated in the War Crimes Amendment
Act 1988. However, these debates for the most part avoided the 1970s trope that
Ustashism was synonymous with Croatian activism, seeming to take objections
with individuals rather than communities, and Croatians were somewhat spared
by the fact that the main targets of this debate in parliament, Urbanchich and at
times Lajovic, were Slovenian and not Croatian.
Just as Asian immigration displaced Croatians as the pre-eminent migrant
‘Other’, so too was the Labor-Liberal paradigm that had made Croatian activism
politically symbolic displaced by the symbolism of economic reform. Croatians
were even displaced as the face of terrorism in Australia, as threats from different
groups came to dominate the agenda. Nevertheless, Croatians were not able to
27
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completely escape the reputation for violence that had been ascribed to it, and as
the issue of soccer violence became a proxy battle for the increasing anxiety over
multiculturalism, once again found themselves in opposition to the expectations
of the Good Australian Migrant.

5.2.1. DISRUPTIONS AND DIVERSIONS
As discussed in Section 4.3., the onset of Asian immigration in the late 1970s
challenged the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant in ways Croatian
immigration had not. These refugees, most commonly identified as Vietnamese
though also including ethnic Chinese and intakes from Cambodia and Laos,
slowly displaced Croatians as the pre-eminent migrant ‘Other.’ Though their
patterns of settlement did not differ much from those of other migrants, they
became highly visible communities. In the 1980s, this was exacerbated by the
settlement issues these refugees experienced, mainly due to the troubled
economic environment of Australia, their low English language proficiency, and
government inattention to the unique psychological aspects of the refugee
experience, such as trauma and family separation. 28
The political symbolism of refugee settlement, therefore, displaced that
which had previously imbued Croatian activism. At the same time, the
problematic aspects of Croatian activism were no longer potent. The rhetoric of
ethnicity and identity with which Croatians had rebranded their activism was not
only mainstreamed, but exalted as an intrinsically Australian quality. The
promotion of ethnicity over nationality allowed Croatians to sidestep the political
issues their Yugoslav citizenship raised. The activities of faith, football, and
folklore not only sat more comfortably within the expectations of the Good
Australian Migrant, but were now celebrated, and even demanded, as cultural
contributions to the nation. Though this activism still represented the political to
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Croatians themselves, Australians perceived them as simply an expression of
cultural identity.
The perceived threat of Croatian extremism had also diminished throughout
the 1980s, as groups such as the Ananda Marga, Armenians, and Palestinians
displaced Croatians as the face of terrorism in Australia. By 1983, ASIO had
downgraded the threat of Croatian violence to low due to a perceived ‘cooling of
passions.’ 29 The Sydney Hilton Hotel bombing in 1978, the assassination of the
Turkish Consul-General and his bodyguard in Sydney in 1980, the Sydney Israeli
Consulate and Hakoah Football Club bombings of 1982, and the 1986 Melbourne
Turkish Consulate bombing occupied the bulk of Australia’s legal, political, and
media attention. The 1980s also saw the rise of domestic terrorism in the form of
Jack van Tongeren and his neo-Nazi group the Australian Nationalist Movement
in Western Australia, and National Action on the east coast. These groups
pursued a right-wing, anti-multiculturalist agenda which used violence,
intimidation, and bombings to terrorise those it saw believed threatening to their
vision of Australia. This particularly targeted Asian communities, restaurants and
businesses. 30 Furthermore, these incidents seemed comparatively more violent
and extreme than those that had been ascribed to Croatians. Though this
perception was `informed by the same racial anxieties that had followed the
introduction of non-European immigration, the fact remains that despite the
frequency of alleged Croatian attacks throughout the 1960s and 1970s, none
resulted in a fatality, and in most cases the only damage sustained was to
property.
The change in positioning and posturing of Australian political parties,
however, seemed to be the most important factor in the depoliticisation of
Croatian activism. As Kelly writes, the 1980s saw the erosion of the Labor-Liberal
paradigm of politics, where intra-party, rather than inter-party, ideological
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battles dominated. 31 Though there was general agreement that only serious
reform could address the economic problems plaguing Australia since the 1970s,
the question of how this reform would and should be achieved featured as much
in debates within the parties as between them. The symbolic economy of politics
in the 1980s therefore, centred on economic issues and how best to achieve the
reform needed to combat recession, even if this still included aspects of the social
and the political. This was confirmed by the triumph of Hawke’s rhetoric of
ending the ‘politics of division’ at the 1983 election.
Hawke and his Treasurer Paul Keating quickly instituted a program of
economic reform that would transform both the Australian economy and society.
Though the greatest and boldest legacy of the Government’s reform agenda was
the decision to float the dollar and deregulate the financial system, these were
decisions that were replicated across most Western countries in this period.
What was distinctive about the Hawke government’s approach, Bongiorno
argues, was that
It sought to combine a shift towards market with a commitment to social
spending to reduce poverty, a basic level of government support for all, and a
continuing role for unions in the workplace. 32

In this environment of reform and rapid change, however, the question of
national identity was inevitable, and one that would come to define the period.

5.2.2. RISE OF ANTI-MULTICULTURALISM
The political strength of multiculturalism in the 1970s lay in its appeal to the
growing number of electorates with sizeable immigrant minorities, and to those
of the ‘New Middle Class’- the suburban white-collar workforce that had emerged
from the affluence of the 1960s who identified with the political activism of the
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left. However the appeal of multiculturalism was far from universal. As Jupp
explains,
By appearing to deny Australia’s British inheritance, [multiculturalism] alienated
conservative elements in the Liberal Party. By encouraging cultural diversity, it
annoyed those who had spent several generations building an Australian culture
which, vague though its outlines were, was favoured well beyond conservative
partisans. 33

Multiculturalism therefore only really appealed to a limited number of
electorates, most of which were already Labor-controlled. It had almost no
impact on rural and provincial districts, especially in conservative Queensland
controlled by the National Party. Therefore, according to Jupp, the bipartisan
consensus that developed in the 1970-80s was never as entrenched within the
electorate as it seemed in public rhetoric.
By the end of the decade this dissonance would resurface in critiques of
multiculturalism and immigration policy. 34 Early critiques of multiculturalism
were mostly found in the work of academics, and came from both the political
left and right. Leftist critiques argued that multiculturalism only valued the
superficial aspects of cultural identity – faith, folklore and football – while doing
very little to address the social inequality inherent in the migrant experience. 35
However it was the criticism from the political right which have the most
influence on public debate, particularly when it became entangled in criticism of
Asian immigration. 36
Early academic critiques from the right included the work of philosophers
Lauchlan Chipman and Frank Knopfelmacher, historian Geoffrey Partington
sociologist Tanya Birrell, and political scientist Raymond Sestito. The basic
arguments of these early critiques were that multiculturalism was a divisive force
in Australian society which in turn encouraged separatism; that it denied a
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distinct Australian heritage based on British origins; that it was simply a response
to the ethnic vote or pressure from the ethnic lobby; or that it was ill-defined and
an intellectual mess. 37 However, the Fraser Government’s support of
multiculturalism, with the bipartisanship of the Opposition, limited the reach of
these critiques from the right, somewhat muting them in the public sphere. It
was not until the defeat of Fraser in 1983 that these arguments against
multiculturalism started to gain wider traction, finding a prominent outlet in
Quadrant, which increasingly published academic critiques alongside more
populist beliefs as the decade progressed.
Most historians situate the catalyst of the rise in anti-multiculturalism in
Geoffrey Blainey’s Rotary Club speech at Warrnambool on 17 March 1984. This
speech was followed by a year of subsequent attempts to justify and elaborate his
argument, and culminated in the publication of his book All for Australia at the
end of the same year. Blainey argued that Australia’s current immigration policy
lent preference to Asian immigration, whose intake was far outstripping the pace
of public opinion and the successful economic, social, and cultural integration of
migrants into Australian society. This consequently ‘tested’ the racial tolerance of
Australians and strained community relations, as evidenced by escalating
tensions and social discord that was not characteristic of European immigration
during the post-war period. Thus, Blainey called for a reconsideration of the
current immigration policy, which he referred to as a product of collusion
between left-wing historians, welfare workers, the ethnic lobby, government
bureaucrats, and politicians, whose support for high levels of Asian immigration
were motivated by personal agendas that paid little regard to the needs and
interests of the general population.
The ‘Blainey debate’, as it came to be called, touched on a national nerve. As
Bongiorno describes,
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the editors of newspaper correspondence columns almost disappeared under the
avalanche of letters from readers on the issue, covering almost every conceivable
angle.

Though some media commentators and conservative politicians praised Blainey,
particularly in the initial stages of the debate, criticism of his views were swift,
and predominantly came from fellow historians. In the same way Tito’s death
came to represent the beginning of a long and slow unravelling for Yugoslavia, so
too did the Blainey debate for bipartisan consensus in multicultural policy. 38 As
the bicentenary year drew nearer, reconciling Australia’s colonial history with its
indigenous past, and navigating the place of Australia’s migrants within this
proved controversial. Debates about Australia’s national identity asked questions
about who we were, who we presently are, and who we wanted to be. Within this
ideological climate, the assumed success of multiculturalism was increasingly
questioned, particularly when faced with the practical issues of Asian
immigration and settlement, the increasingly strained relationship with
indigenous communities, and an increase of internationally-inspired terrorism.

5.2.3. “THOSE BLOODY CROATIANS…”
In January 1981, Croatian soccer club Dinamo Zagreb arrived for a tour of
Australia. They were to play a series of friendlies with the NSW, South Australian
and Victorian state representative sides, but the main attraction was to be their
game against the Australian side as a special Australia Day weekend feature in
Canberra. The tour attracted significant attention as Dinamo was considered to
be amongst the strongest teams in Europe, the current cup-holder of the
Yugoslav national league, and had thrashed the Australian side 4-0 at an
international friendly in Zagreb just two months prior. The first game against
NSW on 23 January passed without incident (and with a 2-1 upset win for the
NSW side), with the 13,000-strong crowd was described as enthusiastic and
38
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mostly ‘in the colours of Croatia.’ 39 The big game in Canberra two days later,
however, was marred by controversy.
Before the match began, a spectator had torn down the Yugoslav flag, while
another had attempted to erect a Croatian flag. As police attempted to arrest the
two men, the predominantly Croatian crowd yelled and whistled. The Dinamo
side were outraged that the Yugoslav flag had been taken down, especially
because the Australian flag was still up, and refused to take the field. After 25
minutes of delay, a compromise was reached between officials that no flags would
be flown, and all ceremony, except for the exchange of banners between players,
would be abandoned. This, however, was not communicated to the organisers in
the players tunnel, and three young Croatian women, ball boys, and a CroatiaDeakin cheer squad led the teams onto the field, before an official
unceremoniously and embarrassingly ordered them to leave. The game ended in
a 3-3 draw, and a less than impressed Yugoslav delegation. 40
Though the next two games in Adelaide and Melbourne also passed without
incident, the game in Canberra was a symbolic start to a decade where the
perceived problem of soccer violence, and its relationship to Croatian activism,
would be played out on the national stage. Though violence both on and off the
field was not a new phenomenon to soccer, debates about immigration and
multiculturalism in the 1980s nurtured the notion that the cause of soccer
violence was the ethnic affiliations of the clubs themselves. Within this debate a
difference arose between those activities that understood as expressions of
culture (‘national’), and those understood as ‘nationalistic’,
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Activities such as folk dancing, which seems to have become the symbolic
cornerstone of multiculturalism, are depicted as ‘national’ rather than
nationalistic and are, therefore, acceptable within the cultural mainstream.
Conversely, displays of political allegiance to a former homeland are regarded as
nationalistic rather than ‘national’ and do not achieve such acceptance. 41

This connection between the political and ethnic allegiances of teams with soccer
violence was also reinforced by soccer officials and sporting bodies, eager to
distance soccer violence from the sport of soccer itself. 42 Soccer and soccer
violence therefore became politically symbolic and a proxy battle for the wider
debate over multiculturalism and national identity.
This is not surprising, given that a degree of ambivalence had consistently
been directed at soccer since the 1950s, not least because ‘the most
distinguishable feature of the game has been its migrant presence.’ 43 Added to
this was a resistance to the sport itself from other codes, who were increasingly
wary of the growing popularity of soccer. 44 In the same way soccer violence acted
as a proxy of the multiculturalism debate in the 1980s, it started as a proxy of the
assimilation debates of the 1950s, where
Ignorance and prejudice easily mixed together as attitudes to migrants and
attitudes to soccer shaded into each other. Incidents of violence particularly
became a handy excuse for metaphorically bashing the game and its advocates. 45

Despite the significant involvement of British migrants, the game became so
emblematic of post-war migrant communities it earned the disparaging title of
‘wogball’, or as the game of ‘Sheilas, Wogs and Poofters’, as described by Johnny
Warren, a former Australian Captain, in his eponymous biography. 46
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‘Jugoslavs’ became a focus of soccer violence as early as 1952, even if initial
reports focused on the violence between Yugoslavs and everyone else. 47 As
Australians were made aware of the divisions between the Yugoslav communities,
predominantly because of the activism of Croatians, this focus shifted to the
violence between Croatian, Serb, and Yugoslav teams. Mosely argues that it was
not so much the degree of violence that made the Yugoslav community stand
out, but the frequency and level of nationalism displayed,
Rival supporters sought to goad and provoke each other with flags, chants,
insulting songs and verbal abuse. Of course the same could be said for any match
with any supporters but the difference was the nationalist fervour that went with
it, a fervour spiced by recent wartime experience. It can be argued that only sticks
and stones break bones, but the sort of taunts used by Croats, Serbs and
Yugoslavs against each other did, metaphorically, cut and bleed people. 48

The 1980s were by no means the highpoint of Croatian soccer violence, 49 however
the promotion of Croatian teams to state and national leagues made any violence
that did occur more pronounced. This was reiterated by the rise of European
soccer hooliganism, particularly in the United Kingdom, which was at its height
in 1986, and of which ‘a strong copy-cat element appeared to exist among
adolescent Croatians.’ 50
Hay, however, points out that although we know there was soccer violence
from 1950-1990, there has been no empirical study of evidence with which to
verify, measure or compare its extent. Instead,
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The focus on violence associated with soccer, while it did have an evidential base,
was shaped by the cultural attitudes of the early 1950s and much of what followed
has to be seen as the fitting of subsequent events into a predetermined pattern. It
is far too simplistic to account for the violence related to soccer in terms of the
politics of war-time and post-war Europe or the characteristics of migrants,
without taking account of the peculiar features of the host society and its
interpreters. 51

Other causes for violence, he argues, can be found in poor umpiring,
overcrowding and unsuitable facilities, and a lack of crowd control. The
reporting, and subsequent historical understanding, of soccer violence as
politically or ethnically motivated, obscured other reasons for conflict, such as
the difference between the physical style of British soccer and the more skilled
European version, or even the mundane politics within clubs about which player
starts and which player is benched, who should or should not be the coach, and
various other personal conflicts. 52
Hay also argues that the conflict between Yugoslav teams has also been overstated, and is not necessarily supported by empirical evidence;
Despite tension, most matches passed off peacefully at times when there were
serious incidents taking place away from the game in Australia and
Jugoslavia[sic], particularly in 1972. Indeed it could be argued that the soccer
clubs were not so much the focus of violence, but rather oases where non-violent
exchanges between opposed political groups were possible. 53

Therefore, the hyper-attention paid towards Croatian teams in the 1980s was
more a result of the historical example that had been made of Yugoslavs in
general within the issue of soccer violence, and the reputation of political
violence the Whitlam government had branded the community with.
Attempts to remove the nationalist elements from soccer first started in
1960. 54 By 1989, calls to ‘Australianise’ soccer were being made more forcefully,55
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and the de-ethnicisation’ of the sport would define the 1990s. 56 Though violence
associated with Croatian teams would worsen, rather than improve in the next
decade, this violence would be framed as a minority or youth issue, rather than
one endemic to Croatians or their political activism. 57 Part of the reason for this
shift would come from the changes of the geo-political world in the late 1980s
which would legitimise Croatian activism and precipitate the collapse of
Yugoslavia.
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5.3. THE TIDE TURNS
The fall of the Soviet Union and the communist ‘alliance’ in Central and Eastern
Europe was the necessary precondition for people to begin to imagine a world without
Yugoslavia. It became more and more difficult to ignore the internal voices that demanded
political freedom and equality. It was no longer possible to continue to label all
oppositionists national extremists. 58

Despite the economic and political crises which beset Yugoslavia after the
death of Tito, it would take almost a decade for the state to unravel. Though not
the complete reason, the continued support Yugoslavia received from the West,
and particularly from America helped Yugoslavia remain a viable state
throughout the 1980s. In 1983 and 1984, an American-led group called the
‘Friends of Yugoslavia’ negotiated significant debt relief for the country, avoiding
near-certain economic collapse, while in 1984, the Reagan administration
confirmed its position that ‘an independent, economically viable, stable and
militarily capable Yugoslavia serves Western and U.S. interests.’ For America, a
unified Yugoslav state continued to represent a bulwark against Soviet
expansionism, and Yugoslav-American relations a reminder to Eastern Europe of
the advantages of friendly relations with the West. 59
By the late 1980s, however, Yugoslavia had lost its viability. As Drapac
explains,
This was not because Tito had squandered a golden opportunity, but because the
state had no obvious or admirable reason to exist… When Yugoslavia would no
longer seem a necessity in the global context, and once powerful outsiders had
less interest in its territorial integrity, then the will of the internal actors who
wanted change prevailed. 60

The 1985 election of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and his introduction
of the Glasnost and Perestroika policies had resulted in a number of nationalist
Drapac, Constructing Yugoslavia, 251–52.
NSDD 133, ‘U.S. Policy toward Yugoslavia -14 MAR 84’, National Security Decision Directives, 19811989, Reagan Presidential Library, accessed via
https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/Archives/reference/NSDDs.html#.WNzqtvIppU0
60
Drapac, Constructing Yugoslavia, 257.
58
59

279

movements across the Soviet Union, prompting a movement away from the
centralist communist model toward free elections and market economies. As the
Soviet Union moved closer towards dissolution, the geostrategic importance of
Yugoslavia to the West waned. Without the prospect of Soviet annexation,
Yugoslav disintegration was no longer a threat. The eventual collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and the fall of the
Soviet Union itself eroded any interest the West may have had in supporting a
Yugoslav state. However as Lampe states, ‘these dramatic events cost Yugoslavia
more than its strategic importance to the West. They also eliminated the
legitimacy of one-party rule across Eastern Europe.’ 61 The economic, political and
national issues that had been brewing in Yugoslavia since the 1970s were able to
come to the fore and determine the future of Yugoslavia’s republics, and Croatian
political activism finally found legitimacy.
For Croatian activism in Australia, these changes in the international political
environment were reinforced by the Hawke Government’s commitment to its
alliance with the United States, and as American interest in Yugoslavia waned, so
too did Australian interest. Furthermore, unlike the previous ALP Prime Minister
Whitlam, Yugoslavia did not factor into the foreign policy objectives of the
Hawke Government, which was more concerned with regional engagement, and
focused on its role as a ‘good citizen’ in the Asian-Pacific context. 62 However, it
would take one Croatian teenager to sour diplomatic relations between the two
countries and turn the tide for Croatian activism in Australia.

5.3.1. TOKIĆ SHOOTING
On 27 November 1988, approximately 1500 Croatians gathered at the
Yugoslav Consulate in Sydney for their annual ‘Yugoslav Day’ demonstration.
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Only a handful of police separating them from the Consulate, speakers addressed
the crowd through microphones, outlining the plight of occupied Croatia. Details
of what ensued next are not clear, but it seems as though the crowd had become
rowdy, and the heavily outnumbered police struggled to maintain control.
Meanwhile, a handful of youths had allegedly entered consulate grounds to tear
down a Yugoslav flag. Noticing the youths, the crowd surged forward, and a few
more jumped the fence. Meanwhile, a Yugoslav security guard for reasons
unknown, fired his gun at the crowd through the gate, hitting 16-year old Josip
Tokić in the neck. 63
Naturally, the Croatian community was outraged, and demanded nothing
less than the immediate closure of all Yugoslav missions and expulsion of
Yugoslav officials. Though gravely concerned, the Australian Government initially
demanded only that the security guard - alleged Matijas Zoran - present himself
to police for questioning, that his gun be made available for examination, and
that the Yugoslav Ambassador, Boris Cizelj, would assure that Zoran would not
attempt to leave Australia before the matter had been resolved. Cizelj agreed to
these requests, and by 29 November, the police believed they had enough
evidence to charge Zoran. However, diplomatic conventions meant that while he
remained at the consulate they were unable to arrest him without the permission
of Cizelj. 64
As the Australian government waited for Cizelj to respond to their requests,
Croatians held meetings, demonstrations, and vigils out of protest, while
Australians were left questioning the diplomatic implications of the situation,
and how it had been able to occur in the first place. The diplomatic impasse
slowly escalated, and on 30 November, both Hawke and his Foreign Affairs
minister Gareth Evans warned that the Yugoslavs could face expulsions or closure
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if they continued to hold out on the arrest. On 1 December, Cizelj received formal
warning that if Yugoslav authorities did not hand over Zoran within 24 hours, the
consulate would be closed and staff ordered to leave. 65
At 6pm on Friday 2 December, the Yugoslav Consulate-General in Sydney
was closed, and all 21 people connected to the consulate ordered to leave the
country by 6pm Monday– the first time any Government had closed a diplomatic
mission in Australia. 66 On 6 December, Belgrade retaliated with the expulsion of
three Australian diplomats. Though Evans ruled out the possibility of any further
action against Yugoslav representatives or a complete severance of diplomatic
relations, the relationship between the two countries had soured significantly. 67
Before reconciliations could be made, Yugoslavia would begin to unravel, and on
16 January 1992, Australia would become the first country outside of Europe to
recognise the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.

K. Scott, ‘Surrender guard or be closed: Evans’, Canberra Times, 2 December 1988, 1,3.
H. O’Neil, ‘Ultimatum on Gunman’, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 December 1988, 1.
66
K. Scott, ‘A diplomatic first: Yugoslavs forced out’, Canberra Times, 3 December 1988, 1,2.
P. Grigson, ‘Yugoslavs out: now for the backlash’, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 December 1988, 1.
67
K. Scott, ‘Evans holds fire’, Canberra Times, 7 December 1988, 1.
‘Time for calm with Yugoslavia’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 1988, 18.
65

282

5.4. EPILOGUE
On 17 June 1989, the Croatian Democratic Union – Hrvatska Demokratska
zajednica (HDZ) was formed in Zagreb, electing Franjo Tuđman as its president.
Though it was not yet an official organisation, its policy of incorporating émigré
Croatians into their political program, meant that almost immediately after its
establishment, representatives travelled to diaspora communities around the
world to establish branches and gather support. More practically, however, these
travels through the diaspora resulted in substantially large financial contributions
to the party. In late August, prominent Osijek lawyer and Croatian dissident
Vladimir Šeks came to Australia, establishing official HDZ branches in Sydney,
and Melbourne. With this act, the post-war political activism of the Croatian
community in Australia was reconnected with its homeland, four decades after its
expulsion by Tito. From this moment, Croatian political activism entered an
entirely new period that would see Croatia declare independence, fight an
incredibly violent war to do so, rebuild the country from its war-torn pieces, and
eventually enter the European Union as a modern, if still nascent, country.
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On 18 July 2016, the ABC’s panel discussion program Q&A hosted a Senator
from each of the parties newly elected in the wake of Australia’s 2016 election.
This included Pauline Hanson, whose successful relaunch of her One Nation
party resulted in four Senate seats. Just four days earlier, a radicalised TunisianMuslim man had deliberately driven a truck into crowds celebrating Bastille Day
in Nice, resulting in 86 deaths and injuring a further 434 people. Naturally,
conversation turned to this latest in a string of Islamic State-inspired terror
attacks, and in defending her anti-Islamic rhetoric, Hanson declared that
We have terrorism on the streets that we’ve never had before. We’ve had murders
committed under the name of Islam, as we have the Lindt café, Curtis Cheng and
the two police officers in Melbourne, right? So this has happened. You have
radicalisation…2

Before she could continue, host Tony Jones interjected to clarify her assertion
that Australia had never experienced terrorism. He explained that:
When you say we never had terrorism in this country before, that’s simply not
the case. In the 1970s there were multiple bombings by Croatian Catholic
extremists. This has happen in Australia before. It’s not the first time. We should
at least get that straight.3

Members of the Croatian community were outraged at Jones’ assertion, with one
even starting an online petition demanding Jones apologise that attracted over
4000 signatures.4 On 20 July, the front cover of Croatian newspaper Za Dom
Spremni carried the headline of ‘You have lied – Apology needed!’ and labelled
Jones the ‘biggest enemy of Croatian Community in Australia.’5

‘Senate Powerbrokers’, Panel Discussion, Q&A (ABC, 18 July 2016),
http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s4485524.htm.
3
ibid.
4
S. Chingaipe, ‘Petition from Croatian Community Takes Issue with Q&A Host’, SBS News, 20 July 2016,
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2016/07/19/petition-croatian-community-takes-issue-qa-host,
accessed 22 July 2016.
J. Miljak, ‘Tony Jones: Croatian Community Demands Apology for Claims Of “terror” involvement’,
Change.org, https://www.change.org/p/tony-jones-croatian-community-demands-apology-for-claimsof-terror-involvement, accessed 2 August 2016.
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Interestingly, in defending his claim, Jones and the ABC both cited the
documents tabled by Murphy during his Ministerial Statement on 27 March 1973
as the evidence for their claims.6 Though Jones never did apologise for his
statements, this incident demonstrates that the issue of post-war Croatian
activism still reverberates in the present. Not only are responses still informed by
misunderstandings, falsehoods, and the selections, simplifications, and silences
in Murphy’s Ministerial Statement, but post-war Croatian activism is still
deployed as a political football whenever it seems fit. That Jones emphasised
Croatian Catholic extremists demonstrates how easily Croatian activism was and
is construed to meet the political purpose of the time. The Catholicism of
Croatians was incidental, rather than integral, to their activism, however, given
that Jones was making his point in relation to the current political debate over
Islamic-inspired terrorism, and Hanson’s record of islamophobia, the nature of
Croatian activism was simply equated with their religious identity.
The contemporary resonance of this thesis becomes even clearer when we
begin to draw comparisons between the experiences of Croatians, particularly in
the 1970s, with the contemporary experience of Muslims in Australia, particularly
since 2014, a year which brought the spectre of terrorism to the doorstep of a
nation accustomed to being slightly removed from global conflict. On 15
December 2014, as Sydney went about its Monday morning rhythms, Mon Haron
Monis took siege of 18 hostages in the Lindt café at Martin Place. Declaring it an
attack on Australia by Islamic State, the ordeal lasted into the early morning of 16
December, and resulted in two civilian deaths and the death of Monis. For many,
the ‘Sydney Siege’ capped off a year in which the spectre of terrorism loomed
large over Australia - the radicalisation of young Australian Muslims, the rising
number of individuals leaving the country to ‘join the jihad’, evidence of
recruitment via social media, and claims of secret terrorist training camps, all
shattered the illusion that terrorism was something that happened ‘over there’,

M. Robin, ‘Croatian Newspaper Calls Tony Jones Its ‘Biggest Enemy’’, Crikey, 25 July 2016,
https://www.crikey.com.au/2016/07/25/croats-set-sights-on-tony-jones/, accessed 27 July 2016.
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by individuals that were ‘not us’. The Lindt Café siege was the realisation of
Australia’s worst fears; a terrorist attack on home soil.
In Australia, these issues were steeped in a wider and longer context of
political and social discomfort regarding the Muslim community in Australia. In
the ‘post 9/11’ world, islamophobia had become a growing feature of the political
and social landscape. The 2002 Bali Bombings, the 2004 Australian Embassy
bombing in Jakarta, and the 2005 uncovering of a terrorist plot targeting Sydney
provided the fuel for a growing cultural anxiety about the place of Muslim
Australians in the nation, which spilled into the streets in December 2005 in what
became the Cronulla riots. These anxieties blurred neatly with the issue of ‘boat
people’, that is, asylum seekers arriving to Australia by boat, which rose to
national prominence concurrently with terrorism and islamophobia. Both
terrorism and asylum seeker arrivals concerned questions of national security,
predominantly involving the Muslim ‘other’, and were underpinned by rising
islamophobia. Thus, not only did both issues come to mutually reinforce the
other, but were also mutually reinforced by the islamophobia that both
underpinned, and arose out of, the issues. As events in 2014 escalated, so too did
cultural tensions, which manifested in controversies surrounding Halal
certification, calls to ‘Ban the Burqa’, accusations of ‘creeping Sharia Law’,
proposed amendments to racial vilification laws, and the political return of
Pauline Hanson herself. Perhaps the best indication of how entrenched the issue
of islamophobia had become by the end of 2014 arose out of the Lindt Cafe Siege
itself, when Australians, anticipating an islamophobic backlash, rallied around
the twitter hashtag #illridewithyou in order to demonstrate solidarity with
Muslim Australians.
To the casual observer, these events seemed indicative of an unprecedented
chapter in Australia’s history, framed by a new and complex geopolitical reality.
However to this fledgling historian, it all seemed a little too familiar. To borrow
from Twain, while history may not have been repeating, it sure was rhyming. As
events unfolded throughout my PhD candidature, the similarities between the
287

current events I was witnessing, and the past events I was researching were
becoming increasingly harder to ignore. So when on 16 February 2014 the front
page of the Sunday Telegraph declared that a ‘Secret bush terror camp’ had been
in operation in regional NSW, I thought of the front page of the Sun Herald on 2
September 1978 declaring that police had raided the training camp of a Croatian
‘Secret Army’, also in regional NSW. When news broke in February and again in
September that police forces had arrested and charged individuals with
conspiracy to commit terrorist acts on Australian soil, I thought of the case of the
Croatian Six, who were convicted in 1981 for the same reason. The moral outrage
levelled at those leaving Australia to join ISIS echoed those in 1963 and 1972 over
young Croatian men leaving Australia to mount incursions into the territories of
Yugoslavia. The scenes that played out on my television of the dawn raids on
September 18 replicated the images which arose out of the raids carried out on
the homes of Croatians over multiple years, but particularly on 1 April 1973. And
finally, the concern of the Islamic community in the wake of the Lindt Cafe Siege
that the actions of one would come to define the many, was one voiced by
Croatians over and over again.
Despite the differences in context, circumstance, and time, in each of these,
the echoes of Australia’s responses to Croatian activism could be felt in the
present. In part, it was Abbott’s exhortation to join ‘Team Australia’ on 18 August
20147 that the sustained déjà vu started to make sense - it was not the
Croatianness of the past that was resonating, but the Australianness of it all.
Though the rhetoric of Team Australia may have been new, the ideas
underpinning it were anything but, and bring to the fore a story as old as modern
Australia itself – the relationship between Australia and the ‘Other’ in its midst.
Put simply, Muslim Australians were now occupying the space Croatian
Australians had once occupied, which has also been held by Asian Australians,
Irish Catholic Australians, and a number of iterations of the ‘Other’. Likewise, in
Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’, we can hear echoes of Pauline Hanson’s ‘One Nation’,
Commonwealth of Australia, Prime Minister Tony Abbott, Interview with Ray Hadley, 2GB, 18 August
2014, transcript: https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-08-18/interview-ray-hadley-radio-2gb, accessed
9 January 2015.
7

288

John Howard’s ‘One Australia’ policy, Calwell’s ‘New Australians’, and the ‘White
Australia’ policy, all of which sought to mediate this relationship.
This thesis has argued that there are three aspects which mediate the
relationship between Australia and its migrant ‘Other’. The first are the push and
pull factors which act as catalysts for migration, and determine the composition
and characteristics of the community that develops in Australia. This in turn
determines the activities and causes around which these communities in
Australia organise. Without understanding these push and pull factors, the
migrant ‘Other’ in Australia cannot be contextualised, explained, nor understood.
The second aspect is the concept of the Good Australian Migrant - a highly
constructed identity, imbued with a set of expectations and provisions upon
which migrant ‘Other’ is perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. It
embodies what I call the ‘expectations of oughts’ – of what Australia ought to be,
of how Australians ought to behave, and of who migrants ought to be and how
they ought to behave. Though the substance of these expectations of oughts have
evolved as historical, political, social, and cultural changes have exerted their
influence, they still provide the foundations from which the relationship between
Australia and the migrant ‘Other’ is mediated.
Finally, domestic, transnational, and international contexts arbitrate the first
two aspects, establishing the paradigms within which they are created and
understood. These paradigms shape the responses of legal, political, and media
authorities to particular migrant groups, who occupy varying spaces and levels of
the ‘Other’. As these contexts change, so too do the paradigms through which
migrants are understood, and therefore legal, political, and media responses. In
the case of Australian responses to Croatian activism in the post-war period,
there are three distinct paradigm shifts around which responses can be grouped,
1947-1971, 1972-1979, and 1980-1989.
The first period, 1947-1971, was informed by the experience and aftermath of
WWII and Australia’s establishment of the post-war immigration programme.
These created conditions for the settlement and development of the post-war
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Croatian community, who pursued a political agenda that sought to establish a
Croatian identity as separate from a Yugoslav one and advocated for an
independent Croatian state. Though this activism was problematic in the eyes of
Australian authorities, responses were tempered by the Cold War myopia of
Australian politics and the adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. These
paradigms were disrupted by the changes of the 1960’s in international and
domestic contexts, as well as changes within the Croatian community itself.
The second period, 1972-1979, was defined by the symbolism of Croatian
activism in Australia’s changing social and political environment. At the
beginning of the decade, the election of Whitlam and his government ushered in
a disavowal of the Cold War myopia that had defined the previous period. As a
result of this disavowal, Croatians found themselves at the centre of a moral
panic, their activism conflated with extremism and terrorism, they themselves a
political football deployed by both the Australian and Yugoslav governments in
their foreign policy endeavours. At the same time, the introduction of
multiculturalism opened up a legitimate space for Croatian activism and allowed
the community to address and redress the reputation that the Whitlam
Government had ascribed them with, and an opportunity to re-brand Croatian
activism. Though the Eden and Croatian Six arrests in 1978 and 1979 threatened
to undo much of this re-branding, responses were mitigated by the paradigm
shifts under way in the late 1970s that had changed Australia’s social political
environment once more.
The final period, 1980-1989 was defined by shifts in both the domestic and
international contexts that caused Croatian independence to become politically
acceptable, and in some corners, even desirable. The reconfiguration of Croatian
activism within the paradigms of multiculturalism allowed it to sit better within
the Good Australian Migrant framework, while the rise of second-generation
Croatians and the arrival of a third wave of Croatian migrants reinforced these
changes. Asian immigration caused a disruption in immigration paradigms,
challenging the general consensus on multiculturalism as a successful or desired
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policy. However it was the death of the President of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito,
and the general demise of communism worldwide, that gave Croatian political
activism its legitimacy, for Yugoslavia was no longer of strategic importance.
Like most scholarship that is concerned with establishing new paradigms
through which histories can be approached, this thesis has served to exacerbate,
rather than solve, the paradox of Croatian political activism in Australia, creating
more and not less demand for further research. This thesis perpetuates many of
the issues identified in the literature review in the name of scope, but which
could and should be addressed. The first is the use of the customary post-war
definition of the Croatian ‘community’ as those who organised around overtly
Croatian organisations that were of the ‘proper’ political inclination, and in
particular those associated with the Catholic Church, folkloric, and football
organisations. The activisms and responses of groups outside of these structures
should be investigated in order to better reflect the heterogeneity of Croatians in
Australia.
In particular, Croatian Yugoslav communities and Croatian Muslim
communities both deserve further historical attention. Croatian Yugoslav
communities stood in the most direct opposition to the traditional Croatian
‘community’, and would provide an interesting and important comparative study
in the navigation of Croatian nationhood and identity during this period. The
Croatian Muslim community, on the other hand, was initially integrated within
the traditional Croatian ‘community’, and even established a Croatian Islamic
Society that cooperated with other Croatian organisations. By the end of the
1980s, however, this section of the community had become completely invisible.
Investigating how and why this change occurred would be another avenue of
research that would result in a more nuanced understanding of Croatian activism
in Australia.
This narrow definition of the Croatian ‘community’ also does not distinguish
between the different communities across Australia, and perpetuates the unfair
predominance of communities in NSW, VIC, and the ACT. Just as Australian
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communities varied from state-to-state and city-to-city, so too did Croatian
communities. Comparative studies need to be undertaken in order to capture this
diversity. Particular attention should be paid to the Croatian communities of
South Australia and Western Australia, who once formed the epicentres of
Croatian communities, and whose histories vary significantly from those on the
east coast of Australia.
A similar issue arises in the question of sources. This thesis has relied
predominantly on Federal Hansard, the collections of the National Archives of
Australia, and the three main newspapers of Sydney, Melbourne, and Canberra –
the Sydney Morning Herald, Age, and Canberra Times respectively, which on its
own contributes to the issue of fragmentation. Expanding the range of sources to
State Hansard and archival holdings, as well as state and regional newspapers
would mitigate the east-centric approach of this thesis and the study of Croatians
in this period generally. The comparative histories that would arise from such
research would better reflect the range of responses to Croatians and their
activism, and incorporate regional or local contexts that have been overlooked by
the general and national approach of this thesis.
Perhaps the most important undertaking for future research, at least in terms
of the history of Croatians in Australia, will be to address the lack of primary
sources and dearth of historical research into Croatians and their activism. The
overwhelming majority of the everyday and grassroots history of Croatians and
their activism remain behind private doors, uncollected and diminishing as time
passes. Without a concerted effort to collect and archive these oral and
ephemeral histories, this history will never be more than that which its
leadership has portrayed it to be. Each and every period, moment, and form of
activism mentioned in this thesis could make up a thesis of its own. These range
from the more obvious cases, such as the two incursions in 1963 and 1972, the
violence of the late 1960s/early 1970s, the Croatian ‘Embassy’, and perhaps most
importantly, the case of the Croatian Six, to those that were less remarkable but
no less significant, such as the yearly 10 Travanj celebrations or November
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Yugoslavia Day demonstrations. Plugging the gaps in the history of Croatians, as
it were, will be an undertaking of unlimited size and scope, but a worthwhile one
nonetheless.
The most politically fraught of future research directions will be to
investigate the allegations of Croatian terrorism, counter-allegations of Yugoslav
agents provocateurs, and the implication of Australian governments and their
agencies within this. Though it is unlikely that a definitive answer will ever be
found, any clarifications or new understandings that can be made, should be
made. It is telling how little historical attention has been paid to this field when
Murphy’s Ministerial Statement of deliberate selections, simplifications, and
silences is still taken as a benchmark of ‘proof.’ The importance of this research
does not lie in its ascription of guilt or innocence – most of those involved in
these activities have long passed – but in clearing up as much ambiguity as
possible so as to depoliticise this history. When these competing histories are
able to talk with each other, rather than at each other, we will be able to
understand the context in which these events were able to occur. This knowledge
can only become more valuable as the increasing spectre of global terrorism and
politically motivated violence exerts its influence on our present.
Ultimately, it is hoped that the model of analysis adopted by this thesis can
make an important conceptual contribution to the study of Croatians in
Australia, as well as Australia’s relationship with its migrant ‘Other’. By applying
the three aspects which mediate this relationship – the push and pull factors of
migration, the concept of the Good Australian Migrant, and the intersections of
domestic, transnational, and international contexts – further research of
Croatians in Australia can move understandings away from the descriptive and
confrontational histories that currently define it, to those of critical interrogation
that integrate contextual environments in order to create more nuanced histories
and knowledge. By changing the components of these three aspects - for example
substituting Croatians for another migrant group, adjusting the contextual time
periods, and maybe even substituting Australia for another country – new
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historical perspectives can be developed and comparative studies produced from
which historians can interpret the relationship between host societies and their
migrant ‘Others’.
This approach may also be able to be applied to more recent or even present
situations that are comparative in nature in order better understand the various
aspects influencing our perceptions, in an attempt to avoid the mistakes of the
past, and perhaps even help prepare for the future. For example, Australia’s
current relationship with the Migrant ‘Other’ of asylum seekers and ‘boat people’
can be understood, managed, and even influenced through these three aspects.
Understanding why asylum seekers are leaving the country of origin, and why
they are choosing to come to Australia can have both practical implications, such
as informing policy planning, and symbolic implications, such as influencing
rhetoric. Interrogating what the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant
currently are, and whether we accept this vision helps deconstruct why asylum
seekers are perceived, understood, and ultimately judged, in the way that they
are. Like the post-war government was able to deploy the Good Australian
Migrant to promote acceptance of their mass immigration programme, so too can
the figure of the Good Australian Migrant be deployed to influence immigration
policy today. Finally, situating these two aspects within current national and
international contexts can help determine the paradigms that are guiding
responses.
This process will become more and more pronounced as conflict becomes
increasingly global in nature and outcome. The devastation and displacement
caused by the conflicts over the last few years have produced the worst migration
crisis since World War II. Unlike previous years, where this displacement was
relatively contained in the East and Africa, forced migration has begun to directly
impact the West as larger numbers are travelling further and further to seek
refuge. This is particularly the case in Europe, where in 2015 alone, over a million
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people literally walked across the continent in search of safety.8 According to the
UNHCR, global, social and economic trends indicate that not only will
displacement continue to grow in the next decade, but will begin to take different
forms. Population growth, rising poverty, food insecurity, urbanisation, climate
change, natural disasters, and conflict over scarce resources are expected to
become the main causes of displacement, and most of this displacement is
expected to occur in Africa and Asia.9 Voluntary temporary and permanent
migration is also increasing, as advancing technologies, emerging industries, and
economic disparities facilitate the movement of people. Further complicating the
situation is that it is becoming increasingly harder to distinguish between the
causes of migration, and between forced and voluntary migration. As
WorldWatch notes,
It will be increasingly difficult to easily categorize people displaced by separate
causes. Environmental problems are often closely intertwined with
socioeconomic conditions such as poverty and inequality of land ownership,
resource disputes, poorly designed development projects, and weak governance.10

While Australia may be afforded some reprieve from these issues by virtue of its
distance, to believe that the population movement will bypass it altogether would
be an act of extreme naivety or wilful ignorance. The presence of the ‘Other’ in
Australia, and indeed of multiple ‘Others’, is only going to become more
substantial as voluntary and forced migration come to define our geopolitical
reality.
How well poised are we as a nation to deal with this? If our history is
anything to go by, the answer does not look promising. However, history is
fundamental to understanding our perceptions and reactions to the world around
us, and therefore it is important that the stories of our ‘Others’ be heard, to
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December
2015,
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identify the rhymes in our history and make them work to our collective
advantage, rather than disadvantage. As Lack and Templeton point out,
Social tensions may indeed arise from time to time, but is exclusion of the victims
the only, the best, or the most realistic solution to such problems? Critics look
pessimistically at ethnic conflicts elsewhere but too rarely at the histories behind
such conflicts or circumstances in which they have arisen. Perhaps they should
be taken as illuminating particular histories rather than as inevitable outcomes of
any ethnic mixing.11

This thesis is an attempt to bring one of the perpetrators of this social tension in
Australia out from the periphery. Australian responses to post-war Croatian
settlement in Australia and the political activism of its community are not simple
narratives of Good Vs. Bad Migrants, but of competing, conflicting, and
concurrent histories, contexts, and influences which demonstrate that
Australians have never truly been ‘excluded’ from world events. As Tavan warns,
‘history attests to the willingness of populations to scapegoat minority groups
during periods of insecurity.’12 With the beckoning of a future defined by greater
insecurity than that which has come, it is important we explore this history and
at the very least, learn to recognise the rhymes.

11
12

Lack and Templeton, Bold Experiment, 163.
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Questions.

may have arrived. As the honorable memÿ mised to the United Nations and is not in
ber knows, educational matters are now default in any way. In addition to making
dealt with primarily by Senator Gorton, the payment promised, Australia is bearing,
who is in another place, and he may have the major part of the cost of maintaining
received a communication. I will make it the police force there. As I said, I have not
my business to find out whether he has, and seen the report and cannot comment on it.
to find out, also, the attitude of the Austraÿ However, on the rendering of it given by
lian Universities Commission on the point. the honorable member, I would say that it
At present I am not informed, but I will is false.
inform myself and then I will inform the
honorable member.
YUGOSLAV IMMIGRANT
ORGANISATIONS.
NYLON STOCKINGS.
Dr. MACKAY.7 I should like to ask
Ministerial Statement.
the Prime Minister a question. The Press
Sir ROBERT MENZIES (Kooyong7
recently has contained reports that a certain
cross parliamentarian from Queensland has Prime Minister)7b y leave7Fo r some time,
sent quantities of used nylon stockings to there have been references both in the
the Prime Minister. Has the Prime Minister Parliament and elsewhere to the activities
received these stockings? Has he examined of certain Yugoslav immigrant organisaÿ
them carefully? Will he cause additional tions. The Government is, and over a period
and equally independent scientific examinaÿ has been, in possession of considerable
tion to be made of the strength of the fibres information on these activities. Certain of
used and of the possibility of stronger synÿ this information is embodied in replies which
thetic fibres of suitable specifications being are being made separately to the series of
used by the manufacturers of stockings? questions on the matter which were asked
Sir
in the previous parliamentary session. This
ROBERT MENZIES.7Thi s is a very
applies to questions asked by the honorable
interesting matter. I have received a letter
member for Yarra (Dr. J. F. Cairns), answers
from the honorable member for Brisbane.
to which he should get today. However,
Did you also send some stockings?
I feel I should also take the opportunity to
make some observations to the House about
Mr. Cross.7Yes .
the Government's general policy in
Sir ROBERT MENZIES.7 I am bound
relation to migrant organisations and about
immigration from Yugoslavia.
to tell the House, as I told him yesterday,
that my wife, on reading newspaper reports
that a miserable bachelor was taking an In the years since World War n , Ausÿ
interest in this problem and making these tralia's immigration programme has brought
complaints, said to me: ÿHeavens! He is to this country people from all parts of
on to it, is he? I have been complaining Europe with a diversity of historical and
about it for years.ÿ I ended, as usual, by cultural backgrounds. Many of these people
being wrong both ways.
were refugees from oppression. Many
derived from happier circumstances. This
UNITED NATIONS.
flow of new citizens has played an importÿ
Mr. GALVIN.7 I direct a question to
ant part in building the nation. It is someÿ
the Minister for External Affairs. Is it
thing which has given us great satisfaction
correct, as recently reported, that Australia
and we wish to see it continue. However,
still owes to the United Nations an amount
it is basic to our immigration policy that all
of £36,500, the balance of the £94,000
these new citizens should be integrated as
pledged for the maintenance of the peaceÿ
fully, and as quickly, as possible into Ausÿ
keeping force in Cyprus? If the report is
tralia's national life. The people of Ausÿ
correct, when is it intended to pay the tralia endorse this approach and, as part of
outstanding amount?
its migration programme, the Government
Mr. HASLUCK.7 I have not seen this has enlisted the help of community and
report My understanding of the matter is public bodies throughout the Commonÿ
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In this regard and on the whole the proÿ Slovenes, under the Serbian King Alexander.
gramme of integration has met with great The Serbs obtained their independence from
the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth
success.
century and were numerically the largest
The Government is not taking an attitude group in the new State. The Croats had against
immigrants from particular counÿ formerly enjoyed a degree of autonomy tries
joining in their own associations. We within the AustroÿHungarian empire and do
not expect newcomers to turn their backs retained a national identity dating back as on
their original heritage. On the contrary, early as the ninth century. Deep differences it is
wholly understandable that immigrants of religious, cultural and historical kinds should
establish organisations amongst themÿ have existed between the groups despite selves for
a variety of social and cultural kindred racial origins.
purposes. It rather follows the precedents
of the Irish and Scots in this country. These Within the new State, the Croats sought
a
federal concept of government with a
organisations, as honorable members will
lar
ge degree of local autonomy. In 1923,
know, can also be a most valuable means
th
of assisting migrants to become fully inteÿ e leader of the Croats, Stjepan Radic of
t he Croatian Peasant Part y and two of his
grated into the Australian community. I
have no doubt that the great majority of colleagues were assassinated in the Parliaÿ
ment in Belgrade. This precipitated a proÿ
organisations and societies to which found breach between Serbs and Croats.
migrants belong come within the category
The Croats developed strong agitation in
to which I have just been referring. Howÿ support of independence, Peasant Party
ever, the Government looks with disfavour
leaders taking their cause to the League of
on any activities of any migrant organisation
Nations. Some Croat parliamentary repreÿ
which lend to frustrate integration.
sentatievs were arrested, others, among
them Dr. Ante Pavelic, went into exile.
The possibility always exists that at some
point, the activities of a particular immiÿ It was at this time that a revolutionary
grant organisation, or the activities of indiÿ movement called Ustashi, meaning ÿ insurÿ
viduals within that organisation, may transÿ gents ÿ was founded, both in Croatia and
gress the law. As necessary, investigations abroad, Pavelic being one of its first leaders.
are made, and will be made, into the This movement, in common with other
activities of various organisations including Croat organisations, took as its symbol the
some which are not organisations of traditional Croatian emblem of a white and
migrants alone or even primarily. If, as a red check shield but associated with this
result of these investigations, there is eviÿ emblem the letter ÿ U ÿ . The traditional
dence of illegal activities on the part of an emblem, both with and without the ÿ U ÿ,
organisation, or individuals within an is to be found in extensive use today by
organisation, evidence which would be Croatian migrant groups throughout the
receivable in a court of law, then steps world.
will be taken promptly, as may be approÿ
It is difficult for people coming to Ausÿ
priate to the particular case, to appeal to tralia easily to forget their historical backÿ the
law of the State or to invoke the releÿ grounds. Since the war a number of organiÿ vant
Commonwealth legislation. I add howÿ sations opposed to the present Government ever, by
way of reminder to the House, of Yugoslavia have developed throughout that it is
not and never has been the pracÿ the world amongst refugees and migrants tice to make
details of security investigations
from that country. It is understandable that
available or public.
some Yugoslav migrants of Croatian oriÿ
gin should continue to hope for the estabÿ
I turn now to the matter of immigration lishment of an independent Croatia and
from Yugoslavia. To understand the attiÿ within a democracy like Australia they have
tudes of these migrants it is necessary to a right to advocate their views so long as
remind ourselves that this part of Europe they do so by legitimate means. I wish to
has an exceedingly complex and troubled make it perfectly clear that the vast majority history.
Yugoslavia emerged from the politiÿ of the migrants from all parts of Yugoslavia cal
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Commonwealth and State authorities are Government's point of view, if we are to
continuing their investigations of Yugoslav have the full discussion on this matter that
and other organisations. Recently the Acting we believe we ought to have.
Premier of Victoria issued a statement on
Sir ROBERT MENZIES.7Th e answer
police inquiries in that State. He said that
to
that
is: ÿ Yes ÿ.
the police had found ÿ that isolated acts
of assault and misbehaviour had occurred Debate (on motion by Mr. Calwell)
but found no evidence whatever to support adjourned.
allegations of Ustashi violence towards
individuals of Yugoslav nationality from
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.
which systematic or organised attacks could
be inferredÿ. That I take to mean that
Motion (by Mr. Fairh/all)7b y leave7
individual attacks have been noted but not proposed7
an organised or systematic series of attacks. (1) That Mr. J. M. Fraser be appointed a memÿ
Similar allegations made in Cairns also were, ber of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs in
I understand, found by the Queensland the place of Mr. Howson, discharged from
police to be unsubstantiated. The Commonÿ attendance.
(2) That the foregoing resolution be communiÿ
wealth's own investigations so far have not
produced any evidence which would warÿ ca ted to the Senate by message.
Mr. CALWELL (Melbourne7Leade r of
rant legal proceedings.
the Opposition) [11.28].7Mr . Deputy
I wish to make the Government's posiÿ Speaker, I understand that the motion that
Sir, and that is the real purpose of this
tion in this regard quite plain, however,

f the Foreign Affairs Committee into two
are discussing arises from the splitting

statement, as well as to intimate at the divisions7th e first division and the second
same time that the particular questions division. This is not a division, in cowboy
asked in detail have been answered in detail, fashion, between the goodies and the
though not in this statement. So I make baddies. The Committee is split into two
the Government's position quite clear: This divisions each of which is composed of
Government will not interfere with freedom members who sit on the Government side
of opinion. Equally, it will not tolerate any of the Parliament. The honorable member
activiiies which constitute a breach of the for Moreton (Mr. Killen) was appointed to
law.
the Committee the other day, and the
discharge of the Minister for Air (Mr.
I present the following paper7
Yugoslav Immigrant Organisations7Ministeria l Howson) from it has necessitated the proÿ
motion of a member from the second diviÿ
Statement, 27th August 19647
sion to the first division. So the honorable
and move7
member for Wannon (Mr. Malcolm Fraser)
That the House take note of the paper.
is now to go into the first division.
Mr. Calwell.7Mr . Deputy Speaker, I
Mr. Curtin.7Tha t will improve it.
wish to ask the Prime Minister (Sir Robert
Menzies) a question about this matter. He Mr. CALWELL.7 I do not know whether has
said that answers7lon g delayed7t o it will. This Committee leaves us comÿ
questions that were put on notice on 5th pletely uninterested. We have never said at
March last will be forwarded to the honorÿ any time since 1951 that we would not
able member for Yarra (Dr. J. F. Cairns) join a foreign affairs committee, but we
today, and, of course, made public. I ask: have always said that we would join one
Will the House have an opportunity7 only on our terms.
indeed, will it be accorded the right7whe n
Mr. Whittorn.7O n your terms!
the debate is resumed and this matter is
discussed, to canvass the whole of the issues
Mr. CALWELL.7Precisely , on our
raised by the honorable member for Yarra rms. That is clear enough. The Gov ernÿ
in his questions, which may or may not in te
ment's attitude is equally clear. It says:
his opinion be answered satisfactorily? In
ÿThese are our terms. We want you to
other words, I want from the Prime Minisÿ
join. We shall be very angry if you do not.
ter an assurance that the canvassing of any
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(2) that Mr President and Mr Speaker be ducting business were to be proceeded with,
joint chairmen of the joint meeting that is, if honourable senators were to ask
and be empowered, if they think it
necessary, to draw up regulations for questions of Ministers about any matters that
the conduct of such joint meeting; concern them. I also would be quite happy to
and
proceed to the making of the statement which
(3) that at such a joint meeting there be I had intended to ask the Senate to allow me
no debate on the subject matter of
the alternative sites and that the quesÿ leave to make. The only difficulty I see is the
tion be decided by a majority of difficulty occasioned by the passage of a few
votes;
moments while certain documents are brought
Invites Members of the House of Represenÿ into the chamber to me. I did not anticipate
tatives to join with Senators in the Senate that it would be necessary to have them availÿ
Chamber or such other place as may be able right away. Perhaps I can table those determined
by Mr President and Mr Speaker
documents at the end of my statement. I
for the purpose of the joint meeting;
And further invites the House of Represenÿ accede to the proposition that has been put
tatives to suggest any alternative to or by the Leader of the Opposition (Senator
modification of the Senate's proposal, with a Withers).
view to the convening of a joint meeting of
Question resolved in the affirmative.
members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives
to determine finally the
question where the new and permanent Parÿ
CROATIAN TERRORISM
liament House be situated'.
Ministerial Statement
Senator MURPHY (New South Wales7
ESTATE D U T Y
AttorneyÿGeneral and Minister for Customs
Notice of Motion
and Excise)7M r President, I seek leave to
Senator K A N E (New South Wales)7I give make a statement on Croatian terrorism, to
notice that on the next day of sitting I shall table documents in relation to that subject
move:
and to have incorporated in Hansard a sumÿ
That leave be given to bring in a Bill for an Act mary of the documents.
to terminate estate duty.
The PRESIDENT7I s leave granted?
SUSPENSION OF STANDING ORDERS
Senator Withers7M r President
Croatian Terrorism and Related Matters
The
PRESIDENT7Ar e you refusing
Senator WITHERS (Western Aust ra l i aÿ leave?
Leader of the Opposition) (3.4)7 I move:
Senator Withers7No , I am not refusÿ
That so much of the Standing Orders be susÿ ing leave. Although
I am prepared to
pended7
allow such a statement to be put down withÿ
(1) as would prevent question time being postÿ out the normal 2 hours notice being given, I
poned until after the Leader of the Governÿ do not know whether I should permit docuÿ
ment in tbe Senate, Senator Murphy, has
made his statement relating to Croatian terrorÿ ments which I have not seen to be incorporÿ
ism and related matters, which the public has ated in Hansard. Senator Murphy has asked been
informed will be made this day; and
for leave to do several things. The Opposition
(2) as would prevent questions being asked during will grant leave to his making a statement.
question time relating to that statement.
But, as to the other matters, I think he ought
I will be quite brief in what I have to say to wait until he has made his statement
about this motion, Mr President. Since last before asking for leave. I do not think he
Friday week the Senate and the public at needs leave to table documents. He has the
large have been awaiting the making of such right to table documents. Therefore I do not
a statement. Certain statements have been see why he has sought leave in that respect.
made in the media in which it has been canÿ But I think we ought to deal with any request
vassed that certain persons in this place could to incorporate documents at the moment he
have their political or personal reputations seeks leave to incorporate them. We certainly
put at stake. This is a statement which ought give leave to Senator Murphy to make a
to be made as early as possible. Therefore I statement.
commend the motion to the Senate.
Senator MURPHY7M r President, I want
Senator MURPHY (New South Wales7
to put evidence before the Senate in a conÿ
AttorneyÿGeneral and Minister for Customs venient form. There is a table of that eviÿ
and Excise) (3.5)7M r President, I would be dence. I do not see why, even at this stage,
quite happy if the ordinary course of conÿ the Leader of the Opposition
(Senator
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Withers) should be placing difficulties in the by the Australian authorities to have been
way of my doing so. However, 1 will do the defunct for some years, had been reorganised
best I can. 1 will proceed now, if there is no early in 1972 as the HIRO (Croatian Illegal
Revolutionary Organisation).
objection.
Following receipt of this aideÿmemoire, the
The PRESIDENT7i s leave granted for
Senator Murphy to make a statement on Commonwealth and State police conducted a
Croatian terrorism? There being no objection, series of raids in Melbourne and Sydney durÿ leave
ing the month of August and a great deal of
is granted.
material
was seized. It is to be assumed that
Senator MURPHY7 I have never accepted
the
first
law
officer of Australia, the Attorneyÿ
the proposition that we must get used to polÿ
itical terrorism, involving bombings, murder, General, would be kept informed by the
intimidation and that democratic governments police of the results of their investigations,
are powerless to suppress such activities. That especially as he continued to be closely quesÿ
such actions have occurred in Australia with tioned in the Senate about Croatian extremist
increasing frequency in recent years is beyond activities. And, indeed, he admitted on 19th
dispute. There was a curious defeatism and September 1972 (Hansard, page 902) that he
lack of initiative in successive Liberal governÿ had seen a lot of material in the possession of
ments' reaction to these outrages. Honourable the Commonwealth Police.
senators will recall that, throughout the last Senator Wright7 I rise on a point of order,
session of the last Parliament, the former it is the usual practice when a ministerial
AttorneyÿGeneral was asked a great number statement of even moderate significance is
of questions by Labor senators about the actiÿ made copies are circulated to honourable
vities of Croatian extremists in Australia. A senators. Are copies not available?
constant theme in his answers was that, Senator Negus7 I wish to speak to the
although there were undoubtedly individual point of order. How can anyone expect the
Croatian extremists in Australia who were AttorneyÿGeneral to produce copies of his
prepared to resort to the most violent statement when the Opposition has asked him
methods in alleged furtherance of their cause, to make his speech some hours before he there
was no credible evidence that any intended to do so?
Croatian revolutionary terrorist organisation
existed in AustraJia. For example in the Senÿ
The PRESIDENTÿOrder! I have made
ate on 24th August 1972, he said:
inquiries about this matter. Because it has
the searches and investigations carried out by the been brought on much earlier than was anticiÿ
Commonwealth Police hitherto have not been able to pated by the Leader of the Government in
discover any evidence of an organisation.
the Senate, only 25 copies have been run off.
So
honourable senators will have to share the
He again repeated this assertion on 19th Sepÿ
copies
that we have. I am quite sure that
tember 1972 in answer to a question from honourable
senators on the Government side
Senator Douglas McClelland (Hansard, page of the chamber
will be happy to hand their
894). It is important to remember that the
copies
to
senators
on the Opposition side.
time when these questions were being asked
and answered was a time of great public conÿ
Senator McManus7 1 join in the protest
cern about terrorism.
which has been offered by Senator Wright. I
The reasons for this were twofold. Firstly, do so because it is obvious from statements
in June 1972, a group of 19 Croatian terrorÿ which have appeared in the Press over the
ists crossed into Yugoslavia from Austria and past 2 days that members of the Press have
engaged in terrorist activities in Bosnia. Six received from Senator Murphy's office copies
were Australian citizens and 3 others had of the statement which he proposed to make.
previously lived in Australia. As a result the The Press was able to state categorically what
Yugoslav Government presented a strongly Senator Murphy intended to say. I make a worded
aideÿmemoire to the Australian Govÿ strong protest that members of the Press have ernment
alleging, inter alia, that the headÿ been supplied with copies of the proposed quarters of the
HRB (Croatian Revolutionary statement but honourable senators have not.
Brotherhood) were located in Australia, that
The PRESIDENT7Order ! When a Minisÿ
th A t li
G
t h d
id d
k
i i
i
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Govemment side, if they have copies, to surÿ The evidence7overwhelmin g evidence7i s to
render them to honourable senators on the be found in documents which I am about to
Opposition side. I understand that a sufficient table.
number of copies is now available and they
These documents come from the files of the
will be distributed to all honourable senators AttorneyÿGeneral's Department, the Commonÿ
immediately.
wealth Police and the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation. I point out that
Senator MURPHYÿThe second factor although some of the documents tabled contain
which highlighted the question of Croat terÿ a classification stamp such as 'secret' or 'conÿ
rorism in Australia and which attracted fidential' they are no longer so. They have all
special attention from the Commonwealth and been declassified and no breach of security
State police was the occurrence of 2 bombing is involved in tabling them. In contrast to the
incidents in Sydney on 16th September 1972 last Government's policy of trying to sweep
involving premises and persons connected this problem under the rug, we propose to
with the Yugoslav community. These inciÿ bring it into the full light of day. I now table
dents left unaltered the then Attorneyÿ the documents. These documents establish
General's statement that there was no organised beyond doubt that Croatian terrorist organiÿ
terrorism among the Croatian community in sations have existed and do exist in Australia
Australia. One must assume also that the today. There is incontestable evidence that 3
AttorneyÿGeneral would have known that a extreme Croatian terrorist organisations exist
cache of explosives and documents had been in Australia today. They are the Croatian
discovered in the Warburton Ranges outside Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB); the United
Melbourne about the middle of 1972 and that Croats of West Germany (UHNj); and the
amongst these documents were several stating Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation
the aims and objects of an Ustashaÿtype orgaÿ (HIRO). There are 2 youth organisations that
nisation known as HIRO (Croatian Illegal have very revolutionary aims and have been
Revolutionary Organisation). This is the very used as recruiting grounds for the 3 extreme
organisation to which the Yugoslav Governÿ terrorist organisations. These youth organisaÿ
ment's aideÿmemoire made reference. Howÿ tions are the Croatian Youth (HM) and the
ever, when the Senate rose on 27th October World League of Croatian Youths (SHUMS).
1972, neither the AttorneyÿGeneral nor any There are 2 umbrella type general organisaÿ
Other member of the Liberal Government had tions which by their publications, training
produced any evidence of the existence in camps, discussion groups, funds and close links
with their national organisations provide the
Australia of organised Croatian terrorism and
climate for the forming of the inspiration to
it held firmly to the position that no such eviÿ
the youth groups and the extreme terrorist
dence existed.
organisations. These umbrella organisations
are the Croation Liberation Movement (HOP)
On taking over the office of Attorneyÿ with its official Ustasha movement within it
General, I considered it my duty to find out for (UHRO) and the Croatian National Resistance
myself whether this was true and to inform (HNO) and its Croatian Armed Forces (HOS).
the Senate and the people of Australia of the Also tabled is a summary of the documents
facts. The impending visit to this country of which 1 seek leave to have incorporated.
the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia gave special
The PRESIDENT7I s leave granted?
urgency to this investigation since, if the true
Opposition Senators7No .
picture was different from that painted by the
previous Government, the present Governÿ
The PRESIDENT7Leav e is not granted.
ment was entitled to entertain grave fears for This question has been raised before and 1 have
the safety of our distinguished guest and ruled that matter should not be incorporated
would be in duty bound to take adequate in Hansard before honourable senators have
precautions for his safety. I am now in a had a chance to see it.
position to state categorically that the Liberal
Senator MURPHY7Th e summary conÿ
AttorneyÿGeneral's oftÿrepeated assertion that tains, inter alia, the report of the Crime
there is no credible evidence of the existence Intelligence Bureau of the Commonwealth
in Australia of organised Croatian extremism Police force dated 6th March 1968; papers
cannot be sustained The contrary is true and about the notorious Andric brothers; papers
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the Croatian troika terrorist cell, a selfÿ in which he was named. Among the documents
contained group of 3 terrorists consisting of an seized were a detailed map of the area where
intelligence officer, a scout and an explosives the Bosnian guerrillas had illegally entered expert;
documents concerning all of the Croaÿ the country, a letter discussing an initial ruling tian
organisations I have mentioned; and docuÿ body of an independent Croatia including, ments
indicating links with overseas terrorist significantly, the name Rover of whom more
organisations as well as other related later, and a receipt from Wollongong Post
documents.
Office for the transmission of a registered
It is impossible to draw any other concluÿ postal article to one Vegar at Offenburg, Ausÿ sion
tria; (Vegar was one of the guerrillas killed in
from the evidence than that Senator
Greenwood, on the most charitable view of the Bosnian operation); a bank slip issued
his conduct, displayed an irresponsible indifferÿ by the A NZ Bank. Wollongong, acknowledging
ence to information which was available to transmission of money to Vegar; a letter
him and which proved up to the hilt the detailing future plans for the recruitment of
seriousness of the problem to which Labor volunteers to Australia for further incursions
senators repeatedly attempted to alert him. into Yugoslavia. One of the letters signed
Let me give a striking example. The Yugoslav refers to the fact that the 'financial resources
aideÿmemoire was received by the Australian of the organisation which we took with us from
Government on 16th August 1972. Among Victoria as well as those received later, have
those named in the aideÿmemoire as being one now been used up'. Does this sound like an
of the ringleaders of Croatian terrorism i3 individual operating independently of an
one Jure Marie. He was already well known organisation? The Commonwealth Police cerÿ
to the Commonwealth Police. He first came tainly did not think so. Their conclusion is
under notice in 1963 after a group of 6 as follows:
Croatian terrorists, allegedly from Australia,
entered Yugoslavia illegally for the stated purÿ
The evidence contained in this document when
pose of waging a guerrilla campaign against the taken into consideration with that enumerated in the
regime. Marie was linked with the organisation aforementioned memorandum of 7 November 1972,
would seem to irrefutably implicate Jure Marie with
of this incursion.
a Croatian Nationalist Organisation which apparently
Investigations conducted over a period of 4 exists in both Australia and Europe and which has years
been engaged in an attempt to overthrow the recogÿ
established the existence in Australia nised Government of Yugoslavia. It is also considered
of a terrorist organisation known as the HRB that, regardless of what this organisation is called,
(Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood). Marie it is in fact a resurgence of the former Croatian
was one of its leaders. After a number of Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB) and appears to police
involve a number of persons who were previously
raids in 1967, including on Marie's
identified as members of the HRB. As you will recall
premises, the HRB appeared to become moriÿ in our initial assessment of the allegations made in
bund in a formal organisational sense, although the Yugoslav aideÿmemoire presented on 16 August
as we now know it continued to operate 1972, we expressed 'serious concern about the possible
existence of a clandestine terrorist organisation in
through troikas or cells. However, Marie conÿ Australia'. We also stated, inter alia: With regard to
tinued to be the subject of scrutiny by the the allegations about the HRB, I would draw your
Commonwealth Police and a possible proseÿ attention to our earlier reports (reference 224/283
cution of him under the Commonwealth headed Croatian Nationalist Activities in Australia,
dated 5 July 1972, and reference X.61, headed Srecko
Crimes Act was considered in October 1970. Blaz Rover, born 3 February 1920, Sarajevo, Yugoÿ
He was also the subject of memoranda from slavia, dated 20 April 1972) indicating the possible
the Commonwealth Police to the Attorneyÿ resurgence of a HRB type organisation. In the past it
General's Department on 9th August 1971 has generally been assumed that the HRB as such
ceased to operate as an organisation in Australia circa
and 12th September 1972. In view of fhe 1967ÿ1968. In the light of intelligence gathered by this
questioning in the Senate to which he was Force over the past nine months, the allegations of
being submitted at the time one assumes that its continued existence by the Yugoslav Government
the formeT AttorneyÿGeneral would have seen must be taken seriously.
these memoranda.
The police report from which I have quoted
Marie was one of those whose premises is dated 23rd November 1972. However, a
were searched by the Commonwealth Police preliminary report on documents seized from
under warrant on 22nd August 1972, following Marie, Rover and others was made by the
receipt by the Australian Government of the Acting Commissioner of Commonwealth Polÿ
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12th September 1972 and the Attorneyÿ bland interim reply was given to the Yugoslav
General would undoubtedly have seen this Government on 20th October 1972, mentionÿ
report. Though all the seized documents had ing that the matter was being investigated but
not been translated at this stage, there were making no admissions about the presence of
references to maps, to the receipt for the Croatian terrorist organisations in our midst, transmission of
money to Vegar and to handÿ even though evidence of the existence of such written items relating
to the Croatian Revoluÿ organisations was in the possession of the tionary Brotherhood and the
organisational AttorneyÿGeneral when the interim reply was infrastructure of a troika group. In
short, on given. No further reply to these allegations or soon after 12th September 1972,
the then was ever made by the Liberal Government to
AttorneyÿGeneral was in possession of eviÿ the Yugoslav Government. Yet the conclusion
dence that the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherÿ reached by the Commonwealth Police and hood
had been revived, was functioning conveyed to the AttorneyÿGeneral's Departÿ actively, and
was associated with the June ment as earlv as 17th August 1972. was in incursion into
Yugoslavia which had been the these words:
subject of complaint in the Yugoslav Governÿ
ment's aideÿmemoire of 16th August 1972. It7
Yet on 19th September 1972 he returned to his That is the aideÿmemoire7
denials of the existence of any Croatian does contain a core of almost irrebuttable fact.
terrorist organisation in Australia and never
In addition, the DirectorÿGeneral of ASIO
resiled from that standpoint throughout the on 7th September 1972 stated in reference to
life of the Parliament.
the aideÿmemoire in a letter to the Attorneyÿ
General's Department:
A responsible AttorneyÿGeneral, aware of Also in general terms, some of the information is
Marie's past role as a leader of HRB, aware almost certainly inaccurate; olher portions contain
of the fact that Marie had been named as a elements of truth but appear exaggerated; and yet
terrorist in the Yugoslav document, aware of other statements are wellÿbased. Overall the Aide
Memoire and enclosures contain sufficient accurate
the anxieties about the resurgence of Croatian material to suggest that it would be illÿadvised to
terrorism expressed almost daily by Labor dismiss the allegations as either exaggeration or
senators, would surely not have reacted to the fabrication until such time as the results of current
raid on Marie's premises and the seizure of inquiries are known.
documents I have referred to in the way in ASIO never retreated from that stand and subÿ
which Senator Greenwood reacted. Let us sequently agreed with me that the aideÿmemoire
examine his conduct in this matter in some contained a core of irrebuttable truth. And
detail, since it is symptomatic of the previous yet, on 19th September, the AttorneyÿGeneral
Government's attitude to the problem. The said in this place:
first point to note is that the raid on Marie, It comes to the quesiion whether we should accept
and other suspected terrorists, was not made allegations made by the President and the Prime
Minister of Yugoslavia as having a basis in fact
at the AttorneyÿGeneral's instigation. On 23rd notwithstanding that our investigation of those allegaÿ
August, the day after the raids, in reply to a tions in Australia has proved that the allegations
question from Senator O'Byrne, he stated in are without such a basis. Simply, it comes down to
this: Does this Senate accept what is alleged by the
part:
President and the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia in
The position as I have stated it for several weeks7
preference to what our own Commonwealth Police
that there is no credible evidence of any Croatian have found and what I have stated?
terrorist groups in Australia7stil l stands. The searches
which were made yesterday by Commonwealth Police It had taken the then AttorneyÿGeneral only a
officers, together with State Police officers, were not month to forget the Commonwealth Police's
directed towards obtaining any such evidence . . . 'core of almost irrebuttable fact', and less than
I should state that the searches yesterday were made
as part of a police investigation and were made a fortnight to forget the cautionary advice of
without my knowledge.
ASIO.
I think that honourable senators may rememÿ
In one of the many debates on this subject
ber the anger with which that was expressed. last year Senator Greenwood indignantly asked
Parliament rose on 27th October without any me7Hansard , page 9257whethe r I gave
information being given to the Senate about greater credence to the allegations of the
the contents of the seized documents. Marie Yugoslav Government than to the statements
had been named as a terrorist in the Yugoslav which he had made. The answer is: Yes, and
Government protest presented to the Austraÿ so do the Commonwealth Police and ASIO lian
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Among the voluminous documents on Sulÿ
were not enough to convict the last Governÿ
ment, through its AttorneyÿGeneral, of misÿ jak and the Australian branch of the terrorist leading
the Parliament and the nation, of organisation UHNj which I have tabled today deceiving
a friendly foreign power, of imperilÿ is a letter dated 30th May 1972 from Mr ling the lives
Commissioner
of Commonwealth
of Australian citizens byshutting Davis,
its eyes to the evidence of organised terrorism, Police, to the Department of Immigration. there
is yet another, perhaps more glaring The letter, a copy of which was in the files of example of
the existence of a dangerous, the AttorneyÿGeneral's Department, sets out violent
Croatian revolutionary terrorist the fact of the existence of this organisation,
its meetings, its officeÿholders and its involveÿ
organisation in Australia.
ment in breaches of the peace in Sydney over
This organisation, separate and distinct from the preceding months.
the HRB7th e Croatian Revolutionary Brotherÿ
hood7i s the Australian Branch of the UHNj
A brochure produced by the Special
7th e League of United Croats of West Reports Branch of the Department of Immiÿ
Germany. Its leader in Germany is one Ante gration in August 1972 on Croatian extremist
Vukic whom our Commonwealth Police conÿ activities makes special reference to the
sidered such a dangerous man that they advised UHNj, its organisation in Australia, its activiÿ
the Department of Immigration against grantÿ ties and its members. A copy of this brochure
ing him a permit to visit Australia in May was forwarded to the AttorneyÿGeneral's
1972. The organisation in Germany was Department on 25th August .1972 and it was
associated over the last decade with attempted specifically directed by the Permanent Head
murders of Yugoslav officials and attacks on of the AttorneyÿGeneral's Department to
Yugoslav embassies and employed strongÿarm Senator Greenwood himself. His most veheÿ
squads to threaten other Croats living in ment denials of the existence of extremist
Germany for the purpose of either conscripting Croatian organisations followed shortly after
them into the organisation or extracting his receipt of this document, which is among
financial contributions.
the documents tabled today.
A branch of this murderous organisation Moreover, if the former AttorneyÿGeneral
was formed in Sydney around June 1971 and was unwilling to accept the evidence which
its membership and activities were well known abounded in government files, he had only to
to the Commonwealth Police, its meetings, read the daily newspapers to discover that the
ironically enough, are or were held in the New South Wales police stated in court proÿ
Ulster Room of the Irish National Association ceedings which were fully reported, that Sulÿ
Hall in Devonshire Street, Sydney. Its leader jak was a member of what was described in
is a man with a particularly violent record the press as a Croatian terrorist movement,
named Jakov Suljak. His name will certainly the United Croats of West Germany.
not come as a surprise to the former Attorneyÿ
General since he wrote to the senator on
When Suljak was arrested on 19th October
25th October 1972, after being arrested on 1972 a considerable quantity of documents
a charge of assault and mentioned in the was seized from his dwelling. These docuÿ course
of his letter that he had also been ments established the fact of transmission of accused of the
'city bombings', an obvious funds from the Australian branch to the reference to the
bombing.' in Sydney on parent body in Germany. A number of phoÿ 16th September
1972.
tographs of armed men were also found,
including one in which Suljak can be seen
ln June 1969 Suljak was jailed in South standing beside a Ustashi flag in the company
Australia for a period of 9 months for 2 parÿ of other armed men. There is no doubt that
ticularly brutal assaults. He had already been the members of the Sydney branch of UHNj
charged with similar offences on 5 separate consider themselves Ustashi. Both the letter
occasions and is at present on bail pending of Commissioner Davis of 30th May 1972,
trial for assault and being found in possession and his detailed report of 26th October 1972
of an unlicensed pistol. On llth November refer to incidents in which the organisation
1969, the Commissioner of Commonwealth was involved which clearly demonstrate its
Police, Mr J. Davis, recommended that he be Ustashi allegiance. For example, they publicly
deported, but his recommendation was not displayed an Ustashi flag at Sydney airport
and also at a Croatia versus Yugal soccer
acted upon.
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match in Sydney on 15th August 1971. Several months imprisonment. This was not a simple
of their members have admitted to the police firearms offence. When he left Australia hurÿ
that they consider themselves Ustashi.
riedly on 19th May 1972 Marincic took with
him a rifle and 4 silencers which he conÿ
In an article by Suljak in the Novemberÿ
cealed in a toy koala.
December 1971 edition of the organisation's
Senator Withers7Ho w could he conceal a
paper 'Croatian Call', he urged Croats in
rifle and 4 silencers in a toy koala?
Australia to support UHNj and stated:
It is our duty to support the Croatian Liberation
struggle . . .
for without a bloody shirt there
will be no Independent State of Croatia.

Senator MURPHY7Th e 4 silencers were
concealed in a toy koala. When the rifle was
discovered the German authorities refused
He does not confine his appeals to the jourÿ him entry and he returned to Australia with nalistic
level but regularly 'stands over' other
gun and silencers. He also was in possession
Croats for donations to the cause.
of a booklet in the SerboÿCroatian language
At this point honourable senators might containing instruction on sabotage and of the
well ponder a few questions. Why was this names and addresses of Ambroz Andric in
man, Suljak, not deported in 1969 as recomÿ France, Adolf Andric in Germany and Pave
mended by the Commissioner of Commonÿ Vegar in Germany. AH 3 of these men were
wealth Police? Why has his organisation, named in the Yugoslav Government aideÿ
which flaunts its Ustashi allegiance, and memoire as participants in the Bosnian incurÿ
which is acknowledged by ASIO in another sion and it will be recalled that Jure Marie had
document which is tabled today, to be a terÿ also maintained contact with Vegar. Al! 3
rorist organisation, been allowed to continue were killed in this adventure, according to the
in existence? And, above all, why was this Yugoslav Government. Surely it is a reasonÿ
able inference that Marincic went to Gerÿ
existence denied by Senator Greenwood?
many to join the Bosnian incursion or at least
A rather surprising beneficiary of the to help equip it.
former AttorneyÿGeneral's benevolence is
one Zdenko Marincic. Marincic arrived in On 18th October 1972, the Assistantÿ
Australia on 16th January 1970. He became Director of the Special Reports Branch of the
Secretary of SHUMS (Union of Croatian Department of Immigration recommended
United Youth of the World), which, despite Marincic's deportation. In weighing up all the
its innocent sounding name, is under thc considerations, including Marincic's probable
effective control of Srecko Rover and is fate if returned to Yugoslavia, the Assistantÿ
suspected by the Commonwealth Police of Director said:
I believe the strong doubts which exist about his
being an extremist front organisation (see letÿ
ter from J. Davis to the AttorneyÿGeneral's past and future involvement in potentially violent
Balkan politics should be exercised in favour of Ausÿ
Department, dated 8th June 1972). He first tralia and therefore recommend that Zdenko Marinÿ
attracted police attention on 29th November cic be deported. Such action, I suggest will have a
1970 when he removed a Yugoslav flag from salutary effect unon those Croatians u/ho u«e Ausÿ
the balcony of the Southern Cross Hotel in tralia as a base for pursuit of their ideals and will
also provide the Yugoslav authorities with a positive
Melbourne during Yugoslav National Day indication that Australia neither supports nor ronÿ
celebrations and burned it. For this offence he dones extremism.
was convicted on 9th February 1972 and I venture to suggest that they are sentiments fined.
with which the overwhelming major'ty ot
On 19th May 1972 Marincic hastily left Australians would agree. These sentiments,
Australia. This was shortly before the 'Bosÿ however, did not find favour with the then
nian incident' which has already been referred AttorneyÿGeneral.
to. Marincic turned up in Frankfurt, Gerÿ In a long and carefully argued submission
many, but the German authorities refused to the Minister for Immigration dated 12th
him entry. He had not obtained a reÿentry November 1972, Senator Greenwood reversed
permit before leaving Australia, so he has no the priorities as between the interests of Ausÿ
right at all to be here. Nonetheless he tralia and those of an obvious Croatian terÿ
returned to Australia on 24th May 1972 and rorist in favour of the latter. His letter, which
was immediately arrested and charged the is among the documents tabled, should be
ne t da
ith ha ing a firearm in his possesÿ l l t di d b
h i i t td
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regard for men whose preferred methods of matters, we can only reach one conclusion
asserting their political beliefs are the bomb about his conduct in this matter: In order to and
the gun. Let me quote just one passage protect a terrorist from deportation, he misinÿ from
formed the Minister responsible for the
this extraordinary letter:
1 appreciate your concern that Marincic is a perÿ issuance of a deportation order about the son
whom we could not safely allow to remain in
legal consequences for the terrorist of such an
Australia. I understand your apprehension is that he order.
is a man with a propensity to violence and that, >n
view of recent happenings involving violence to perÿ
This is a serious charge but is supported by
sons and property, we have a paramount obligation
to the Australian community to remove him from an earlier example of Senator Greenwood's the
country.
benign view of the rights of terrorists. This
Naturally I share your apprehension that we case involved none other than Jure Marie, should
knowingly allow a person of violent procliviÿ about whom I have already said a great deal.
ties to remain in this country if he is an immigrant
whom we can deport. But this is a matter of balancÿ On 4th July 1972 the AttorneyÿGeneral's
ing the likely harm to Australia against (he conseÿ Department put a submission to him that he
quences of deportation. It is relevant in each case to should recommend that Marie's application
note the country to which a person will be deported.
for a passport be refused. The officer of the
I have indicated the traditional and accepted
rule7
applicabl e not only in the past in this country Department who made this recommendation
but also in the USA and the UK7tha t deportation pointed out that ASIO's latest report and the
or extradition does not take place where a person is most recent Commonwealth Police report on
likely to be dealt with for his political opinions by Marie indicated that he was deeply involved
thc country to which he is sent. I believe that this in Croatian nationalist activities and was preÿ
outweighs all other considerations in this case.
pared to support acts of violence against
In the event, Marincic is still among us. Howÿ Yugoslavia, that there was a real possibility
ever misguided one might consider an Attorÿ that he would, if granted a passport, be a
neyÿGeneral who placed the interests of an participant in acts of violence directed against
obvious terrorisi ahead of the interests of the Yugoslavia and that, if this occurred, it would
Australian people, there might be some who be an embarrassment to Australia's relations
would be impressed by the countervailing with Yugoslavia. Senator Greenwood rejected
libertarian considerations on which his subÿ this advice from his Department and was not
mission is apparently based. There is, howÿ in favour of refusing the passport to Marie.
ever, a fatal flaw in this argument, which Fortunately, the Minister for Immigration did
assumes that the deportation of Marincic not grant Marie's application.
would inevitably place him at the mercy of
the Yugoslav police. The chief law officer of In a previous debate on this subject Senator
Australia must have been familiar with the Greenwood indignantly repudiated the charge
decision of the High Court in the case of that he was 'soft' on Croatian terrorists. Znaty
v. The Minister of State for Immigraÿ Surely that was a mild charge to lay at the tion and
Another (1972 Argus Law Reports door of a man whom the documents prove to
page 545). Judgment in this case was delivÿ have been the active protector of terrorists!
ered on 25th February 1972, that is, some 9 On 21st September 1972, 2 highÿranking
months prior to the letter to the Minister for officers of the AttorneyÿGeneral's Departÿ
Immigration urging him not to deport ment, alarmed by recent events, especially the
Marincic.
bombings in the streets of Sydney, called on
The judgment of the Court in that case him and drew to his attention certain Croaÿ
clearly established the right of the Governÿ tian publications and discussed the various
ment to deport a person to anywhere. Counsel Croatian organisations. Their submissions to
briefed by the AttorneyÿGeneral submitted the AttorneyÿGeneral are among the docuÿ
that the law was and had been since 1903 ments produced today to the Senate. One of
that the Government is not bound to send the these officers, who had been specially assigned
deportee back to the place from which he 6 years earlier to Croatian affairs and was
came and the Court approved that submisÿ considered in the Department to be the expert
sion. If we assume that he was familiar with on this subject, expressed the view that 2 of
this decision and surely he would not underÿ these organisations, HOP and HNO, 'were not
take to advise the Minister for Immigration primarily cultural but political and militarist'.
without familiarising himself with the upÿtoÿ A f
k l t thi ffi
li d f

536

Croatian Terrorism

SENATE

Croatian Terrorism

The tone of the last Government's attitude The Minister recommended that the Governÿ
towards Croatian terrorism was set as long ment should make a strong statement that
ago as 27th August 1964 by Sir Robert outrages 'of this kind will not be tolerated'.
Menzies. His statement was precipitated by a That was Mr Lynch in government. Mr
complaint by the Yugoslav Government followÿ Lynch out of government speaks in a
different tone. Last week he condemned the
ing 2 incidents:
precautions taken to
protect
the visiting
(1) The 1963 guerrilla incursion into
Yugoslav Prime Minister as 'hysterical'.
Yugoslavia by 6 Croatians previously resident
Sir Garfield Barwick, then Minister for
in Australia.
External Affairs, also expressed his concern
(2) The discovery of a militaryÿstyle trainÿ
shortly after the 1963 incursion into Yugoÿ
ing camp for Croatian extremists near slavia. In a letter addressed to the Attorneyÿ
Wodonga, Victoria.
General and the Minister for Immigration
M r Menzies gave a little lecture on Balkan dated 6th January 1964, he wrote, in part:
history and stated that police 'had found no
In essence, thc problem is one of 'keeping an eye'
evidence whatever to support allegations of on immigrant extremists, while operating within the
Ustashi violence towards individuals of framework of existing law and practice. We should
not abandon our democratic principles of tree
Yugoslav nationality'. Mr Menzies went on to speech, belief and association but I would hope that
migrants are left with no misunderstanding of the
say:
disfavour with which the Government would view
It is understandable that some Yugoslav migrants
any activities which might reasonably give rise to
of
Croatian origin
should continue
to hope
for thea objections by the present governments of their
establishment
of an independent
Croatia
and within
countries of origin. With this end in mind, I should
democracy like Australia they have a Tight to advocate
like to suggest that the Australian Security Intelÿ
their views so long as they do so by legitimate ligence Organisation should maintain some superÿ
vision over migrant groups (making no attempt to disÿ
means.
That is a reasonable proposition but I leave it guise its surveillance) and bring lo your attention any
activities which might be considered to have conÿ
to honourable senators to judge whether the
travened sections 30 (A) or 30 (C) of the Crimes Act.
'means' 1 have disclosed today are 'legitimate'. In appropriate circumstances, it may, be necessary to
The long list of unsolved crimes of violence consider the desirability of prosecutions under the
tells an eloquent story of the indifference of Act as a further deterrent to uncontrolled extremism,
although this measure need not be adopted except in
governments of 23 years duration to the thc last resort.
'means' used by Croatian extremists to attain
the goals Mr Menzies smiled on so benignly. The story which I have unfolded today and
The police have done their best with inadeÿ the documents which I have tabled show how
quate resources and no encouragement. They little heed was paid to the warnings of Mr
could hardly fail to draw the conclusion that Lynch and Sir Garfield Barwick. Indeed one
successive Liberal governments could not can only agree with the comments made by
have cared less whether they succeeded or not one prominent politician in a letter which he
in crushing Croatian terrorism. To be sure, wrote to the then AttorneyÿGeneral on 16th
there were sporadic cries of alarm from indiÿ December 1969. His comments included the
vidual Ministers. For example on 3rd following:
December 1969, the Honourable Philip The extremists themselves may by now have come
Lynch, then Minister for Immigration, wrote to believe that they can act with impunity and that
they can therefore, without risk to themselves, step
to the then AttorneyÿGeneral Hughes expressÿ up the level and frequency of violence.
ing:
He went on to express some concern that:
. . . concern al the likely serious consequences
On the only occasion when an offender (who was
if Croat nationals in Australia are permitted to conÿ arrested at the time of committing the offence in the tinue
unchecked their terrorist activities and outraaes course of a public demonstration) was brought before against
representatives of the Yugoslav Government a court, he was fined an amount which might have and
authority generally in this country. 1 have reason
left an impression with the Yugoslav missions to
believe that the terrorists are endeavouring to here . . . that tbe Australian authorities did not create
the impression amongst Yugoslav migrants in
take the
Australia that the Croatian extremists have
the matter
supÿ seriously.
port of significant sections of Australian society and For the benefit of honourable senators who
even the government. 1 am moreover concerned with are interested, those comments came from the
the likely, effect upon our relations with Yugoslavia, Rt Hon. William McMahon, when he was
especially in terms of our migration arrangements Minister for External AfTairs Even after these
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one which ASIO described to me as that of dinating Committee of Croatian Associations
'indifference' to the problem of Croatian terÿ in Australia). Affiliated with the Committee
rorism. In the view of ASIO the organisation are such important organisations as HOP
was not given proper ministerial directives in (Croatian Liberation Movement), HNO
(Croation National Resistance) and UHNj
regard to Croatian terrorism.
Passing reference has been made to Srecko (United Croats of West Germany).
Rover. He is a leader of the Croatian Liberaÿ Now that it is clear that the new Governÿ
tion Movement in this country and, indeed, ment intends to cope vigorously with the
he is a world figure of considerable imporÿ problem of Croatian terrorism we hope and
tance among emigrant Croats. He is the believe that it will be possible to gain the coÿ
leader of HNO (Croatian National Resisÿ operation of that vast majority of peaceful
tance), based in Melbourne and linked with Croatian citizens who are the first victims of
the Spanish headquarters of the organisation. the fanatical minority of their countrymen
Among the documents tabled today is a copy who engage in terrorism. The documents
of an interview between a Commonwealth tabled show that Croatians have been intimiÿ
Police officer and Rover. The latter admits dated to contribute money to the terrorists.
that he will use any means possible to achieve The measures which we propose will put an
an independent Croatia; claims to know that end to this. What I have said about Croatian
one of the Andric brothers (since killed in the terrorism applies to all terrorism. I point to
Bosnia incursion) made the pen bomb which the case of the Bulgarian terrorists, Daskaloff
exploded in Richmond Town Hall on 2nd and Petroff, who were convicted of throwing
September 1967, gravely injuring a young a bomb into the grounds of the Russian
man; advocates the violent overthrow of the Embassy in Canberra and were sentenced to
Yugoslav Government. Documents seized in terms of imprisonment. Despite that these
the raid on Rover's home in August 1972, men were clearly liable for deportation, the
copies of which are tabled today including a previous Goernment did not deport them and
map of the route to be followed by the incurÿ they are still in our midst.
sionists,
prove
conclusively
his personal
involvement with the Bosnia incursion of
The present Government's policy will be to
June 1972. Also seized was a seal bearing the
d
insignia of the Supreme Headquarters of the eport aliens associated with terrorist organisÿ
Croatian National Resistance and the Croaÿ a tions who have been convicted of crimes of
tian Armed Forces, ammunition and docuÿ violence, and become liable to deportation.
ments relating to the instigation of guerrilla Recommendations have been made that cerÿ
tain persons be deported, not necessarily to
activity in Yugoslavia.
the country from which they came. AH
Senator Rae7No t in Australia but in proper procedures and safeguards of civil
liberties will be observed. The Minister for
Yugoslavia.
Immigration makes the necessary orders. The
Senator MURPHY7I s the honourable new policy is to cut out the cancer of terrorÿ
senator implying that because the guerrilla ism from our body politic. This should apply
activity took place in Yugoslavia and not in to all who are liable to deportation and from
Australia this should be of no account to the whom violence can be apprehended. The law
Government of Australia? A most significant will be used to deal with terrorism and vioÿ
document seized was a report from the lence.
Supreme Advisory Council of the troika dated
15th July 1972, indicating that an organisaÿ Important changes will also be macle in our
tion has been set up in Australia on the basis police and security arrangements. Pending the
of small cells or troikas. The manner in full report on the operations of ASIO and its
which these troikas operate is set out in detail relations with the executive government which
in a report from the Commonwealth Police 1 intend to present to Parliament during this
prepared on 6th March 1968 which was session, the DirectorÿGeneral of ASIO will
always available to the former AttorneyÿGenÿ operate mainly from Canberra. This will
eral and which is among the documents ensure closer liaison with the Australian Govÿ
tabled today. In a move to establish himself ernment and the Commonwealth Police in
as the leader of Croatian nationalism in Ausÿ combating terrorism In the past there has
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their operations overlapped. Tliis is a problem 1 should like to add a word about events of to
which 1 have given much attention in the last week. I am advised that terrorists came to past
few weeks.
Canberra last week with the intention of killÿ
ing the Yugoslav Prime Minister. The Comÿ
Another problem is that matters of national
security often involve breaches of State crimiÿ missioner of Commonwealth Police, Mr J.
nal law. This has often meant that ASIO has Davis, advised me that, frustrated in that not
been supplied with information which ambition by security precautions, the terrorÿ bears on
matters of national security. The ists might make an alternative attempt on the conclusion I have
life of the Australian Prime Minister (Mr
drawn from this is that we
Whitlam)
or other Ministers of the Governÿ
need federal laws to cover crimes which may
ment. The unanimous opinion of the Federal
affect national security.
law enforcement authorities was that it was
Senator Rae7On e political police force? Is unsafe for the Australian Prime Minister to
that what you intend?
walk through the Port Kembla Steelworks of
Senator Webster7Wit h Senator Murphy as Broken Hill Pty Co. Ltd on Wednesday last.
In this situation, I make no apology for any
head of the police.
Senator
MURPHY7Befor e honourable steps which I took last week to ensure that
senators opposite continue with interjections I the intentions of violent terrorists were
think they would be better advised to wait thwarted. Those who take the view that those and
precautions were unnecessary because nothing
see what recommendations have been
made in the past and from what distinguished happened are indulging in a twisted form of
quarters, which 1 am not in a position to put logic. Toleration of terrorism in this country
now before the Senate but which I assure is over. Whatever we import from the rest of honourable
the world we do not need that. This Governÿ
senators I will put later.
ment is determined that terrorism in Australia
I intend to recommend to Cabinet that legÿ will be resolutely stamped out. A list of the islation be
introduced for new or strengthened
documents has already been tabled along with
Federal criminal laws to deal with offences
the other documents. 1 ask for leave to have
such as the use of telephones or postal serÿ it and a summary of the documents incorporÿ
vices to convey threats to persons or property; ated in Hansard.
committing an act of violence against a
The PRESIDENT7i s leave granted? There
foreign guest of the Australian Government;
against diplomatic or consular personnel or being no objection, leave is granted.
premises or against persons or premises
(The list and summary read as follows)7
engaged in or used for overseas or interstate
LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
trade ancl commerce; acts of violence or
CROATIAN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
threats of violence against Australian Minisÿ
IN AUSTRALIA
ters or officials of the Australian Government APPENDIX A
and others; acts or threats of violence or
Document A.17
Th e Menzies Statement of 27th
extortion by aliens; inciting in Australia acts August 1964.
Document A.27Lette r from Dr Hefer to Mr
of violence against a person or property in a
foreign state with which Australia has friendly Menzies received 2nd September 1964.
Document A.37
Lette r by Sir Garfield Barwick as
relations or to collect nioney or to train perÿ Minister for External Affairs to the AttornevÿGeneral
sons in the use of weapons, explosives or of 6th January 1964.
Document A.47Notatio n by Mr Snedden when
poisons in Auslralia for this purpose. I will
also propose legislation to supplement the AttorneyÿGeneral, on a departmental submission
powers already possessed hy the Australian dated 25th September 1964 relating to prosecution of Government
certain Croatians.
to prevent the entry into Ausÿ
Document A.S7ASI O Position Paper of 1st May
tralia of terrorists or persons associated with 1967.
Document A.67ASI O Position Paper of 1st
organised crime. The Commonwealth Police
will be strengthened, especially in its criminal October 1967.
Repor t of the Crime Intelligence
Document A.77
investigation unit. The Commissioner ureau
had Bof the Commonwealth Police dated 6th
requested the previous Government to be supÿ March
1968 on the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherÿ
plied with extra staff and additional translaÿ hood (HRB).
Document A.87
Lette r by Mr Lynch, when Minisÿ
tors but this request fell on deaf ears. These
requests have now been examined by my ter for Immigration to the then AttorneyÿGeneral Department,
dated 3rd December 1969.
found to be reasonable and
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Document B. 117Lette r by Srecko Rover to the
Document A. 107Commonwealt h Police comments
GovernorÿGeneral dated 20th October, 1972 comÿ
upon the two preceding Ministerial letters.
plaining about Her Majesty the Queen's visit to
Document A.ll7ASI O comments on the two preÿ Yugoslavia.
ceding Ministerial letters.
Document B.127Aim s and objects of the Croatian
Document A.127
Repor
of conference
between
Commonwealth
Police
and t ASIO
held on 17th
Febÿ Youth (H.M.).
Document B.137Th e principles and the oath of
ruary 1970 in respect of the Rolovic Note deh%ered
r
the World League of C oatian
Youth (S .H.U .M.S.).
to the Australian Government.
Document B.147Constitutio n of the Croatian
Document A. 137Backgroun d brief by ASIO dated
.I.
.)
lu
i
Il
Revo tionary Organisat on (H R.O and the
2nd April 1971 on Croatian National Resistance trlegal
anscript o f committal proceed ings
in Victoria
Do°ument A. 147Memorandu m from thc Attorneyÿ
against its leaders.
General's Department dated 10th June 1972 to the
Document B.l57Lette r by Joint Committee of
AttorneyÿGeneral advising of the Croatian Illegal Croatian Organisations in New South Wales to Prime
Minister McMahon dated 3Ist August, 1972.
Revolutionary Organisation 'HIRO).
Document B. 15A7Cop y of police reports on the
Document A.l 57Recor d of interview prepared by
Senator Greenwood when AttorneyÿGeneral, of his United Croats of West Germany (U.H.Nj.).
Document B.l67Oal h of the Croatian Revoluÿ
interview with the Yugoslav Ambassador on 19th
July 1972.
.
_ , . tionary Brotherhood (H.R.B.).
Document B. 177Th e papers of Adolf Andric.
Document A.167Pres s Statement by Senator
Document B.17A7Photograph s of the pen bomb,
Greenwood, when AttorneyÿGeneral, dated 20th July
o
R
t
, 6
ichmond T wn Hall. 2nd Sep ember 19 7.
1972
Document B.187Th e Jure Marie papers of May,
Document A. 177
Pres s Statement by Senator
1967
ÿ
Greenwood, when AttorneyÿGeneral, dated
ll t h
Document B. 197Recor d of interview by Sgt.
August 1972 relating to the armed incursion into
George
of the
Commonwealth Police with Jure Marie
5th June,
1968.
Yugoslavia.
. . .
. « of
Document A. 187Cop y of a submission
by the
(H

u

AttorneyÿGeneral's Department to the Attorney.
General relating to a passport application by Jure
Marie.
Document A. 197Lette r by Senator Greenwood,
when AttorneyÿGeneral, to the Foreign Minister, Mr
Bowen, dated 27lh November 1972.
Document A.207Letter s by Senator Greenwood,
when AttorneyÿGeneral, to the Minister for Immigraÿ
tion Dr Forbes, dated 29th June 1972 (passport
application by Josip Bogut) and 12th November 1972
(deportation of Marincic).
APPENDIX
Document BB.l7Constitutio n of the Croatian Liberÿ

Document B.207Th e Jure Marie papers of
August. 1972.
Document B.217Recor d of interview by Sgt.
Brown of the Commonwealth Police with Blaz
Kraljevic on 8th August. 1972.
Document B.227Ma p of part of Germany
obtained at the premises of Pericic in August,
1972.
Document B.237 A news sheet entitled 'Report
from Revolutionary Front'.
Document B.247Lette r from H.R.B. Europe to
A.S.I.O. andof Immigration.
letter relating thereto by A.S.I.O. to
Department

Document B.257Cop y of a CommonweaUh Police
ation Movement (HOP).
report upon $300 being forwarded to Sweden from
Document B.27Constitutio n of the official Croaÿ Mount Gambier. South Australia.
tian Ustashi Movement' and the seventeen principles
Document B.267Cop y of a memorandum from
the Australian Embassy, Washington, to the Departÿ
of the Ustashi.
.
Document B.37Correspondenc e
between Josip ment of Foreign Affairs about the American governÿ
Kovac of Canberra and Srecko Rover of Melbourne ment's attitude on Yugoslavia.
Document B.277Photograph s of bomb incident in
dated 14th and 21st July 1972.
Document B.47Cop y of a letter to Prime Minister Sydney on 16th September, 1972.
APPENDIX C
McMahon by the Croatian Coÿordinative Committee
of Victoria dated 25th May 1972 complaining about
Document C.l7Publicatio n entitled 'Ustasa', 1941ÿ
the cancellation of Srecko Rover's passport.
1971.
Document B.57Lette r to the AttorneyÿGeneral
Document
C.27Publicatio n entitled 'Pregled',
from Ljubomir Vuina dated 23rd September, 1972.
Document B.6 (a)7Cop y of a record of A.B.C. March, 1972.
Document C.2A7Lette r by A.S.I.O. dated 24th
television interview with Tomislav Lesic on 19th Sepÿ
April. 1972 to the then AttorneyÿGeneral.
tember, 1972.
Document B.6 (b)7Cop y of a record of interview
Document C.37Publicatio n entitled 'Spremnost',
on A.B.C. television wilh Fabian Lovokovic on 20th August, 1972.
.
September, 1972.
Document C.47Publicatio n entitled 'Uzdamca .
Document B.77 A series of photographs taken at
Document C.57Publicatio n entitled 'Vjesnik'.
the Wodonga Training Camp in 1963.
Document C.67Publicatio n entitled 'Hrvatska
Document B.87Constitutio n of the Australian Drzava', February, 1973.
Croatian National Resistance7Oceani a (H.N.O.).
Document C.77Publicatio n entitled 'Obrana', Janÿ
Document B.97Recor d of interview between uary, 1973.
Superintendent Milte and Srecko Rover.
Document C.87Publicatio n entitled 'Hrvatska
Document B. 107Intelligenc e report by a troika
terrorist group and a copy of a map of Yugoslavia Borba'.
which marks the route into Yugoslavia taken by the
Document C.97Publicatio n entitled 'Osvif, Februÿ
terrorist raiding party of June, 1972. Rover's papers
ary, 1973.
(1972).
Document CIO7Publicatio n entitled 'Kletva*.
Document C ll7Publicatio n entitled 'Instructions
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The documents constitute evidence that Croatian
terrorist organisations exist in Australia and have so
existed for many years.

Croatian Terrorism

tian Youth (H.M.), which has had Jure Marie, at
one time the Australian leader of the Croatian Revoÿ
lutionary Brotherhood, associated with it. The second
of the youth groups is the World League of Croatian
Youth (S.H.U.M.S.), which is one of the organisaÿ
tions contained within the general body of the Croaÿ
(i) Background to the Documents
tian Liberation Movement (H.O.P.). These two youth
2. These documents come out of a background organisations have been used as recruiting grounds
for the smaller terrorist organisations.
that effectively commences in Australia in 1956,
although Croatian organisations commenced in Ausÿ
tralia as far back as 1950 with the arrival of the (ii) Documents, Ministerial Statenient, Correÿ
early Croatian migrants from the refugee camps of spondence and Special Reports by Commonwealth
Europe.
Police and ASIO
In 1956 General Luburic, who had his headquarÿ
6. Document A l is a copy of a statement made by
ters in Spain, split away from the general organisaÿ Mr Menzies the then Prime Minister in the House of
tion that was continued after 1945 by the Ustashi Representatives on 27 August 1964 which had been
leader, Dr Ante Pavelic. General Luburic was interÿ precipitated by a complaint by the Yugoslav Governÿ
ested in a more militant revolutionary organisation. ment to the Australian Government following the
Dr Pavelic was advancing in age and died in 1959. 1963 armed terrorist raid into Yugoslavia and the
Dr Pavelic, in 1956, created the ÿCroatian Liberation holding of a military style training camp near
Movement' (H.O.P.) with its headquarters in Buenos Wodonga, Victoria in 1963. Mr Menzies stated that
Aires, Argentina, as a general world organisation to the Commonwealth investigations:
incorporate and coÿordinate the various other orgaÿ 'so far have not produced any evidence which
nisations and movements within it.
would warrant legal proceedings'.
One of these organisations, controlled by the miliÿ The emphasis of this statement seems to have been
tary office of the H.O.P., is the official 'Croatian that investigations would be made of various organisÿ
Ustashi Movement'. General Luburic on the other ations and where evidence:
hand, created the Croatian National Resistance
(H.N.O.) with its headquarters in Madrid, Spain. This 'which would be receivable in a court of
law' . . .,
organisation has proved to be a marked inciter of
militant revolution against the State of Yugoslavia
was obtained an
throughout the world.
'appeal to the law'
Here in Australia, the split between the two Ustaÿ would be made. In addition details of security invesÿ
shi world leaders was reflected by the establishment tigations would not be made public.
of the Croatian Liberation Movement (H.O.P.) Ausÿ
7. Document A2 consists of a letter to Prims
tralian Branch. It has been led since its foundation
Minister Menzies from Dr Hefer, the World Presiÿ
in 1956 by Fabian Lovokovic.
dent of the Croatian Liberation Movement (H.O.P.)
dated 24 August 1964 in Madrid and apparently
In Victoria, Srecko Rover followed General
Luburic and formed an Australian Branch of the received on 2 September 1964. Dr Hefer is the curÿ
Croatian National Resistance (H.N.O.). The H.O.P. rent World President of H.O.P. and in Document C l
of the publication 'Ustasa' there is a picture of him on
in Sydney is linked directly to the Buenos Aires
headquarters of the world organisation of H.O.P. The page 15 speaking from a podium with the Ustashi
symbol of the ' U' with the bomb inside it.
Melbourne Croatian National Resistance (H.N.O.) is
linked to the Spanish headquarters of that organisaÿ 8. Document A3 is a letter by Sir Garfield Barÿ
tion which produces 'Obrana'.
wick as Minister for External Affairs to the Attorney
3. Upon the death of Dr Pavelic the World General. In this letter Sir Garfield Barwick expressed
his
concern at the foreign policy implications of terÿ
Presidency of the H.O.P. was taken by Dr Stjepan
Hefer who remains the current World President. rorist activities which:
Although the official 'Croatian Ustashi Movement' is 'may embarrass our relations with other Governÿ
incorporated within the Croatian Liberation Moveÿ ments'.
ment (H.O.P.) which, as we have seen, was the creÿ
He also stated in the letter:
ation of the warÿtime Ustashi leader, Dr Pavelic,
' I should like to suggest that ASIO should mainÿ
there are a number of other groups which claim to
be the true descendants, in revolutionary spirit, of the tain some supervision over migrant groups (making
terrorist military Ustashi of Ante Pavelic. These no attempt to disguise its surveillance) and bring to
groups include the Croatian Revolutionary Brothÿ your attention any activities which might be conÿ
erhood (H.R.B.); the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary sidered by them to contravene Sections 30A or
30C of the Crimes Act.'
Organisation (H.I.R.O.) and the United Croats of
West Germany. (U.H.Nj.) All of these organisations 9. Document A4 is a copy of a memorandum by
exist in Australia and evidence of this fact is conÿ the AttorneyÿGeneral's Department dated 25th Sepÿ
tained in the annexed documents.
tember 1964. The submission dealt with the question
4. The secret terrorist organisation, the Croatian of prosecutions of a number of Croatians including
Revolutionary Brotherhood (H.R.B.) has been the late Father Romac of Sydney for offences against
involved with the two armed terrorist raids into the Passports Act and the Aliens Act. Mr Snedden Yugoslavia
in 1963 and 1972. The documents contain who was AttorneyÿGeneral at that time made the folÿ evidence that
members of the H.R.B. were associated lowing notation on the submission:
with the Croatian National Resistance (H.N.O.) and
ÿThere is a period of public quiescence al preÿ
its Victorian leader, Srecko Rover,
sent. I would not want to see the whole issu»
5. There are two militant youth groups to which
revived by prosecutions which are not in themÿ
the documents annexed relate. The first is the Croaÿ
selves of great proportion . . . signed BMS'.
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10. Documents AS and A6 are Position Papers June 1972 to the AttorneyÿGeneral then Senatoi
produced by ASIO in relation to Croatian organisaÿ Greenwood. The memorandum informs the Attorneyÿ
tions on lst May 1967 and lst October 1967. These General that a new terrorist organisation calling itself
Position Papers were available and indeed were forÿ the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation
warded to all appropriate ministers of the Governÿ (H.I.R.O.) has been discovered in Victoria. The memÿ
ment including the AttorneyÿGeneral.
orandum had a report of the Commonwealth Police
11. Document A7 is a report on the Croatian Revÿ attached to it as well as translations of the docuÿ
ments
of the organisation. These documents include
olutionary Brotherhood (H.R.B.) by the Crime Intelÿ
ligence Bureau of the Commonwealth Police force the constitution of this terrorist organisation fully
dated 6th March 1968. This document sets out in clear set out in Document B.H.
terms the full structure of this Croatian terrorist 19. Document A15 is a record of interview preÿ
organisation including the Oath and the manner in pared by the then AttorneyÿGeneral of his interview
which it is taken as well as the troika and stozher with the Yugoslav Ambassador on 19th July 1972. In
militarist structure.
the last paragraph of that record of interview Senaÿ
tor Greenwood records the following;
12. Document A8 is a letter dated 3rd December
1969 from Mr Lynch, when Minister for Immigraÿ
' I said that it was very difficult to have this
tion, addressed to the AttorneyÿGeneral. In this letter
knowledge of a person's intent before he left Ausÿ
Mr Lynch expressed his concern:
tralia.
'at the likely serious consequences if Croat
Where there was some reason for believing that
nationals rn Australia are permitted to continue a person because of his statements, activities and
their terrorist activities and outrages against repÿ associates could be presumed to bc fostering terrorÿ
ist activities the Government could act and I
resentatives of the Yugoslav Government and
instanced the refusal of a passport to Srecko
authority, generally in this country'.
Rover'.
Mr Lynch further stated that:
' I have reason to believe that the terrorists are 20. Document A16 is a copy of the press stateÿ
endeavouring to create the impression amongst ment issued by the then AttorneyÿGeneral dated 20th
Yugoslav migrants in Australia that the Croatian July 1972.
extremists have the support of significant sections
21. Document A17 is a copy of a press statement
of Australian society and even the government'.
issued by the then AttorneyÿGeneral dated l l t h
13. Document A9 is a letter addressed to the August 1972.
AttorneyÿGeneral by Mr McMahon when Minister for
22. Document A18 is a copy of a memorandum by
Foreign Affairs, pointing out that over the last few the AttorneyÿGeneral's Department dated 4th July
years there have been a number of incidents or attacks 1972 to the then AttorneyÿGeneral. That memoranÿ
by extremist groups, especially against Yugoslav dum dealt with the application for a passport by
official missions in Australia. Mr McMahon stated
Jure Marie. Jure Marie is covered at length in Docuÿ
that:
ments B18, B19 and B20. The memorandum of 4th
July 1972 recommended to the then AttorneyÿGeneral
'the extremists themselves may by now have come
to believe that they can act with impunity and that that:
they can therefore, without risk to themselves, step
'On balance our view is that this is a case in
up the level and frequency of violence'.
which the issue of a passport might properly be
again refused.'
14. Document A10 is a report by the Commonÿ
wealth Police commenting upon the two above menÿ Both ASIO and the Commonwealth Police had recÿ tioned
ministerial letters. The conclusions to this ommended to the Department of Immigration against report
contain the following statement:
the issue of a passport to Marie. Despite these recomÿ
' f t is quite clear that Australian Croats are
mendations the AttorneyÿGeneral was not in favour
f involved in an international conspiracy directed of refusing a passport to Marie. Nonetheless the
, against the Tito Government of Yugoslavia and it Minister for Immigration did not grant the applicaÿ
seems that members of the Croatian Revolutionary, tion.
Brotherhood will persist in their attempts to attack 23. Document A19 is a copy of a letter by the
people and premises of the Yugoslav Government then AttorneyÿGeneral dated 27th November 1972 to
in Australia'.
the Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Bowen expressÿ
15. Document A U is a memorandum by ASIO to ing disagreement with a proposed course of action by
the AttorneyÿGeneral's Department dated 12th Februÿ the Minister for Foreign Affairs in relation to Croaÿ
ary 1970. This memorandum contains ASIO's comÿ tians who had gone from Australia to visit Yugoslaÿ
ments upon the two above mentioned ministerial letÿ via and had been detained by the Yugoslav authoriÿ
ters.
ties.
16. Document A12 is a report dated 20th February
23. Document A20 consists of 2 letters by Senator
1970 by the Commonwealth Police at a conference Greenwood, when AttorneyÿGeneral to the Minister
held on 17th February 1970 between Commonwealth for Immigration dated 29th June 1972 relating to a
Police and ASIO in respect of the Note delivered by passport application by Josip Bogut and 12th
Ambassador Rolovic of Yugoslavia to the Australian November 1972 relating to the deportation of Marinÿ
Government.
cic.
17. Document A13 consists of a background brief
circulated by ASIO and dated 2nd April 1971. The Croatian Liberation Movement ÿHOP) and the Croaÿ
tian Ustashi Movement ÿUHRO)
brief is entitled 'The Croatian National Resistance
(H.N.O.)7Recen t Developments'.
24. The Consutution of the Croatian Liberation
18. Document A14 is a copy of a memorandum Movement, as revised and issued by Dr Hefer in
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with Fabian Lovokovic, the leader of HOP in Sydney
at the Mintis Press, 117 Burwood Road Beln ore
and the man referred to in the correspondence in
New Soulh Wales. It is contained, together with « document B3. In that interview Lovokovic did not
translation, in document B l . This document refers
deny or refute that the Constitution of the Croatian
In Art cle 1 u> the 'Croatian Ustashi Movement' and Liberation Movement (HOP) contained a orovision
i ÿ Article 14 provides in Item 5, for a 'M.l.tary
providing for a 'Military Office'.
Office'.
30 Document B7 is a series of photographs taken
25 The Constitution of the official 'Croatian Ustaÿ at Wodonga, Victoria, during a training camp organÿ
shi Movementÿ within the HOP is set out m docuÿ ised by the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP.) in
ment B2. It is taken from the book ent.tled, Croaÿ 1963 A Unit of the Citizen MiUtary Forces assoÿ
«\
Libe>. »n Movement 1929ÿ59' issued by the ciated itself for reasons of public relations, with tno
HOP on lhe occasion of 30 years existence o f ÿ training by these men of the Croatian Ustashi Moveÿ
USTASA Croatian Revolution Organisation (UHRO) ment within the HOP. The photographs show the
1959' The document is a translation that was done heavy black ' U ' of the Ustashi under the chessÿboard
by Constable First Class M . Russell of the Commonÿ shield of Croatia with the letters 'HOP' over ihe top.
wealth Police Force in 1964. Attached withi that docÿ These photographs
corroborate the statements
r e n t is a statement of the 17 articles of the Ustash, attributed to Lovokovic in the Kovac/Rover correÿ
embodied in a document issued in Oermany in 1970 spondence in document B3 for he was at the
by T'Ustashi Satnik' (i.e. 'Ustashi CaptainVÿAnte Wodonga training camp.
Vukic, who is the current President of the European
Branch of the United Croats of West Germany.
Croatian National Resistance (HNO)
16 Documents B l and B2 need to be related to 31 The Constitution of the Australian Croatian document B3,
containing correspondence between National Resistance7Oceania , is set out in document J r f p towc of
Canberra and Srecko Rover of Melÿ B8. That document states that:
bourne dated 14th and 21st July 1972, in wh>ch
'We regard Yugoslavia and Yugoslavianism as
Kovac writes that Mr Les Shaw stated to a group o j
thc greatest and lhe only evil that has caused the
n people that Lovokovic 'admits that Ustash. cx.s
existing calamity . 7 7 Therefore we consider
in Auslralia and that he is their leader'. Copies of any direct or indirect help to Yugoslavia. Croatian
these letters were obtained by the Commonwealth
national treason.ÿ
Police from originals found in Rover's prem.ses m
Also included in this document is a report upon the
the searches made under search warrant in August General Assembly of the Croatian National Resisÿ
972 The letter of 21st July 1972 further reads 'He tance in Auslralia of 18th October 1969. This Report
(Lovokovic) admits that people are bemg trained and refers to a world tour of Croatian Associations by
says that he is not responsible for i f . Mr Shaw said Mr Srecko Rover including a visit to Spam 'on a
that everyone, mcluding Mr Rover had stated on matter of importance'. Reference is also made to fraÿ
television that 'there are no Ustashi ^ Australia
ternal greetings and 'thoughts' of officials and memÿ
Lovokovic claims that there are . The first lette of
bers of Croatian National Resistance in Europe,
Hth July 197' refers to certam persons reÿestablishÿ Stressing the special importance and significance ot
ing an organisation with 'only those who will join as our Associations in Sweden and Germany, as well as
Ustashi'. That letter also reads,
of members in Argentina and South America. This
'He (Ante Kovac) says that our politicians have
greeting also extends to the United States members.
degraded the letter ÿ U ÿ and thai he will have it
ÿ 32 A significant record of interview is contained
rectified'.
in document B9. This is a record of an interview
27 The reference in these letters to 'pohticians held on 16th February 1970 between Superintendent degrading
the letter ÿU», relates to document
Milte when a Commonwealth Police Officer, with B4
This document contains a copy of a letter to
Srecko Blaz Rover. In this interview. Rover al the
Prime Minister McMahon by the Croatian Coÿordmaÿ outset attempted to forestall the interview by seeking tive
Committee of Victoria, dated 25th May 1972,
Superintendent Milte to inquire of ASIO about
complaining about the cancellation of Srecko Rover s Rover Rover's words were, 'Why don't you phone
passport and that the Australian Governmem .s ASIO first before you talk to me.' The record of
tampering AustralianÿCroatian politicians in exile.
interview shows where Rover stands on the question ÿ>8.
Document B5 contains a copy of a letter of terrorism and ihe overthrow of Yugoslavia by
addressed to the AttorneyÿGeneral (then Senator force and violence. When asked by Superintendent
Greenwood), dated 23rd September 1972 rom Milte how he and his people proposed to achieve
Cjubomir Vuina. Vuina in referring to the Ustash. their alms of a recognised state for Croatia. Rover
replied:
said:
,
7In fact it is or was a body of people who
'We will do it by any means possible.'
resisted the Communist Government in Yugoslavia When Superintendent Milte asked him which organisÿ
during the War and of course became an unpopuÿ ation he belonged to in Auslralia, Rover staled, lar
body with its Government. Violence is tar
None, Sir. I wts a member of the HOP but they
removed from its concepts in tbis country'.
expe««d me because of my radical views. When
The writer of that letter is a former Colonel in what asked did he know Jure Marie, the Andric hrothers,
was the elite Black Legion of the Ustashi m the Ivica Kokic and Josip Senic, Rover replied:
Hitler puppet regime of Croatia during the Second
' I know all these people. Andric was the person
World War.
who made the pen bomb.'
(The Black Legion was an elite pari of the Ustashi
The pen bomb referred to is the one that exploded
Army similar to Ihe German SS and had the concenÿ at the Richmond Town Hall on 2nd September
tration camps under its control.)
1967 when a youth suffered grievous bodily harm.
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When Superintendent Milte put to Rover that Father and his successor was considered by ASIO to be
Kasic advocates violence to free Croatia from Yugosÿ
Josip Bicsic. The organisation publishes a paper in
lav tyranny, Rover made the following statement:
Argentina entitled 'Hrvatska Gruda'.j
Srecko Rover has, in a past police interview,
'But this is alright because it is just, like Vicÿ
supplied the following information about himself:
toria wanting to govern in its own right from New
He was born, Sarajevo, on 3rd February 1920
South Wales.'
where he was educated to Matriculation standard
The most significant statement by Rover in this interÿ
and later attended the University of Zagreb, the
view, which is a clear admission by him that he supÿ
capital of Croatia. He siudied Electronic Engiÿ
ports violence and terrorism is shown bv the followÿ
neering. However, he left University in 1943,
ing:
having been called up to serve in the Second
'Milte said: How do you propose to overcome
Bojna Ustaske Vojnice (i.e. Second Battalion,
the present Yugoslav Government
Ustashi Armed Forces). He joined as a Private
He said: Bv similar means to that being used in
and in June 1944 was promoted to commission
Vietnam today.
rank of Lieutenant. He served in Armoured
Milte said: What do you mean?
Units in Sarajevo in the First Ustaski Zdrug (i.e.
Brigade), ready to repel any Allied landing that
He said: Your Government is trying to overÿ
might take place on the Adriatic Coast by the
throw the North Vietnam Government by means
Western Allies. In 1945, on the downfall of
of force and we intend to do the same in Yugoÿ
the slavia. I will do anything in my power to assist them
Axis powers, Rover went to refugee camps in
in achieving this aim.'
Italy and Austria and in the next few years was
involved in several guerrilla terrorist raids into
33. Document BIO contains irrefutable evidence of
Yugoslavia. In 1950 he migrated to Australia
Srecko Rover's close personal involvement with terÿ
and has ceaselessly pursued the aims of organisÿ
rorism including the armed terrorist raid made into
ing the overthrow by force and violence the
Yugoslavia in June 1972. The evidence contained in
State of Yugoslavia.
these documents fully corroborates the statements
made by Rover in the record of interview with 34. Document B i i is a letter signed by Srecko
Superintendent Milte on 16th February 1970. as set Rover to the GovernorÿGeneral dated 20th October
out in document B9. The papers in document BIO 1972, with a covering letter to Senator Greenwood,
are translations and copies made from documents the then AttorneyÿGeneral, complaining about the
that were obtained by the Commonwealth Police visit of Her Majesty the Queen to Yugoslavia. This
under search warrant in August 1972. Other docuÿ document needs to be seen in the light of document
ments and articles were obtained from Rover at the B4 which refers to Srecko Rover as being an 'Ausÿ
same time. These included the following:
tralianÿCroatian politicianÿinÿexile'.
(i) A Seal bearing the insignia of the Supreme
Croatian Youth <H.M.)
Headquarters of the Croatian National Resisÿ
35. Document B12 contains an extract from the
tance and the Croatian Armed Forces (HOS);
Croatian Youth Journal, 'UZDAN1CA' of the May
(ii) Ammunition for a fireÿarm of a calibre the 1965 edition. A translation is attached. It sets out the
possession of which is illegal in Victoria:
aims and objects of Croatian Youth (H.M.) as
(iii) A list of names and addresses, overseas as embodied in a Resolution carried at the Foundation
well as local, of persons involved in Croatian Meeting of lhe organisation on 28th March 1965. In
Article 1 i l states:
organisations;
'We do not recognise any Yugoslavia, Monarÿ
(iv) Documents relating to the Conference ot
Croatian National Resistance held in Toronto chist or Communist, and we will fight against her
early 1972. which indicate that Rover was by the use of all means of total destructÿ
ion. . . .'
elected ai thai Conference to the position of
Article 3 states:
Deputy World Leader of HNO.
[lt was while Rover was attending that Conferÿ
'We remain loyal lo lhe ideas and principles
ence rhat his passport was cancelled.]
underlying the
Croatian
Right
of
State
(v) Documents relating to the instigation of guerÿ Parly . . as well as to the principles of the
Croatian Ustashi Movement of Dr Ante Pavelic,
rilla activity in Yugoslavia.
the Poglavnik.'.
All original documents and articles that had been
obtained under search warrants in August 1972 from World League of Croatian Youth (S.H.U.M.S.)
Rover and olher persons were returned to Rover and
36. Document B13 contains the text setting out the
those AttorneyÿGeneral.
persons in November
as document
required by
then
Paper 1972
(a) of
BIOthe
is pr inc iples upon which the World League of Croat ian
Youth
(S.H.U.M.S.) is based. Translations are
an Intelligence Report (translation attached) from a
attached.
The document also contains application
'Troika' lerrorisi group operating secretly in Ausÿ
tralia. Paper (b) of document BIO is a copy of a forms and the form of Oath required to be taken by
map of Yugoslavia which marks a route into Yugoÿ its members. T h : originals of these documents were
slavia to an area where the armed terrorist raiders of obtained by the Victoria Police Force, together with
June 1972 were crushed in an armed skirmish with the documents relating to the Croatian Illegal Revoÿ
lutionary Organisation (H.I.R.O.) that were found
lhe military and security forces of Yugoslavia.
with the cache of arms and ammunition in the Warÿ
[The Croatian Armed Forces (HOS), the seal of burton Mountains in Victoria in MayÿJune 1972. This
which is in the possession of Srecko Rover and organisation is referred to in document Bl as it is a referred
io above, was formed, according to ASIO, youth organisation within the Croatian Liberation after 194S
and was the successor to the Ustasha Movement (H O P ) and there is an express provision Army General
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Croatian Illegal RevolutionaryOrganisation (H.I.R.O.)
hood, I pledge myself to obey and carry out
ind Croatian Revolutionary Army (H.R.V.)
without demur any orders and instructions, given
me and to serve loyally the Brotherhood's Revoluÿ
37. Document B14 contains the Constitution of the
tionary Principles.
Croatian
Illegal
Revolutionary
Organisation
(H.I.R.O.) which claims to have been made at the
I pledge myself to keep any secrets entrusted to
Ustashi Supreme Headquarters in 1972. A translation
me and not to disclose anything that might damage
is attached. It also contains stationery headed 'Croaÿ the interest of the Brotherhood and of the Croaÿ
tian Revolutionary Army' (H.R.V.). The originals of tian People.
these papers were obtained by the Victoria Police
If I offend against this Oath and the Brotherÿ
Force as the result of searches in the Warburton
hoods Revolutionary Principles, my penalty
Mountains of Victoria where a cache of arms and
under the organisation's laws, shall be death.
ammunition was found in a training area in the
So help me God.'
bush. The leaders involved in this organisation have
40.
Document
a series of
papers
that
been prosecuted by the Victoria Pohce and the
ere obtained
byB17
the contains
Commonwealth
Police
under
transcript of the committal proceedings against them swearch
warran
at
the
premises
of
Ad
lf
Andric,
in
t
o
is attached to document B14. The Constitution of
1966,
in
Geelong,
Victoria.
Translations
for
each
of
H.I.R.O. provides: 'A Chemical Branch for bomb and the papers are attached, together with a record of an
explosion production is to be formed'. It also proÿ interview
by Sergeant E. H. George of the Commonÿ
vides:
wealth Andric
Police with
Adolf
Andricinonthat
21stheJune
1966.
Adolf
is very
important
was
an
'A
militia
is
to
be
formed
in
any
case;
they
are
to be given military training and preparations for
active terrorist member of this terrorist organisation
their arming are to be made:
while he was in Australia. After returning to Europe
in 1969 he carried on his terrorist activities and
Further:
maintained his association with other Croatians in
'The Supreme Stozer will open special training Australia. Adolf Andric was a leader with his brother
schools for terrorism and for all 'activist' activities
Ambroz, of the armed terrorist raiding party which
on assassinations, raids, sabotage, arson, etc' entered Yugoslavia in June 1972. Many of the memÿ
Joint Committee of Croatian Organisation in New bers of that raiding party had been recruited in Ausÿ
tralia. Adolf Andric was an industrial chemist having
South Wales
38. Document BIS is a copy of a letter by the had technical training in this trade in Yugoslavia
Joint Committee of Croatian Organisations in New before migrating to Australia. Many of the papers in
South Wales to Prime Minister McMahon dated 31st document B17 indicate considerable experimentation
August 1972, complaining about searches made on in relation to poisons, explosives and bombs. These
the premises of certain Croatians. The letter conÿ documents portray a picture of terrorist planning tained
a printed sidenote with the names of the folÿ that is almost beyond comprehension. Several of the lowing
papers set out the fundamental principles of HRB.
organisations:
They also evidence a close association of other
(a) The Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP);
important members of the Croatian community with
<b) The Croatian National Resistance (HNO);
Adolf Andric. This is especially so in the case of
(c) The Croatian Country Club; and
Tomislav Lesic and Jure Marie.
(d) The United Croats (UHNJ)
41. Document B17A consists of four photographs
Tbe document is clear evidence of the unification
of
the pen bombs and the scene of the washroom
which had been achieved in 1972 of all the militant
wh
ere
it exploded in the Richmond Town Hall on
and extremist Croatian organisations. The United
2nd September 196 7. Rover informed Super intendent
Croats (UHNJ) has its associations overseas, as with
Milte in the in
t erview recorded in document 9, that
HOP and HNO, and is a terrorist organisation. The
Am
broz Andric, the brother of Adolf Andric , made
United Croats is an organisation based directly on
the
pen bomb.
Ustashi principles and methods of operation. This is
shown in document B2. Press reports on State Police
42. Document B18 consists of a series of papers
proceedings in New South Walesand Commonwealth that were obtained by the Commonwealth Police
Police reports on this terrorist organisation are conÿ under search warrant at the premises of Jure Marie tained
in document B15A. That document contains in May 1967 in Wollongong, New South Wales. the
criminal record of the Australian leader of the These papers are a few of the many that were United
Croats of West Germany as well as a full obtained from Jure Marie's premises at that time and statement of tbe
structure of this terrorist organisa
they are all of a similar nature. Translations are
tion.
attached to each of the papers contained in docuÿ
ment B18. They portray a picture of a tightlyÿknit,
wellÿdisciplined secret militarist structure. One of the
Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB)
39. Document B16 contains the Oath of the Croaÿ series (000290) of papers in document B18 is headed
tian Revolutionary Brotherhood. A translation is as follows:
attached. The oath is taken at a ceremony before a 'Croatian National Resistance 'SUD' Armed Forces
black draped table on which is placed a rifle, dagger,
Headquarters
crucifix and two candles. The rifle and dagger are in
a crossed position. The oath is in the following 25lh March 1964
Top Secret
Operation area 8
form:
' I swear by Almighty God and things that are To gentlemen Croatian Officers, NCOs andSoldiers.
T S *
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already stated, possesses the seal of the Croatian had no marking on it, airline tickets and other docuÿ
Armed Forces (HOS). Another document in the ments evidence that he had travelled in Europe in
series in document B18 contains a copy of the print May/June 1972. The terrorist raid into Yugoslavia in
from the seal containing the insignia of the Croatian June 1972 was mounted from Germany and Austria.
Revolutionary Brotherhood. Bound in a red folder This can be related to the document that contained a
contained in document B18 is the Croatian text, record of an interview between Superintendent Milte
together with a translation, of a Handbook or Manual and Rover in which Rover stated that persons would
of Croatian Revolution.
be sent through Germany to fight in Yugoslavia. The
43. Document B19 is a record of an interview by evidence contained in Document 20 of Marie sending
Sergeant E. H. George of the Commonwealth Police money to Vegar in Europe can be related to the with
Jure Marie on Sth June 1968. The interview statements made by, Tomislav Lesic on the ABC teleÿ was
based on the papers that had been obtained vision on 19th September 1972, and contained in docuÿ under
search warrant in 1967, some of which are conÿ ment 6(a). In that interview Lesic stated that funds tained in
document B18. Jure Marie was the leader were sent to guerrilla fighters in Europe and Croatia.
at that time of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherÿ 48. Document B23 is a newsÿsheet entitled 'Report
hood in Australia.
from Revolutionary Front'. A translation is attached.
' 44. Document B20 contains papers that were This report indicates that it is produced by the
obtained by the Commonwealth Police from the H.R.B. It relates to the terrorist raid into Yugoslavia
premises of Jure Marie in August 1972. These docuÿ in June 1972.
ments show that Jure Marie was still involved with
terrorist activities in 1972. The original with translaÿ 49. Document B24 is a copy of a letter from the
tions and clear diagrams of the organisation structure Deputy for External Affairs, Headquarters of the
of a terrorist group with its associated Troikas is Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, Europe,
clearly seen in these documents. This series of papers addressed to the Regional Director for Victoria of
contain copies of bank and receipt documents eviÿ A.S.I.O. There is also a copy of a letter by A.S.I.O.
dencing the fact that Jure Marie had sent money to to the Department of Immigration relating to an
Paul Vegar in Europe. Paul Vegar was one of the H.R.B. proposal to allow a group of 15 of their Australian
naturalised Croatians who took part in the members to leave Australia.
armed terrorist raid into Yugoslavia under the Andric Funds to Sweden
brothers in June 1972.
50. Document B25 Is a copy of a report by the
45. These papers contained closeÿup maps of a Commonwealth Police dated 7 March 1972, relating
special area of Yugoslavia and an accompanying letÿ to $300 forwarded from Mount Gambier, South Ausÿ
ter referring to the maps and events that were tralia, by bank draft to Goteborg, Sweden, to aid
planned to lake place in a town called Severin that Croatian extremists in Sweden.
is detailed on the maps. These maps and correÿ Attitude of the United States Governnient
spondence are associated with the armed raid into 51. Document B26 is a copy of a memorandum
Yugoslavia in June 1972. One of the letters refers to No. 2205/72 dated 31 July 1972, to the Secretary,
the fact that the 'financial resources of the organisaÿ Department of Foreign Affairs, from the Counsellor
tion which we took with us from Victoria as well as of the Australian Embassy, Washington, D.C. That
those received later, have now been used up'. The memorandum states that the attitude of the United
letter goes on lo speak of the organisation bearing States Government is that the United States would
the burden from Australia and also refers to the gain nothing and lose much if Yugoslavia were to
Australian organisation. That letter also refers to the breakÿup or be weakened by internal divisions and.
HRB. There is a sheet in Marie's papers accomÿ separatism, particularly if such developments were
panied by a translation with the number '1382' on it, encouraged or promoted from abroad. It also states
which is a statement of a constitution for units that in recent years the United States Administration
within the HRB. The diagram is an illustration of an had been concerned to chip away at the roots of the
HRB unit.
Croatian extremist strength in the United States.
46. Document B21 is a record of an interview by Photographs of bomb incident, Sydney, 16 September
Sergeant Brown of the Commonwealth Police with 1972
Blaz Kraljevic on 8th August 1972. Kraljevic relates 52. Document B27 consists of photographs of the
how he was recruited to take part in the armed terÿ bomb incident in Sydney on 16 September 1971.
rorist raid into Yugoslavia of June 1972, and how PUBLICATIONS
Lovric and Glavas were also recruited for that raid.
Lovric and Glavas took part in the raid. Kraljevic 53. A range of Croatian extremist publications is missed
joining the group in GermanyÿAustria, due to produced in Australia and overseas with distribution his
arrest for liquor offences in Victoria. Another in Australia.
Croatian named Zdenko Marincic who was associated 54. All these publications are a source of inciteÿ
with Kraljevic. left Australia at that time, but was ment to and encouragement of violence and terrorÿ turned
back by German police at Frankfurtÿonÿ ism.
Main. Upon his return to Mascot Airport he was
'USTASA', (JUBILEE), 10 April, 1941ÿ1971 ediÿ
arrested, charged and convicted of having unlawful tion. Page 38 carries a poem by Venco, AUSÿ
possession of an unlicensed firearm7 a rifle and four
TRALIA, titled 'TO CROATIA'.
silencers secreted in a toy koala bear. He was senÿ
'Oh my beloved Homeland, turned into a dungeon,
tenced to nine (9) months imprisonment. Although an
Thy children's innocent blood continues to flow
alien he was not deported.
Because of their Croatian name.
<
Today thou enjoyest neither freedom nor justice,
47. Document B22 is a copy of a map of part of
With the symbols of thine old fame defaced,
Germany that was obtained by the Commonwealth
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The creators of another Tenth of April will rise,
And a dawn of freedom shall yet be born for
Croatia.
Au revoir, oh my ancestors' cradle,
My brothers and sisters, my sea, my clefts dales
and my hills,
Au revoir, for the hour is nigh.
A new generation has arisen from the graves of
thy martyrs,
Woven from the fibres of sacrifice and permeated
with love
For thee, oh my Homeland of knights.
Ustasi Private Soldier. C l
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'OBRANA' (DEFENCE), January, 1973. The
paper
frontÿpages a picture of GENERAL
LUBURIC in a dress uniform, complete with the
Nazi decoration of a Knight's Cross. Pages 4 and
5 carry Swedish press comment on the September
1972 airliner hijacking. The Swedish papers quoted
from are picked in a manner presenting the
hijackers in a most favourable light, behaving like
perfect gentlemen throughout the episode. The
article's purpose of praising the hijackers is transÿ
parent. Page 9 carries extracts from the text of a
leaflet received by the paper from Cleveland,
U.S.A., titled 'A PROCLAMATION TO THE
SERBIAN PEOPLE' and signed by the 'UNION
OF
SERBIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD'. The
'PREGLED' (REVIEW), March, 1972, Page 17
carries a picture titled 'ON THE EVE OF CROAÿ extracts call ON THE SERBIAN FIGHTERS TO
FOLLOW THE CROATIAN PATRIOTS' EXÿ
TIA N REVOLUTION' and showing perched in a
tree a sniper with his rifle at the ready. The capÿ AMPLE OF MURDERING YUGOSLAV AGENTS
tion says, 'HAVE A LOOK AT THE ABOVE AND HIJACKING AND BRINGING DOWN
AIRCRAFT. WITH CHRISTMAS APPROACHÿ
PICTURE*. 'SPRINGTIDE IS APPROACHING
ING, 'LET US BARE OUR TEETH AT THE
I N PRENJ AND PAPUK MOUNTAINS (Translaÿ
YUGOSLAVS! WRECK TITO'S EMBASSIES
tor's note7tw o mountain ranges suitable for guerÿ
AND CONSULATES!' The text purports lo use
rilla operations). LONG LIVE THE YOUTHFUL
the Serbian variant of the SerboÿCroat language.
SPIRIT OF CROATIAN REVOLUTION'.
But its grammar, style and terminology are such as
The DirectorÿGeneral of A.S.I.O. wrote on 24
could never have been used even by a simple Serÿ
April 1972 to the AttorneyÿGeneral (Senator
bian. The 'PROCLAMATION' is a transparent
Greenwood) enclosing copies of translated articles
plant, most probably composed by a Croatian born and
commented that the Attorney may 'wish to
or at least educated in ZAGREB.
examine' (the articles) 'in the light of the Crimes
Act'.
'HRVATSKA BORBAÿ (CROATIAN STRUGÿ
GLE). It has a routine Croatian extremist inflamÿ
'SPREMNOST (READINESS), August, 1972,
matory approach.
front page. Under the title of ÿTHEY HAVE
DIED FOR CROATIA', the paper lists the nineÿ
'OSV1T' (DAWN) CROATIAN WEEKLY, No.
teen participants in the incursion into Yugoslavia 69, 14.2.1973, front pages under the title of 'THE
saying that 'WE MUST ALL AGREEÿ THAT
ABOUT THE ANDRIC BROTHERS', its
THEY HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES FOR TRUTH
reporter's interview of 'a person who does not wish
CROATIA.
to disclose his name for personal reasons'. The
'UZDANICA' (MAINSTAY), No. 1, 1972 Page
paper goes on to say ihat it does not 'belong to
1. It carries an article signed by 'T. S.' and titled any political party and, as such', does not 'engage
'OUR ANGLE ON BUGOJNO', which identifies
in polities'. Its only desire is to 'write for and
its readers with the terrorists taking part in the inform the Croatian people of developments both
June, 1972 raid in BOSNIA, YUGOSLAVIA. Page
inside the country and outside'. Stating that it will
13 carries an article by 'STEF' and titled 'A follow its regular practice of not commenting on
CROATIAN DEATH MORE HONOURABLE any political articles, the paper adds that what it
THAN LIFE' dealing with Dr Jelic's death copied wishes to serve is 'the interest of the Croatian
from the 'CROATIAN STRUGGLE'. It contains
people and their freedom'.
another
article
headed
ÿTHE
REVOLUÿ
The interview itself is most strongly proÿAndricÿ
TIONARIES'
BREAD
IS
COVERED I N
brothers.
BLOOD', signed by 'BUCO', which praises the
June, 1972 raiders.
The end of the interview makes it clear that the
paper has the interviewed person's full name and
'VJESNIK' (CHRONICLE) OF THE CROAÿ
T I A N LIBERATION MOVEMENT H.O.P., in address.
Canberra, July, 1972. Page 7 carries an anonymous
'KLETVA' (CURSE), a roneoed booklet circulatÿ
7article headed 'WE HAVE FOUND THE ANTIÿ
ing in the Croatian community. It is a manual for
VENOM TO SERBOÿCOMMUNIST VENOM'. revolutionary armed forces and irregulars. It
The article praises the Ustashi movement and its includes chapters on the
general
REVOLUÿ
aims. Its conclusion calls on Croatians to answer
TIONARY
ORGANIZATION.
SABOTAGE,
the call of duty, their motto being 'A PAINFUL
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, SECURITY SERÿ
WOUND CAN BE TREATED ONLY WITH A N
VICE, PROPAGANDA SERVICE, REVOLUÿ
EVEN MORE PAINFUL MEDICINE*.
TIONARY COURTS, GUERRILLA WARFARE
and on REGULAR ARMED FORCES, complete
'HRVATSKA DRZAVA' (CROATIAN STATE)
with diagrams on basic army units.
'INÿ
February, 1973. Page 8 carries an article by Ivan
STRUCTIONS FOR CROATIANS OUTSIDE
JELIC headed 'SPEAKING FRANKLY', which
calls for the establishment of a Croatian governÿ THEIR HOMELAND' an openly H.R.B. leaflet
ment in exile, to include the best, most able and signed by the CROATIA'S NATIONAL LIBERAÿ
most resolute exiled Croatians who will 'COÿ TION FRONT and circulating of late in the Croaÿ
ORDINATE OUR STRUGGLE' AND LEAD IT tian community. It opens by calling on the Croaÿ
ALONG THE MOST EFFECTIVE LINE SO tians abroad to wreck Yugoslav embassies and
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Senator MURPHY7 I move:
That the Senate take note of the statement.

Security Intelligence Organisation? Why did
he run away from speaking about the subject
today? That is why we thought it would be
Senator WITHERS (Western Australiaÿ
far better to wait and see what this great
Leader of the Opposition) (4.3)7A t this
statement was all about before proceeding to
stage I shall speak briefly to the motion that
question time. Question time will be called on
the Senate take note of the statement. The
shortly and we will then be in a position to
Senate will appreciate that a paper which
ask questions in order to try to fill in the
has taken about an hour to put down and
gaps, because gaps do exist and they ought
which has been supported by a large number
not to exist. Rather than spend some 60 minÿ
of documents cannot be considered immediÿ
utes in this place trying to destroy his predeÿ
ately by the Opposition. Therefore we will
cessor in office as AttorneyÿGeneral it would
seek to adjourn the debate on the motion
have been far better for Senator Murphy to
which has been moved by Senator Murphy.
justify his own actions over the last 12 days,
Before we do so I think that a few comÿ which have put the total security of this
ments may be in order. Today we have
nation at risk. As 1 said earlier, I think the
listened to Senator Murphy's statement,
Senate ought to come back to the paper at a
which, as 1 have said, occupied almost an later stage and therefore I ask for leave to
hour. It has been delivered in an almost
continue my remarks.
theatrical atmosphere. I suppose the honourÿ
able senator ought to be pleased that he
Leave granted; debate adjourned.
had a full house. I am only pleased that
people have not paid to come otherwise
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
they would be asking for their money back
Senator GREENWOOD (Victoria)7M r
because they must have been disappointed
President, I claim to have been personal ly
at whai the statement contained. I thought m isreprese
nte d and I seek le ave to make a
that after the raid on Friday, 16th March
statement.
Senator Wilkinson7Visit .

The PRESIDENT7I s leave granted? There
being no objection, leave is granted.

Senator WITHERS7 I used the word 'raid .
Senator GREENWOOD7 I have listened
One would have thought that that would
for
the
greater Part of an hour to what I
have been adverted to somewhere in the
regard
as not an exposure, not an identificaÿ
statement. But the most that can be said is
tion of terrorist individuals or organisations in
that it was dismissed in 2 minor paraÿ
this countrv but what I have interpreted as a
graphs on page 28 of a 30ÿpage document.
challenge to my integrity, a challenge to my
All we have listened to this afternoon has
honesty and a challenge to the bona fides
been a reiteration of statements about a reign with which I discharged the office of
of terror7mos t of which we have heard time AttorneyÿGeneral last year. It accords with
and time again. One would have thought that what was forecast in Press statements. I proÿ Senator
Murphy would have at least pose to reply not today but in due course and attempted to
justify his actions of the last 12 in detail, chapter and verse, in the course of days and not
make the statement wbich he the debate, because I have been subjected to made this
afternoon. One is left with the a monstrous vilification in which truth has impression that all
that Senator Murphy has played virtually no part. 1 have sat here
attempted to achieve is a state of tension, and
Government senators interjecting.
it is a state of tension which is often brought
about by the continual presence of police. We
The PRESIDENT7Order ! I will not have
have heard of threats of death, threats of this Senate governed by a claque on the back
bombings, threats of bombs in the Senate and bench either on my right or on my left.
of bullet proof g'ass. What happened here
today? We heard nothing at all about those Senator GREENWOOD7 J have sat here
things. All I can say, Mr President, is that and 1 have listened to and I have read
Senator Murphy has deliberately not excerpts of things I have said taken completely
attempted to ans er the q estion before the out of context and not put in the balance

APPENDIX 1C
MINISTERIAL STATEMENT – GREENWOOD
Australia, Senate, Parliamentary Debates, No.S.14, 1973, 798-807.
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Senator Withers be entitled to speak in the ignored what is relevant, concealed what is
debate, in effect, as though he had not yet inconvenient and refused to table all the docÿ
uments which would enable people to find out
spoken.
Senator Withers1 I would be agreeable to where the truth lies. The truth has not been
told and the reason that the truth has not
that course if all other honourable senators
been told has been because the Attorneyÿ
agree.
General has chosen not to do so.
The PRESIDENT1Wha t does Senator
He stated that there are terrorist organisaÿ
DrakeÿBrockman say on the matter?
tions
in Australia. He has named certain
Senator DrakeÿBrockman1 I am glad that
we
organisations. But who are their members,
have been brought into it. On behalf of
what are their activities, what have they
the Australian Country Party, I agree.
done? What is there to justify his claim?
Senator MURPHY1Woul d Senator Gair Where is the substantiation? Where indeed, is
indicate whether he concurs with the proposal? the credible evidence? What does the Attorneyÿ
Senator Gair1 I would hate to disturb the General say? He says that the evidence is
harmony that appears to exist. I have no in the documents that he piles on the table of objection to
the Senate1
som e 2,000 or more pages of
that procedure.
documents. For what purpose? Is it to allow
Senator Negus1O n behalf of myself and the assumption to be made: 'Well, if there are
the independent senators, I state that we 2,000 pages there must be something'? But he agree.
does not identify what he relies on as eviÿ
Senator MURPHY1Ma y it be taken that dence. Above all else, he has refused to prosÿ by
general concurrence this will be the course ecute anybody or any organisation for any of the
criminal activity of any kind. Nor has he said
proceedings?
that he will prosecute1i f indeed, in the preÿ
The PRESIDENT1I s there any objection?
judiced atmosphere he has created, any perÿ
There being no objection, leave is granted for
son he has named could expect a fair trial
this course to be followed.
before a jury.
Motion1b y leave1withdrawn .
Senator Murphy claims that there is overÿ
whelming evidence, incontestable evidence, of
CROATIAN TERRORISM
his allegation of terrorist organisations in this
Ministerial Statenient
country. There are laws1i n the Commonÿ
Debate resumed from 27 March (vide page wealth Crimes Act1unde r which he can
547), on motion by Senator Murphy:
prosecute persons and apply to the courts to
That the Senate take note of the statement.
declare such organisations to be unlawful.
Senator GREENWOOD (Victoria) (3.7)1 Persons who cause death, injury and terror by
The AttorneyÿGeneral (Senator Murphy) said exploding bombs are terrorists and liable to last
week that he would inform the the full rigours of our criminal law. It is not
Senate and the people of Australia of the only persons who commit the crimes but perÿ facts1th
e facts of organised Croatian terrorÿ sons who conspire to commit crimes or who ism in
attempt to commit crimes who can be proseÿ
Australia. He has not done so. What
he has done has been to choose his target, cuted. The laws exist, the offences exist, the
select his facts and give those chosen by him determination to stamp out political terrorism and
those only to the Senate and to the is asserted1an d yet there are no applications
nation. What he has done in the name of the to the courts. It is inconceivable that if there
truth has been to accuse some, to judge some, is evidence of organised terrorism there
to vilify some, and to deceive all the people should be no prosecutions. And, naturally
of Australia. He has done this by concealing what we are concerned about are not proseÿ
the truth; not by exposing it. If the facts did cutions of individuals following police raids
not support his beliefs, then he ignored and and arrests since the AttorneyÿGeneral made
suppressed those facts. What he has done has his statement last week. We are concerned to
disgraced his office. As the AttorneyÿGeneral challenge and deny the AttorneyÿGeneral's
of the Commonwealth he claimed to be givÿ assertions that last year the evidence was
ing the facts on a serious matter of whether available in abundance to support prosecuÿ
i
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h
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This statement, which Senator Murphy
given. The fact is1i t must be1tha t there is
no evidence which would enable prosecutions. describes in effect as a lie, I made as Attorÿ
There is no credible evidence to support the neyÿGeneral. I made it responsibly. It is not a
allegations. This is what the Commonwealth lie, in fact or in effect. I made it after considÿ
Police, the Australian Security Intelligence eration of the recommendations, the factual
Organisation and the AttorneyÿGeneral's material, the reports and the relevant inforÿ
Department of the Commonwealth confirmed mation which had been supplied to me. The
to me and what the documents the Attorneyÿ responsibility for the statenient naturally is
General concealed and the facts he withheld and must be mine, but it was made as a conÿ
plainly disclose.
sidered statement of the position as I and the
The AttorneyÿGeneral had an abundance of agencies of the Commonwealth for whom I
material available to him. What he chose not was responsible knew it.
to reveal is revealing. I have a document, A further document from ASIO, undated,
received from ASIO last year and dated 13th which Senator Murphy did not table, was an
April 1972, which Senator Murphy has availÿ initial assessment after tbe bomb explosions
able to him and which he has not tabled. And which occurred in Melbourne in April 1972
what does it say? It expressed, in 11 closely and which I received about that time. The
argued pages, that it is difficult not to believe document stated:.
that the majority of violent incidents involvÿ
However, even if it can be shown that within the
Croatian nationalist organisations there are some
individuals
with a propensity to violence this would ists1
1i t Ihey are indeed the work of Croatian nationalÿ
mus t
also be the result of activity by isolated provide insufficient grounds for general condemnation individuals
of
the
organisations
when
.
there
is
no
evidence
to
or very small groups. Certainly the inciÿ
dents
themselves have been of a type not requiring indicate that bomb attacks are other than the violent organisational
support, but rather, limited ingenuity expressions of individual extremists.
on the behalf of an individual to obtain explosives
If requested I shall table the document. These
ancl construct a simple detonating mechanism.

ing Yugoslavs in Australia:

assessments are entirely consistent with the
Did Senator Murphy refer to this statement?
view that is to be found in the documents,
Did he table this document? He did not. The
which Senator Murphy was prepared to table,
document concluded:
of what was said in 1971.

that while there were grounds for presuming that the
Croatian nationalist organisations as entities are I note, for example, from those tabled docÿ
unlikely to be involved in such violence in Australia, uments, that on 2nd February, 1971 the
a more probable explanation lies in the activities of DirectorÿGeneral of Security stated:
individuals and small groups acting independently
It should be understood that, so far, evidence is
without organisational support.
lacking that any of the bomb attacks on Yugoslav
I shall table the document and I challenge the establishments have been planned by specific organisÿ
AttorneyÿGeneral. Why did he not table it?
rather than by individual extremists. The
Why did he make no reference to its concluÿ ations,
detection of individuals, or small isolated groups, is
sions?
obviously a more diflicult matter than the penetration
Senator Murphy denied that there was basis of established organisations.

for my assessment that there was no credible I note also that at the conference attended on
evidence of the existence in Australia of 20th February 1971 to deal with coÿoperation
Croatian revolutionary terrorist organisations. between the Commonwealth Police and ASIO
He said that at the time I made those stateÿ the Commissioner of Commonwealth Police
ments they were untrue. But what are the reported to the Secretary of the Attorneyÿ
General's Department that the recent acts of
facts? What was the statement I had made? I
violence were discussed and that:
had said on 20th July 1972:
. . . the indications were that Croatians were
Investigations by the Commonwealth Police so far involved but whether this was as the result of activity
have not revealed any credible evidence that any and control by Croat organisations was not clear.
Croatian revolutionary terrorist organisation exists in
Australia. The Government cannot positively reject It was also said that:
assertions that individuals or groups of individuals . . . evidence is lacking that bombings etc. have
may be engaging in terrorist activities directed in been the work of organisations but may be the work
some way to achieving Croatian independence.
of small groups which are not integrated.
Allegations of such activities and other matters are
It
frequently brought to the notice of the police and is obvious that the ASIO and the Commonÿ
these are subject to continuous investigation. If invesÿ wealth Police assessments of 1971 still
tigations disclose such activities, the persons so remained the same in 1972 Why did the
d
ill b
t d if th i
ti iti
i
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received in 1972? They do not support his be kept informed. But the final report
elaborate thesis but why should they not be apparently was not available until 23rd
revealed?
November1b y which time, because of the
Senator Murphy claimed that there was an dissolution of Parliament, I had ceased to
irresponsible indifference to information availÿ receive any reports or submissions from the
able, but he makes this charge only on the Commonwealth Police. One of the last Comÿ
basis of that information which he regards as monwealth Police documents I received was a
relevant for the Senate and the people of submission from the Commissioner of Comÿ
Australia to have. It may be clever politics but monwealth Police dated 19th October 1972.
it is unworthy of the principal law officer of It said:
the Commonwealth. I was consistently receivÿ From time to time, allegations have been made by
ing submissions from the Police, from ASIO both the Yugoslav Government and various groups in
and from the AttorneyÿGeneral's Department Australia that clandestine training is being given to
Croatian 'terrorists' in this country prior to their
on the whole question of terrorism. Senator
returning to Europe to carry out guerilla activity
Murphy referred to the aideÿmemoire from against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
the Yugoslav Government and the allegations (SFRY). All such allegations have been scrupulously
about the Croatian Revolutionary Brothÿ investigated but to date no viable evidence at all has
been uncovered to support the contention that Croaÿ
erhood. But, again, what are the facts? I tian terrorists have been trained in Australia.
received a departmental submission on 18th
I shall table this document. Surely this is
August 1972 which stated:
highly relevant. It was the day before the
The reports by ASIO to the Department of reply was given to the Yugoslav Government.
Foreign Affairs dated 24th March 1970 and to this
Department dated 15th August 1972 both indicate Why did not Senator Murphy choose to make
that, in ASIO's view and that of 'the relevant law this information available? The Commonÿ
enforcement agencies' no evidence has been found to wealth Police had
reported to the
support the Yugoslav contention of 1970 that the AttorneyÿGeneral's Department on 17th
groups gathered round the Croatian Revolutionary
Brotherhood were still in existence in this country, August 1972. At that stage they had before
and were operating on a scale comparable with preÿ them the aideÿmemoire which had been preÿ
1963 activities.
sented by the Yugoslav Ambassador on 16th
If requested I shall table this document. Will August. Senator Murphy has placed reliance the
upon this aideÿmemoire and drawn certain
AttorneyÿGeneral say why he declined to
put this material before the Senate and the conclusions from it. But his conclusions are
based on the same tactic, of selecting what he
people of Australia?
wants
and ignoring what is to the contrary or
The aideÿmemoire
contained numerous
allegations. Persistent among the allegations in is inconvenient, as characterises his whole
the document were the assertions that terrorÿ statement.
ist training by terrorist groups was taking What are the facts? What are the matters
place in Australia. Senator Murphy claimed Senator Murphy withholds? First he refers
that what he called a bland interim reply was extensively to the police report of 23rd
given on 20th October to the Yugoslav Govÿ November which he has tabled and which
ernment which maintained that the matter represented, apparently, the final conclusions
was still being investigated but made no of the Commonwealth Police. It is a docuÿ
admission of the presence of terrorist organisÿ ment never produced to me and he would ations
in our midst. It was this which, subseÿ know this. And yet he attempts to build a quently, the
Prime Minister (Mr Whitlam) has case on the assumption that it was material stigmatised as a lie.
known to and in the hands of the previous
But how could the reply say anything else Government. Second, he tables the Commonÿ
in the light of the facts? Senator Murphy wealth Police report dated 17th August 1972
chose to withhold the facts. What are the which, of course, was stated by the police to
facts? All the detailed aideÿmemoire allegaÿ be a preliminary study. He refers to one senÿ tions
were being investigated. Searches of tence only1tha t it, namely the aideÿmemoire, homes
had taken place. I was constantly does contain a core of almost irrebuttable being informed that
documents seized1an d fact.
nothing other than documents had been found But what was the core of irrebuttable fact?
by the Commonwealth Police in these The Commonwealth police did not expressly searches1
wer e
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sisted of. Nor does Senator Murphy. I shall either the movement'1Croatia n National
'o r Rover'. It also states: 'We are
refer to what it might be at a later stage. Resistance1
not yet in possession of evidence', to support
Third, what the report did say was:
For the first time we have been given clear eviÿ alleged assessments of individuals. Further the dence
that the Yugoslav authorities have been makÿ report says: 'The names and premises . . . ing a
detailed study of leading Croatian nationalist are the subject of current investigation'. Then
figures in Australia and that they may well be in it says: 'We are unable to obtain any credible
possession of credible evidence which would support
their allegations. Whilst we would disagree at this evidence to support these allegations'. They
juncture with some specific aspects of their claims, related to training and terrorist groups. The
particularly in relation to the links between HRB and report also states: 'Police have been unable to
HIRO, basically they seem to have evidence pointing obtain formal complaints from witnesses who
towards the existence of a Croatian terrorist organisÿ
would testify in Court'. That was referring to
ation in Australia.
The evidence referred to consisted of what allegations of apparent extortion. Finally, it
was alleged by the Yugoslav Government. It states: 'Our investigations failed to produce
had to be tested by investigation. As the credible evidence to support such claims'.
That was relating to claims of blackmail with
report said, they may well be in possession of
the purchase of soÿcalled Croatian
credible evidence which would support their respect to
passports.
allegations. The report expressed serious conÿ
cern on what the material in the aideÿ
These are, as I have indicated, the stateÿ
memoire contained about the possible exisÿ ments to be found in the police report of tence
of a clandestine terrorist organisation in
17th August. These statements are highly relÿ
Australia.
evant but were not even referred to by
It is proper and only fair to consider what Senator Murphy. They represent the state of the
police investigation and their assessment of
5 pages of the police report of 17th
August indicated. What was the core of irreÿ the position before they proceeded to make
buttable fact? Surely it was, as a study of the the detailed inquiry into the Yugoslav Govÿ
report discloses, that there had been a raid, ernment's allegations in the aideÿmemoire.
an unlawful incursion, by persons intending
They represent the considered police viewÿ
violence, into Yugoslavia. Some of these perÿ point at about the same time as I made the sons
came from Australia. They had links statement which Senator Murphy categorised with
Australia. The report stated:
as a lie. I had said that investigations by the
Attacks have taken place on Yugoslav missions Commonwealth police so far had not revealed without
detection of the culprits.
credible evidence that any Croatian revoluÿ
That is fact1irrebuttabl e fact1bu t in the tionary terrorist organisation existed in Ausÿ
light of the many reservations and qualificaÿ tralia. But there was no denial. There was a
tions the report contains it is difficult to see willingness and preparedness to investigate all
what other irrebuttable fact, relating to Ausÿ allegations. And this, as the police report
tralia, is referred to. As I have indicated, indicates, as the departmental submission supÿ
Senator Murphy did not specify what it ports and as the various ASIO reports
referred to.
confirm, was the position at that time.
But the balance of the report, which was And I reiterate again: Why, if the Attorneyÿ
tabled in the Senate, on a day subsequent to General was concerned to prescnt the
the making of Senator Murphy's statement, facts, was no mention whatsoever made of
indicates that, until investigations were made, these specific matters? The AttorneyÿGeneral
the claims of the Yugoslav Government also revealed his partisanship and limited preÿ
could not be the subject of more than initial sentation of the material available to him comment.
For example, the report says: 'We when he chose to quote part, and part only, are not in
a position to comment on the of the initial ASIO assessment of thc aideÿ veracity of all
the claims'. That was relating memoire. I refer to the ASIO document of to allegations
of Australian involvement in 7th September 1972 which he has tabled. organisation and
training of terrorist groups. What he did not refer to was the part of the It says: 'Until
detailed substantiating evidence ASIO report immediately preceding the pasÿ is provided'.
That was relating to individuals' sage which he quoted. What he omitted was alleged
involvement in particular acts. The as follows:
report states: 'This Force has been unable to
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useful assessment of tbe aide memoire. In general which Senator Murphy did not refer. It is a
terms, it would appear that none of the material significant omission. The Commissioner of the
provided would be of any great value as evidence in
a legal sense, but rather that it consists of a series of Commonwealth Police in his report of 17th
allegations requiring investigation.
August 19721tha t was one of the tabled

He committed the cardinal sin of quoting out documents1describe d it as one of a number
of context. The police report concluded by of disturbing aspects. Maybe the susceptiÿ
stating that a detailed list of specific questions bilities of the AttorneyÿGeneral were offended
was being prepared for clarification by the when he learned that there was a police suspiÿ
Yugoslav authorities. And the ASIO report cion of one or more Yugoslav agents provoÿ
indicated that inquiries had been instituted in cateurs. What was omitted from his statement
an effort to establish the international links, was the police comment on the aideÿmemoire
the nature of organisational support, the oriÿ assertions of the existence of a secret terrorist
gins of the initiation and planning of the Bosÿ organisation HIRO. In respect of this a proseÿ
nian raid and the location of any possible cution for possession of explosives was and is
military training. Yet when all the police still to be heard in Victoria. I quote from he
searches, the investigations, the interrogations report of 17th August:
and the inquiries and translations of seized There are a number of disturbing aspects, particuÿ
documents had been completed what did the larly in relation to one of the 4 allied conspirators, police
report? They reported1an d as I have Ivan Mudrinic. This force has received information said,
from a number of sources that Mudrinic was in the
because of the dissolution of Parliament,
pay of the Yugoslav ConsulateÿGeneral, Melbourne.
it was not a report which came to me1tha t This gives rise to the suspicion that he played the
the allegations of a secret terrorist organisaÿ role of agent provocateur in the matter of the Warÿ
burton explosives cache and, in fact, possibly in relaÿ
tion must be continued to be taken seriously. tion
to the constitutional documents of HIRO. These
And this, of course, was no more and no less documents appear to be almost a text book example
of prima facie evidence of illegal associations under
than what they had said in August.
section 30 of the Commonwealth Crimes Act.
All allegations of terrorism and terrorist
It niswhy
diflicult
at this juncture'
see any
viable
the Bosnian
inciden to
group
would
be
organisations
must
be taken
And creas
they
were taken
seriously.
Whatseriously.
was avaihble
o
it
f

arrying such documents, which n view of their

was the allegation. But to say that X or the X apparent lack of relevance to anywhere except Ausÿ
organisation is terrorist is not proof that he tralia, would be an unnecessary burden. It is possible or it
is1an y more than to say that X is a that the Yugoslav authorities .may have obtained
copies through Mudrinic or possible other informants
murderer is to establish that he is. And what in Australia. In view of the pending trial of
I have said is a fundamental aspect of our Mudrinic et al, any enquiries which might overtly
civil liberties. We value certain rights as part suggest an agent provocateur would prejudice the
of our free society. And one of them is that a Crown case. The matter is therefore the subject of
discreet inquiry.
person accused of a crime is obliged to be
and is entitled to be tried in a court, under I repeat that Senator Murphy did not refer to
due process of law, and not to be judged this allegation. Why? Surely it is relevant in
criminal simply on the assertion of a policeÿ any assessment of whether the aUegations of
man, a foreign government or an Attorneyÿ Croatian nationalist organisations being terÿ
General. Arising out of the many allegations rorist organisations are justified. Surely it
in the aideÿmemoire the final police report of raises questions as to whether the sweeping
23rd November recommended only that one condemnation of the Croatian migrant comÿ
Jure Marie was implicated with an munity is justified. The real point about this
unidentified Croatian nationalist organisation matter is whether the organisation known as
which the report stated 'apparently existed in HIRO exists. If it does, has any part been
Australia and which has been engaged in an played by the Yugoslav authorities themselves
attempt to overthrow the recognised Governÿ in respect of its creation or existence?
ment of Yugoslavia'. There was no credible Obviously the police have their suspicion.
evidence of the other allegations, and no
The suspicion to which the police report
prosecutions eventuated.
gave expression is certainly a view held bya
The police reports taken together reveal the number of Croatians. These allegations of
facts and they present a vastly different picÿ agents provocateurs, of which I readily conÿ
ture from that which was presented by the cede there was no credible evidence to enable
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passed on their views to me last year. Cerÿ ment. Is it because it supports the allegation
tainly there are Croatians who regard their of an agent provocateur to which the Comÿ
troubles in Australia as having been fomented monwealth Police referred in their report of
by Yugoslav secret police in Australia. The 17th August?
AttorneyÿGeneral would be aware of these
I consider it my duty, as the Attorneyÿ
allegations. He would also be aware of the General has not done, to raise the question as
ASIO appreciations, of worldwide assessment to the extent to which Croatian nationalists made
by other nations' agencies, and the are properly to be regarded as suspects in a
information possessed and suspicions held by number of unresolved incidents. I say, withÿ
the Commonwealth Police. And yet he has out making any conclusion on the matter,
not referred to any part of this in his stateÿ that these allegations ought to have been
ment. He ought to have been frank with the placed alongside all the other allegations and
Senate and the Australian people.
assertions which Senator Murphy made in his
The AttorneyÿGeneral has not tabled a statement. If he says he is proposing to give
number of documents which raise, as they the facts he should give all the facts and not
ought to raise in the mind of any scrupulous only some of them. What the Australian
AttorneyÿGeneral, the questions of whether or people are looking for is not only the truth
not there are agents provocateurs in Australia but the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
and whether they have been involved in any and an AttorneyÿGeneral should aid them and
of the incidents attributed to Croatian terrorÿ not hinder and mislead them in that quest.
ists. I received an ASIO appreciation shortly
I turn now to the claim that the Sydney
after 29tb August 1972 in which reference bombings of 16th September 1972 highlighted
was made to the activity of the Yugoslav the question of Croatian terrorism. Why? It
intelligence service in Australia in an effort to may be that these bombings were the work of
penetrate and fragment emigre organisations politically motivated Croatians. It may be that
and to sow distrust so that the Croatian they were the work of Croatians not politically
emigres would be unable or unwilling to act motivated. They may have been the work
as a cohesive antiÿregime body. Reference was of any Australian, immigrant or otherwise,
also made to the beliefs held in emigre and who had some criminal objective to pursue
security intelligence circles as to the techÿ or, they may have been the action of an
niques which bave been used by the Yugoslav agent provocateur. We do not know.
authorities and the anticipation as to the
.actions which might be expected in this
That it was terrorist in character is unquesÿ
country by Yugoslav authorities. It was tioned. But noÿone has been charged and
stressed that no hard evidence was held to supÿ police investigations have still not revealed port
these beliefs. This is a document availÿ material upon which a prosecution may be able to
the AttorneyÿGeneral. It would be made. The ASIO in an assessment dated 19th unreasonable to
suppose he has not seen it. September 1972 expressed the view that there He did not table it.
Again I challenge the was nothing to link the 2 bomb explosions AttorneyÿGeneral to say why he
chose to and a hijacking of a Swedish plane which ignore its implications. occurred on
the previous day to any invesÿ tigations of Croatian terrorist activities. They
Another document not tabled deals more expressly left open the possibility that some
specifically with the alleged implication of form of organisation may yet prove to exist. I
the Yugoslav Consulate with the as yet shall table the assessment I received from
unheard trial relating to the cache of exploÿ ASIO1 a document available to Senator
sives and documents discovered in the Warÿ Murphy which again he did not table. I chalÿ
burton Ranges. I specify the document as a lenge him to say why this document was not
letter to the Secretary of the Attorneyÿ tabled.
General's Department dated 29th August 1972.
1 do not say anything more about the contents
The distortions I have pointed to in Senator
of the document because it purports to relate Murphy's statement are founded on a comÿ
conversations with named persons employed parison of what Senator Murphy said and the
by the Yugoslav Government. But Senator material he had available to him and to which
Murphy knows the gravity and the relevance he either gave no weight or which he declined
of the information it contains. Yet he did not to disc.'ose in any way. His statements and the
take it into account in any way in his stateÿ allegations he founds upon those statements
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are not only improperly based, they are held a Press conference when questions could
dishonestly presented. It is a biased and selecÿ be asked of me and answered. I said, in full
tive presentation of facts. The AttorneyÿGenÿ and frank detail:
eral has misled the Senate and the people of
Commonwealth Police have investigated allegations
Australia by making a statement, tabling docÿ
re
by the
the use
Australian
Broadcasting
Commission
oncerning
of premises
at the rear
of a shop
uments and ignoring and concealing material c ported
which may exculpate those whom he traÿ in Shannon Avenue, Geelong and that Croatian men
duces. This is injustice and when the weight and youths met in Geelong and proceeded to
of parliamentary privilege is also placed on different parts of the You Yang mountains for trainÿ
ing. There is no evidence to support the claim that
of more than 30 men met in the shop or
the scales against the persons who are groups
traÿ
duced the justification on him who does it is slept in the shed in the backyard of a house behind
so much the greater. But what injustice is the shop. Both the Victoria Police and the Commonÿ
caused if the persons who are vilified and wealth Police are satisfied these allegations are not
true. Other allegations reported have been invesÿ
convicted by parliamentary accusation are not tigated and no evidence to support them has been
even aware1le t alone able to have access found.
to1documents , information and material
which, if it may not declare them innocent, Specifically1
raises that reasonable doubt which is the corÿ 'Press reports that a woman said that Yugoslavs
often spent weekends at a You Yangs farmhouse
nerstone of our criminal law.
have not been borne out by investigation.
Reports of shooting noises and gunfire in the
Is it too weak to describe Senator Murphy's
arare expla nable
i by the fac tha
t , there
t
ea
is a rifle
ange
in the area used by the
conduct as inexcusable? It is, surely, the more r
r eputable Australian
Sporting Shooters Association.
reprehensible when, in addition to tabling
The local President of the Shooters Association
documents containing rumour, suspicion and
unverified allegation, he permits a roving has stated that the presence of 40 or more men on
. the You Yang rifle range was common and had no
connection with political matters. The Association
expedition to the media and the public to
print and say what they please1wit h absolute
has conducted both day and night firing exercises
for the last 14 years.
privilege concerning the individuals named in
Local
police in the area have reported that no
the parliamentary documents. It is a denial of
complaints
relating
to 'groups of armed migrants' has
fundamental human values which this country
have ever been received by them.
long cherished1an d for which, I hope,
Local
inquiries
elicited
no military
aining
of the
ty ephave
alleged
in athat
new
r report
the lack of challenge over so many years has
tr could
s pap
have possibly
been carried out
ine the You
not weakened our firm desire to sustain.
Yangs area without it becoming a matter of public

knowledge. The You Yangs are a highly popular tal
Senator Murphy's statement is a monumenÿ
recreation area used by sporting bodies and the
misrepresentation. He accuses the former
general public. It is also used for motor sports
Government1an d its predecessors1o f defeaÿ
including car trials and rallies, some of which are
conducted after dark.'
tism and lack of initiative. Nothing is further
from the truth. And Senator Murphy knows
from the records available to him what the It is apparent that inquiries conducted by the
C
o
li
truth is. Yet he denies it by his refusal to pommonwealth p lice and the rVictoria po ce have
roduced the same result. The e is no evidence to
acknowledge what occurred. He conceals it substantia et reports and allegations' of Croatian miliÿ
tary
training activities in the You Yang area.
by withholding from the Senate documents of
undoubted relevance. He knows1bu t he did
This is not the mark of irresponsible indifferÿ
not acknowledge it1tha t the pattern of police ence. It is the mark of concern and willingness
investigations, of ASIO intelligence assessÿ to test every allegation that is made. Senator
ments and an active pursuing of all leads and Murphy must know, because the material is
information was maintained at all times. available to him, of the detailed investigations
Everything the police heard was investigated. which occurred. And yet he chose to ignore
Everything I heard or received was invesÿ them. I had stressed many times in many places
tigated. Newspaper stories were investigated, in 1972 the strongest denunciation of terrorism
journalists were interviewed and, from the of any description. Violence of any kind is to
information obtained, what was able to be be deplored. And I knew that, in what I said,
investigated was investigated. I detail, for I had the full support of my colleagues in
example, what I said on 20th July 1972 in government. I had constantly reiterated the

Croatian Terrorism

4 APRIL 1973

Croatian Terrorism

805

or subversive activities1t o be carried out gent as practicable. He should know, if he
either in this country or overseas1
the y would has inquired, that this was a matter on which
not be tolerated. As far as the Government I had
requested the AttorneyÿGeneral's
was able it would put a stop to them. And Department to prepare a submission for my
numerous steps were taken, apart from consideration as a uniform laws project to be
requiring and ensuring that police and other presented to the Standing Committee of investigations
were maintained.
AttorneysÿGeneral. Naturally, this is a matter
Senator Murphy must know, for the docuÿ falling within State responsibilities. Senator ments
he tabled reveal it, that the earlier surÿ Murphy should know of the work of the
veillance and other lawful activities of the Central Crime Intelligence Bureau and its
Commonwealth police and other police forces special interest in criminal activities within
were effective1s o effective that the organisaÿ migrant communities. He knows or should
tion known as the Croatian Revolutionary know of steps initiated to review the effecÿ
Brotherhood virtually disbanded and ceased tiveness of the Commonwealth Police Force.
to exist by 1967. One organisation reasonably He should know of steps taken to improve
suspected in those days of possible complicity liaison between police forces.
in or preparedness to assist acts of violence I have mentioned these matters because
against the Yugoslav Government therefore they refute the portrayal of apathy and disinÿ
ceased to be a cause for concern. And this is terest which Senator Murphy so selectively
what all the subsequent assessments of the sought to create. Senator Murphy has claimed
Commonwealth agencies confirm. Whether, as that ASIO described the attitude of my predeÿ
police reports of 23rd November 1972 cessor Mr Hughes and, thereafter, Mr N. H .
received by Senator Murphy after he became Bowen and myself, as indifferent to the probÿ
AttorneyÿGeneral suggest, the body has been lem of Croatian terrorism. This, for my part
revived is for Senator Murphy to determine. and on the part of my predecessors I entirely
But if he has evidence he has an obligation to repudiate. The statement emanating from
take action.
ASIO, which Senator Murphy declared subseÿ
Senator Murphy knows, or ought to know, quently by an answer to a question to have
that in conjunction with the Department of come from the DirectorÿGeneral himself, is a
Foreign Affairs an interdepartmental commitÿ curious selfÿserving statement. Its significance
tee to consider existing legislation and pracÿ would not be lost on the AttorneyÿGeneral.
tice in Australia in the detection and counterÿ Yet it was not associated with the same
ing of terrorist activities was established. It strength, priority or vehemence of expression
was to consider, as I indicated to Mr Bowen which has characterised the other condemnaÿ
as Foreign Minister in a letter of 16th tions in his statement. Are we to believe that
October 1972,. a conspectus of Commonÿ a man who has never previously complained,
wealth and State and territorial laws having a now, in the extraordinary atmosphere which bearing on
terrorist activities1no t only with the AttorneyÿGeneral by his raid on ASIO a view to
ascertaining whether Australian law has
created, suddenly discovers
an was adequate
to deal with terrorism, but also
indifference in the former AttorneysÿGeneral? to
ascertain what changes would be required
For my part, I had numerous conferences
to give effect to any new international treaties
and
discussions with the DirectorÿGeneral of
and obligations. Senator Murphy must know,
Security.
Senator Murphy should have known,
because it was public knowledge and the
material is available to him, of the efforts for the information must be available to him,
which the Government made to persuade the that on 27th September I summoned a conÿ United
ference of the DirectorÿGeneral of Security,
Nations General Assembly to take a
strong and positive stand against terrorism the Commissioner of Commonwealth Police
and senior officers of the AttorneyÿGeneral's
throughout the world.
Department to consider amongst other things
Senator Murphy must know because the more effective means of liaison, investigation
AttorneyÿGeneral's Department has the mateÿ and dissemination of intelligence relating to
rial which I asked to be prepared, of the allegations and counterÿallegations of Yugosÿ
summary of laws throughout Australia relatÿ lav terrorism. The document which I shall
ing to the storing and acquisition of gelignite. table indicates not a picture of indifference
I i
f
d
i
h
b
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best possible position to provide the Prime Senator Murphy, which I mention only
Minister and Cabinet with assessments of because they were specific and ought to be
intelligence relating to terrorist activities in answered. They also are the results of slanted
Australia. The document, which is a submisÿ and selective presentation of material. He
sion by the Secretary of the AttorneyÿGenÿ states, for example, that, on 19th September,
eral's Department approved by me on 6th I had claimed in the Senate that the allegaÿ
tions of the President and Prime Minister of
October 1972, states:
The purpose of this minute is to seek your formal Yugoslavia had been proved as allegations
approval to the arrangements agreed on at the disÿ without basis. He contends that this was conÿ
cussion you had with Mr Barbour and myself on trary to the 'core of almost irrebuttable fact'
27th September last for a group to be established to which was an expression contained in the
coÿordinate intelligence and investigations relating to preliminary assessment by the Commonwealth
politically motivated acts of violence.
The coÿordination group is to consist of a senior Police of the Yugoslav Government's aideÿ
officer of this Department who will be in charge of memoire. But what he omits and it is the
the group, a senior oflicer of the Commonwealth fact, is that the debate in the Senate was
Police Force and a senior officer of ASIO.
about statements which had been made by
After setting out the functions of the group President and Prime Minister prior to the
aideÿmemoire being received. These stateÿ
the document records:
ments were part of the subject matter of
In accordance with your requirements the group
will make frequent and regular reports on at least a Senator Murphy's motion which was being daily
debated. And the Commonwealth Police
basis to yourself.

report of 17th August had confirmed that If
the
DirectorÿGeneral of Security is these broad allegations were without basis1
a s
accurately reported by the AttorneyÿGeneral, subsequently the allegations in the aideÿ
he has a curious idea of 'indifference'. The memoire about specific bases and training
group was established for one reason, and camps were said to lack viable evidence.
that reason was that as a Government we
were not prepared to tolerate violence or terÿ But the quotations and imputations which
rorism and any step to further our determiÿ Senator Murphy chose to make are contrived
nation was worth while. I shall also table, an to create a different impression from what the
earlier document, being a memorandum to record shows. And this, of course, appears to
me by the Secretary of the AttorneyÿGeneral's be the quite deliberate pattern of what
Department headed 'Yugoslav Migrant Probÿ Senator Murphy said. Senator Murphy
lems and Related Matters' dated 29th August accused me of being an active protector of
1972, concerning the need for a thorough terrorists. It is a charge unsupported by eviÿ
appraisal to be made of troubles in the dence and absolutely unwarranted. It derives
Yugoslav community in Australia and for from the letter I forwarded to the Minister
improving liaison between the various Comÿ for Immigration which last week was incorÿ
monwealth agencies. The memorandum I porated in Hansard. To that letter I then and
table was in response to initiatives which I now fully adhere. Zdenko Marincic was a
had taken and I refer to them only to estabÿ convicted person. That he was a person who
lish that, if Senator Murphy had wished to do must be taken either to have been prepared to so,
he could have acknowledged them himÿ engage in violence overseas or to support the self. It
was from this appraisal and subseÿ violent acts of others I plainly acknowledged. quent
consideration that the coÿordinating But he had committed no act of violence in group on
politically motivated acts of vioÿ Australia and in my opinion, to deport a perÿ lence was
eventually established in the Attorÿ son to such a country where he will be perÿ neyÿGeneral's
secuted for his political opposition to the
Department.
Government of that country is not my conÿ
But these are all matters to which Senator cept of how an Australian Government Murphy
makes no reference. The documents should act1o r of how the Australian people were
available to him but were excluded. would expect it to act. I do not know how They
demonstrate, as almost all of what I any AttorneyÿGeneral with a sense of justice have said
today demonstrates, that the and a respect for human values could have vilification in
which Senator Murphy has taken a different view.
engaged was derived from a highly selective,
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AttorneyÿGeneral's Department to be relieved questions the statement does not answer. It is
of his duties because of some supposed refusal a statement for which the AttorneyÿGeneral
to accept bis advice. If he was relieved, must carry the shame of the Australian
and 1 do not know that he was, it was an nation that it was ever made.
internal decision of the Department. It was
The PRESIDENT1Order ! Senator Greenÿ
not mine. In any event the officer whom I wood, you indicated to me that you wished to
identify as the one allegedly relieved was table some documents. Do you seek leave to
communicating with my office, as my records table the documents?
reveal, on Croatian matters at the end of
Senator GREENWOOD1Yes . I seek leave
October. Senator Murphy must know the
facts1bu t he has chosen again, not to state to table the documents which I said in the
them but to leave the matter open for innuÿ course of my statement I would table.
endo and assumption. I also say, to illustrate
The PRESIDENT1I s leave granted? There
the character of the case sought to be made, being no objection, leave is granted.
that
the
opinion I
expressed
as
Senator GREENWOOD1 I table those
AttorneyÿGeneral on the question of the grant
documents which are as follows:
of a passport to Jure Marie, which was in
1. Croatian
13th April Nationalism
19721
ASI Oand
Appreciation
headed:
Politically
Motiv
any event refused, by the responsible Minisÿ
ated
ter, namely the Minister for Immigration,
was
V 'iolence in Australia'.
not included in the tabled documents. I
M emorandu m by the Secreÿ
2. 29th August 19721
retained my copy of my notation on fhe 3ÿ tary of the AttorneyÿGenera
l's Department headed:
'Yugoslav Migrant Problems and related matters'.
page submission dated 6th July, wherein I
3. 19th September 19721
ASI O note headed:
expressed my views and acknowledged comÿ
'Recent Events in the field of Croatian Nationalÿ
pletely that the decision was for the Minister
ism and Politically Motivated Violence'.
for Immigration. Why the departmentally
noted copy of a 2ÿpage submission dated 4th of 4. 4th t October 19721Submissio nt by the: Secretary
the A torneyÿGeneral's Departmen headed
July and never presented to me was tabled I
'Coÿordinating Group on Politically Motivated
am unable to say.
Acts of Violence
'.
(approved by AttorneyÿGeneral, 6th October 1972)

In conclusion I say that Senator Murphy's
5. 19th October 19721
Commonwealt h Police Subÿ
statement should never have been made. It m ission to the Se cretary of the AttorneyÿGeneral's
was made in a highly charged atmosphere of Department headed:
'Parliamentary Question1Croatia n Nationalist
unprecedented acts1o f raids on security
Activities'.
headquarters by Commonwealth Police, of
intensive house searches, of massive security
Senator JAMES McCLELLAND (New
precautions. In this atmosphere, charges have South Wales) (4.1)1I t is a great pity that
been made contrary to the usual processes to Senator Greenwood did not wait until after
which we are accustomed and a whole last weekÿend to compose his speech, or at
migrant community is virtually accused of least he was not adroit enough to make a few
guilt1becaus e every Croatianÿborn citizen amendments to it after the events of last
tends to be regarded as a potential criminal. weekÿend. Otherwise, presumably, he would
It is alien to our traditions and the not have brought himself to say:
AttorneyÿGeneral's statement has done
Above all else, he11
nothing to allay the widespread fears and referring to the present AttorneyÿGeneral
concern to which expression has been given.
(Senator Murphy)1
The statement accuses organisations of has refused to prosecute anybody or any organisation
being terrorists, of being recruiting grounds, for any criminal activity of any kind.
of being umbrella organisations for terrorists. I am perfectly aware1
an d I will keep well
But is there credible evidence to sustain those within your ruling, Mr President1tha t these
accusations? If there is none he has monÿ charges against these particular people are sub
strously maligned and condemned a group of judice and I will make no comment at all
Australian citizens who have no redress and upon their guilt or otherwise. But surely, I am
who will long bear the scars of his action. permitted to say that Senator Greenwood's
But if he has the evidence why has he not statement is already out of date, because we,
used the courts? Why has he chosen the Parÿ as a government, have done within 4 months
liament to present a slanted and highly prejuÿ what his Government and its predecessors did
di i l di
i
f h
h h
h
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new incentive scheme to encourage and assist year. The task force has reported back to the
exports. That scheme has been under exarrunÿ IDC which is composed of interested departÿ
ation. Industry people have been consulted and ments. The task force was charged with the reÿ
have made comments. There has also been an sponsibility of investigating the allegations,
Industries Assistance Commissionrepon looking keeping firmly in mind the traditional rights and
into the expon market development grants traditional movements of people from Papua
scheme as well as other expon incentives. All New Guinea in the Torres Strait area. The interÿ
these matters are being considered by the departmental committee is at the present time
Government and until they are resolved I am not considering the report of the task force. The
in a position to make any funher comment. As response to that report has not yet come to me,
soon as the matter has beenfinalisedby the but the initial investigationsshowthatthemoveÿ
Government, an announcement will be made in ments referred to by the honourable member are
not considerable.
this House.
TRANSPORT PLANNINGAND
INTEREST RATES
RESEARCH
Mr BARRY JONESÿI direct my question to
the Treasurer. Is it a fact that the Reserve Bank Mr NIXON (GippslandÿMinister for has
Fo r the information of honourable
been pushing down forward margins on the Transport),
United States dollar below the relative differenÿ members I present a report prepared by the Deÿ
tial between interest rates in Australia and partment of Transport entitled 'The Transport
interest rates in the United States? Is the present (Planning and Research) Act 1974 Report of
margin unrealistically low and is it intended to Progress to 30 June 1977'. The report was
reduce it funher? Is the Reserve Bank pushing produced at the request of State authorities and
down forward margins in order to bring the Ausÿ provides an example of the coÿoperation beÿ
tralian dollar to parity with the United States tween State and Commonwealth which is being
dollar? If so, does this indicate that the Governÿ achieved under the Act.
ment wishes to establish an open foreign
COMPENSATION: COMMONWEALTH
exchange market in Austraha?
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Mr HOWARD,O n a number of occasions, in
Mr HUNT (GwydirÿMinister for Health)ÿ
response to questions and also through stateÿ Pursuant to section 122 of the Compensation
ment, I have provided to this House and to the (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act
community generally, a description and explaÿ 1971 I present the annual report of the Comÿ
nation of the current management of the Ausÿ missioner for Employees Compensation for the
tralian exchange rate. Frankly, I have nothing to yearended 30 June 1977.
add to those descriptions.
ENVIRONMENT
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
Mr GROOM (BraddonÿMinister for
Mr SHIPTONÿI direct a question to the Minÿ Environment, Housing and Community ister
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs concernÿ Development),
Fo r the information of honourÿ ing
illegal immigration to Nonhern Austraha. Is able members I present the summary report of the
Minister aware that numbers of Papua New
the sixth meeting of the Council of Nature Conÿ
Guinea citizens are overÿstaying their traditional, servation Ministers, Cairns, 29 July 1977, and
normal and usual visits to Australia and have the summary record of proceedings of the ninth
settled permanently in northern Australia, parÿ meeting of the Australian Environment Council,
ticularly in Queensland? Has the Minister's Deÿ Canbena, 11 August 1977.
partment investigated this matter? Does the Minÿ
DCROATIAN EMBASSY'
ister have an estimate of how many such people
are overÿstaying in Australia? Have they come to
Ministerial Statement
Australia under any special anangements?
Mr PEACOCK (KooyongÿMinister for
Mr MacKELLARÿThis matter was brought Foreign Affairs),b y leave, I wish to make clear
to my attention last year. Following that, I conÿ the Government's position with respect to the
sulted Ministers of other interested depanments creation of establishments, institutions or organÿ
and an interdepartmental committee was set up isations which can, because of the diplomatic terÿ
to look at the impUcations ofthe question. A task minology used, result in substantial difficulties in
force was established and that task force AustraUa's relations with other countries and
journeyed to Thursday Island in the Torres Strait impede the operations of Australia's foreign polÿ
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wellÿbeing of the nation. This is particularly so destruction of a state in friendly relations with
whensuchan establishment is referredto as an Australia but which also arrogates to itself an unÿ
'embassy'. Australia is a party to the Vienna acceptable title and status which could in turn
Conventionon Diplomatic Relations.That conÿ disrupt the orderly conduct of Australia's relaÿ
vention, in article 22,
whic h has the force of law tions with another universally recognised
in AustraUa,
impose s on Australia a special duty member of the international community. This
to prevent any impairment of the dignity of a could clearly have a substantial adverse effect on
diplomatic mission accredited to this country. It our international standing, the conduct of
is not a matter which can be dealt with in any Australia's foreign policy and our national
sense of compromise. It is a matter of our interÿ interest, thus affecting all AustraUans.
national obligations and the domestic law which
It can scarcely be maintained that the setting
gives effect to these obligations. I need hardly
u
add that this would not apply to such estabUshÿ i p of a soÿcalled Croatian Embassy is not an
ments as the soÿcalled Aboriginal Embassyas it mpairment of the dignity of the diplomatic
did not affect the standing of any other nation mission which in law, and in fact, represents
Yugoslavia in this country. It is of no less concern
with which Australia has diplomatic relations.
that the unauthorised establishment of this soÿ
It has not been necessary in the past to treat called Embassy interferes with the exercise ofthe
this matter as one for legislative action. Howÿ executive power of the Commonwealth to conÿ
ever, this has now become necessary because of duct Australia's international relations. The
the establishment in Canberra late last yearof a Government is thus deeply concerned lest other
soÿcalled Croatian Embassy. It is becausethe esÿ minority groups may be inspired by the conÿ
tablishment of the soÿcalled Embassy has had tinued existence of the selfÿstyled Croatian Emÿ
important ramifications for Australia,ramifica ÿ bassy to believe that they, too, may similarly
tions with respect to the Vienna Convention, interfere in and jeopardise Australia's relations
Australia's responsibilities under it, the effective with sovereign states. Furthermore, it has been a
operation of Australia's foreign policy, and our longstanding poUcy of AustraUan governments
longÿstanding relations with a universally recogÿ to oppose the importation into Australia of alien
nised nation, namely Yugoslavia,tha t the political and racial feuds. The Government is
Government now feels it necessary to consider also concerned about the aggravation of tension
legislation to put an end to this anomaly and to between certain ethnic groups.
guard against any recurrence.
At this stage let me make it quite clear thatit is
I therefore wish to set out the Government's
not in any way the Government's wish to disÿ
position with regard to this matter. The soÿcalled criminate against the Croatian commumty or to
Croatian Embassy has been set up in Canberra stop, or hinder, members of that community
by certain persons who may or may not be fully forming their own groups and clubs where these
aware of the serious impUcations of their actions, are not aimed at a state and government with
which impede the correct and orderly conduct of which AustraUa has normal diplomatic relations.
Australia's international relations, for which I The overwhelming majority of the Croatian
am directly responsible. It is therefore necessary community in Australia has shown, byits contriÿ
that I now make clear to this House beyond any bution to the development of Australian society
possibility of doubt the Government's views and and culture, a strong loyalty and commitment to
intentions on this matter. These are in short that its new homeland. It is an affront to this loyalty
an establishment such as the soÿcalled Croatian and commitment that a soÿcalled Croatian Emÿ
Embassy is damaging to the national interest and bassy should purport to represent them. The
that such an estabUshment cannot therefore be proper international representative of the
tolerated.
interest of AustraUans of Croatian, as of other,
Yugoslavia acceded to independence in the origins is the AustraUan Government and no one
context of the postÿWorld War I settlement, to else.
which Australia was a party. AustraUa has longÿ
The only course of action for the authors of
standing and friendly relations with that country. this enterprise is for them to abandon it forthwith
By mutual agreement many people from and revert to the means by which dissent may be
Yugoslavia have settled in AustraUa. This has peacefully asserted within the law as it prevails
strengthened our ties. We respect Yugoslavia's in our society. In order to leave no doubt of the
sovereignty. The Government cannot therefore seriousness with which this matter is being
view with indifference an attempt to establish regarded, and consistent with the provisions of
and maintain on AustraUan territory any organÿ article 22 of the Vienna Convention I wish to
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introduce legislation specifically prohibiting Cabinet since then. I leave the matter there. The
institutions or bodies falsely representing themÿ point, I believe, has been adequately made.
selves as diplomatic, consular or other official
However, I will relate a few simple facts
missions of another country or part of another associated with this matter. The 'Croatian Emÿ
country. Such action is essential not only to bassy', as it is called, was opened on 29
remove the anomaly which has already been November last year. It has taken something like
created, but lest the practice of establishing soÿ four months to obtain this firmness of attitude
called embassies be extended thus jeopardising from the Minister. In that intervening period it
Australia's foreign relations and national has become quite clear to those about Canberra
interest. The Government does not believe that who have contacts and who are concerned about
the Australian community would support the esÿ these matters that relations between Yugoslavia
tablishment of organisations so obviously to the and Australia have become increasingly strained
detriment of this nation. I present the following and were reaching the point of jeopardy as a
paper:
result of the absence of appropriate firm action
'Croatian Embassy',
Ministeria l Statement, 5 April 1978. by the Government.
I remind the House that on 29 November last
Motion (by Mr Fife) proposed:
year when the 'Croatian Embassy' was opened,
That the House take note of the paper.
the opening was graced with official Government
Mr HAYDEN (OxleyÿLeader of the Oppoÿ presence. Senator Knight, formerly of the Deÿ
sition) (3.13),I t is appropriate that the Governÿ partment of Foreign Affairs, and Mr Haslem, of
ment should take firm action on this matter, this House, were present. I think it is reasonable
although it must be conceded that the action to ask, in view of the provocative statements that
comes belatedly and grudgingly. The Minister the Minister for Foreign Affairs has made,
for Foreign Affairs (Mr Peacock) has given a whether their presence at the opening of the emÿ
firm undertaking that legislation will be bassy was with the knowledge of the Governÿ
introduced to give effect to the sentiments he has ment and of the Minister and to what extent they
expressed in his statement. I would wish that he were encouraged or discouraged. But there are
might have more success in the introduction of more important questions to be asked. It is sigÿ
that legislation than he has enjoyed so far in nificant that although the embassy was opened
seeking to introduce legislation to prohibit the well before the last general election, the Minister
operation of the Rhodesian Information Office in did not find his way clear to make a statement on
this country. Honourable members will recall the matter until well after the election, nearly
that Security Council resolution 409/77 coÿ four weeks later. Presumably he was waiting
sponsored by the United States of America, until the Croatian vote had beensafely counted.
proposed among other things that member
Mr Hodgman,
Ho w debased you are.
nations should take action to close down
Rhodesian Information Offices. This Governÿ Mr HAYDENÿThe Minister for Foreign ment
gave a firm undertaking to the Australian Affairs,
people last year that that would be done. The Mr SPEAKERÿOrder! The Leader ofthe Opÿ
right wing rump of the Government, which is position will resume his seat. The honourable
large and even greater in its influence on the member for Denison will withdraw that remark.
Government,
Mr Hodgman, I withdraw it, Mr Speaker.
Mr SPEAKERÿOrder! The motion is to take
Mr HAYDEN,
Th e Minister for Foreign
note of a paper about legislation in relation to orÿ Affairs has attracted no stature to his presence by
ganisations declaring themselves to be embassies the way in which he has handled this matter. He
when that is not the fact. The honourable gentleÿ has been tardy and unimpressive. His final
man can make statements relevant to that action, the statement to the House today, comes,
motion but not to an entirelydifferent subject.
as I said before, grudgingly and belatedly and is
Mr HAYDENÿMr Speaker, I submit that a clear indication that action was finally what I
am proposing is that on the Minister's extracted, I stress extracted,fro m the Governÿ record
so far we have no reason to feel reassured ment, not because it felt it should act as a matter that he
will be successful in introducing the sort of principle or because it felt the burden of its
oflegislation that is required here. In the case of responsibilities internationally under the Vienna
the Rodesia Information Office he has been conÿ Convention which the Minister has quoted, but
h b
i hd b
d b d l
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indicating to him that he is engaging in conduct
government they adopt another. Then they try to
lay the blame on the shoulders of the Federal
considered by me to be contrary to the Act. I
Labor Party, which Senator Webster said was have told him that unless that conduct, which inÿ
not concerned with the interests of people in priÿ cludes the display of the sign 'Croatian Emÿ
mary industry. I think that our record stands secÿ bassy', a flag and a shield, is discontinued within
ond to none and shows that we are concerned 14 days after today and undertakings are given
with the problems of primary industry. When we that it will not reÿoccur, an application will be
get into government again at the end of next year made to the Federal Court of Australia for inÿ
the people out in the country areas will throw up junctions preventing that conduct from continuÿ
their hats and say: 'Three cheers for the Labor
ing. There have been indications that Mr
Party'.
Despoja does not wish to engage in activities
which are contrary to the Act and is seeking to
Senator CAVANAGH (South Australia)
make representations on them. If this is so, I shall
(5.43)1 I want to take only a few minutes in this
be willing to examine these representations
third reading debate. In view of the way that the
within the next 14 days. Needless to say, i f Mr
debate is going, I hope that we do not have
Despoja ceases to engage in activities contrary to
another turmoil similar to that which we have the Act and undertakes not to engage in them
had in the past on such occasions. I think it is
further, no injunction proceedings will be
very unfortunate that the Minister for Science
necessary.
and the Environment (Senator Webster) has
adopted the attitude he has. One of the first The Government's decision to pursue this
things to learn on joining the Ministry is that, matter should not in any way be interpreted as
whilst it might be nice to answer statements an act of discrimination against the Croatian
made by the Opposition, one's duty as a Minister community. The Government has no wish to stop
is to get Bills through the Parliament. Although or hinder members of the Croatian community
Senator Webster might gain some satisfaction forming their own clubs, groups or associations.
from adopting the attitude he has adopted, in The Croatian community has, and continues to
doing that he is not carrying out his duty as a demonstrate it by its contribution to the developÿ
Minister of getting his Bills through the Parliaÿ ment of Australian society and culture, a strong
ment. Those Bills would have been passed by loyalty
and commitment to its new homeland
now had he not made his aggressive attack. That and the Government welcomes this contribution.
could lead to the irritation of senators, the calling I hope Mr Despoja and those associated with
of quorums, and senators being thrown out ofthe him take advantage of the next 14 days to make
chamber. All that could happen simply because the institution of such proceedings unnecessary.
we have a Minister who is not carrying out what I
believe is the duty of a Minister, namely to get
Senator M U L V I H I L L (New South
legislation through this place.
Wales)1b y leave1O n behalf of the Leader of
the Opposition (Senator Wriedt) I simply say
Question resolved in the affirmative.
that the Opposition regards this situation that
Bills read a third time.
besets the Government as one in which a very
fine decision has to be made between liberty and
'CROATIAN EMBASSY'
licence. The AttorneyÿGeneral (Senator Durack)
Ministerial Statement
and I had some experience of this situation in a
Senator DURACK (Western Australiaÿ committee context. Although we may perhaps
differ on emphasis I am sure that we both apÿ
AttorneyÿGeneral)1b y leave1
Becaus e of the
interest shown in the Senate in the activities of preciate the deepÿseated antagonisms that exists the
in the Yugoslav community. The point at issue is
so called 'Croatian Embassy' in Forrest, I inÿ
form the Senate that the Government has deÿ how far certain elements can go in a community.
cided to take action in relation to it under the Any government has to have a foreign policy
that at least observes certain conventions.
Diplomatic and Consular Missions Act.
Senator Georges1Wha t are you going to do,
It could be said that the cultural aspirations of
storm it?
an ethnic community are under siege, but I do
Senator DURACKÿWould the honourable not know of any part of Australia in which
senator like to hear the rest of the statement? Croatian clubs have not proliferated. They have
This afternoon I sent a letter to Mr Mario been approved by councils and State governÿ
Despoja, the self styled 'Charge D'Affairs' of the ments of different political colour. But, that is not
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plain fact is that Yugoslavia is in a unique situÿ important role in that movement for a new interÿ
ation. It is a country which is more or less in beÿ national economic order and for raising the livÿ
tween the Warsaw and North Atlantic Treaty ing standards of all of the people in what can be
Organisation power blocs. I will not elaborate on generally described as Third World nations.
that point. I commend to honourable senators
I think it is a matter of regret that small groups
the statement made some years ago by a former
in our community should seek to establish a posÿ
senator, Senator Wright, when he was the
ition independent from that of the State of
Foreign Affairs spokesman in the Senate for the
Yugoslavia which, after all, suffered greatly durÿ
Liberal Government in which he spelt out in deÿ
ing World War II. In the intervening years it has
tail the situation if there were a fragmentation of
endeavoured, quite successfully I believe, to raise
Yugoslavia. Unfortunately some people have
the living standards of its people. Yugoslavia
sought such an event.
also occupies a very important role in the divided
It is not my purpose, or the Opposition's purÿ Europe that arose at the end of World War II.
pose, to score any political points on this matter. I
We have been aware of the development of
think we are encouraged by the fact that people
terrorist movements that claim to speak on beÿ
who are to the Right have to observe the law in half of the Croatian community. We are aware,
the same way as people who are deemed to be to of course, that these groups do not speak on beÿ
the far Left. On behalf of the Opposition I say half of that community; that in fact the overÿ
that a democrat does not have any satisfaction in whelming majority of Croatians and Yugoslav
having to curb selfÿexpression. However, there is migrants who have come to Australia have
a dividing line. I do not want to stifle debate so I settled and have proved themselves to be good
will conclude my remarks with that point.
citizens willing to accept the democratic and
Senator GIETZELT (New South Wales)ÿby open way in which Australian community life
develops. They do not want to be caught up in
leave1 I move:
the web of international intrigue which unfortuÿ
That the Senate take note ofthe statement.
nately has been part of the movement around the
'Croatian Embassy'.
I wish to endorse the remarks made by Senator
Mulvihill. We allrecognisethat he has played a
We do not, of course, want to go over the
signincant part in resolving the problems difficult days of 1973 when the Prime Minister of
associated with some of the groups that have ocÿ Yugoslavia came to this country as a guest of the
cupied a more than unusual role in recent years Government following an invitation extended by
in endeavouring to divide the Yugoslav comÿ the previous Government during 1971ÿ72. We
munities in our country. I think I can say that the know of the endeavours of a small minority of
Opposition would support the Government's inÿ malcontents who tried to create social tension
tentions in this matter. Legislation on this matter
within the Yugoslav communities and within the
was passed some time ago and we have been
Australian community generally, and all that
awaiting the second stage of the legislative
flowed from that. I think we have waited long
process1
tha t is, for the Government to make a enough for steps to be taken by the Federal
decision to apply the Act, and to call upon those Government to put an end to selfÿstyled embassÿ
who designate themselves as the 'Croatian Emÿ ies that seek to abrogate the right of the official
bassy' to cease activities which relate to our reÿ embassies of governments with which we enjoy
lationship with other countries.
close and friendly relations.
I think it is a matter of great regret that some
I think there has been a very good relationship
of these people have been able to create the imÿ between the Government of Yugoslavia and the
pression in the Australian community that they Australian Government regardless of the
represent a strong view in the Yugoslav comÿ changes in composition of the Australian
munity. In fact they represent a small minority Government, and that is the way it should be. I
view that is associated with an expression of think the Opposition would commend the
nationalism which in itself contradicts the very Government for the steps it has taken in accordÿ
strong trends of federalism that exist in the state
ance with the legislation. The AttorneyÿGeneral
of Yugoslavia. Of course, their view ignores the (Senator Durack) indicated in his statement that
very important role that Yugoslavia is playing in some negotiations will take place with those
developing the bridges between the major people who style themselves as the 'Croatian
powers of the world I refer particularly to the Embassy' As a result of those negotiations the
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Excise Amendment Bill ÿNo. 2)

gains accruing to the production of oil from lowÿ
cost Australian fields, principally those of Bass
Strait, would go to the Australian oil producers,
principally EssoÿBHP. The Government has deÿ
EXCISE AMENDMENT BILL ÿNo. 2) 1979 cided to take a larger share of the revenue itself.
Second Reading
To that extent the Opposition approves of
Debate resumed from 4 June, on motion by what the Government has done, although, for
reasons that I will outline, it would prefer a reÿ
Senator Chaney:
source
tax to apply. The Opposition also has resÿ
That the Bill be now read a second time.
ervations in that clearly this measure, like so
Senator WALSH (Western Australia) many of the measures in the 1978 Budget and (5.55)1Thi s
Bill is also a product of the Fraserÿ the 1979 autumn horror miniÿBudget, will sigÿ Howard
horror miniÿBudget of 24 May. The purÿ nificantly increase the consumer price index and pose of the
Bill is to ensure that any further inÿ ensure that the rate of inflation will continue to creases by
the Organisation of Petroleum rise.
Exporting Countries in oil prices will be passed
on in the prices paid by Australian refiners for It is perhaps nice for Mr Newman that he
domesticallyÿproduced crude oil, but that the adÿ should have managed to score a small victory in
ditional revenue flowing from OPEC price inÿ this matter, given not only his troubles of the last
creases after 1 January 1979 will accrue entirely couple of weeks but also the way in which he has
to the Government instead of, as under the preÿ stumbled along in the shadow of the Australian
vious arrangements, being shared between the Labor Party's shadow Minister in this area, Paul
Government and the Australian crude oil Keating. Mr Newman has been trying desperÿ
producers. The Government estimates that, as a ately to be noticed, while stumbling along in Mr
result of the OPEC 1 April increase of 9.5 per Keating's shadow. Mr Newman has been able to
cent, this measure will raise $ 166m in a full year. point out, apparently, to the Government the
It is widely expected, indeed almost certain, that error in the original legislation. He has certainly
on 1 July there will be a further OPEC price inÿ been noticed now, not so much for pointing out
crease of 10 per cent or thereabouts, so it is probÿ this error but for not being able to hear, or so he
able that over the entire year this measure will tells us, in the House of Representatives. We
yield government revenue of some $320m or have a Ministry in which the Prime Minister (Mr
Malcolm Fraser) cannot remember and Mr
$330m.
Newman cannot hear.
The history of this measure has
demonstratedÿif further demonstration were This measure represents a movement away needed1
ho
w the Government has lost control from the Government's import parity pricing both of the
process of government and of parliaÿ policy, but it is an inferior type of tax to the reÿ mentary
business. The blunder which the source tax which the Australian Labor Party has Government
made was summed up succinctly in long advocated. A resource tax seeks to tax away the current
issue of the Laurie Oakes Report as the pure economic rent component of mineral follows:
and oil deposits. By economic rent I mean any reÿ
turn over and above that necessary to call forth
. . . The National Development Minister, Mr Newman,
the factors of production which would produce
insisted on the amendments1
the desired or existing level of output.
The reference is to amendments which were
Sitting suspended from 6 to 8 p.m.
made after the Bill had been originally
introduced in the House ofRepresentatives1
Senator WALSH1Prio r to the suspension of
after studying the legislation on his return from an overseas the sitting I was saying that in one sense the Opÿ
trip, in an extraordinary blunder, the original legislation proÿ position welcomes this measure insofar as it
vided for all oil fields to be treated in the same way, even ensures that the additional windfall gains which
though the Treasurer, Mr Howard, had said in his expendiÿ
accrue to crude oil producers from low cost Ausÿ
ture and taxation statement to Parliament: 'The implications
of these new levy arrangements on small producers and marÿ tralian fields do so entirely for the public revenue
ginal fields will be kept under reveiw.'
rather than being divided, as was the case under
To some extent the Government, in introducing the previous arrangements, between the Ausÿ
this legislation, has recognised its past errors. It tralian producers and the public revenue; on the
has implicitly recognised the foolish decision1 other hand we have a reservation. That, of
although it fails to acknowledge it, of courseÿ course, is that this measure, like so many other
th t it
d i th 1978 B d t h it d id d measures which were announced a fortnight ago
embarrassment to the Australian Government. I
seek leave to continue my remarks later.
Leave granted; debate adjourned.

